M. I. D.
from FE

322.

8 M.I.2

Canton, China, September 30, 1921.

1921 893.7-9-27

Friction between Canton and Macao.

M.I.2.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

NOTED M.I.C.

753.93315/3

On the afternoon of the 25th instant I received from our Minister at Peking a telegram, a paraphrase of which I have the honor to enclose, advising me of the concern felt by the Portuguese Minister for the safety of the foreign missions at Macao due to the friction existing between the authorities of Macao and of Canton owing to the objection of the latter to the assessing of dues from Chinese fishermen at Lappa, opposite Macao, by the harbor officials. The paraphrase of my reply thereto, made telegraphically, as directed, much against my will due to the totally insufficient allowance made to this office for telegrams, I have also the honor to transmit as well as a copy of my despatch No. 171 of September 29, 1921, reporting as fully as possible on the causes that have led to the strained relations between Macao and Canton, wholly owing to the failure of China and Portugal to deliminate the boundary between the Colony and the mainland. In connection with this question

permit

permit me to refer you to my despatches No. 582 of February 2, 1910, and No. 19 of January 30, 1920, especially to the maps of Macao attached thereto.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

LEO BERGHOLZ

Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram, Mr. Schurman to Mr. Bergholz, September 25, 1921.

2. Telegram, Mr. Bergholz to Mr. Schurman, September 26, 1921.

3. Mr. Bergholz to Mr. Schurman, September 29, 1921.

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A true copy of the signed original
WAR

Enclosure No. 1.

Despatch No. 322 to
the Department.
Canton, China.
September 30, 1921.

1921 261.7-J-21 NOV
WAR DEPARTMENT

Paraphrase of a telegram received from the American Legation at 4.45 p. m., September 25, 1921.

September 25 (1921) 11.00 a. m. Mr. Berghols is informed that the situation between the Portuguese and the Chinese at Macao is causing the Legation of Portugal considerable alarm and he is directed to approach the persons directly concerned in the hope of bringing the friction at present existing to a just conclusion. He is also directed to make every inquiry possible into the cause of the dispute and to advise the Legation promptly of the result of his action.

SCHURMAN

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A true copy of
the original

Enclosure No. 2.

Despatch No. 328 to
the Department.
Canton, China.
September 30, 1921.

Paraphrase of a telegram from Consul General Bergholz, Canton, China, to the American Legation, Peking.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Dated and sent: September 26, 1921, 5.00 p.m.

Gray Code.

Subject: The Macao Fracas.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

American Legation,

Peking, China.

In reply to your telegraphic instruction of September 25, 1921, 11.00 a.m., I have the honor to state that it is my belief that unless the Portuguese are the agressors any danger of an uprising at Macao or of a clash between the Portuguese and Chinese is passed, as the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs here gave his assurances in my presence to the Portuguese Consul General that the Chinese would maintain the status quo. The dispute arose out of the attempt on the part of the Portuguese to collect dues from Chinese fishing vessels on the Lappa side of the inner harbor; an attempt which resulted in an exchange of shots between Chinese soldiers on Lappa and armed harbor police boats of the Portuguese. This resulted in the death of the police boat engineer and one civilian, both of whom were citizens of China. The person regarded as responsible for the fracas is the Assistant Harbor Master of Macao.

I am reporting more fully by mail.

BERGHOLZ

A true copy of the signature in ink

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Enclosure No. 3.

No. 171.

Despatch No. 322 to
the Department.
Canton, China.
September 30, 1921.

893.7611/9-2114

Canton, China, September 29, 1921.

Subject:- Friction between Canton and Macao.

The Honorable

Jacob Gould Schurman,

American Minister,

Peking, China.

Sir:-

Upon the receipt in the afternoon of the 25th instant of your telegram of the same date advising me that the Portuguese Legation was much concerned over the situation at Macao and directing me to make an investigation of the cause of the friction between Canton and Macao and to telegraph the result of my inquiry, I called upon my Portuguese Colleague and informed him that I had been instructed to approach him and the authorities at Canton in the possible hope of arriving at a just and speedy settlement of the questions which had arisen between the Government at Macao and the Canton authorities, wholly due, I may add, to the failure of China and Portugal to deliminate the boundary between the Colony and China which has been a cause of irritation, more or less acute, whether under the Imperial Manchu Government, the Military Government at Canton, or the Republic since 1557 when the Portuguese first settled in Macao.

The

The Portuguese Consul General, Dr. Amadeu da Silva, informed me that on September 16th a large Chinese war junk approached the Harbor of Macao and upon being warned to leave by the Harbor Master continued to the Island of Lappa and landed men who fired on a police patrol boat killing the engineer and wounding three men, all Chinese citizens. The launch returned the fire doing no damage, however. On September 22nd, he stated, a small Chinese torpedo boat entered the Harbor and was ordered to leave which it did but returned on the 24th instant and is now anchored off Lappa Island according to an arrangement entered into between the Commander of the British gun-boat "TARANTULA" and the Governor of Macao, the British Minister at Peking having some ten days ago been requested by his Portuguese Colleague to mediate between Macao and Canton. The Japanese Consul General at Canton has, also, been directed to use his good offices on behalf of Portugal.

In the forenoon of the 26th instant Mr. Luk King Fo, one of the Secretaries of the Foreign Office, who had been sent to Macao to inquire into the complaints of the Chinese fishermen at Lappa, opposite to Macao, called at the Consulate and gave me, briefly, an account of the causes which have led to the somewhat strained relations between Macao and Canton. I informed him of the deep interest the Legation felt in the continuance of friendly relations between China and Portugal and expressed the hope that, especially at this time, the Chinese authorities would do nothing to bring about a severance of relations with Macao. Mr. Luk assured me that Canton would never

initiate

initiate hostilities and would do nothing to provoke the Portuguese or wound their susceptibilities. In the afternoon we met at the Portuguese Consulate General and Mr. Luk, in my presence, renewed to Dr. da Silva the protestations of good will towards Macao on the part of the Foreign Office.

A translation of the report made by Mr. Luk to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to enclose. It differs somewhat from that of the Portuguese Consul General as Mr. Luk's investigation does not declare that a war junk entered the Harbor but that the police patrol in its endeavor to collect fees from Chinese fishing boats anchored on the Lappa side of the Harbor fired upon the soldiers stationed there who, concealing themselves behind the natural defences of the Island, returned the fire with the result above given.

I also have the honor to transmit a report made to me by Mr. W. F. Cary whom I requested, prior to the receipt of your telegram, on his telling me of his intention to visit Macao, to inquire into the trouble. Translations of the proclamations referred to by Mr. Cary will be found attached. They clearly disclose the mental attitude of the authorities upon the arrival of the Chinese torpedo boat.

The present trouble has been brought about by the overzealousness of the Assistant Harbor Master at Macao in collecting fees for licenses from Chinese fishing boats, whether on the Macao side of the channel or on the Lappa side which is under Chinese control. The collection of the dues is not so serious as the manner in which it is

conducted

conducted. Chinese in the employ of Macao are sent out in armed launches to collect dues from Chinese fishing vessels, even when they are drawn up on the Lappa shore to be cleaned and frequently compel both the owners and the vessels to proceed to the Macao side to obtain licenses.

This procedure is seriously objected to by the Chinese authorities on the ground that it contravenes the Treaty of Peking while Macao relies upon the same Treaty in justification of its action. By Article 2 of the Protocol of March 26, 1887, between China and Portugal "China confirms the perpetual occupation and Government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal as any other Portuguese possession" and by Article 2 of the Treaty of Peking of December 1, 1887, "China confirms in its entirety the second article of the Protocol of Lisbon, relating to the perpetual occupation and government of Macao by Portugal" and stipulates that "so long as the delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect to them shall continue as at present, without addition, diminution, or alteration by either of the parties." Portugal insists that at the time of the signing of the Treaty of 1887 Macao exercised jurisdiction over all the waters of Macao, especially within the inner Harbor between Macao and Lappa. China, on the other hand, contends that the "waters of the port" were exclusively Chinese and that, since no delimitation of the boundaries has been made "everything in respect to them shall continue as at present without addition,

diminution,

diminution or alteration by either of the parties," following Article 2 of the Treaty. In support of this contention the Foreign Office at Canton declares:

1. "It is to be noted that the inlet or waters between Macao and the Chinese island of Lappa were once exclusively Chinese.

2. "Prior to 1848, the Portuguese occupied Macao as yearly tenants of the Chinese Government.

3. "The refusal of the Portuguese to pay the annual land rent of Taels 500 rendered their occupation of Macao, from 1848 to 1887, tortious and illegal.

4. "The Treaty of Peking legalized the Portuguese occupation of Macao in terms tantamount to a cession of the territory of the settlement AS FROM THE DATE OF THE TREATY.

5. "While there was no general rule of International Law which could automatically fix the land frontier of Macao, there was, at the date of the Treaty of Peking (and it is still a rule of law), such a principle of the Law of Nations which determined the frontier line of two states bordering on an inlet i.e., the middle of the main channel.

6. "As Macao was LEGALLY ceded to the Portuguese by the Treaty of 1887, it necessarily follows that the boundary line between it and the Chinese territory of Lappa Island then lay along the middle of the inlet separating the two.

7. "Hence, the STATUS QUO of 1887 was that the "waters of the port" of Macao extended up to the NOT BEYOND the middle of the inlet, the waters on the Lappa side being entirely under Chinese jurisdiction. On this view, the case against the Portuguese contention is complete both in law and in fact.

8. "The recent incident at Macao is admittedly the direct outcome of the Portuguese attempt to extend the "waters of the port" right up to the Lappa side of the inlet, it is clear that the Portuguese are and must be in the wrong and wholly responsible for the origin and consequences of the incident."

There are no Missions, American or others, at Macao and the concern expressed by the Portuguese Minister was due to the fear of an uprising among the Chinese residents

of

of the Peninsula who number between 45,000 and 50,000 with a Portuguese population in 1910, when the last census was taken of 3,601. Of this number, 2571 were natives of Macao, largely of mixed blood, and 896 of Portuguese birth. Other nationalities numbered about 250, mainly French and English. There are no Americans permanently living at Macao. A very large number of the Chinese in Macao are not very desirable citizens as many are fugitives from the mainland and in case of serious trouble would undoubtedly attempt to loot the city where there are not over 300 soldiers.

I am enclosing, for your information, a map of Macao and its territories. Macao is the shaded island opposite the Island of Lappa and the two other islands below it are held, and governed, by Portugal. The three large islands on the left, Lappa, Macarira and Tai-Vong-Cam, are claimed by both Portugal and China and are not inhabited, with the exception of Lappa which is under the control of China.

In connection with the attempts made to deliminate the Macao boundary I have the honor to refer to my despatches Nos. 315 and 13 of February 2, 1910 and January 30, 1920, respectively, especially to the maps attached thereto.

A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to the Department.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

LEO BERGHOLZ

Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Report

Enclosures to No. 171 to the Legation at Peking.

1. Report of Mr. Luk King Fo.
2. Report of Mr. W. F. Cary.
3. Translations of Proclamations.
4 Map of Macao.

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A true copy of the signed original

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
DEC 14 1921

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3-1 2637-9-216

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT The Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party.

Current Events Report.

From China.

No. 8959. Date October 27, 1921. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

GEORGE L. O'CONNOR
Capt. Inf., U.S.A.

REC'D, M. I. D., G. S DEC 12 1921

Enclosures are translations of:

(a) Letter, Chairman of the Councils of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Government of Mongolia - to -"The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great America."

(b) Circular on the Party, giving historical abstract, aims and functions of the party, signed "Committee of the Peoples Revolutionary Party.

(c) Declaration of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Government of Mongolia, Citizen Bodo.

copies (5) M.I.D.
(1) Manila
(1) Tientsin.

Binding Margin.

# D E C L A R A T I O N.

of

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Government
of Mongolia, Citizen Bodo.

Hereby informing the diplomatic corps of Peking of the great distresses which the Mongolian people has borne in a period of riot (which has continued for almost two years) and which was accompanied by unheard of pillage, murders of the peaceful Mongolian population and of foreigners who were living in the confines of Mongolia, I consider it a duty to make a statement, although it be a short one, of the views and intentions of the newly formed Peoples Government of Mongolia.

From the moment of the conclusion in 1915 (by the European Calendar) of the Tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongolian, agreement in Kiakhta in which Outer Mongolia received the right of autonomous existence, having acknowledged at the same time the suzerainty of China, there has already passed a period of several years and the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia has never violated the points of the agreement and by no means has it permitted itself to take steps directed against the suzerain rights of China.

Notwithstanding this, in 1919 the Celestial Empire, violating the provisions of the agreement, conducted a large number of troops into Mongolian territory and having by means of military force compelled Bogdo-Hana and the Government to sign an act prepared by its government for the destruction of autonomous Mongolia, deprived the Mongolian people of their charter liberties.

The unlawful seizure of Mongolia was an accomplished fact and the Mongolian people groaned under the pressure of unjust and foreign rulers. In 1920, as soon as the Russian Baron Ungern having no place in his own fatherland and hiding from the pursuit of lawful punishment, burst into our northeastern frontier, the Chinese military and civil powers in Urga censured our Mongols on the grounds that we had invited this bandit. One after the other our Dukes, princes and lamas were arrested in a number greater than 10. Several of those arrested were subjected by Chinese to cruel tortures and others, who could not bear the cruel tortures and barbarous conditions of incarceration, died.

The repression of theChinese usurpers was not confined to this

Afterwards at the moment of the attack of Baron Ungern on Urga, the Chinese seized the religious head of all the northern buddhists, our Bogdo-Hans, and for fifty days held him in confinement where His Holiness experienced great suffering and persecution.

In the second moon of 1921, when the Russian bandit Baron Ungern again made an attack on Urga, the Chinese powers and army, without showing due resistance to the enemy, this having shown their complete inability to defend the territory of Mongolia, turned in shameful and disorderly flight, pillaging and destroying along the way the peaceful Mongolian population. The retreating Chinese army unmercifully killed women, old men and young children not leaving anybody alive. The property of the unfortunate Mongols was plundered by them, their cattle were driven away, their huts and temples, after being plundered, were burned..

When he took the city of Urga, the Russian Bandit Baron Ungern brought about tremendous slaughters of Mongols, Russians, Chinese and representatives of other people without distinction, and the property of those killed was subjected to pillage. On the other hand, he occupied himself with the establishment of the former rights and privileges of our Bogdo-Hans, with the placing of his Holiness on the throne. He proclaimed himself as a man to whom Mongolia was obligated for the establishment of an autonomous government.

As a matter of fact, he usurped all the power, and, having given out at the beginning ~~xxxx~~ the watchword of destruction ge min ov (of the Chinese revolutionists) and having subsequently announced that he was going to demolish Red Soviet Russia, he began to send out detachments of his hangmen in various directions. Those of the male population who fell in the way of these detachments, if they were able to carry arms, the bandits forcibly took with them and at the same time pillaged their property and drove away their cattle. For the least opposition to the bandits, the Mongolians were subjected to death. It is difficult to describe all the distress and tortures endured by our people. Unable longer to endure the yoke of the usurper and the bandits, the Mongolian people as one man rose up from all sides of the Mongolian lands against their enslavers, standing up in the ranks of the troops of the Mongolian peoples party organized by the best representatives of the nation. More than that, having obtained assistance from the Government of Soviet Russia, we, in cooperation with the latter,

almost succeeded in clearing out of our territory all the hangmen of the bandit Baron Ungern. We took our capital, order and legality are being restored, security of person and property are fully guaranteed, likewise of the peaceful native population and of foreigners living in the confines of Mongolia as well. Bogdo-Hana has been elevated to the throne as heretofore and the Peoples Government has been formed in accordance with the spirit of the times, with the granting to our people of civil liberties.

In view of the fact that the Government has taken the most decisive measures for the clearing from its territory of the remnants of the bands of Baron Ungern, that there have been sent out governmental detachments in all directions where remnants of these bands are hiding and that the capture of the latter is going on successfully, we can be sure that in the not distant future there will not remain a single bandit within the confines of Mongolia, and that full ordere and quiet will be set up.

On the basis of the foregoing, the following conclusion can be drawn:

The Republican Government of the Celestial Empire having without any basis or reason, through threats to take military action, destroyed the autonomous right of our Mongols and usurped the power, showed itself on the appearance of the Russian bandit Baron Ungern unable to give him due opposition, or to defend the territory of Mongolia from the invasion of a small band of bandits, and evidenced its complete inability to guard the security of persons and property of the peaceful population. More than that, the troops of the Chinese Government having proclaimed the Mongols irreconcileable enemies of the Celestial Empire, killed the peaceful population with a view to the general destruction of our people, subjected the property of those who were killed to pillage, drove away their cattle, defamed their

sacred things and burned their temples, houses and huts after having pillaged them. These unexampled crimes of the Chinese soldiers which cast the Mongolian people into tremendous distress and suffering, are revealed as crying violations of the principles not only of international right but of humanity in general.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to admit that this inhuman policy of destruction and pillage of a whole people originated from the government of the Celestial Empire. And so, it seems to us that we are led to this state of affairs by the insidious and harmful policy of a handful of ambitious and greedy adventurers. The Peoples Government of Mongolia by no means bears towards the Celestial Empire any hostibe feeling and has no intention of taking any hostile action against it, on condition, however, of full non-interference on the part of China in the internal affairs of Mongolia in general and in particular on condition of the passage anew by the established Peoples Government of the principles of a consitutional system of government of the land. Mongolia cannot acknowledge the suzerainty of China in any form.

Being firmly convinced that it is essential for China and Mongolia to take measures leading up to the earliest possible establishment of diplomatic and trade relations based upon mutual advantage, I am hopeful of a favorable decision of this cardinal question for the well being and tranquility of both peoples.

With regard to the establishment of trade relations with other peoples, our Government will hold to the policy of the Open Door and of equal favorable opportunity to everybody, based on the exact sense of the agreement which it will strive to conclude with the foreign powers

In conclusion, I consider it a duty to bring to the knowledge of the people of the world that the government

the Russian Soviet Republic has definitely assured the Peoples Government of Mongolia of its renunciation of all its special trade rights and privileges as ordained by the trade agreements between the former Russian Imperial Government and the autonomous government of Mongolia, and of the final annulment of those agreements.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Government of Mongolia.

BODO.

Urga, the 12th day of the 8th moon of the 11th year of Him who was elevated by the many (- i.e. Sept.12, A.D.1921)

(Translated from the Mongolian into the Russian and from the Russian into the English Language.)

From : The Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Government of Mongolia.

To : The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great America.

Greeting you, Citizen Minister, by the order of the Peoples Government of Mongolia, I have to inform you as follows:

Beginning with 1919 and continuing until 1921, our Mongolian people, in consequence of force and seizure, having lost the right of an autonomous state, has lived through tremendous distress and bitter suffering. But at the present moment having with the fraternal assistance of the Government of the Russian People, freed itself from the wicked and oppressive actions and from the troops of the reactionary Chinese subduers and from the bands of the Russian renegade and robber, Baron Ungern, has elevated Bogdo-Hana to his former place and has established the power of the Peoples government and stable, lawful order.

At the same time, the Peoples Government has ordered me to communicate through you, respected Statesman, to the Government of the North American Republic and to the business circles of your land that Bogdo-Hana, the Peoples Government and the people of Mongolia, guaranteeing . . . . . .

. . . . . .

a full opportunity to carry on peace-promoting trade relations, requests you, Citizen Minister, that your respected Government and the business, trade, and commercial circles of your land should without delay commence the exchange of goods which is indispensable to our mutual good, the early beginning of which and the establishment of consular relations will permit the Peoples Government to propound for the skilled decision of the American Government a series of other important questions of international character tending to the mutual welfare of the American and Mongolian people.

Therefore, with assurance of friendship to you, Citizen Minister, to great America and to your respected Government and people, in expectation of a favorable reply, I am remain

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples
Government of Mongolia,

URGA, No. 43, the 14th of Sept.,1921. BODO

(Copy.)

(Copy)

To all citizens of Outer Mongolia from the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party.

In the history of the many vicissitudes of the Mongolian people there has been more than once an occasion when it fell under the power and thralldom of foreign nations and experienced great suffering, but nevertheless the Mongolian people habitually and inevitably freed itself from the grip of foreign enslavers, and establishing its self-reliance and governmental independence became the master of its own territory, and developed its national culture according to its own customs and historical peculiarities.

If we turn to similar events of a recent epoch, we find that the Chalchas or Halhas?? ..of our Outer Mongolia, being unable to reconcile themselves with the pressure of the reactionary officials of the Tsin Dynasty, and incensed by this pressure, arose more than once with arms in hand against the Chinese enslavers and, as a final result having established a separate State and marked out the way of regeneration, strove toward the perfection of its governmental agency and towards progress. But the reactionary Northern Chinese Government not allowing the aspirations (of the Chalchas?) thus shown to develop, by means of artifice and force destroyed the national existence of our Outer Mongolia; it (the Northern Chinese Government), not content with the destruction of the National existence of our Outer Mongolia, and creating from within and from without various offences and riots, caused every body to lose day after day and month after month all hope of better and peaceful times.

And now the laboring masses and the laboring honest intelligencia of our land, without distinction between _____ and _____, awakened not only by the above-mentioned circumstances but by the unalterable desire to return to the Mongolian people mastery over its immemorial lands and waters by considerations of the welfare and happiness of the laboring masses and by the opening of highways for their economical and cultural regeneration for the establishment and restoration on new labor bases of the destroyed State for the revival of unity and coherence, have unified their desires and decided to fight for the attainment of the object in view, having established it as a firm principle that they will not spare either their lives or other blessings and having organized the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, the basic aims of which are herein published for the information of the laboring masses of Outer Mongolia.

1. The party will strive by means of the establishment of power and rights and through the abolishment of suffering and distress of the laboring people of Mongolia, for their peaceful development and for their regeneration on a level with other cultured peoples, among them those of the new culture which has labor as its basis and those of all sides of life, for their enlightened social equality and for their well-being.

2. The party believes that the Mongolian masses will attain peace, welfare, communion with the new laboring culture and with the knowledge of enlightened people, and thus the Mongolian Nation will win the liberty of national self-determination and independent national existence and, in any case, it ought not to be under the thralldom and pressure of usurpers and imperialists, and, therefore, the party to sum up everything, putting forth as its aim the unification of all the Mongolian tribes into one national whole, ~~fmx~~ will strive for the present for the liberation of Mongolia from under the reactionary power of China and of other reactionary subduers who have invaded Mongolia.

3. Taking into account the multiplicity of population and the existence of separate individual provinces and nationalities in the makeup of the central Chinese Republic, the party considers

as expedient the unification of all these provinces and nations into autonomous governments and the establishment between them through the reaching of agreements of federative bonds, and does not see anything to impede the entry of the people into this federative union; on the contrary if the south and the north of China, Szechwan Province, Thibet, Chotan (Chinese musselmen) Manchuria and Mongolia establish each for itself an autonomous organization and constitute among themselves a unified and solid federative unity, then by that very thing these provinces and peoples will put an end to the mutual quarrels and vexations and will free themselves from domination on the part of foreign imperialists and usurpers; thus, for instance, in former times the Russian Imperialistic Government especially desirous of grasping the natural riches and raw products of our Outer Mongolia wished forcibly to tear it down, and at the present time the same purpose is followed openly in our sight by Northern China, Japan and America.

4. Strengthening of the power of the laboring people and establishment on new bases of national existence conformable to this --the complete realization of these two basic aims which the party, acting in accordance with conditions of time and of place, will achieve on the firm foundations of revolutionary socialism.

5. If in Mongolia there appear parties of another tendency than ours, and if these parties can cooperate to the attainment of our two indicated basic aims, then our party will enter into temporary agreement with them; but if there arise parties able to cause harm and opposition to our basic aims then these parties will be looked upon by our party as enemies of the Mongolian laboring people. Furthermore, those elements who are treacherous and who cringe before the Chinese, Japanese and other foreign pillagers and oppressors of the type of the Russian Baron Ungern will find in our party a merciless enemy. Driven from his own land by Russian workers and peasants, who are setting up the power of labor, these outcasts of the former Russian Czarist Government, now Baron Ungern, formerly Semenoff and others, by means of force attained through Japanese arms, and by pillage and bribery, strove and are striving to deceive the Mongolian people falsely promising them stability. To all such bands and boastful plunderers who seek plunder for their personal profit and also to all those whether they be countrymen of Mongolia or Russians, or Japanese who have sold themselves to these emigrants and are betraying the Mongolian laboring people, our party will bring an end.

6. The questions of external and internal policies of religious life, or alteration of the history of established Mongolian customs, traditions and economic life, the party will enlarge upon in accordance with the spirit of the time which the people of the world are living through, with the character of future changes in world events and in the interests, welfare, and progress of the Mongolian people. The party will put aside and destroy, if possible by gentle measures of action, and, if that is impossible, not hesitating even before violent measures compatible with the demands of the interests of the matter, only those customs of tradition of the institution which are absolutely useless or which, being not in accord with the spirit of the time, show themselves to be once and for all outlived and harmful.

7. The party will take all measures to establish a close bond and contact with the revolutionary parties of China, Russia and other lands which put forth as their aim and carry out, not in words but in action, revolutionary warfare for the abolition of imperialism,

for the strengthening of the power of the laboring people, and for its brotherhood and equality.

8. Taking into account the unity of interests and of the aims of the little peoples who are oppressed and enslaved like the Mongolians by foreign imperialists and spoliators, the party will strive toward the closest contact and complete unity of action with these peoples, going hand in hand in the warfare for national self-liberation.

9. The questions mentioned in the sixth point in regard to national make-up to the organization of the central government, local self-government, justice, public education, public ownership, finance, public health, supply, social security, equality and the lightening of taxes and obligations, etc., worked out in detail and set forth in the proper divisions will be published by the party supplementarily.

10. Taking into account the fact that there are people of higher and lower social status, spiritual and worldly, men and women who desire to join the ranks of our party and work on behalf of the future of the Mongolian people, the party hereby announces that there can be as its members people of a dignified manner of living who are ready immediately to spend their strength in a struggle for the well-being of the laboring masses of Mongolia, and who accept in full the program of the party and are obedient to its orders.

11. The points expounded above, formulated out of consideration for the good of the native land, of the laboring masses, and of the State are published for general information.

12. Repeat and spread broadcast this declaration.

(SIGNED) COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLES REVOLU* TIONARY PARTY.

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Peiping

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 15 1921

From FE
2657-I-217
2

WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. 2.

Peking, September 9, 1921

No. 1102

GEORGE L. O'CONNOR
Capt. Inf. U.S.A.

Many to be Kept

893.00/4112

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:—

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies in quadruplicate of the Legation's Quarterly Political Report for the quarter ended December 31st, 1920.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

S/GL signed - A.B.Ruddock

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

1 - Copies in quadruplicate
of Quarterly Report,
Dec. 31st, 1920.

Encl

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.
DEC 15 1921
2657-I-217
1
WAR DEPARTMENT

# DOMESTIC POLITICS

October, November, December, 1920.

GENERAL

The quarter was one of widespread dissensions throughout the country, kept alive by a few dominating personalities. The different sections of the population had no especial feeling of hostility against each other - certainly not deep enough to cause them to undergo great sufferings in the waging of perpetual warfare. On the other hand, evidence was daily forthcoming that the growth of provincial autonomy would be one of the greatest factors in solving the muddle of Chinese politics and that ultimately it would materially assist in eliminating the troublesome military leaders as well. The signs of the times pointed to the emergence from the chaos of a more or less loose confederation bound together by federal revenue collecting agencies and by improved means of inter-communication. In the meantime, the Peking Government was floundering about under administrative and financial difficulties of all kinds, displaying a pitiful lack of power and a regrettable subservience to those domestic and foreign agencies possessing that power.

NORTHERN POLITICS

The helplessness of the Central Government continued to find exemplification in various ways. The Premier's announced policy was the disbandment of troops and he repeatedly declared that in future he was going to adhere firmly to that policy, and if the provinces wished to maintain large bodies of troops they must themselves supply the funds therefor. In striking contrast with this, however, was a simultaneous declaration by Military Governor Wang Chan-yuan of Hupeh to the effect that his unpaid troops must look to Peking for their arrears in pay. On the other hand, on October 17th four divisional commanders were appointed for the 23d and 26th Divisions inclusive. These divisions hitherto did not exist and except so far as they were constituted of the disbanded Anfu troops they were to be regarded as an increase in the military establishment and therefore a departure from the disbandment policy declared by the Premier upon his induction into office.

During late October one of the military conferences, typical of the existing method of government in China, was held at Paotingfu, the seat of government of General Ts'ao K'un. Ts'ao called the conference which was attended by Generals Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang in person and by representatives of General Chang Tso-lin. General T'ien Chung-yi, Military Governor of Shantung and former Anfu party leader, and other prominent military officers of the North were also present. The decisions arrived at by the conference were never specifically stated. Shortly after the conference, however, General T'ien Chung-yi was given the concurrent post of Civil Governor of Shantung, greatly against the wishes of the people of the province, and Ch'i Yao-shan was permitted to resign that post.

The greatest

The greatest significance to be attached to the conference was that the policies of the Government should be determined in meetings of military leaders instead of at Peking, the seat of the nominal government of the Republic.

Another conference of representatives of the Ts'ao K'un and Chang Tso-lin factions of the northern militarist party was held at Paotingfu on November 30th as a result of which the Central Government was asked to defer the abolition of the office of military governor. While disbandment of troops was urged for other provinces, it was decided that action in this matter should be deferred in regard to Chihli, Fengtien, Hupeh and Shantung on the ground that special precautionary measures were necessary in these provinces. However, political reasons ofra more cogent nature were easy to imagine for such a decision. It was further decided that unification of the country should take place province by province rather than by treaty with a united South. The conference declared its support of President Hsu and Premier Chin and urged energetic measures in regard to bandits, famine relief, etc., and suggested measures for preventing abuses in the forthcoming elections next spring. Thus the military leaders continued to dictate their policies to the Peking Government.

At a Cabinet meeting on December 2nd, in response to the suggestions from Paotingfu, it was decided to defer discussion in regard to abolishing the office of Military Governor until afterunification and reorganization had been accomplished.

The Peking Government continued throughout the quarter to go steadily into debt, partly in unpaid bills and partly in small loans collected from Chinese banks. The inability of the Government to pay off and disband troops, themselves

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largely the cause of the financial distress, had its logical effect in mutinies and lootings. In late November there occurred a rising at Hochien in Chihli. In the first week in December a second rising at Kao-yang, also in Chihli, and on November 29th a more serious affair at Ichang where the troops of the 19th Mixed Brigade under General Chang Chi-shan mutinied and looted the Chinese and Japanese sections of the city. The godowns of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha Steamship Company were burned and native banks were looted. Fourteen out of twenty-four Japanese business houses and dwellings were gutted. Rioting continued all night, after which the greater part of the soldiers returned to camp. Through the raising of funds by the local merchants the soldiers were pacified and the city tranquilized. The mutinying troops had been without pay for nine months and had been for some time out of hand. On the other hand, it was suspected that Military Governor Wang Chan-yuan of Hupeh was not greatly distressed at the looting as it presumably was a matter of inconvenience to the new Civil Governor, Hsia Shou-k'ang, to whom he was opposed. A few days following the Ichang affair a similar looting at Paotingfu was narrowly escaped.

The position of the Peking Government, in the eyes of the nation, was weakened by the aggressive policies of Chang Tso-lin. This fact was recognized even by the Premier himself, who appeared subservient to Chang. The dominance of the northern militarist was perhaps one of the greatest factors in preventing unification, but it was apparent that no permanent settlement could be reached until the question of military supremacy was made a national issue and settled for all parts of the country simultaneously. While public demand for the abolition of the military Governor

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and for the disbandment of troops and the restoration of executive power to civil officials continued from various quarters, militarists were simultaneously formulating plans and combinations to strengthen their position and to neutralise the public demand for greater civilian power.

Chang Tso-lin continued to scheme for the increase of his power in the North. He secured the post of commandant of the Peking constabulary for a henchman, and was making efforts to secure the appointment of a follower to the post of Tartar General of Suiyuan as he had done recently for a similar post at Kalgah. These ambitious schemes were earning for him the distrust of political leaders throughout the country and unpopularity with the people. Rumors of a monarchical restoration and of a coup on the part of Chang Tso-lin, with the assistance of Chang Hsun, began to be circulated toward the beginning of November. Chang's energetic demands to secure personal control of Mongolia afforded a basis for the theory of the creation of Manchuria, Mongolia and the three eastern provinces into a semi-independent state.

On October 2nd a Presidential Mandate abolished the post of Inspector General of the Yangtze River and appointed General Li Shun, Military Governor of Kiangsu, as Inspector General of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhui, and General Ch'i Hsieh-yuan as Assistant Inspector General. General Ch'i was Li Shun's own nominee and was formerly Pacification Commissioner and Commander of the 6th Division at Anking. Li Shun thus became the third of the super-tuchuns, each of whom controlled three prpvinces. His term of power was short lived, for in the early morning of October 12th he committed suicide. He left valedictory messages stating that the reason for his action was his inability to solve the difficulties connected with the reuniting of the various factions

under one central government. It was considered probable that he anticipated personal, rather than official, difficulties due to the apparent impending reconciliation between General T'ang Chi-yao and the Peking Government, since T'ang felt that General Li Shun had played him false. It was beyond doubt that the deceased military governor in his capacity of intermediator gained the enmity of the various political contestants rather than their friendship as the result of his good offices.

On October 20th a Mandate was issued by the President directing the Minister of the Interior to give due honor to the valedictory messages left by Li Shun, and on October 22nd he was buried at Tientsin with elaborate ceremonies.

On October 15th General Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, Commander of the 6th Division, was appointed Acting Military Governor of Kiangsu Province.

During the first week in December, Wang Shih-chen, Minister of War at the time of the attempted restoration of the monarchy under Chang Hsun, was appointed High Inspecting Commissioner of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhui, to succeed the late Li Shun. His candidacy was supported by Ts'ao K'un, Wu Pei-fu and President Hsu. As he was of the Chihli party, he was opposed by Chang Tso-lin who advocated Chang Hsun for this important post. The Premier adopted a non-committal attitude. This appointment formed one of the first tests of strength between Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K'un. Although he publicly agreed to the appointment, Chang secretly placed obstacles in the way of Wang's assuming his duties and through his agents stirred up a so-called popular demonstration against the appointment, eventually preventing Wang from assuming his office. Peking's lack of control over the provinces found further proof in the difficulties experienced by the Cabinet's appointees.

In the meantime, the Government's appointee as Civil Governor

Governor of Hupeh, Hsia Shou-k'ang, was unable to take up his office on account of the opposition of the Military Governor, Wang Chan-yuan, although the people of the province were not unwilling to receive Hsia as he was a Hupeh man.

Thus, two forces were tending to cripple the Peking Government in the exercise of powers formerly undisputed, i.e., the rapidly rising spirit of provincial independence and the truculence of the provincial military leaders.

Signs were present of the creation of a new political party or faction, called the Shantung party. Northern politics of late years had been dominated by the Chihli faction headed by General Ts'ao K'un and by the Fengtien faction headed by General Chang Tso-lin. The new party, designed especially to promote the interests of General Wang Chan-yuan, Military Governor of Hupeh and of the Premier, probably included the following powerful natives of Shantung, in addition to the persons named: General Lu Jung-hsiang, Military Governor of Chekiang, formerly an Anfu partisan; General T'ien Chung-yü, Military Governor of Shantung; General Wu Pei-fu, Assistant Inspector General of Chihli, Honan and Shantung; General Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, Acting Military Governor of Kiangsu, and numerous divisional and other high military commanders of Shantung birth.

On October 30th there appeared two Presidential Mandates which on their face appeared of historical importance. One announced that Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, one of the administrative directors of the Canton Military Government, Lu Jung-t'ing, Inspector General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and Admiral Lin Pao-yi, both of the latter also directors in the Military Government of Canton, had reported to the Central Government the cancellation of the independence of the Military Government of the Southwest. The Mandate therefore intimated that the country as a whole had

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been reunited under one government.

That the spirit of these mandates was unduly optimistic was at once attested by a circular telegram despatched under the names of T'ang Shao-yi, Wu T'ing-fang, Sun Yat-sen and T'ang Chi-yao, disclaiming the authority of Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan to cancel the military independence of the military government. From a number of standpoints also the unification of the country was still far from fulfillment, although, generally speaking, the prospects for the submission of all the provinces to Peking were brighter than for a long time previously, due mainly to the exhaustion of all the fighting units, and to the fact that each unit was in need of assistance against powerful adversaries.

The Peking Government in thus endeavoring to capitalize the assumed capitulation of the military government of Canton and ignoring the independent position of various other provincial leaders who had by no means yielded to Peking undoubtedly committed a tactical error and served to make negotiations with those leaders very difficulty

That Peking derived no additional advantage from the submission of Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan and his associates was so apparent that the Premier adopted a conciliatory attitude, in spite of the mandates, not only toward T'ang Chi-yao but also toward the old Kuomingtang leaders in Cangon, such as T'ang Shao-yi and his associates. In fact on October 31st the Premier had already addressed telegrams to these various leaders asking their concurrence in peace measures.

The other Mandate decreed the election of a new national parliament to be formed in accordance with the election regulations of the first year of the Republic, which were based upon the Nanking Constitution. This Mandate was greatly criticized in Peking, especially by members of the Parliament, on the ground that it

that it disregarded the Constitution under which the President was elected by the Peking Government.

In connection with the Mandate of October 30th in regard to the new parliament, the Ministry of the Interior on November 4th sent a circular telegram to the provinces instructing them that if they were unable to cope with all the matters arising in connection with the election of the new parliament in accordance with the election laws of August 10, 1912, they should appeal for assistance to the Bureau for the Election of the New Parliament, an organization remaining from the time of the formation of the present northern parliament. In preparation for the Unification of the country, there was created a new organization, "Office for the Preparation for the Reconstruction Conference".

On November 7th there was convened in the President's Palace the first meeting of this body. The entire Cabinet was present, together with some prominent men such as Liang Shih-yi and two representatives of Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, the deposed Canton leader. The meeting decided upon the method for beginning the reconstruction conference which included the selection of eighty members of the "new" parliament as members of the conference to which also the provinces were to be invited to send representatives.

In answer to the Government's circular telegram of November 4th, General T'ien Chung-yü, Military Governor of Shantung, heartily endorsed the proposal to abolish the tuchuns and asked that the proposal be initiated with the Province of Shantung. The Society for Provincial Self-Government in Peking composed of representatives of fifteen provinces thereupon sent an open telegram to T'ien asking him toqgive effect to his telegram by resigning his post. Needless to say, this suggestion remained without effect.

On November

On November 17th a Presidential Mandate was issued stating that since the founding of the Republic two national elections had been held but that,while the rules of supervision were most strict, these rules had not been adequately enforced. The Mandate directed strict compliance with the rules of the forthcoming elections under penalty. The parliamentary elections were set by the Cabinet for March 1, 1921, and the final elections on April 1st, to elect members of the House of Representatives. It was further decided that the election of the members of the Upper House should be held on April 20th in Peking. The election of Mongolian and other representatives of the dependencies should be held on April 30th.

On the same day another Mandate appeared, stating that local self-government was a fundamental attribute to a Republican form of government; that, on the founding of the Republic, plans had been made to carry this out along the lines laid down during the last days of the monarchy, but this had not been successful, and had resulted in disorders in 1914 and in 1917; that upon the assumption of office by the present President he had taken several steps to educate the people up to this function, but no great results had been obtained. The Mandate instructed the Ministry of the Interior to take immediate steps to prepare the people for local self-government, utilizing the best foreign methods. Other mandates issued on the 18th dealt with judicial improvements.

In spite of these Mandates, however, there appeared no appreciable progress in the direction of such a fundamental reform as the abolition of the office of military governor and it was feared that the forthcoming elections, if indeed they were held, as subsequently proved not to be the case, would still be utilized by political parties for their own aggrandizement.

The promulgation of the mandate instructing the provincial

local

local officials to prepare for local self-government called forth telegrams to the Government from all parts of the country, criticising the mandate and pointing out that the self-governing organs already in existence were capable of carrying out the functions of local self-government. The representatives in Peking of Kansu, Hunan, Hupeh, Chekiang and Anhui formed a union having as its object to compel an earlier inauguration of local self-government and if possible to abolish the tuchun system. This so-called inter-provincial self-government society on December 13th attempted to see the Premier and the President, but failing in this they left a memorial inveighing against the institution of military governors as the source of many of the present miseries of China.

The Ministry of the Interior addressed an accouncement to the provinces that provincial self-government should be restored as from January, 1921, and local self-government as from July, 1921. The exact significance of these phrases was not clear, but it was roughly supposed that it was intended to mark the reversion from the policy of centralization of power initiated by Yuan Shih-k'ai.

Following Li Shun's death there was a very strong agitation on the part of Kiangsu province to make use of the event for the abolition of the office of Tuchun. This agitation had also been made by the people of Shantung, Hupeh, Anhui and Shensi. It was evident that the people of China realized that so long as a handful of leaders controlled the huge military forces, their rights as citizens and the creation of a real government were impossible to attain. The Peking Government for obvious reasons was not able to yield to this popular demand, but the Minister of the Interior sent a circular inquiry to all the provinces asking for an expression of opinion as to the possibilities of restoring

local

local self-government therein.

Following the abolition by General T'an Yen-kai of the office of Military Governor of Hunan, General Chao Heng-t'i was elected by the provincial assembly commander-in-chief of the military forces of the province and Lin Chih-yü Civil Governor of the province. They assumed office on November 25th. In spite, however, of these auspicious events, Hunan continued to be full of unrest.

The successful protest of Hupeh against the appointment of Sun Chen-hsia resulted in the appointment of a Hupeh man, Hsia Shou-k'ang. The Civil Governor of Shantung, Ch'i Yao-shan, a native of Kirin province, resolutely insisted on resigning his post and continued to reside in Tientsin. General T'ien Chung-yü, a native of Chihli Province and Military Governor of Shantung, was disliked by the people of Shantung, who would have preferred their fellow provincial General, Wu Pei-fu, as Military Governor in place of General T'ien. This tendency promised to point the way to a larger measure of provincial autonomy, with possibly the election by the provincial assemblies or the people of their own civil governors, and while the Government was clearly unable to carry out the change at the present time, the whole idea was gaining power and was the most encouraging feature of the political developments of the day.

SOUTHERN POLITICS

At the opening of the quarter the situation at Canton was indecisive. Military Governor Mo Jung-hsin was able to continue in office in spite of Ch'en Chiung-ming's attacks and notwithstanding very lukewarm support on the part of troops in the vicinity, including those on the Island of Honam. The people of Kwangtung, however, appeared determined to rid their province of the Kwangsi militarists and to end their unscrupulous exploitation of the province's resources.

The struggle in Szuchuan also continued without definite result, but there also the invading forces composed of Yunnan and Kweichow troops appeared to be doomed to ultimate retreat and the demand for the control of each province by officials chosen from among

its own

its own people continued to receive increasing evidence.

In the meantime, General T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan appeared blocked in his attempt to conduct an offensive against the Peking Government. Two of his representatives were expected in Peking at the beginning of the quarter. T'an Yen-k'ai, in Hunan, was merely maintaining his position. The so-called "independent navy" at Canton affirmed its intention of proceeding to Amoy to declare its reversion to the North.

Later in the month of October, negotiations were inaugurated by the assistance of Admiral Lin Pao-yi with General Ch'en Chiung-ming on the one hand and Lu Jung-t'ing and Mo Jung-hsin on the other. On September 30th Military Governor Mo Jung-hsin of Kwangsi delivered the seals of office to Admiral T'ang-kuang, as acting military governor elected by the provincial assembly. Toward the middle of October a request was received by the Peking Government from Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, one of the administrative directors of the Canton Military Government, to sign the protocol already arrived at in substance between the two governments. This request the Peking Government was unable to grant because of its approaching negotiations with General T'ang Chi-yao, Military Governor of Yunnan.

General Liu Ts'un-hou, who, in company with the late Military Governor of Szuchuan, Hsiung K'o-wu, had secured control of that Province from General T'ang, asked the Peking Government for military funds, while his colleague, Hsiung, reported victories. The request of General Liu was supported by the Military Gov-

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ernor of Hupeh, General Wang Chan-yuan, but here again the Peking government was unable to accord its support for fear of jeopardizing the success of the negotiations with its opponent, T'ang Chi-yao. To reconcile the interests of the various opposing elements was practically an impossible task. Toward the end of October Szechuan was practically cleared of Yunnan and Kweichow troops, Chungking having been recovered by Hsiung Kb-wu on the 18th.

The deadlock continued in Canton. General Mo Jung-hsin continued to demand payment of several millions of dollars and intimated that he would retire if General Ch'en Chiung-ming did not succeed him. The Military Government dragged on a nominal existence, apparently deriving its sole support from gambling houses in Canton, while General Li Jung-t'ing from his domain in Kwangsi Province rendered some slight assistance.

General Ch'en Chiung-ming's continued offensive finally was crowned with success and Canton fell into the hands of the Cantonese troops. General Mo Jung-hsin left the city on October 20th and General Tang Ting-kwang took over the duties of military and civil governor concurrently. General Ma Chi and the greater part of the Kwangsi troops withdrew on the 27th and 28th. General Ch'en Chiung-ming entered Canton on the 29th. Conditions were generally quiet. The Shekcheng arsenal was destroyed on the night of the 25th by the retiring Kwangsi troops.

Toward the end of November General Wang Chang-wei, Military Governor of Hupeh, acting concurrently with the Inspector General of Hunan and Hupeh, tendered his

resignation

resignation owing to the assumption of duty of the newly appointed governor of Hupeh, in opposition to his wishes.

During the first week in December, Wang Shih-chen, Minister of War at the time of the attempted restoration of the monarchy under Chang Hsun, was appointed High Inspecting Commissioner of Kiangsu, Kiangsi andAnhui, to succeed the late Li Shun. His candidacy was supported by Ts'ao K'un, Wu Pei-fu and President Hsu. As he was of the Chihli party, he was opposed by Chang Tso-lin who advocated Chang Hsun for this important post. The Premier adopted a nonpcommittal attitude. This appointment formed the first test of strength between Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K'un. Although publicly agreed to the appointment, Chang secretly placed obstacles in the way of Wang's assuming his duties and through his agents stirred up a so-called popular demonstration against the movement.

-- FOREIGN RELATIONS --

[redacted]

On September 30th the regulations governing the organization of the office of the Pacification Commissioner of Mongolia with seat at Urga were promulgated, but they contained no reference to the division of offices between Chinese and Mongols which was understood to be the intention of the Government. Ch'en Yi was named Pacification Commissioner. He continued to linger in Peking awaiting the settlement of various questions before proceeding to Mongolia. At his request General Chang Ching-hui, Tartar General of Chahar, was ordered to co-operate with him in military operations in Mongolia. On October 5th an identic note was sent to the foreign legations by the Chinese Government warning against loans to the Mongol Government in return for concessions of mines and forests in Mongolia, and on October 8th Ch'en Yi was appointed by Presidential Mandate Director General of Gold Mines in Tushetu and Tsetsen Khanates, a further precaution against alienation of mining rights claimed by the Peking Government. It was supposed that this measure had in mind the rumored loans by the Mitsui and Lungkou Banks against concessions in Mongolia.

The acuteness of the political and military situation in Mongolia continued to increase, in evidence of which was the receipt of notification from the Chinese Foreign Office on October 13th of the prohibition against the use of code telegrams and of a further note dated the 14th announcing that foreign travel in Outer Mongolia was forbidden on account of the disturbed conditions.

Toward

Toward the end of October an irregular band of Russians under the command of Ungern von Sternberg, a Lieutenant of Semenoff, appeared in the vicinity of Urga and engaged the Chinese forces in battle. Fighting was conducted with field pieces and resulted in numerous casualties, but without decisive result. This attack was presumably instigated by the Japanese authorities, with the Mongol Klooms, in an effort to establish Mongolian autonomy and to strengthen Japanese influence throughout Mongolia, as a result of which the natural resources of Mongolia would fall into Japanese hands. Following this preliminary attack, the Russians in Urga were subjected to barbarous treatment by the Chinese troops whose cruelty turned upon all foreigners almost without discrimination. Martial law was declared in Urga by the Chinese and reinforcements were hurried forward from Kalgan. These measures affected most adversely the very considerable American interests in Mongolia.

In view of these hostilities Ch'en Yi left precipitately for Urga. The Living Buddha and other leading Mongolian nobles were placed under arrest by General Ch'u, in charge of the forces at Urga. The seriousness of this step was at once apparent. Ch'en Yi requested further reinforcements which were not forthcoming.

On the account of the very acute situation and the danger to Americans, particularly to Mr. Edwin W. Mills, a mining engineer, and to Mr. McLaughlin, of the Mongolian Trading Company, a rescue party of about sixteen American citizens was organized to proceed to Urga, across the line of military operations, and effect Mr. Mills' departure from the city. This expedition was opposed

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very energetically by all of the Chinese authorities, including the Premier, the War Department and the Foreign Office, but, in disregard of their protest, the party proceeded under the guidance and direction of Major John Magruder, Assistant Military Attaché. Transportation for the party was provided by automobiles of the Mongolian Trading Company, an enterprise of Mr. Charles L. Coltman, which was among the American firms most injured by the events in Mongolia. This party reached Urga from Kalgan on the 13th of November and after staying there about a week, and following many narrow escapes from armed clashes with the Chinese authorities, returned with Mr. Mills and Mr. McLaughlin. The visit of the American rescue party had a most salutary effect on the situation in general, as well as in accomplishing its purpose of bringing food and transportation to the Americans in Urga.

The forces attacking Urga were apparently driven away from the immediate vicinity of the city. The Cabinet decided upon various measures regarding Mongolia, such as rewarding the troops fighting in defense of Urga by full arrears of salary, the strict protection of foreign residents and their escort from Urga should they so desire. This latter decision was notified to the American Legation on November 10th.

[redacted]

As a consequence of the Manifesto of September 23rd withdrawing recognition from Russian diplomatic and consular officials in China, the Chinese authorities assumed control of the Russian concession in Tientsin on September 29th, and of the Russian concession in Hankow on the 30th. At Tientsin the form of taking over and the subsequent acts of the Chinese authorities aroused more criticism than in Hankow. The Chinese Foreign Office having given assurances that the municipal organizations in the concessions would be interfered with as little as possible, the American and other residents in the Tientsin concession were reassured when extensive financial and regulatory innovations in favor of Chinese control were made. The abrupt action taken by the Chinese Government without any preparations for the continuance of judicial functions from Russian citizens resulting practically in the cancellation of all extraterritorial rights aroused great indignation among nationals of other countries as well as among Russians. The interests of other nationals having relations with Russians were considered as endangered.

Vice Minister of Justice, Chang I-p'eng, requested the Chinese Government to constitute the railway area a special district wherein he might establish special Chinese courts (Shum P'an T'ing) and exercise jurisdiction over Russian citizens. Numerous vexatious questions involving considerations between Russians and other nationals remained unsolved and formed the genuse of many complaints.

On October

On October 9th at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps the Dean was authorized to request of the Chinese Foreign Minister a confirmation of his oral assurances and that the measures of the Chinese Government in regard to Russians were a temporary derogation of Russian rights subject to later agreement between the Chinese Government and the future Russian Government and also suggesting that in view of difficulties arising from the application of the Mandate the Chinese Government and the Diplomatic Corps concert on a provisory modus vivendi for the administration of Russian rights.

The Legation having reported these facts to the Department of State, was authorized to say to the Chinese Government that in the view of the American Government the Chinese Government had taken over very great responsibilities in the fulfillment of which it would be thru subject to grave danger of suspicion and misconstruction which could only be avoided by preserving a punctilious regard for its obligations towards Russia and the utmost circumspection in relation to other related interests. In view of the announced anti-capitalistic campaign in China of the Bolsheviks, the presence in Peking of an emissary from Verkhne Udinsk gave rise to danger of appearance of subservience to Bolshevik influence, particularly in the matter of extraterritoriality in which all the principal foreign powers were interested.

During the early part of October, Chang Yi-p'eng, Vice-Minister of Justice, went to Kirin to arrange for the taking over by Chinese tribunals of the Russian Courts in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone and at Harbin, and these/latter courts ceased to function on October 5th. On that day the Taoyin at Harbin called on the foreign

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foreign consuls suspected that it was the intention of the Chinese Government to utilize the Russian judicial machinery as much as possible, continuing the Russian officers as officials of the Chinese court.

One of the first cases of importance, which might serve as a test of the value of the Chinese administration of law in the Zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, arose in connection with the efforts of Mr. Max Wolfsohn, an American fur dealer who had lost a large amount of furs through theft by Semenoff agents, to recover his loss through attachment of certain gold said to belong to Semenoff deposited in the Chinese American Bank of Commerce in Harbin. The case proved to be a thorny one, and did not find its solution during the quarter. The standard of Chinese justice administered by the courts could not be said to be very high, nor to warrant optimism as to the success of Chinese justice, should extraterritorial administration ever be abandoned by foreign powers in China. Procrastination, evasion, even trickery and deceit characterized the processes of the court in spite of the flood of publicity thrown on the case.

The Siberian situation in general appeared to be that Verkne-Udinsk and Blagovesshensk under Moscow leadership were opposed to Chita and Vladivostok under general Japanese influence. Japan continued to maintain this schism through control of channels of communication and the use of military force. Semenoff, who had been recently withdrawn eastward by the Japanese when it was thought that they could arrange to have an

assembly

assembly of the Far Eastern Republic at Vladivostok under their surveillance, had now been sent back by the Japanese as it was seen that the Assembly would not be held at Vladivostok but at some more western point.

Semenoff continued his former tactics, and at the beginning of October was sending a force under Baron Ungern von Sternberg westward, presumably to Verkne-Udinsk.

During October the Semenoff -Kappel forces suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks. Chita fell into Red hands on October 31st. Ungern's forces were badly punished and retreated toward Manchouli Station. At the same time Chinese official reports indicated that reactionary Russian forces were approaching Urga with the intention of expelling the Chinese garrison.

Negotiations had been proceeding during the quarter between the Chinese Foreign Office and the Yourin Mission representing the Far Eastern Republic. Some twelve articles had been agreed upon in principle. The negotiations were, however, suddenly interrupted in October by the Chinese Government through the appointment of its Foreign Office representative, Mr. Chang Tsu-shan, as Minister to Sweden and the substitution of Mr. Liu Ching-jen, former Minister to Russia and High Commissioner in Siberia. It was thought at the time that the Chinese Government began to feel doubt of Yourin's authority to speak for all the Siberian governments.

In early October, Yourin announced the formation of the Far Eastern Republic at a joint meeting of the Amur, Vladivostok and Verkne-Udinsk delegations, and

stated

stated that this new united government enjoyed the support and disinterested help of Mother Russia; declared in favor of a peoples' constituent assembly, the institution of private ownership of land suitably modified, and no concession of territory to a foreign power; and announced that the Government would call upon Russia and foreign capitalists to develop the country.

During the first part of October General Wrangel, representing the South Russian Government, telegraped to Peking protesting against the withdrawal of recognition from Russian diplomatic and consular officials, or at least against the derogation of Russian rights resulting therefrom, and warning China that it would be accountable.

During October details were obtained from the Chinese Foreign Office regarding a trade convention between Chinese Turkestan and the Soviet representative to Turkestan. This agreement concerned commercial matters and the return of refugees and defeated soldiers. It was agreed that these matters should be regulated by representatives of either party on the territory of the other. The Legation was informed by the Foreign Office that negotiations had begun two years previously when it was seen that a local agreement for trade relations was needed to prevent extensive thievery by Bolsheviks in border raids on Chinese territory. The matter was entirely disassociated from the question of the Yourin Mission or the recognition of the Bolsheviks. The matter appeared to be one of local interest only as a measure of self protection and that the Central Government, because of the great distance separating it from Turkestan, and

and because of the virtual independence of the Chinese authorities, these could do but little more than approve it, when received, which was done about the middle of September, 1920.

During early October General Chang Shih-lin, Chinese emissary in Moscow, was recalled to Peking as having become too favorably inclined to the Bolsheviks.

Chinese Eastern Railway:

On October 2nd, 1920, the Minister of Communications signed with the Russo-Asiatic Bank an agreement providing for joint management of the Railway under the following terms: the repayment of the five million taels stipulated in Article twelve of the original Agreement should be made by the Railway to China with compound interest in the form of loan bonds redeemable in 1939, or date of the previous redemption of the Railway, the security being the Company's movable and immovable property and the earnings of the Railway. Of the nine directors, the President, and four directors shall be Chinese appointed by the Chinese Government without share-holding qualifications. The Government should appoint several Chinese assistants to the heads of the chief sections of the Railway, but there would be no decision of the Board of Directors unless approved by seven members. The Chinese Government might appoint two Chinese out of five members of the Committee of Audit. Railway positions were to be divided equally between Chinese and Russians. Thereafter the Company should have a purely commercial character, and the Chinese Government reserved the right to take measures to ensure this.

It was

It was argued that this agreement merely regularized a condition that had gradually arisen since the shareholders' meeting in Peking in 1918, and especially since the spring of 1920 when negotiations for the present agreement actually began. Considerable interest attached to the document because of the fact that the Bank had since 1918 been under French diplomatic protection and now had 60% French capital, whereas paragraph 60 of its charter provided expressly that its branches in Asia were placed under the protection of Russian Government representatives.

According to the Chinese contention, the main effect of the agreement was to make the Chinese Eastern Railway a purely commercial enterprise without political complexion of any kind.

On the 9th of October a Presidential Mandate appeared announcing the October 2nd agreement arrived at between the Minister of Communications and the Russo-Asiatic Bank. The main points emphasized were that the Chinese Government took over the authority of the former Russian Government in the Railway Zone; that the whole question would be taken up again with a recognized government in Russia; that the Railway was a purely commercial concern and that the Chinese authorities would protect life and property along the Railway. Yourin, in a statement published by the Dalta Agency, designated the Chinese action as a seizure of Russian rights and predicted that a united Russian Government would not recognize its validity, and would hold China responsible for all losses. He denied most emphatically that the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was empowered to retain control of the line.

On October 28th

On October 28th a meeting of the shareholders took place in Peking for the purpose of electing members of the Board of Directors, but as the persons elected did not accord with the intention of the Chinese Government to keep the road free from political influences the Chinese Government rejected the results on technical grounds. The same was done in the case of a meeting held on the 31st, and the matter resulted in a deadlock.

On October 31st there were published three Mandates promulgating regulations for a system of guards to be established in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the regulations governing the employment of foreigners to be connected in a capacity advisory thereto.

On November 25th a Mandate appointed Dr. C.C.Wong as a Vice President of the Railway. He was already a member of the Inter-Allied Technical Board.

The presence of large numbers of the defeated reactionary Russian forces embarassed the Railway and the Chinese authorities.

As the status of the Inter-Allied Technical Board appeared possibly affected by this new agreement, Mr. John F. Stevens came to Peking and secured written specific assurances from the Chinese Minister of Communications on that point.

## CHINESE - JAPANESE RELATIONS:

On October 2nd a number of Chinese bandits, together with a few Russians and about a hundred Koreans, swept down upon the city of Hunchun, in Chinese called Hui-ch'un, in the district of Chientao, on the Korean-Kirin border, and raided the town, killing some Japanese and burning some of the buildings connected with the Japanese Consulate. Shortly afterwards news was received of the despatch of considerable numbers of Japanese troops into the territory concerned in the Hunchun incident in the Chientao region. Chinese public opinion was greatly disturbed.

On October 8th or 9th there were published communiques of the Japanese Government detailing the special conditions of the Korean immigrants there and the dangers that necessitated the despatch of Japanese troops into this Chinese territory. It was alleged that the measure was taken with the concurrence of the Chinese Government. On October 9th a Presidential Mandate appeared expressing regret at the incursion of the bandits and the destruction of a foreign consulate and ordering certain measures of military protection.

The Chientao question, a long standing controversy between Japan and China, was thus reopened, and it was expected that Japan would feel justified in taking very strong measures, even to the permanent garrisoning of the region with Japanese troops, as the place was of great strategic importance being near the Russian, Siberian and Chinese borders.

During

During the quarter the Japanese Government continued to despatch considerable forces to the Hunchun district despite the protests of the Chinese Government which, for its part, sent comparatively heavy reinforcements to that region under the personal command of Mao Kuei-ch'ing, Military Governor of the Province of Kirin.

Negotiations continued throughout November between the Chinese and Japanese authorities in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the so-called Chientao region, but a complete agreement was not reached. The Chinese Government agreed to the various guarantees desired by the Japanese Government except those relating to the prevention of political intrigues against Japan by Koreans resident there, and it refused its preliminary assent to a return of Japanese troops if circumstances should require it. The question of dual sentries along the frontier was still under discussion.

It appeared that the bandits had been threatening Hunchun for fully a month before the final serious attack of October 16th, and that the Chinese officials sent no reinforcements, and that even on November 15th, a month after the attack, no Chinese troops had arrived.

The sum total of the various published communiques and reports such as the celebrated Mizumachi letter and its subsequent refutation by the Japanese Foreign Office made it evident that beginning with the middle of September the Japanese Government had contemplated a military incursion into this Chinese territory and determined to base it upon the presence of Chinese bandits

also there imperilling Japanese interests.

On October 2nd occurred the Hunchun raid, with the burning of the Japanese consular buildings. When, however, Japanese troops entered the Chientao region they devoted most of their attention to the Korean residents, and in fact found them organised in military bands and provided with military equipment, accounts of which were published. It was manifest that the measures taken by the Japanese Government were from the first designed to eradicate Korean insurrection movements having their base in Chientao and were not directed, except incidentally, against Chinese bandits.

**FOOCHOW INCIDENT:**

An interchange of notes under date of November 12th between the Japanese Legation and the Chinese Foreign Office provided a formal settlement of the Foochow incident of November 16, 1909. The notes expressed mutual regrets at the occurrence and provided for a small solatium. Chinese public opinion seemed to be against the settlement on the ground that the Japanese troublemakers were not properly punished.

During the early part of November, Chang Tso-lin sent a personal emissary, one Yu Ch'ung-han, to Japan apparently to solicit Japanese aid. Yu's utterances, said to be of pro-Japanese character, aroused severe criticism on the part of the public against Chang Tso-lin.

On

On November 14th, Mou Shu-cheng, the celebrated Muslim leader, escaped from the Japanese Legation under circumstances indicating Japanese connivance. Protests from the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Legation, which continued over a long period, resulted fruitlessly, the Japanese Minister disclaiming responsibility for the safe keeping of "Little Mou".

## [illegible] AFFAIR

During the quarter a settlement was reached of the Nikolaevsk affair in which, during the month of July, 1920, Chinese gunboats on the Amur River at Nikolaevsk opened fire upon certain Japanese troops in the neighborhood of that city. The Japanese Minister at Peking had made four demands based on the findings of the Joint Sino-Japanese Commission which had investigated the affair.

1. An expression of regret by the Chinese Government to the Japanese Government.
2. An apology by the Chinese Naval Commander of the Squadron involved to the Japanese Military Commander of the Nikolaevsk region.
3. The punishment of all officers and men of the crew involved.
4. The payment of reparation to the families of those who it is claimed were killed by Chinese naval guns.

The Chinese Government refused payment of reparation. However, the Chinese flotilla commander of the gunboats on the Amur apologized to the Japanese authorities and the commanding officer of one of the Chinese gunboats at Nikolaevsk during the affair was suspended on full pay for six months. The incident was thus closed.

-- MISCELLANEOUS --

The Government showed its interest in the famine by issuing a Mandate on October 2nd instituting "Associate Directors General of Famine Relief" for the four provinces most affected, naming General Ho Yung-lien, former Tartar General of Chahhar, for the post in Shantung; Wu Ch'ien-ts'un, former Chief of Police of Peking under President Yuan, for Honan Province; T'ien Ying-hsiang, Vice Speaker of the Lower House, for Shansi; and Kao Tsung-chueh for Shensi. These officials were supposed to assist the civil governors of the provinces concerning the principal directors general of famine relief. No mention was made of the funds with which they were to operate. On October 1st the Foreign Office addressed an identic note to the Foreign Legations proposing a surtax of 1/10 of the present maritime and native customs duties, the proceeds of which were to be utilized for famine relief. The proposed surtax was to be imposed for one year and to be utilized as security for a loan for relief purposes. The surtax would be collected under the supervision of the Inspector General of Customs. Unofficial organizations met and effected a union between Chinese and foreign societies.

On October 10th the Minister of the Interior, Chiang Chih t'an, was appointed Director General of the Board of Famine Relief, the detailed regulations of which were published on October 16th. It was the evident intention of the Government to make this an important organization, ranking almost with the Ministry.

<u>On October 11th</u>

On October 11th there went into effect government surcharges on railway tickets, etc., which was expected to bring in $5,000,000 during the year, the proceeds to be utilized in famine relief. Among the public works designed to provide employment of famine sufferers were automobile roads from Chefoo to Weihaien in Shantung, from Tsinan to Kaifong, Tsinan to Tientsin, and Paotaiho to Peking. The Chinese Government urged that the American concessionaires begin work at once on the Grand Canal improvement scheme and the Siems-Carey Railway in order to provide famine labor with employment.

On October 19th a Mandate appeared promulgating rewards and punishments in connection with famine relief measures. Lou Tseng-tsiang was appointed Associate Director of the Board of Famine Relief. On the same day the Government Gazette carried a ministerial order of the Ministry of the Interior promulgating regulations governing the building of roads in connection with famine relief. A Dutch civil engineer formerly employed in the Conservancy Bureau was named by the Government to superintend the road building.

On October 16th Yuan Pao-hui was appointed Executive Director of the Board of Famine Relief.

CONSORTIUM:

During September and October the representatives of the Consortium Groups met in New York and came to final agreement on the terms of the Consortium Agreement. This document, dated October 15th, was textually substantially the same as the agreement negotiated at Paris

in May

in May, 1919. The more important resolutions, from the point of view of Chinese politics, were, that the Consortium would welcome the co-operation of a Chinese group forming a representative national unit and prepared to undertake the obligations involved; that as requested the Kuni tax, the Consortium took note of this source of security for consideration later should occasion arise; that the Consortium's representatives should investigate the prospects of issuing in China a Chinese silver loan; that the American Group should be requested to take over for the ultimate benefit of the Consortium, the Pacific Development Corporation loans; and that the Chinese Government make a public announcement recognising the entire issue of the Hukuang Railway loan without distinction.

The Railway policy of the Consortium was stated to be that railway construction be resumed at an early date and that that the Hankow-Canton section of the Hukuang Railways should receive first consideration. The Consortium, except the Japanese members, declared itself ready to consider an application for a loan of ten million gold dollars for the Chinese Eastern Railway, on certain condition.

While these meetings were being held in New York much anxiety and agitation were evident in Chinese circles as to the scope and purposes of the Consortium, and fears were freely expressed that the United States was being misled by the other nations. The Legation was unofficially informed that the Chinese Government would greatly prefer that the Pacific Corporation option remain in American hands, and that the Government was

perturbed

perturbed about the rumors as to the pledging of the land tax as security.

On October 29th the four Consortium representatives in Peking notified the Chinese Minister of Finance that they would not consider either individually or collectively loans for any purpose unless authorized by the new Consortium.

The Chinese Government appeared unwilling to recognize or appeal to the Consortium even though the people were starving and the GOVERNMENT NEEDS desperate. Inspired press reports against the Consortium appeared freely in the vernacular press, characterizing the terms of the Consortium as stringent. In reply to this accusation, the American Group stated that the Consortium had laid down three principles of action:

1. The first object should be to the benefit of the Chinese people.

2. Loans should be made for constructive purposes and the objects of these should be carefully specified.

3. Some reasonable safeguard should be adopted to provide that the proceeds of loan funds be expended for the purposes intended.

In spite of these declarations, agitation against the Consortium continued from the point of view that it would jeopardize China's sovereignty by a system of supervision of national finance and railways, and possibly of the land tax. In an official circular telegram of November 4th to the provincial authorities, the Cabinet assailed the Consortium and held it up as a bogey to induce the disbandment of troops. The Premier also made an attack on it before the press representatives on November 6th.

On November 4th

On November 4th the American Group, replying to a request for an advance of five million dollars sent by the Minister of Finance through Mr. Kwa Ma Yuen, of the Chinese American Bank of Commerce who was present in New York at the time of the Consortium meeting, replied that the Consortium could not consider piece-meal business and that any loan to be successful in the American market must form part of a comprehensive scheme for constructive effort in China; that, however, the four Groups believed that it would be possible to consider a loan looking to the contemplation of the Canton-Hankow Railway, and, when further funds became available, for the additional development of the Hukuang Railway system, on the following conditions precedent: complete recognition by the Chinese Government of the liability of entire original issue of Hukuang bonds without distinction; provision for separate security for the proposed loan, mentioning the willingness of the Pacific Development Corporation to cede its option, which would need revision, to the American Group; lastly, the development of the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement. On this basis the Group mentioned the possibility of a total loan of one hundred million dollars gold, the first advance to be one-quarter of this sum, secured on the Wine and Tobacco revenues, and subject to certain conditions. Although this proposal was submitted to the Chinese Minister of Finance nothing came of it.

[redacted]

During December there was made public an exchange of notes between the Japanese and American Governments for the settlement of the Tientsin incident of March, 1919, in which Japanese and American soldiers stationed in Tientsin had come into serious armed conflict.

ARMS EMBARGO:

The question of the enforcement of the arms embargo came up acutely during the quarter. The Japanese Legation at Peking brought accusation in general terms against the British, Americans and Italians for infractions of the agreement and complained of the large amount of ammunition ordered by China from Japan but undelivered on account of the embargo agreement. Further representations to the Italian Foreign Office by the Japanese, British and American Embassies were discussed.

PROHIBITION OF CATTLE EXPORT:

The Diplomatic Body was notified during December that cattle would for a time be refused transportation on the Tsing-Pu Railway. This measure was based on the alleged desire to conserve the cattle for agricultural use next spring, and was a matter

of great

of great interest to the American Legation since the United States Military establishment in the Orient imports its beef from Shantung. The Legation accordingly pointed out that cattle export was an important industry in Shantung, that only surplus cattle were exported, that the famine stricken population could not in any case maintain their cattle until next year, that to cut off this legitimate income would be highly unjust. Nevertheless, up to the end of the year the embargo was not removed. This fact did not affect the export trade of cattle from Tsingtao over the Shantung Railway by Japanese dealers who could ignore the orders of the Chinese authorities.

EDUCATIONAL:

At the National University of Peking on October 17th there was conferred the degree of Ph. D. upon Dr. John Dewey, and LL.D. upon Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, former American Minister. Similar degrees, the highest that the University can bestow, have already been conferred upon Mr. Painleve, former Premier of France, and upon the President of the University of Lyons. All of these degrees were awarded at the same time, although for various reasons the dates of conferring of them varied. This event was recognized by educated Chinese as symbolizing the tribute of respect paid by the most noted modern Chinese intellectuals to the science of France and the United States.

SIEMS-CAREY CONTRACT:

At the beginning of the quarter, fears were entertained that the Chinese Government had serious intentions of cancelling the Siems-Carey railway project. The Government in Peking was aggressively asserting Chinese rights vis-a-vis foreign interests, and it was thought that this vigorous attitude of the Ministry of Communications was undoubtedly encouraged by the British and Japanese who would rejoice to see American interests eliminated from railway enterprise in China. As a matter of fact, although requests were made for the execution of the canal project in connection with the famine situation, and representations were made looking to the continuance of the railway project, no direct steps were attempted by the Chinese Government looking to cancellation.

CHANG CHING-YAO AND WILLIAM REIMERT:

In the case of the murder by the undisciplined soldiers of General Chang Ching-yao, the degraded Tuchun of Kunsu, of the American missionary, William Reimert, indemnity in the sum of $45,000 was paid by Chang personally on October 13th, but, despite the orders of the Government for his arrest and trial for various misdeeds, he was allowed to depart for Shanghai by Wang Chang-yuan, Tuchun of Hupeh. The Chinese Government expressed the view that the demands of justice had been satisfied by

the

[illegible]ection of Chang, and quoted legal opinion to the [illegible] that the only charge preferable by the American [illegible] being negligence, no greater penality was [illegible]ible. It was quite clear that Peking did not wish [illegible] make any particular effort to bring Chang to trial.

WINE AND TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION:

During the quarter there came up for renewed discussion the position of Mr. C.L.L.Williams, who was appointed Associate Inspector General of the Wine and Tobacco Administration. Because of the hostility of the Inspector General, Mr. Williams was never permitted to function, although through the influence of the Minister of Finance, Mr. Chow Tze-chi, he was given office room in the Ministry of Finance.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

The election of China to the Council of the League of Nations was a matter of great gratification to the Government. On December 25th a Mandate appointed Minister V.K. Wellington Koo Chinese representative.

DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS:

On September 29th Mandates appeared appointing V.K. Wellington Koo Minister to Great Britain, and Sze-ke Alfred Sze Minister to the United States, thus effecting an exchange. Chang Tsu-shen, a counselor in the Foreign Office, was appointed Minister to Sweden and Norway on October 29th.

On October 10th the Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Tientsin, Mr. Huang Jung-liang, was appointed Minister to Austria.

**Mr. [illegible]**

On October 2nd, Fr. Charles D. Tenney, who had served for many years in the Legation as Chinese Secretary and latterly as Counselor and Chargé d'Affaires, left Peking for the United States.

DEC 15
WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. 2.

Peking, September 9, 1921

No. 1601

893.00/4111

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:--

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies in quadruplicate of the Legation's Quarterly Political Report for the quarter ended March 31st, 1921.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

signed - A. B. Ruddock

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

1 - Copies in quadruplicate
of Quarterly Report,
March 31, 1921.

Encl 1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-I-217
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DEC 15 1921
WAR DEPARTMENT

# DOMESTIC POLITICS

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JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH

1921

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[redacted], including Military
[redacted] China.

The quarter was one of comparative calm as far as the situation in Peking itself was concerned. The Cabinet was plainly drifting in an unenthusiastic and aimless manner, endeavouring to patch up the country in an opportunist and dowdyish fashion, but without any real plan of action. Lack of funds, that great handicap of all Peking governments, continued to hamper the realization of such hazy plans as the Premier and his advisers may have indulged in. The quarter was therefore one of provincial by-play, the balancing of forces and the manoeuvers of political intrigues.

At the beginning of the year Peking politics revolved around the same question of funds. Chow Tzu-ch'i, Minister of Finance, was gradually losing prestige and was on the point of resigning. He found himself in a position common to all officials at this time. Those who can secure a loan at once become powerful, whereas those who are unable to obtain funds must give way to those more fortunately situated. The star of the Vice Minister, P'an Fu, was evidently in the ascendant. P'an was reported clearly more of an opportunist and more fortunate in having greater resources to draw upon.

In spite of many predictions to the contrary, the Peking Government weathered the financial crisis concomitant with the advent of the Chinese New Year. The Central Government brought suit in the Shanghai Native City Court against Dr. Wu Ting Fang in order to obtain the sum of $1,800,000 deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in Shanghai

in his

in his name, and in the meantime obtained in the British Supreme Court of Shanghai an interim injunction restraining the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation from parting with the funds credited to Dr. Wu.

National finances were the talk of the day. Emphasis was laid on the funds available from the group of native banks, $6,000,000 per month, which was considered adequate to run the Central Government, were declared to be available if the Salt and Customs surpluses were pledged as security. A Presidential Mandate of March 24 ordered the Minister of Finance to consult with the Native Banks Group, the Inspector General of Customs, the Directors of the Bank of China and Bank of Communications for the purpose of placing the various internal loans on a stronger basis. Some arrangement similar to the 24, 4th and 7th year loan service was suggested. Political conditions and particularly financial conditions were gloomy throughout the quarter. The Peking Government was undoubtedly in a weakened condition and the Cabinet wavering. So inadequate were the government revenues that the teachers in the primary schools were greatly in arrears of salaries and went on strike. This not only undermined the position of the Minister of Education, but shook the stability of the Cabinet as a whole. Admiral Sah Chen-p'ing, Minister of the Navy and ineffective Acting Premier before the last accession of General Chin, fell seriously ill and insisted on resigning his post.

The only Yuehun south of Peking who appeared to be offering active support to the Premier was Wang Chen-yuan of Hupeh.

NO NATIONAL SPIRIT IN PEKING

The extreme impoverishment of the Chinese Government manifesting itself in many directions, such as the non-payment

...ways, the nonpayment of interest on foreign and domestic loans, etc., had also caused it to become in arrears in the payment of salaries of teachers in the government schools in Peking. On this account both the teachers and students of Peking in March went on a strike in order to compel the Government to supply the funds necessary for the maintenance of the National University and seven other government institutions. The Government showed a callous indifference to the demands made upon it for educational funds.

The resignation of General Pao Kwei-ching as Tuchun of Kirin was finally accepted, General Sun Lieh-chun being appointed to his place. General Wu Chun-hsiang, one of Chang Tso-lin's division commanders, was appointed Tuchun of Heilungchiang. The resignation of General Pao removed one of the few Chinese officials in Manchuria who were not absolutely under the control of Chang Tso-lin. General Chang Wei-hsiang, whom Chang Tso-lin desired to be removed as commander of the railway troops, was the only one remaining who was not subservient to Chang's influence.

Throughout the quarter the press contained constant references to a monarchical restoration movement alleged to be instigated by General Chang Tso-lin. Several incidents gave strong color to the possibility of such a monarchical movement. The return of Chang Hsun to active politics was notable. Prince Tuan, who, by Article 2 of the International Protocol of 1900, was to be exiled forever to Turkestan, returned to Peking during the fall of 1920 and had been residing in the capital since then. A meeting was held at Mukden during March of the friends and adherents of Chang Tso-lin, ostensibly on the occasion of Chang's birthday, but really, it was believed, to afford an opportunity for the exchange of views on a possible coup d'état. At the same time, another rival meeting was being held at Hankow by

representatives

representatives of the tuchuns of the Yangtze Valley provinces and it was thought that the determined attitude of that section of the country with which Wu Pei-fu was in sympathy would serve as a deterrent on Chang Tso-lin to prevent the immediate execution of his plans. These monarchical rumors obtained such currency that both General Chang and the Government considered it necessary to issue formal denials. Nevertheless, it was strongly believed in Peking that General Chang, at any rate, had general plans for a monarchical restoration, but was obliged to discard them in the face of a strong popular opposition. At the end of the quarter, the real intentions of Chang Tso-lin were still uncertain. Whether it was his plan to attempt the restoration of the monarchy in China, the establishment of an independent Manchuria, or maintain a psition of passive inaction during the coming events in Siberia was unknown. There was no doubt, however, that he was in close touch with Semenoff's representative in Mukden as well as with the Japanese.

SZECHUAN

At the end of December the Peking Government issued a Mandate appointing General Hsiung Ko-wu Civil Governor of the province. One of his chief military and political rivals in the province, General Liu Ts'un-hou, still retained his appointment as Military Governor conferred by Peking previously. General

Liu Hsiang

Liu Hsiang was appointed Pacification Commissioner at Chungking. It was thought that the aspirations of the three dominant leaders in the province would thus all be satisfied. As showing the specious nature of the relations of many of the provinces to Peking at the present time, it was interesting to note that General Hsiang had previously received and still retained the appointment of Military Governor from the Canton Government. Confronted with the necessity of making a choice, he was reported to have declined with indignation the appointment conferred by the Peking Government, but in any event his action was of comparatively little importance since both he and General Liu Ts'un-hou were soon compelled by the vicissitudes of politics to leave the province to the practical control of General Liu Hsiang. In any event this enormous province remits no funds, except maritime customs receipts, to Peking, not even the salt revenues, which are nominally under foreign control and pledged as security to the Reorganization Loan of 1913. The province had long been the scene of conflicts with troops from the neighboring and much poorer province of Yunnan, and had even been under the domination of the latter, but the Yunnan forces had met with serious reverses and had withdrawn. It thereupon announced its independence both of Peking and of Canton and so far as is known made good its boast.

From all reports it likewise appears to have arrived at a state of comparative tranquility, although it is unfortunate in the fact that its only outlet for commerce, the Yangtze River, is infested with small independent military leaders, amounting to scarcely more than brigands, which fact greatly affects its prosperity.

SHANSI

SHANSI

This province, adjacent to Chihli on the west, ever since the revolution of 1911 has contrived to remain aloof from provincial politics. Its governor, General Yen Hsi-shan, is known as the "Model Governor". He maintains a force of about 60,000 men and gives his attention to the educational and economic welfare of the people. The provincial assembly has considerable influence in the finances of the province and beyond grumbling somewhat at increased taxes the people seem fairly contented.

SHENSI

The next province to the West, Shensi, has in its southern portion an alien element in the shape of a portion of the so-called "People's Army" which maintains a rather tenuous connection with Canton under the leadership of General Yü Yu-jen. Similar small enclaves of political power exist in some other provinces. Unless the leaders concerned attempt to push their ambitions too strongly they seem to disturb conditions very little, but as will be evident, their presence constitutes one of the many factors which compel the provincial leaders to maintain, at ruinous cost, their overgrown provincial armies. The province itself is poor, and the Governor, a person of no especial qualifications, is said to derive his political strength, such as it is, from the support of General Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria.

KIANGSU

In this province the people, who are largely Mohammedan and more independent that the average Chinese, finally became tired of their Military Governor, General Chang Kwang-chien,

and caused

and caused his retirement, whereupon the Government appointed General Ts'ai Ch'ang-hsun, then Tartar General at Suiyuan, to be his successor. The powerful Mohammedan elements, however, desired the appointment of a Mohammedan general named Ma Fu-hsiang, a man who bears a very good reputation, even among foreigners, and on this account General Ts'ai was unwilling to assume his post. An acting governor was therefore appointed. The province is too distant for the Peking Government to endeavor to enforce its will against any determined opposition. As a general thing it cannot effect a change of military governors unless it is sure of the support of other military governors having strong forces at their disposal.

**[redacted]**

This distant province in the Northwest extremity of China, with a very large Turki element in its population, plays a small part in present day Chinese politics. The Military Governor has remained unchanged for a long time and the province comes into prominence only occasionally owing to its juxtaposition to Russian territory, with consequent complications arising from the incursions either of reactionary refugees, such as the forces of Ataman Annenkoff, or of Soviet emissaries.

**[redacted]**

This province, in which are situated the extremely important Yangtze cities of Wuchang and Hankow, has already been mentioned in connection with the position of its Military Governor, General Wang Chan-yuan, as one of the three great supports of the Peking Government. This General, a rude

soldier

soldier of strong and arbitrary character, had latterly greatly aroused the hopes and gained the favor of the Peking Government by actively endeavoring to win over to the support of Peking the independent provinces of Szechuan, Yunnan, Kweichow and Hunan. He had convoked conferences of representatives of the powerful personages of these provinces and had led Peking to believe that he could secure their open allegiance to the Central Government. All that he needed in order to consummate his plans was an ample supply of money. This, of course, Peking was not in a position to supply and there appeared to be very little ground for thinking that his efforts would be crowned with success. At the same time it was very probable that the nominal allegiance of these provinces could be purchased, and that at not very exorbitant rates. The only thing that would stand in the way, if money were available, would be a threat of punishment from Canton, and Canton appeared to be in no position to make good such a threat. At any rate, General Wang Chan-yuan had greatly increased his prestige latterly by his machinations with the neighboring provinces and from being a person of slight consequence he had come to be considered one of the main props of Peking. He ruled his province with severity, suppressing with vigor any manifestation of popular aspirations, such as were indicated in student movements, while his lack of real loyalty to Peking was indicated by his stubborn resistance to the appointment of Hsia Shou-k'ang as Civil Governor. Not only did he refuse to acquiesce in this appointment made by the Peking Government, but he was so active in his hostility to the new Civil Governor that the latter was in March recalled to Peking. This was one of those numerous and constantly

growing

growing incidents that served as indications of the weakness of Peking vis à vis the provincial leaders.

HUNAN

Hunan was under the nominal control of General Chao Heng-t'i. He was theoretically independent both of Canton and of Peking, but endeavored to keep on good terms with both and was open to intimidation and financial inducement from either. The province was actually under the control of a number of subordinate military leaders who collected the taxes and throve upon the illicit encouragement of the opium traffic. One of the alien elements already referred to existed in this province in the shape of a military force under General Li Lieh-chün, who entered Hunan from the province of Yunnan and owed allegiance to Canton. The state of the province was gradually getting more and more deplorable as the militarists and their first cousins the bandits proved a very heavy load for the people to bear. The Governor reaped a considerable revenue from the provincial mint as did the military governor of Hupeh from the mint in that province, but he was becoming more and more enfeebled politically. A typical incident in his regime occurred on Christmas day when he murdered about ten of his more powerful political enemies. He was an open adherent of the new political doctrine of provincial autonomy and the province of Hunan had been the first to draw up and adopt a provincial constitution. Needless to say, while under his present military incubus, no system of representative government could possibly be put into effect.

YUNNAN

In January, General T'ang Chi-yao continued to rule this province as military governor under the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Provincial Forces. As already stated, he had conducted incursions into the adjacent provinces ofKwangsi, drawn thither by the rich revenues thereof, but the troops of Yunnan had begun to tire of all these military operations, to them apparently without any special objective, and the province of Yunnan itself had not been entirely remunerated for the great expense attendant thereon. This feeling of dissatisfaction found expression in the person of General Ku P'in-chen, a trusted lieutenant of the Governor, who turned against him and in the early days of February drove him from the capital, assuming the position of Commander-in-Chief himself. The effect of this action was to bring to an end the warfare between the two provinces, in which the smaller province of Kweichow had also been involved, and also to cause the withdrawal of the province of Yunnan from association with the Canton Government. The deposed Governor was one of the "Administrative Directors" of Canton, and he proceeded to that city announcing his intention to go on to Japan. Arrived at Canton, however, he was induced by Sun Yat Sen to remain and to take up his duties as one of the original seven administrative directors of whom only four remained. Sun Yat Sen sent a representative to the new Governor of Yunnan to ascertain his attitude towards Canton, but so far as was learned the province desired to maintain a position of isolation.

KWANGSI

It will be recalled that on October 27, 1920, General Mo Yung-hsin, the Kwangsi leader, then in control of the province of Kwangtung, was driven from Canton and returned with his forces to

Kwangsi.

Council. On December 29, 1928, the Peking Government issued an announcement that the province had cancelled its autonomy and had returned to its allegiance to Peking. Military and Civil Governors were appointed by Peking and thus nominally close relationships were re-established. The main hope of Peking was centered upon General Lu Jung-t'ing who was appointed Border Commissioner to protect the area adjacent to Kwangtung. This General, a relic of the old regime, had under him most of the forces that had previously conquered Kwangtung and through him the Peking Government, as it subsequently appeared, hoped to recover control of that province. In the meantime continual requests for money were sent to Peking by Kwangsi which were satisfied as far as possible. Otherwise the changed status resulted in no apparent difference to anyone concerned.

**KWEICHOW**

This rich province continued under the control of the ex-Anfu leader, General Lu Jung-hsiang, formerly Defense Commissioner at Shanghai. While seeking to remain friendly with Peking, he proclaimed his independence of Peking and of Canton and had latterly been loyally supporting the cause of provincial autonomy, even going so far as to offer to resign his position as Military Governor, an offer which he had not yet carried into effect. He maintained his position mainly by his control of northern troops in the province. The people on the whole appeared contented and the province peaceful.

**FUKIEN**

General Li How-chi, Military Governor of Fukien, had a rather difficult role to play on account of his province being adjacent to Kwangtung. In October of last year, when General Ch'en Ch'iung-

ming

which returned to Canton to help eject the Kwangsi forces, he associated General Ch'en Ch'iung-ming and he appeared to have a tacit understanding with the Canton Government. At the same time he was nominally friendly to Peking. Control of the provinces was here also maintained largely by the use of northern soldiers, but the latter were insubordinate and the condition of the people was not happy, since they were alternately harrassed by soldiers and by brigands.

**KWANGTUNG**

After returning to Canton in November, 1920, the former Military Government took up again, with the same personnel, though slightly depleted, the task of governing Kwangtung province, and it began a liberal program of reform. Gambling houses were closed amid great popular enthusiasm and the production of opium prohibited, thereby depriving the Government of a large source of income. Municipal improvements were initiated and through other similar democratic and public spirited policies, such as the extension of the franchise, the convening of a parliament - even though a rump one - and through invitations to the provinces to return their duly elected representatives, the granting of charters to cities to establish municipal government, the selection of magistrates from the district in which they functioned, etc., the confidence and respect of a considerable portion of the population, including foreigners, was largely won.

The Government, however, labored under the universal incubus of poverty and Sun Yat Sen was greatly incensed by the refusal of the Diplomatic Body to authorize the rendition to him of the surplus customs revenue, of 2,500,000 taels accumulated during the months when the Kwangsi forces were in control at Canton. This acute question arose in the previous quarter, but reached its climax

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in the quarter under consideration. The contention of the Canton Government was that each province was entitled to a proportionate amount of the customs duties collected in the province and that these particular funds which had been earmarked for Canton but set aside pending a definite settlement of the Canton situation should now, because of the established government of Sun Yat Sen, be handed over by the Diplomatic Corps to Canton. The contention of Peking was that nothing should interfere with the flow of the revenue derived from the customs to the central customs bureau at Peking, as otherwise, should each province attempt to detain for local purposes the funds derived from the customs, there would not only be no revenue left for the Central Government at Peking which had the needs of the entire country in mind, but also there would be inadequate funds with which to meet the foreign loans to which the customs revenues were pledged as a first mortgage.

Early in the quarter, Mr. Guo Tai-ch'i, representing Sun Yat-Sen, came to Peking to interview the foreign legations on the subject and to request the rendition to the Canton Government of 13-7/10% of the customs surplus formerly allocated to it but lately withheld on account of the non-representative character of the Canton Government. Mr. Guo urged that the southern portion again be given to the South because a precedent had already been set, because the Canton Government was the only organization in China representing modern liberal ideas of honest government and because the Peking Government was unrepresentative of the nation and was corrupt, inefficient and opposed to all progress.

In reply to the argument that the Peking Government is the government of China recognized by the foreign nations and

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responsible, therefore, for all the obligations based upon the customs revenue and should be at liberty to dispose of those revenues with entire freedom, that is, to give a portion to the South or not, as it desired, without interference from foreign nations. Mr. Quo replied that in the last few years the Peking Government had saddled the nation with enormous foreign loans, especially Japanese, which the southern provinces would be obliged to assist in repaying, while the country at large, and they in particular, had received no vestige of benefit from such loans. He objected primarily to the reorganization loan of 1913 which he alleged was unconstitutional, never having been authorized by Parliament, and was the cause of all China's subsequent misfortunes because with the proceeds of this loan Yuan Shih-k'ai was able to throw overboard all projects of constitutional developments in China and indefinitely retard the formation of a republican form of government.

Mr. Quo was listened to by the different legations without comment or encouragement.

In view of the unsympathetic attitude of the foreign legations, Dr. Wu Ting Fang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sun Yat Sen's government, toward the middle of January telegraphed the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps that, as the Canton Government exercised all power, de facto as well as legal, in the constitutionalist provinces, it was an absurdity and anomaly for the Chinese maritime customs to function in those provinces under orders from Peking and to collect and divert revenue for use elsewhere; that, therefore, the Canton Government had directed the customs service in those provinces after February 1st to be subject to its orders and control, those of the present personnel who acknowledged the authority of Canton to be retained and rules hitherto obtaining to be observed; foreign obligations based on

the customs

the customs to be scrupulously met and to form first charge pro rata on collection. After consideration by the Diplomatic Body, the Dean replied that no interference with the loan service arrangements or with the administration of the customs would be tolerated. To the Consular Corps at Canton was left the decision as to the manner in which this message should be delivered.

The Canton Government then issued a long public statement giving the reasons leading to the proposed step and at the same time indicted the Peking Government for squandering millions of dollars and for not bringing about the unification of the country by meeting the delegates of the South in conference. At the same time the Canton Government recalled that it had abolished gambling in Kwangtung at a sacrifice of $10,000,000 yearly revenue, had effected the disbandment of troops, etc. On January 27th the Canton Government issued a further statement with regard to the proposed seizure of the customs, declaring that in taking the step it was intended to open the eyes of the Peking Government and compel it to introduce successful reforms with the object of reuniting China. The military government alleged that it did not intend to jeopardise the interest of foreign bond holders guaranteed by the customs revenue or interfere with the existing management of the customs.

As a matter of fact, the threat of the Canton military government did not materialise. The Inspector General of Customs made a timely arrangement for the removal of the customs office to the Island of Shameen, off the city of Canton, which is under foreign control. Sir Francis Aglen furthermore, through an exchange of telegrams with Dr. Wu, apparently brought home to the Canton Government the uselessness of the step under contemplation.

On February 3d

On February 24, the Canton Government issued a face-saving statement declaring that the military government's intention to control the customs in the southern ports had been communicated to the Inspector General of Customs at Peking and that the Inspector General had assured the military government that he acknowledged the authority of the military government and that he took instructions from that government.

In the meantime, the matter was under active consideration by the Diplomatic Body and considerable divergence of opinion was experienced. The matter was crystallized, however, by the decision of the American Government which directed the Legation at Peking to inform the Diplomatic Body, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Wu Ting-fang through the American Consul General at Canton that the Department of State was of the opinion that the foreign powers were not competent to withhold from the Peking Government any surplus which might be due it or to impose new conditions for the release of funds held in trust for the Peking Government by the Commission of Bankers which handled the service of the Boxer Indemnity and the pre-Boxer loans. This notification to Dr. Wu naturally resulted in lengthy statements in reply from him. The notification to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Peking was of course highly gratifying to the Peking Government.

Announcement of the views of the American Government pointed the way for the concurrence by the other members of the Diplomatic Corps and in return the Peking Government submitted to the Diplomatic Corps for its approval a proposal to use the customs surplus originally allocated for the use of the Canton Government in the following manner:

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1. 480,000 taels for Canton conservancy.
2. 700,000 taels for diplomatic and consular service expenses.
3. 1,400,000 taels to be handed to the Inspector General of Customs for strengthening the domestic loans.

In a subsequent communication it was proposed to set aside from the third category $200,000 for plague prevention service on the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

At a meeting of the Corps on March 11th, all the legations but one, namely, the French, were prepared, in view of the instructions received by the American Legation, to accept the proposal of the Chinese Government and it was agreed that each legation would reply separately to the Chinese Foreign Office. At the last moment, however, the French Minister withdrew his objections to the proposed allocation of the accumulated southern customs surplus, and the consent of the Diplomatic Corps became unanimous. Before yielding, however, the French Minister secured the allocation of a certain part of the funds for French educational purposes in Kwangtung Province.

During February, the Central Government obtained an injunction in the British Supreme Court at Shanghai restraining the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation from parting with the funds of the Canton customs surplus deposited in the name of Dr. Wu Ting-fang pending the action instigated in the Shanghai Native City Court. This action at Peking was in reply to that of Dr. Wu who had secured the removal of an injunction placed on Taels 1,125,400 belonging to the Canton Government and on deposit in the foreign bank in Shanghai. The injunction was made in April, 1920, and Dr. Wu had asked for its removal on the grounds, among others, that he was no longer a resident of the international settlement; that the members of the Canton Government which had in April asked for the injunction were no longer members of the Canton Government and that he did not represent the Canton

Government. The court granted the removal of the injunction on the ground that Dr. Wu had been removed from the jurisdiction of the court.

CASSEL CONTRACT

Although no further developments occurred during this quarter in connection with the Cassel contract for coal mining operations in Kwangtung Province, the contract was under active consideration. Mr. Frederick W. Stevens, American Consortium representative, following his visit to Canton, was convinced that this contract was virtually one to secure railway privileges and principally to obtain connection between the Hankow-Canton Line and the Canton-Hongkong Line in order to feed the harbor of Hongkong to the detriment of the harbor of Canton.

# RELATIONS WITH FORRIGN COUNTRIES

SINO-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS

At the beginning of the quarter Mongolia was still the scene of great unrest. Chinese troops were in control at Urga and were continuing their policy of persecution toward Russians and insolence toward other foreigners. The Mongols were intriguing with Baron Ungern von Sternberg to capture Urga. The Living Buddha was still held prisoner by the Chinese. Chinese authority in Mongolia was divided between General Chen Yi, the Pacification Commissioner, and General Chang Ching-hui, the Tartar General at Kalgan. Great suffering was felt by the Russian population at Urga due to the cruelty of the Chinese and at a season of extreme cold. Travel and commerce in Mongolia was still unsafe. Cars belonging to American firms were attacked and conditions in general were dangerous for foreigners. In February, the Living Buddha proclaimed the independence of Mongolia and declared himself emperor. Orders were sent to the chieftains, princes and nobles of the various leagues urging them to co-operate and free Mongolia from Chinese rule.

As a result of co-operation between the various factions hostile to the Chinese, Urga was captured on February 3d by Baron Ungern von Sternberg with a small force of Cossacks, Tartars, Buriats, Mongols and a few Japanese. Many Chinese soldiers, as well as many Jews and Bolsheviks, were slaughtered by Ungern's orders after the capture of the city. On the other hand, there was practically no looting and persons caught so doing were hanged. The Living Buddha was thereupon freed and proclaimed ruler of Mongolia.

In taking Urga, Ungern also captured practically all of the Chinese artillery, machine guns and rifles belonging to the Chinese in garrison at the time, together with large

quantities

quantities of ammunition and other supplies. The defeated Chinese troops fled in great disorder toward the north and west.

The Diplomatic Body had under discussion during the month of February the question of a relief expedition to Urga to be organized under the direction of foreign military attachés at Peking, but on the recommendation of the Senior (Japanese) Military Attaché, the proposal was abandoned.

The Chinese Government was unable, in view of the severity of the Mongolian winter and of its own financial difficulties, to do anything to recover its control of Urga and Outer Mongolia generally and the Russian-Mongol forces penetrated south half the distance to Kalgan. No attempt was made to capture Kalgan itself and so far as the Chinese Government was concerned no effort was made to expel the invaders.

## [redacted] RELATIONS

The beginning of the quarter witnessed the formal establishment of the Far Eastern Republic. The Constitutional Assembly of the Republic met in Chita on February 12th. Of the 424 elected members, 351 were present. Mr. Shilov, formerly commander of the partisan groups in Amur Province, was elected chairman of the executive committee which was composed of twelve members of the various political parties. The Assembly opened by a speech from Mr. Krasnoshekov, head of the Far Eastern Republic. Japanese military and political missions were present in Chita at the opening of the Assembly. As was to be expected, the career of the Assembly was a stormy one, arising from the conflict of interests and ideas between the Communists, under direction from Moscow, and the less radical groups. The Republic began a vigorous military existence so far as lay within its powers. Mobilization orders requiring all men between the ages of 20 and 35 years to report for military duty were issued, materially increasing the forces of the Republic. No troops were sent to European Russia from that part of Siberia east of Lake Baikal and no troops arrived in the territory of the Republic from Russia.

The relations of Chita with Habarovsk, Blagoveschensk and Vladivostok were kaleidoscopic and changed with each new situation presented by the alternating plans of the Japanese military leaders and the reaction produced upon the Russian parties in Eastern Siberia. It seemed clear that the Chita Government had received orders from Moscow to avoid a conflict and to make a trade agreement with Japan. Economic conditions, strategic situation, the condition of the Amur Railroad line, were all unfavorable to the Chita Government in

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the Sino of war with Japan.

Simultaneously, Mr. Yourin, head of the Far Eastern Republic Mission in Peking, continued to press his negotiations with the Chinese Government. World-wide opposition to Soviet Russia of which Chita was supposed to be at best but a disguised outpost, led China, in spite of the obvious advantages which she would obtain from a commercial agreement with Chita, to postpone, during the quarter, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, any definite conclusion in the negotiations with Yourin.

China, however, appointed a Consul General at Chita to take charge, among other duties, of the transportation of Chinese travelers from Urga and Kiakhta to Manchuria from Chita by arrangement with the Republic. The Chinese officials were bitter in their complaints that Chinese laborers in the Far Eastern Republic's territory were being maltreated and subject to extortion in spite of representations by the Chinese Government.

The frontier at Manchuli Station was finally opened to traffic between the Far Eastern Republic and China, but the anticipated commercial activity did not result. The credit of the Chita Government did not materially improve as there was practically no buying in the Harbin market.

Toward the end of the quarter a communication was received by the Legation from Yourin, emissary in Peking of the Far Eastern Republic. It was temperate and reasonable in tone. It declared that the Far Eastern Republic had now been established for a year; was functioning well; was controlled by a Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage and guaranteeing full civil rights, including inviolability of private property; it declared the territory of the Republic was now well in hand and was resisting foreign encroachment; the Republic welcomed legitimate trade; it hoped for friendly

relations

relations with the United States and for economic co-operation, it had valuable resources to exploit and products to market, it requested the United States to send a delegate or commission to Chita and asked permission itself to send a commission to the United States to present its case.

EASTERN SIBERIA

The situation in Eastern Siberia continued critical. About 35,000 Russian troops were mobilized at Habarovsk. The Japanese occupation naturally resulted in tending to unite all Russian factions against the Japanese, thereby tending to strengthen rather than weaken the Chita Government. The Japanese have between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the line extending from America Bay to Possiet Bay, the line passing through the Suchan mines, Spasskoe and Nicolsk. At the beginning of the quarter there were no Japanese troops west of Harbin. The Japanese had one battalion at Harbin and one battalion distributed between Harbin Changchun and Harbin Pogranitchnaya. These were the only Japanese troops between Harbin and the maritime provinces.

Food shortage was general throughout Eastern Siberia.

Mr. Parvinoff, representative of the Vladivostok Government, detailed to arrange for the demobilization of Kappel troops, was arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Mukden about February 26th and was released in early March.

Semenoff, at the beginning of the quarter, was still in

Dairen

Japan. His agents were active in various cities in China, all of them were well supplied with funds and engaged in purchasing arms and equipment necessary for a military campaign. Undoubtedly a close liaison existed between Ungern in Mongolia, Semenoff, certain reactionary groups in China and Europe, and the Japanese.

At the beginning of the quarter, Semenoff visited Mukden with the avowed intention of inducing Chang Tso-lin to approve a plan providing for the organization of Russian troops under Semenoff to garrison and act as railway guards on a part of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This plan had Japanese approval. General Chang received Semenoff politely, but refrained from committing himself on the plan. In February, two representatives of Semenoff and the reactionary Russians visited Peking, General Kreschatisky and General Zeilkoff.

## SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

On January 27th, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs exchanged notes with the Japanese Legation abolishing the Sino-Japanese Military Pact of 1918. This pact had for years been the subject of very great criticism throughout China. T'ang Shao-yi demanded its cancellation as a prerequisite to the internal peace conference, and Premier Chin had been subject to attacks from all quarters for participation in its conclusion. As Minister of War, he had himself gone to Japan to consummate the agreement.

On January 3d, the Legation was authorized by the Department of State to notify the American Consuls and the Japanese Minister that on and after January 15th the temporary acquiescence in Japanese passport control on railways under Japanese supervision was withdrawn. The previous request of the Japanese Minister for postponement of this notification was declined and he was informed that the American Government was unable to acquiesce in his contention that it did not assent to these regulations inasmuch as the American Government did not consider that the Japanese authorities had been granted any right to scrutinize the passports of American citizens in Chinese territory. As a result of this position taken by the American Government, the Japanese Minister in Peking on January 18th informed the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps that the Japanese Government would, from the 1st of February, 1921, discontinue the examination of passports of all foreigners in the zone of the Shantung and Manchurian railways.

Major Wallace Philcox, Assistant Military Attaché visited the Hunchun district to investigate the results of the Japanese invasion. Arriving in Hunchun on December 31st, he reported that the large proportion of Japanese troops were retiring to

Korea

Korea; that the campaign of terrorism had been discontinued; that there was no indication of Bolshevism; that the Korean independent forces had been scattered into the mountains and that the bandits were quiet.

During the quarter there was under consideration the misconduct of a Japanese station employee at Tsingtau towards two American ladies, a Miss Donaldson and a friend. A rather grudging expression of regrets for the affront offered was finally elicited after long correspondence with the Japanese authorities.

YUNNAN

Toward the end of January, Assistant Military Attaché John Magruder, accompanied by Student Interpreter Howard Buckmall, left for an extended trip in Yunnan and Szechuan, along the Tibetan border, for purposes of investigation of local conditions. During the quarter telegraphic and written reports were received from them indicating their progress through the two provinces named. They had not yet returned to Peking at the end of the quarter.

# MISCELLANEOUS

During the quarter, the question of famine relief played a very conspicuous role. The proposal of the Chinese Government made in the previous quarter for the imposition of a customs surtax of one-tenth with which to obtain famine funds had received the general approbation of the foreign governments, but great difficulties were encountered in securing from the Chinese authorities adequate foreign representation and measure of control in the disbursement of the funds thus obtained. Protracted and even acrimonious negotiations were necessary in order to bring this matter to a conclusion satisfactory to the Diplomatic Corps. Finally, on January 14th the Ministers of Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands, acting as a committee on behalf of the Diplomatic Corps, met the Chinese Ministers of Finance and Interior at the Netherlands Legation and after protracted interview of some hours agreed upon a committee for the control of the disbursement of the surtax proceeds.

The Committee as agreed upon was as follows:

1. The foreign treasurer of the Peking United International Famine Relief Committee.
2. The chairman of the investigation committee of that body.
3. A representative of the American Red Cross Society.
4. A representative of the North China International Society for Famine Relief of Tientsin.
5. A representative of the Chinese-Foreign Relief Society of Shanghai.
6. A representative of the Peking United International Famine Relief Committee.

The Chinese membership was:

1. The Chinese treasurer of the Peking United International Famine Relief Committee.
2. A representative of the Government Relief Bureau.
3. A representative of the Province of Chihli

4. A representative to be elected by the International Relief Committee of Shantung.

5. A representative to be elected by the International Relief Committee of Honan.

6. A representative to be elected by the International Relief Committee of Shansi.

The loan of the four banks, French, British, Japanese and American for the sum of $4,000,000, for which the famine surtax was to serve as security, was shortly afterward concluded.

A further delay occurred on the question of the going into effect of the famine surtax. The Diplomatic Body finally agreed that the same delay should occur in the putting into effect of the surtax as occurred in the case of the revised tariff, that is, one month's time. After consultation with the Chinese authorities, it was agreed that the surtax would be collected on all imports and exports beginning immediately with March 1st, and that shipments from abroad, made prior to that date, would also pay the surtax. The committee of control thus agreed upon by the Diplomatic Body and the Chinese authorities at once entered upon its duties and functioned satisfactorily during the quarter.

In the early part of January, President Wilson appointed Thomas W. Lamont as chairman of a committee to raise funds in the United States for famine relief in China. Mr. Frederick W. Stevens, American Consortium representative, was named by Mr. Lamont as his representative in Peking. A committee was formed by Mr. Stevens in collaboration with the American Minister, Mr. Crane, called the American Advisory Committee for Famine Relief, and composed of the following members:

Mr. Charles R. Crane, American Minister

Mr. Frederick W. Stevens, Consortium representative.

Mr. George L. Davis, of the Methodist Mission

Mr. George D. Wilder, of the Congregationalist Mission

Mr. John D. Rayon, of the Presbyterian Mission

Mr. Henry L. Deckweiler, Second Secretary of the Legation, [illegible] of the Vicar Apostolic.

Mr. J. L. Baker, American Adviser in the Chinese Ministry of Communications, representative of the American Red Cross in China

Mr. R. H. Bailey, of the Y. M. C. A.

Mr. Roger S. Greene, Director of the China Medical Board, Rockefeller Institute.

Mr. Charles E. Bennett, Manager of the International Banking Corporation

Mr. Henry G. Emery, Manager of the Asia Banking Corporation

Dr. Robert Coltman, Standard Oil Company

Mr. William Morgan Palmer, Adviser in the Salt Gabelle.

This committee co-operated closely with the United International Famine Relief Committee in famine work and was of greater assistance in famine relief than any other purely foreign body in China.

During the quarter, Mrs. Eleanor Egan was sent to China by the Saturday Evening Post to report at great length on famine conditions. She made a personal visit to the famine district and sent home voluminous and it is believed highly exaggerated and untrustworthy reports of the conditions.

The International Famine Relief Committee had a stormy beginning, as was to be expected from so international a body. The inefficiency and indifference of the Chinese themselves combined with international rivalries and the desire of many of the countries which really did not contribute very much toward the famine to play a role equal to those who did, naturally produced unfriendly feelings. However, the greatest efforts were made by the Americans to co-operate with this committee as far as was possible in order to alleviate the distress which it was at first believed to be very great. As time went on, however, it was clearly shown that the first reports

were

were grossly exaggerated and that while suffering undoubtedly existed, the original figures given of deaths and destitution were very highly colored. Nevertheless, the continued drouth always offered a fear for the future that the conditions described in unofficial and sensational reports as already existing might actually develop, and the Americans were spurred on to sustained efforts to combat the situation as it existed.

CONCLUSION

Following the arrival of Mr. Frederick V. Stevens, representative of the American Group in the Consortium, toward the end of December, 1920, as reported in the report for the preceding quarter, negotiations were at once actively begun by him with the representatives of the other Consortium groups looking to an agreement as to methods of operation. He furthermore began an extensive investigation of the situation in financial and banking circles in China. It very soon became apparent that the Consortium was not prepared, for the time being at least, to make any cash advances to China for any purpose whatsoever, even for those which the Consortium had declared to be within the scope of its activity. The effect, therefore, of Mr. Stevens' presence in China as regarded the actual financial condition of the country was at most indirect. There was no doubt that the failure of the Consortium to come forward with any funds, while not unexpected, was nevertheless a source of deep disappointment to the Minister of Finance, Mr. Chow Tzu-ch'i, and to the large body of Chinese officialdom and public, who pretended to see in this a verification of their openly expressed fears that the United States had been enticed into the Consortium by the other participants for the purpose of tying America's hands while the other nations were free to proceed at will to perfect their financial plans in China. From that point of view, Mr. Stevens' presence in China, after his much-heralded arrival, was one of considerable disappointment and loss of prestige for the United States.

On the other hand, a distinct though indirect benefit to China arose from the formation of the Consortium and the presence of its representatives in China through the strengthening of two Chinese banking groups, one in North China and one in Central

China

China, which took on new life and became increasingly independent in their attitude toward the Government in the matter of government loans. This feature of the situation can hardly be over-emphasized and deserves the most careful attention. It may very well prove to be one of the most efficient methods of bringing home to the Chinese through a channel to which they are all highly susceptible, namely, their pocketbooks, the solidarity of interests between the individual and the Government which is now so totally lacking in the Chinese body politic. If the Chinese Government can come under the control of the Chinese banking interests, it will be a long step toward stabilization of conditions in the country and the permanent weakening of the corrupt and leech-like military leaders who are dragging the country into deeper and deeper chaos.

On the other hand, Mr. Stevens in his relations with his colleagues in the Consortium encountered very grave difficulties. The principal point of difference was with the British over the question of leadership. The resolution No. 19, adopted at the New York meeting of the Consortium, providing that the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation continue to act as clearing house for the Consortium, gave basis for the British Legation and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to claim leadership in the Consortium for the British Group. This matter came up for attention immediately after the arrival of Mr. Stevens and formed throughout his stay a subject of stormy and acrimonious dispute. At the end of the quarter the matter was still undetermined, Mr. Stevens' appeals to Mr. Lamont having failed to elicit anything positive in support or denial of the British contention.

As supplementary to the joint communication of the four legations of Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States of September 29, 1920, transmitting to the Chinese Government

copies

copies of correspondence leading up to the formation of the Consortium, there was transmitted on January 16th a further joint note from the four legations forwarding copies of additional correspondence in this connection, particularly the exchange of communications between the Japanese and American Governments. Following this were negotiations between the four interested governments for agreement as to the date of joint publication of these documents. It was agreed that publication should take place on February 15th. Later the Japanese Legation requested postponement to the end of March, on the ground that Japan hardly found itself in a very convenient position to have the documents published at a moment when the political mood of the Japanese nation was at its height through the sitting of the Imperial Diet and that some of the documents might easily invoke unwarranted criticisms which it was certainly desirable to avoid".

The Club of the Peking Bankers' Association of Peking opened in January, and gave physical evidence of the increasing importance and affluence of Peking banking circles.

LOANS FROM CHINESE BANKERS

In February, the Chinese Government concluded an arrangement with a Chinese group of banks at Shanghai by which the banks obligated themselves to advance funds to the extent of six million dollars silver for the purchase of railway supplies and materials. The Government itself, by this agreement, was not to handle any of the money, but the latter was to be paid directly to the sellers of the materials upon acceptance thereof by the Government and representatives of the Banks. In March the Government likewise concluded a loan for the erection of the Shanghai Mint, amounting to $2,500,000 silver. These loans were in addition to numerous petty loans concluded with Chinese banks at ruinous rates of interest for short periods.

It is to be noted that members of the Chinese Government are often personally interested in the banks from which money is borrowed. Such officials are manifestly not averse to concluding arrangements more favorable to the banks than to the Government, and the interest, with discounts, etc., is alleged often to amount to 30% or 40%.

## FEDERAL TELEGRAPH COMPANY

As a result of negotiations begun in the previous quarter, there was signed on January 8, 1921, a contract between the Chinese Ministry of Communications and the Federal Telegraph Company of California, represented by Mr. Barnes Hems, providing for the erection of four wireless stations in China, - at Shanghai, Peking, Harbin and Canton, with a fifth central station of great power for overseas communication likewise at Shanghai. The conduct of the service was to be in the form of a joint partnership for ten years with equal division of the profits. At the end of this period the entire ownership and management of the stations should vest in the Chinese Government, but the Company to receive royalties for a second period of ten years. The signing of this contract was of fundamental importance, not only on account of the value to the United States and China in providing for direct, rapid and inexpensive telegraph communication between the United States and China, but also because of the question which this contract raised of the open door in China and the validity of monopolistic and preferential agreements entered into between China and foreign powers.

As a result of the signing of this contract, vigorous protests were entered with the Chinese Government by the Danish, British and Japanese Governments, and with the American Government by the Japanese Government, on the ground of the infringement respectively of the terms of China's agreements with the Great Northern Telegraph Company, the China National Wireless Telegraph Company (Marconi) and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha Wireless Company, as follows:

By a contract dated May 24, 1919, the Ministry of War had arranged with the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company for the creation of a British-Chinese concern called the Chinese

National

National Wireless Telegraph Company, the latter to have the exclusive privilege, prices and other conditions being equal, to supply the Chinese Government with all of its requirements in the nature of wireless apparatus. Under date of February 21, 1918, the Ministry of the Navy had concluded with the Japanese firm, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, a contract providing for the erection of a large wireless installation in Peking, this contract being followed on March 5th of the same year by an exchange of notes guaranteeing that the Chinese Government would neither itself erect any other wireless installation for overseas communications, nor permit anyone else to do so. On the score of these contracts the British and the Japanese Governments, as soon as they learned of the American contract, protested to the Chinese Government against the alleged violation of their rights. The Danish Government protested on behalf of the Great Northern Telegraph Company, alleging that the Company had contracts with the Chinese Government wherein the latter had promised to prevent any competition with the cable business of the Great Northern Telegraph Company and its associated companies until the year 1930.

These protests at once called forth vigorous communications from the American Government to the three governments concerned, in which there was discussed the fundamental questions of open door and equal trade opportunity in China. The American Government at once reaffirmed its well-known position in regard to the incompatibility of any and all preferential and monopolistic rights conferred by the Chinese Government to private concerns with various treaty provisions, notably Article 30 of the Chinese-American Treaty of 1858, etc. Strongly worded correspondence was exchanged between Copenhagen, Tokyo, London and Washington, no party to the controversy showing any disposition to abate its claims. The Chinese Government, apparently

terrified,

[illegible] at the international conflict it had provoked, adopted a policy of absolute neutrality and left the foreign nations concerned to adjust their conflicting claims among themselves. However, the Chinese Government was subjected to so much pressure from the three governments that it appeared to be weakening in its support of the American contract and the American Government deemed it necessary in early February to inform the Chinese Government that to cancel the Federal Telegraph Company's contract on the ground of its disregard of monopolistic or preferential clauses in other contracts would be regarded by the American Government as an unfriendly act. This stern warning served to preserve the existence of the Federal contract. So great, however, was the pressure brought by the British Legation upon the Chinese Government that an agreement was reached between the British and American Legations whereby they mutually agreed to refrain from making any further representations to the Chinese Government on the question pending the outcome of the exchange of views then going on between Washington and London.

On February 16th, the Japanese Minister protested to the American Legation on the ground of the Mitsui contract.

Mr. Barnes Mann, the representative of the Federal Telegraph Company, upon the signature of the contract returned to America to present the contract to his Company and to the Department of State. The Company confirmed the contract at the end of the quarter and, at the instance of the Department of State, submitted to the American Consortium Group the question of its financing. The American and also the British, French and Japanese groups, to which the question was also referred by the American group, all having declined to participate in the financing, the Company was left free to obtain the funds where it chose.

to these.

In this connection an important conference took place toward the end of the quarter between the representatives of the British and American Legations, on which occasion the question of British-American co-operation and trade rivalry in China was thoroughly discussed. Taking the British protest against the Federal Telegraph Company's wireless contract as a theme, the representatives of the British Legation inquired whether the American principle of the open door and equal opportunity was to operate to dispossess established foreign interests in China, such as railways, mines, telegraphs, etc., even those of preferential character like the Hanyemi contract, thus depriving foreigners and, for instance, British, pioneering enterprises in China, of the initial advantages gained through foresight and business acumen over their competitors. The British representatives endeavored to argue that the Federal contract by its failure to take cognisance of existing contractual obligations, whether preferential or not, endangered the sanctity of all contracts in China and created the danger that China might use this precedent for breaking contracts at will irrespective of their nature, thus ushering in a period of intense trade competition in which the conclusion and execution of contracts would depend upon intimidation or inducement! The British representatives plainly hinted that in such a commercial warfare the British would triumph over the Americans. The British intimated further that if an understanding on commercial and financial matters in China could not be reached between the British and the Americans, it could much less be reached between the French and the Americans and the Japanese and the Americans.

As a very desirable alternative to such unrestrained competition the prospect was held out of British-American agreement and co-operation in China, the first move in that

4 direction

[illegible] being, of course, the surrender by the United States of its rights under the Federal wireless contract.

It was clearly apparent that the British Legation was perturbed over a prospective American success in China of such magnitude as that represented by the Federal Telegraph Company's wireless contract.

## EX-GERMAN, EX-AUSTRIAN and EX-RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS

During the quarter there was an active discussion of the degree of control to be maintained by the Chinese authorities over the ex-German, ex-Austrian and ex-Russian concessions in Shanghai and Hankow. Considerable dissatisfaction was expressed by the foreign residents in these concessions in Tientsin, while the situation at Hankow appeared to be better administered by the Chinese authorities. The principal cause of complaint in the Russian concession at Tientsin lay in the assumption by the Chinese authorities of the rights, duties and prerogatives of the former Russian Consul General, particularly of the right of control of the police administration of this concession. At the end of the quarter the question remained unsolved.

In the German concession the principal complaint lay with the building tax and land transfer tax imposed by the Chinese authorities. The matter was under consideration throughout the quarter by the Diplomatic Body.

[redacted]

The Government Gazette of January 31st published a letter from the Cabinet approving the plan of the Ministry of Communications for the construction of part of the Canton-Hankow-Szechuan (Hukuang) Railway. The plan called for the construction of a railway from Chuchow to Hengchow, and from Hengchow to Hsin T'an Ling, in Hunan Province. The funds for the construction of the railroads were to be provided from the earnings of the Peking-Hankow Railway, the Peking-Mukden Railway, the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. For the construction of the section between Chuchow and Hengchow each of the above named railroads was to provide the following amounts:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peking-Hankow Railway | - | $150,000 | per month for 3 years |
| Peking-Mukden " | - | 120,000 | per month for 3 years |
| Tientsin-Pukow " | - | 120,000 | per month for 3 years |
| Peking-Suiyuan " | - | 30,000 | per month for 3 years |

a total of $4,800,000 per annum or $14,400,000 for 3 years.

For the construction of the Hengchow-Hsin T'an Ling section, the four railways mentioned above would contribute a total of $200,000 a month for three years, or a total of $7,200,000. It was possible that the proposed construction of part of the Hukuang route with Chinese funds was due to the lack of hope of a Consortium loan.

PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY

A loan was made to the Peking-Mukden Railway by the British-Chinese Corporation to provide funds for double-tracking the line between Tongshan, the colliery town of the Kailan Mining Administration (British), and Shan Hai Kwan, a railroad division point a few miles northeast of Chinwangtao, the seaport of the Kailan Mining Administration. This double-tracking was therefore to be done in order to more easily take care of the more than

4,000,000

4,000,000 tons of coal produced annually by this mine.

There was considerable discussion as to the submission of the financing of this project to the British Group of the Consortium - which was done - and also as to strict equality of tenders for bids between firms of different nationality. As requests for such bids were published in England only, American firms felt cause for complaint.

AMERICAN EMBASSY AT PEKING

During the quarter there was wide comment in China on the news that a congressional sub-committee at Washington had reported favorably on the establishment of an American Embassy at Peking. The American press in China was favorably disposed to this proposal, whereas the foreign owned papers were averse on the ground that the American Government should not take such a step without consultation with other powers. The matter was later dropped by Congress.

PHILIPPINE BOOKKEEPING LAW

During the quarter the Chinese Government was considerably aroused by the passage by the Philippine Legislature of a law requiring account books to be kept in the English, Spanish or Philippine languages. It was claimed by the Chinese that this law was aimed against the Chinese inhabitants of the Islands, who keep their accounts in Chinese and that it would have a disastrous and unfair reaction on the Chinese residents in the

Islands.

Legation. Official representations were made to the Legation by the Foreign Office and petitions were received from Chinese Chambers of Commerce. The question was under consideration by the mission of General Wood in the Philippines.

HANDLEY-PAGE AEROPLANE CONTRACT

There continued into this quarter from the previous one the subject of the Handley-Page contract for the supply of a large number of flying machines to China. During the previous summer the British Legation had been subjected to very severe criticism for permitting the conclusion of the Vickers contract for the delivery of aeroplanes to China. The British Legation had furthermore experienced great difficulty in preventing the use of the aeroplanes already delivered in China for military purposes during the Anfu troubles by the military leaders on one side or the other. The Handley-Page Company, therefore, apparently appreciating that opposition would be made in official British circles, proceeded to the conclusion of their contract for a further supply of aeroplanes of their own manufacture to the Chinese Government without consultation with the British authorities. The matter having come to the attention of the British Legation, the British Minister made severe representations to the Handley-Page representative, refused the official support of the Legation to the contract and reported the matter to London where his position was confirmed. The official reasons given for such action was the infringement of the embargo on the importation of arms, the very large number of machines involved, the uselessness of the machines to the Chinese, the squandering of China's money and the fear that the Japanese Government would seize upon the opportunity to demand the entry into China for some Yen 13,000,000 of arms under contract

[illegible] but undelivered through the operation of the arms embargo. It was also alleged that the contract infringed the terms of the Consortium as the contract contemplated a public floatation of bonds abroad. The British Government finally requested that in view of its disapproval of the contract, similar action be taken by the American Government should an American firm, presumably the Curtiss Company, approach the American Government for support of a similar contract. This assurance was given by the American Government. Subsequent rumors current in Peking were to the effect that the refusal of the British Government to support the Handley-Page contract was also due to rivalry between the Vickers and Handley-Page companies and to domestic issues in Great Britain.

ARMS EMBARGO

During the quarter the question of the arms embargo received considerable attention. Although there was a feeling that certain infringements of the embargo had been committed by one or other of the contracting parties, nevertheless such quantities of materials as had been admitted into China had been comparatively small. The embargo by and large was effective and it had succeeded to a large extent in assisting to keep the country quiet and in assisting toward unity.

Nevertheless, the Congress of the United States, in withdrawing presidential war powers, took away from the American Executive the power to maintain the embargo on the exportation of arms to China. The Department of State continued, however, to refuse to approve the exportation of such materials and it was supposed that this would act as a deterrent on American exporters.

Protests were entered by the Peking Government against the

Use

[illegible] military purposes in Kwangtung Province of American [illegible] imported for commercial purposes. It appeared that planes bought by Guy Slaughter and Company and sold to Rihon, a French contractor in Macao and Canton, and used for exhibition and commercial purposes for some time, were afterward sold by Rihon in Shanghai to agents of Canton and eventually found their way into military operations.

## [illegible] CARGO

During the quarter very active consideration was given to the question of the importation of machinery capable of manufacturing arms and ammunition imported by the Davis Company, Limited, Canton and Hongkong, which was touched upon in the preceding report. The Peking Foreign Office continued to make vigorous protests to the Legation in an endeavor to secure the delivery to the arsenal of the undelivered portion of the cargo.

## SHANGHAI MINT LOAN

On March 4, 1921, the Chinese Government signed a loan agreement with a group of Shanghai Chinese bankers for a loan of $2,500,000 the proceeds of which were to be used for the construction of the new mint at Shanghai. Interest on the loan was at 9% and the loan was secured by the released Salt Gabelle surplus and the mint property. An American mint expert, Mr. Clifford Hewitt, was engaged as mint superintendent.

During the month of April, Mr. Roy Chapman Andrews, representing the American Museum of Natural History of New York, arrived in Peking on his third Asiatic Expedition. It was his plan to remain in China for five years and conduct extensive work of exploration in various categories of physical science throughout Western China and Mongolia.

## PLAGUE

During the quarter an outbreak of plague occurred in Southern Chihli along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Both native and foreign doctors were sent to suppress the outbreak and after some delay it was brought under control.

## INTERNATIONAL BANK AT TSINGTAU

Through lack of sufficient business, the International Banking Corporation was obliged during the quarter to close its branch at Tsingtau.

## MUNICIPALITY OF HARBIN

During the quarter there continued to be discussed the question of the reorganisation of the municipality of Harbin. The proposals of the Consular Body were submitted, but at the end of the quarter the Diplomatic Body at Peking was still awaiting the views of the American Government.

## CONSERVANCY

During the quarter invitations were issued by the Conservancy Board to the principal European countries and the United States to name technical representatives to proceed to Shanghai in October, 1921, for the purpose of giving expert advice on the future development of the port of Whangpoo in Shanghai. The American delegate officially designated was General Goethals. Much annoyance and delay was caused by the action of the British representative to receive a larger salary than that acceptable to the engineers of the other nations.

## EXPORTS OF SILVER COIN

Difficulty was experienced in the quarter by the Standard Oil Company in exporting silver coin from Kwangsi Province, and transportation by an American warship was under consideration by the Department of State. At the end of the quarter, the matter was still unsettled.

## [illegible] BANK, HARBIN

The Harbin branch of the Chinese-American Bank of [illegible] was during the quarter finally denied the right by the Department of State to fly the American flag. This put an end to this longstanding question. It was felt that, although there was 50% American investment in the bank, it was nevertheless chartered as a Chinese institution under Chinese laws and that in Harbin particularly it would be undesirable to have it appear, through the display of the American flag, that the Bank was by implication subject to American jurisdiction. As was to be expected, the Bank was most reluctant to abandon the use of the flag.

## CONTINENTAL AND COMMERCIAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK

During the quarter further representations were necessary to the Chinese Government because of the failure to pay accrued interest on the loan of the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago.

M. I. D.
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M. I. 2.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.
DEC 5
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peking, September 9, 1921

No. 1603

M. I. 2.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:—

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies in quadruplicate of the Legation's Quarterly Political Report for the quarter ended June 30th, 1921.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

S/GL signed - A.B.Ruddock

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:

1 - Copies in quadruplicate of quarterly report, June 30th, 1921.

Enc 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1921 2657-D-225 DEC 17
WAR DEPARTMENT

# DOMESTIC POLITICS

## APRIL MAY JUNE 1921

GENERAL

The general situation in China during the quarter was one of drift and supine helplessness on the part of the Peking Government; of intensification of the power of Chang Tso-lin over the Peking Government and Mongolia to the disgust and apprehension of Central and Southern China; of a firmer hold by Sun Yat Sen and his group upon affairs in South China; of increasing domestic chaos in almost every province in China to an extent rarely if ever before reached in modern Chinese history, finding its most notable example in the Kwangtung-Kwangsi struggle; of sporadic revolts against growing militarism by the peasantry without, however, cohesion and leadership; of threatened and actual mutinies among the unpaid, undisciplined, ignorant soldiery armies, endangering more and more foreign lives and property; of quite uneffectual, though perhaps honest, efforts on the part of the Peking Government to effect disbandment of troops and the union of China through moral suasion, not arms; of continued demoralisation of China through increased poppy growing at the instance of rapacious military leaders; of virtual financial bankruptcy by the Central Government resulting from the practical elimination of all remittances from the provinces and the necessity for making subsidies substantially in the nature of blackmail payment, to those militarists on whom Peking's political existence depends; of impending disaster from the deferred settlement of the unsecured loans from Japan - while on the other hand China herself was filled with native wealth which total distrust of the Government and officials generally prevented from being utilised for national benefit and only found expression in the gradual growth of native banking groups which, taking the Consortium as a model, laid down severe restrictions for the advance of funds to the Government for even the most

legitimate purpose.

In contrast with this gloomy domestic picture is the more favorable aspect of China's foreign relations. Directed by a group of young China, trained in western ideas of national sovereignty, China is adopting an aggressive attitude on questions touching her sovereign rights. The conclusion of the agreement with Germany whereby Germany abandoned extraterritorial rights in China without adequate recompense elsewhere, was a distinct triumph and was of particular significance following upon the elimination of Russia's rights of extraterritoriality. The aggressive spirit showed itself in the overbearing attitude towards Russians in Chinese territory and in increased independence in China's attitude towards the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Inter-Allied Technical Board.

There was thus presented the simultaneous anomaly of a soldier-ridden country, torn by domestic strife, ineffectually guided by moneyless rival governments, scoring in international relationships through a fortunate combination of circumstances and the friendly predisposition of most of the countries of the world to believe the optimistic declarations of China's representatives abroad as to real conditions in China.

PREMIER'S APPEAL FOR CHINA

During the quarter the Premier continued to exert himself on behalf of retrenchment of government expenses. Various measures were promulgated for enforcement as from July 1st, such as abolition of concurrent posts, abolition of superfluous posts, etc. The Premier expressed the expectation that through these measures, especially in Peking, the expenditures of the Central Government could be brought down to about $5,000,000 per month, a figure which could be met by receipts from the Central Government's own

revenues

revenues, such as the Customs, the Salt Gabelle, the stamp tax, etc. There was considerable opposition to the retrenchment schemes, especially from the great numbers of office holders who would be affected, and their successful accomplishment seemed very doubtful. In the meantime, the Government existed on revenues collected by foreign managed agencies, and even these, such as the Salt revenue, were being greatly decreased through internal disorders.

MILITARY POWERLESSNESS OF PEKING

The mutiny of the Ninth Division troops at Pei Yuan was avoided by a narrow margin. This Division was formerly one of the very best in China, and its present condition pointed out again the demoralization due chiefly to inefficient officers and lack of pay for the enlisted men. Practically the only troops who were not threatening to cause trouble were those of Chang Tso-lin, which were paid with considerable regularity.

The Mutiny of the First Division of Honan troops at Changtefu, lasting from about April 15th to 20th, also went to show the narrow margin that separated the existing condition of the country from military turbulence and disorder, even in regions close to the Capital, involving the isolation of Peking through interruption of the railways. The outbreak was eventually put down and railway traffic resumed. It appeared that Wu Pei-fu and his troops came to the rescue of Tuchun Chao Ti, otherwise his mutinying division might have succeeded in removing him as well as his unpopular brother. Wu Pei-fu and his troops proved themselves necessary to the Honan tuchun who must now continue to provide them with funds.

The War Department as such exercised practically no control over the various divisions and brigades of Chinese troops. Troop

commanders

commanders refused at will to carry out instructions from Peking and retained their positions due to political intrigue and to the forces of the troops under their personal control.

There was probably no division or brigade outside of the Metropolitan area of Peking that could be considered as entirely amenable to the orders of the President or his war secretary. The result was a division of the country into independent and often hostile military establishments whose function was to maintain the power of the various tuchuns that they might continue to levy taxes, raise armies, force contributions from merchants and otherwise exploit the people.

## THE MILITARIST CONFERENCE AND THE CABINET CHANGES IN PEKING

The outstanding event in the development of Peking political affairs during the quarter was a conference convened at Tientsin early in April and transferred to Peking on May 6th, between Chang Tso-lin, Inspector General of the three Manchurian provinces, Ts'ao K'un, Inspector General of Shantung, Honan and Chihli, and Wang Chan-yuan, appointed Inspector General of Hunan and Hupeh. While the Premier alleged that the Government had summoned the Conference in order to benefit by its advice on state matters, it seemed apparent that it had its origin in no more exalted a motive than to effect, if possible, a mutual agreement among its members for the prosecution of their personal quest for money and power.

These three militarists, on whose support and under whose control the Peking Government exists, while still in Tientsin required the presence of the Premier. On May 14th, the President appointed a reconstituted Cabinet, General Chin Yun-p'eng being

continued

continued as Premier, as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Minister for Foreign Affairs | - | W. W. Yen |
| Interior | - | Ch'i Yao-chen |
| Finance | - | Li Shih-wei |
| War | - | Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün |
| Navy | - | Li Ting-hsin |
| Justice | - | Tung K'ang |
| Education | - | Fan Yuen-lien |
| Agriculture & Commerce | - | Wang Hai-yin |
| Communications | - | Chang Chih-t'an |

With the exception of Dr. Yen as Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Fan Yuen-lien as Minister of Education, the new Cabinet contained the name of no official worthy of great confidence. The militarists then assembled in conference pretended to refuse to interfere in matters of Cabinet personnel, but the selection of the different ministers must of necessity have received their approval. The elimination of Chow Tsu-ch'i as Minister of Finance and of Yeh K'ung-cho as Minister of Communications was required by the failure of those officials to secure sufficient ready money for the Government. Speaking generally, the change constituted a defeat for the old Communications clique and a victory for the new Communications clique, the latter popularly considered to be pro-Japanese, inasmuch as it contains such men as Ts'ao Ju-lin and Lu Tsung-yu. The appointed Minister of Finance, Li Shih-wei, was president of the Sino-Japanese Industrial Company and was known as a Japanese sympathizer. It was understood that the Premier incurred the danger of popular disapproval in appointing such an official, and it was supposed that the appointment was made in consideration of the promise of the Japanese not to press for the immediate payment of the Nishihara loans and the making of an additional loan of $30,000,000. The Japanese, on their part, were reported to have been promised concessions for engineering work in Chihli Province, the cancellation of the American Federal Telegraph Company's wireless contract, and the opening of two new commercial ports in Shantung. It is significant that the two

prominent

[illegible] ministers deposed, Chow Tzu-ch'i and Yeh K'ung-cho, were popularly considered to be pro-American. The new Minister of Communications reluctantly assumed his post, hesitating to meet the passive resistance of the followers of Yeh, who are very numerous and powerful in the Minister of Communications. On the other hand, Li Shih-wei, appointed Minister of Finance, refused to take up his post on any consideration. P'an Fu, one of the two Vice Ministers, was subsequently appointed to act as Minister.

The three Inspectors General left Peking at the end of May. Although they had thus delayed their departure, their enormous financial demands, according to the best information available, had not been fully satisfied. It seems probable that Chang Tso-lin did not receive more than $3,000,000; that Wang Chan-yuan received little and that Ts'ao K'un received a comparatively small amount. The so-called conferences were of a most informal description. Practically all questions were decided at feasts or during the course of gambling, the result of which was the private transfer of enormous sums of money. The net result of the conference from the standpoint of its effect on political conditions in China was a rough division of power between Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K'un. Chang was subsequently made High Inspector General (Dictator) of Mongolia, and Ts'ao K'un was permitted to appoint his protégé, Governor of Shensi. Wang Chan-yuan appeared to secure no advantage from the conference. However, before proceeding to Tientsin, he held a meeting of the military representatives of Hupeh, Hunan, Szuchuan, Yunnan, Kweichow and Kwangsi, and established his position as leader in the Yangtze Valley and Southwest China, a position analagous to that held by Chang Tso-lin. The confederation was a loose one of some half dozen to a dozen provinces, united by bonds of various degrees of strength, with a general trend in support of Peking, but apparently designed as a common defense against a dictatorship by

ng Tso-lin with the resultant danger to the personal positions of the provincial leaders making up the alliance that that would imply. The Peking Government was stated to have sent a telegram to Wang Chan-yuan praising him for having held this conference, which it construed as an effort on his part to bring about unification.

Certain other results were said to have been achieved by the conference, such as the determination to use military force against Kwangtung, the sending of an expedition to eject Ungern from Urga, the use of force in bringing about the election of a parliament, etc. Probably in popular opinion the most important result of the conference was to indicate the subserviency of the Peking Government to the dictates of these three leading militarists.

The new Cabinet was confronted with such difficulties that not only the Minister of Finance but also the Ministers of the Navy, War and Education refused at first to assume their portfolios. The Minister of the Navy soon overcame his relustance, but the Minister of Education consistently refused to take up his duties, mainly, it is supposed, because of the continuance of the educational strike in Peking, called in order to compel the Government to assign a monthly income of $320,000 for the support of the Government's educational establishments in Peking. His motives may have been partly political as the strike is believed to have been largely instigated by the "Yen Chiu-Hsi", a political party headed by Hsiung Hsi-ling, Liang Ch'ich'ao and other prominent politicians who are now out of office.

## MONARCHICAL RESTORATION

As the result of persistent rumors to the contrary, a public statement was made early in the quarter by Chang Tso-lin that he had absolutely no intention of attempting to restore the monarchy in China. He further declared that should anyone make the attempt it would surely fail. That was the general opinion throughout China, and it was therefore believed that Chang Tso-lin was expressing his real feelings in the matter regardless of whether or not he would have preferred that form of government. He also most solemnly denied to the Peking delegate to his birthday celebration his approval of a monarchical restoration scheme and any connection with "Little Hsu".

On March 31st at a Cabinet meeting it was decided to ask the President to issue a Mandate designed to quash the rumors of a monarchical restoration, and on April 3d such a Mandate appeared, condemning the reports and directing that disseminators thereof should be punished by law as disloyal to the Republic.

## [illegible] TEACHER'S STRIKE

A demonstration by the teachers and students of many schools in Peking took place on June 3d before the President's palace, into which they endeavored to force their way in order to see the President and protest against the Government's failure to pay the salaries of teachers and supply funds for the upkeep of the schools. The Vice-Minister of Education had been induced to go with them. In the fray that followed, many students, soldiers and the Vice-Minister were wounded. The affair aroused great indignation, and the Government at once made public a statement that although it was true that it had been impossible to provide funds for education, yet all other governmental agencies had suffered as well. On the 7th, the Ministers of Finance, Communications and Education signed an agreement to continue the Cabinet decision of April 30th that out of the funds handed over to the Ministry of Finance by the Ministry of Communications the sum of $230,000 should be appropriated monthly to the educational system. In spite of this, however, Tsing Hua College (the so-called American Indemnity College) joined the strike on the 10th out of sympathy for the students in the government schools.

[redacted]

One of the topics discussed at the Tientsin conference of the super-tuchuns was that of the Inspectorship of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhui. For some time the Peking Government had endeavored to induce General Wang Shih-cheng to accept the post, but this he refused to do. Public sentiment was strongly against the post as being unnecessary, expensive and objectionable and the Acting Military Governor of Kiangsu, Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, was even reported to have telegraphed the Government recommending the abolition of the post.

## MA FU HSIANG AT SUIYUAN

During the quarter, General Ma Fu-hsiang took up his duties as Military Governor of the military district of Suiyuan. His reputation for honesty and ability is above that of the average Chinese official. With the support of Southern Mongolia and of the Mohammedans of Kansu, of whom he is a prominent leader, he holds a strong position.

## [illegible] AND WUCHANG LOOTINGS

On June 4th Ichang was again looted, having suffered the same fate on November 29, 1920, both times at the hands of the 41st Mixed Brigade. A number of foreigners suffered, but no foreigner was killed. The foreign women and children sought refuge in the Customs compound, guarded by a few sailors from H.M.S. GNAT, the only war vessel in port at the time. The damage inflicted on the Chinese was very great, and many foreign business houses were looted, among them the Robert Dollar Company. As a result of this looting, the Chinese started a movement for the establishment of an International Settlement at Ichang, where Chinese could share with foreign firms a certain degree of efficient protection. There was a strong demand among foreigners of different nationalities for such an International Settlement to serve as the basis for volunteer companies and systematized protection from foreign gunboats, as in the case of Hankow. The impression was strong that the setting aside of such an area, as provided for in various treaties but never carried into execution at the treaty port of Ichang, would contribute greatly to the protection of residents therein, although it would not necessarily contribute, except indirectly, to the safety of Ichang as a whole.

On the nights of June 7 and 8, several military organizations, headed by the 2d Division, looted Wuchang. The foreign losses were small in this case, as Wuchang is not a treaty port.

It appears that many of the troops that shared in the looting of Ichang were brought to Hankow on the China Merchants' steamer KWEILEE with their loot. The leaders in the looting were the troops of the 2d Division, they were permitted to leave with their plunder and were even given a bonus on leaving for disbandment, but they were stopped at Hsiaokan and probably 1500 slaughtered with

machine guns

Chihli guns. In both cases pay being in arrears was the ostensible excuse for the mutinies.

It was apparent that these mutinies, in combination with other circumstances unfavorable to Wang, were of very serious consequence to his standing, and that his rapid rise to fame was destined to be followed by an equally speedy fall from power.

At the end of the quarter the foreign governments were in active consultation among themselves as to the nature of the representations to be made to the Chinese Government as the result of these mutinies.

## "INDEPENDENT" PROVINCES

The provinces announcing their independence from both Peking and Canton were Hunan, Kweichow, Szechuan and Yunnan. Of these provinces, Hunan was nominally governed by Military Governor Chao Heng-t'i, but his control was almost nominal and the province in reality was divided up among about a dozen semi-independent leaders who inclined towards Canton in the southern part of the province and more or less towards Peking in the northern part. The province was subject to intimidation and inducements from both Sun Yat Sen and Wang Chan-yuan, but for the moment the latter's influence was probably superior, since he was affording financial and military assistance to Chao. The hordes of military officers and soldiers battened on illegal taxation and on revenues devised from the illicit growing and selling of opium. Economic distress among the people occasioned by natural causes, misrule and political and military disturbances was increasingly severe, and this province, nominally in the forefront of those striving for political independence and rehabilitation along modern constitutional lines, appeared to be in a more deplorable state actually than those provinces under the immediate tyranny of the tuchuns.

In Kweichow, General Lu T'ao, self-styled commander-in-chief of the military forces of the provinces, held a precarious position that was constantly threatened by the adherents of General Liu Hsien-shih who was expelled from the province by Lu T'ao.

In Szechuan, the dominating figure was General Liu Hsiang. Hsiung Ke-wu and Liu Ts'un-hou had been engaged in a struggle for supremacy in which the latter was defeated, but the victor himself, in course of time, was obliged to withdraw from Szechuan in the face of the increasing power of Liu Hsiang.

The situations obtaining in Hunan and Szechuan afforded

conclusive

conclusive evidence of the state of those provinces that cut themselves loose from all allegiance to a superior authority. The presence of large military forces owing a personal allegiance to various leaders and the political apathy of the vast mass of the population rendered it inevitable that such provinces should become the battle ground for powerful rivals. There is something to be said in favor of the argument of Premier Chin Yunp'eng that the progress in education of the Chinese people must be continued under the strong guidance of the Central Government, exerted in an even despotic way, until they are able to take over the control of their own destinies.

In Yunnan, General Ku P'in-chen, as commander-in-chief of the forces of the province, held an almost undisputed sway, although the finances of the province were in a very bad state. The deposed military governor, General T'ang Chi-yao, however, had still a great deal of power in Yunnan, due to the allegiance of his former troops and his adherents there.

The Peking Government contended, and with some show of probability, that the alleged independence of these four provinces could readily be cancelled by the judicious use of comparatively small sums of money. The leaders were encumbered with obligations due to the troops and apparently would have been glad to barter their nominal independence for the means of discharging these harrassing debts.

It should be noted that the former governors of Yunnan and Kweichow were part of the Canton Government and the latter organization through the adherence of these men claimed at least a predominating influence in their former fiefs.

There were also a number of provinces which had not declared independence from Peking, but whose connection with the Central Government was so tenuous as to make Peking powerless therein. Such provinces were notably Fukien and Chekiang. The supremacy

of Generals

Generals Li Hsu-chi and Lu Yung-hsiang, the military governors of these two provinces, was based largely upon their possession of northern troops, but it should be noted that these troops were solely mercenaries and would exert themselves in no way to support Peking. The leaders of these provinces, also, would be open to any important inducement from either side appealing to their cupidity or apprehensions. Hangchow, the capital of Chekiang, had become more or less the seat of an "Anfu" recrudescence. The Governor had been issuing a number of pronunciamento in favor of the so-called "federal" system whereby each province would adopt its own constitution, exercise self-government, and ultimately coalesce for the formation of a new central government, but the Premier asserted that the Governor's mentality was such as to render it impossible for him to evolve these ideas without the assistance of his Anfu instigators. Nevertheless, some of the views expounded appear to the foreign onlooker very reasonable, e.g., as when the Governor said that the politicians of the present day point to the disorganized state of the country and advocate centralization of power as the only remedy. General Liu Yung-hsiang asserted that the so-called centralization of power as at present exemplified meant simply that the agents of the Central Government had acquired such despotic authority as to enable them to exclude not only the people from a voice in their own affairs, but also the nominal over-lord, Peking. As he stated it picturesquely, "the tail is too heavy to wag".

PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

A conference of provincial representatives to discuss Local Executive Government was convened at Peking on May 4th. All but two or three of the provinces nominally under the control of the Peking Government were represented. The Premier's efforts to attack questions such as retrenchment, disbandment of troops and local self-government did not meet with much success, the vested military tyranny and the lack of popular support being too powerful for him. Pitted against the provincial "war lords", without popular support, neither the President nor the Premier can make any headway.

SHENSI - Ch'en Shu-fan

Early in the year General Wu Pei-fu declared that he would use every effort to get rid of Ch'en Shu-fan. On May 25th a Presidential Mandate was issued depriving Ch'en of the post of Military Governor of Shensi and ordering him to Peking to a post in the College of Generals. Divisional Commander Yen Hsiang-wen, an adherent of Ts'ao K'un, was appointed Acting Military Governor of Shensi. General Feng Yu-hsiang, then stationed at Hsin Yang-hsien in Honan, was ordered to Shensi to enforce the order which had been resisted by Ch'en Shu-fan. Ch'en was said to be assisted in this resistance by an understanding with Lu Yung-hsiang, Military Governor of Chekiang, and back of it all was said to be the directing mind of "Little Hsu" and other Anfuites. The Premier admitted that Anfuites were back of Lu Yung-hsiang's opposition to the Peking Government, and stated that Lu himself had not the learning to compose his alleged telegrams. It was possible that Chekiang, Fukien, Shensi and Kansu were forming the nucleus of a large combination against Peking, which had to depend upon Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K'un for support, and in the formation of this combination Ch'i Hsieh-yuan, Military Governor of Kiangsu, would be potentially a most important factor. While protesting his loyalty to Peking, he maintained a very non-committal attitude. General Lu Hung-t'ao, Acting Military Governor of Kansu, denied that he had any intention of assisting the recalcitrant General Ch'en Shu-fan.

The incidents surrounding the removal of Ch'en Shu-fan, Tuchun of Shensi, emphasize the inferior position of the Peking Government in the play of inter-provincial intrigues and its lack of power to appoint and remove military governors, for it can hope to displace

one

one of these powerful leaders only by securing the assistance of other governors and as a rule they are reluctant to displace one of their number except for the sole purpose of replacing him with a partisan of their own, and it is not always easy to decide upon a candidate agreeable to all concerned. The Peking Government relies for support on the military governors of Chihli and Fengtien, although a number of others are benevolently neutral. As a general thing, the Peking Government is now not an important factor in the affairs of the nation, and what prestige it still has is the result of its recognition by foreign nations. The ability enjoyed by the Government to sign agreements on behalf of the Government and to pledge China's credit is still a factor, although in the latter respect a gradually diminishing one, owing to the highly problematical repayment of funds borrowed. The Legation discovered that the only way to secure a repayment - not always successful - from the Ministry of Finance, even of a small sum of a few thousand dollars, was to enlist the assistance of some minor official in the Ministry who would seize upon any cash that appeared before it was diverted to appease some unusual demand elsewhere, and even this method has failed of late. These instances exhibit the pitiable state to which disorganization has progressed.

Ever since his return to Canton from Shanghai, Sun Yat Sen had evidently been manoeuvering to have himself elected President. This step was palpably premature and was frowned upon by Sun's principal military supporter, General Chen Chiung-ming. Sun persisted, however, and Chen finally gave way. On April 7th, in Canton, the Southern Parliament elected Dr. Sun Yat Sen President of the Republic. He secured his election by a minority - 216 votes - of the old parliament, andagainst 6 votes for General Chen Chiung-ming, and a resolution was passed by the Parliament declaring that the reorganised military government should be the legal government of China. The election was followed by very friendly manifestations by the people. Dr. Sun's inauguration took place on May 7th and in his address he declared for provincial autonomy and a federal form of government and for the economic development of China, and pleaded for foreign recognition. While the sentiments of Sun were lofty and presumably sincere, his program of government appeared rather lacking in practicability. One was thus led to admire his utterances and applaud his professed democratic aims, but also to scrutinise carefully the methods for China's salvation which he sponsored. However, the fact remained that nowhere was there sincere or effective support for Sun except in Kwangtung. There the laboring classes supported him wholeheartedly, but there was some pessimism in business circles because they saw evidences of an indefinite prolongation of disunion and political unrest.

As was to be expected, Dr. Sun's election called forth condemnation in Northern and Central China as being an unconstitutional proceeding.

Canton, during the quarter, was, roughly, divided into three

groups

- one under Sun Yat Sen, who secured his election under the pretense that it was necessary to offset the threatened monarchical restoration of Chang Tso-lin which he claimed would inevitably fail and would leave the country in chaos and without a political nucleus around which to rally and to prevent another so-called bogus parliament and president being set up in Peking; the second under the Civil Governor, Chen Chiungpming, who was in favor of the election of a President, but only through the vote of an actual quorum - 492 - of the Parliament; and a third, supported by T'ang Shao-yi, who did not believe that a presidential election was as yet opportune and who felt that the constitutionalist cause should strictly insist on the continuance of the Chinese Constitution as originally adopted, which could be secured by permitting Kwangtung province to develop a strong and enlightened government around which other provinces would gather.

The Canton Government contained, however, elements of progress and enlightenment which were lacking in Peking. The administration continued to receive the approval and support of the Americans resident in South China and it was distinctly friendly to the United States. The reforms instituted, referred to in the previous quarterly report, were maintained and enlarged. Feelings towards Great Britain were not friendly because of the British effort to stifle the port of Canton for the benefit of Hongkong and to monopolise, through the Cassell contract, coal and transportation facilities in the Province of Kwangtung. Although conflicting rumors were current as to Canton's attitude towards Japan, it seemed fairly certain that the Sun Yat Sen Government was not committed to Japan and indeed there was evidence of an unfriendly and distrustful feeling towards the Japanese.

It was known that Sun Yat Sen had long cherished the intention of sending an expedition against Kwangsi, justifying such action by the alleged necessity of removing that hostile menace from his

flanks.

[illegible]. His apprehensions were justified in May by the issuance of secret orders from Peking to General Lu Jung-t'ing, Military Governor of Kwangsi, to attack Kwangtung. It is reported that this measure was demanded by the militarist conference in Peking. At any rate, hostilities began in June. The Canton Government claimed that Kwangsi was assisted by troops from Yunnan, Kweichow and Hunan. The fortunes of war in the early days of the conflict were fairly equally divided and victories were reported on both sides. The Peking Government attached the gravest importance to the outcome of the conflict, forecasting that in the event of the Kwangsi victory, the openly independent and doubtful provinces would all hastily declare their adherence to Peking, while on the other hand, a Canton victory would mean a protracted civil war. The Peking Government therefore exerted itself to the utmost to assist Kwangsi with money and munitions, even, as stated above, with the alleged complicity of British ships. The Premier stated that if Sun Yat Sen should be victorious over Lu Jung-t'ing, the former would endeavor by military force to bring other provinces under his control. Great reliance was placed by Peking on the soldiers of General Lu since they were experienced fighters and were indeed once the conquerors of Kwangtung; but the Kwangtung troops had the animus of fighting for their own province against invaders, and Sun Yat Sen's popularity and power were sure to be increased by his defense of the province.

The Canton Government continued to appeal for the recognition of friendly powers as the rightful government of China, claiming that its power was felt over a wider area than that of Peking, a contention that, subjected to a strict scrutiny, was entitled to some support, since the Peking Government itself seemed to be merely a component of forces emanating from powerful provincial leaders.

# FOREIGN RELATIONS

## MONGOLIA

The loss of outer Mongolia continued to be one of the darkest blots on the record of the present Peking Government. At the beginning of the quarter Baron Ungern von Sternberg was in undisputed possession of Urga and a very large part of the surrounding country. The unfortunate Pacification Commissioner of Mongolia, Ch'en Yi, after his undignified and precipitate retreat from Urga with the shattered remnants of his forces thoroughly whipped by vastly smaller forces under Ungern, made his way slowly back to China via Manchouli, Harbin and Tientsin, to find himself on March 31st deprived by Presidential Mandate of his ranks and offices.

Refugees and wounded soldiers, the few survivors of the disastrous and inglorious campaign against Ungern, who arrived in China during the early part of April brought news of the enormous sufferings borne by the Chinese who fled from Urga. In the meantime, in spite of help supposed to be available from reactionary Russians in Heinchiang and Kansu under Anenkoff, Ungern was in turn faced by danger from another quarter and met defeat, as described elsewhere, at the hands of the forces of the Far Eastern Republic.

An envoy from the Living Buddha of Urga arrived in Peking during the quarter and submitted a peace proposal to the Chinese Government, on the basis of complete autonomy for Outer Mongolia, the agreement to be based on the Kiakhta Convention of 1915; Outer Mongolia to be recognized as a part of China, no troops of the Central Government to be stationed there; Chinese merchants to have every opportunity to trade and reside.

On the other hand, a conference of Mongol nobles was held in Mukden to devise means to protect Mongolia and to frustrate the

plans

...s of the Living Buddha and his Russian intrigues.

In the meantime, China was following a policy of laissez-faire. Immersed in even more perplexing and vital domestic problems, the Peking Government seemed incapable of grasping the Mongolian nettle firmly in an effort to reach a solution. The weeks and months dragged by in aimless discussions and recriminations until in despair, apparently, of reaching any better solution and as usual following the line of least resistance, the Peking Government, following the Tientsin and Peking Tuchun conference, on May 30th appointed Marshal Chang Tso-lin High Commissioner (virtually dictator) of Mongolia, with plenipotentiary powers over Inner Mongolia and control over the Special Administrative Districts of Chahar, Jehol and Suiyuan. This was the great opportunity so long planned for by Chang. By this he acquired his coveted and absolute control of all of China and Mongolia north of Peking. His title to the strongest man in China was now undisputed. With characteristic caution, he refused to take over at once these new honors and responsibilities and the Government was supposed to be making appeals to him to assume the heavy duties of his new office.

Of course, one of the principal objects of the Government in thus heaping new honors on Chang was to assure, if possible, the early despatch of an expedition to recapture Urga from Ungern and to retrieve Chinese military honor and standing in Mongolia; and presumably just for the reason that Chang was not thoroughly informed as to all the phases of the situation, including the attitude of the Japanese, he delayed in taking over at once the administration of his new Princedom.

FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

During the period under review the Far Eastern Republic continued its tenuous and yet aggressive existence. Relying on its position as an outpost of Moscow with all that that implies, it adopted an attitude of equal to equal in its relations with China and Japan and presented a more or less undaunted front to its arch enemy, Ungern Sternberg. In spite of its very vague power over the vast territory claimed by it as coming under the jurisdiction of the handful of men at the small Siberian railway town of Chita, it seized upon the opportunity of the moment to endeavor to negotiate on equal terms with the Chinese Republic and to bolster up its obvious weaknesses by fulminations against the aggressive designs of the Japanese. During the quarter the Government of the Republic declared its sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire east of the River Selenga and Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean, thereby including the regions of Baikalia, Zabaikalia, Amur, Pre-Amur, the Maritime Provinces and the northern half of Saghalin Island, but excluding the Kamchatka Peninsula. The declaration provided that the form of government of the Republic would be modeled on the principles of real democracy and self-government; that it would guarantee to the population all political freedom, such as personal immunity, freedom of press and of speech, etc.; that amnesty to political offenders would be granted; as would private ownership of property on behalf of all citizens of the Republic as well as all foreigners residing in the Republic. The Declaration concluded with a statement that the natural resources of the country were the property of the people as a whole and therefore not in the

category

category of private property; but that foreign capital for the development of such natural resources was desired.

In spite of declarations of belief in private ownership, the majority of the Constituent Assembly continued to be communistic in tone. The Socialists and other non-communists refused, however, to be completely silenced and boisterous sessions of the Assembly resulted, in one of which quite a number of members were said to have been injured. Although several members of the parties of the Right had been elected to the Assembly, for various reasons they did not go to Chita to take part in the work of that body. Most of these men were hostile to the Republic. In order, therefore, to deprive them of their influence as members of the Assembly, the latter enacted a law by which members who did not take part in the proceedings of the Assembly without an immediate and satisfactory explanation were debarred from membership in the body.

On the other hand, it appeared that conditions in Chita were normal, not to say prosperous, and that superficially, at least, the life of the city and the Government were proceeding regularly and peacefully. There would seem to be little doubt but that the Government was functioning with the consent of a majority of the people in the area under control, and that suitable police protection was maintained. Naturally the formation of a successful government was greatly hampered by the presence of Japanese troops in Siberia and their machinations against peace and stability in those regions.

Of course, after four years of war and several years of revolution, business conditions were in great disorder. Material for export was lacking, currency had depreciated, but it seemed apparent that these conditions would greatly improve and that eventually Siberia would have an acceptable government. The Government, while functioning with Soviet approval, was developing

along

ing more moderate political ideas and subsequently might favorably affect even the policies of the Soviet Government at Moscow. There was no doubt whatever that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Eastern Siberia would mean that the Far Eastern Republic could and would take over actual control of the districts occupied by the Japanese since the existing Russian administrations in the occupied regions could not by any means exist without the physical presence of the Japanese troops.

The political situation in the Transbaikal continued unsettled. The capture of Urga by Baron Ungern Sternberg, dealt with in the discussion of the Mongolian situation, was a source of great anxiety and embarrassment to the Far Eastern Republic as well as to China. With his rear thus well protected, Ungern was able to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway and the towns within his reach. In his attack, Ungern, with about eight thousand Buriats, Mongols, Russians and some former Chinese soldiers of the Urga garrison, launched his offensive from Mongolia against Siberia. His advance was along the line Kiakhta, Troitskasov. East Bank of Selegga River, with the railway between Verkhne-Udinsk and Chita as his objective. This advance reached and occupied Troitskasov in the early part of June.

The situation was measurably relieved for the Republic by the inability of Semenoff at Grodekovo to come to active support of Ungern through the refusal of the Chinese authorities, especially Marshal Chang Tso-lin, to permit Semenoff's forces to be transported over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The forces of the Far Eastern Republic, supplemented by troops despatched by the Soviet Government from Western Siberia, were accordingly enabled to meet Ungern Sternberg near Kiakhta during the first of the month of June and to administer a sharp defeat. Only Ungern himself and a few followers succeeded in escaping back into Mongolia, but they were pursued

by

Russian troops who at the end of the quarter were occupying Urga and other strategic points in Outer Mongolia. Practically all of Ungern's munition and supply trains were captured.

Ungern's control and occupation of Urga had been notorious for his murder of all Jews in Urga and the summary execution of numerous Russians and Chinese. It was a matter of surprise and gratification, therefore, that no retaliatory methods were adopted by the Russian troops and conditions at Urga after their arrival there were reported as quiet.

In the negotiations between the Far Eastern Republic and China, the Chita Government was at the end of the quarter using withdrawal of their troops from Mongolia as a lever to hasten negotiations with the Peking Government.

These and other efforts of the reactionary Russian leaders, Semmeff, Ungern, etc., who, according to the statements of their own agents, were receiving Japanese assistance to carry out an offensive against the Far Eastern Republic with military detachments organized in Mongolia, Manchuria, and in that part of Eastern Siberia controlled by the Japanese, thus failed completely to achieve success. The Japanese Foreign Office disclaimed any connection whatever with this movement, but it was incontrovertible that without the physical presence of Japanese troops in Eastern Manchuria the movement would never have been possible. Moreover, there was little doubt that the movement was actually assisted by the Japanese staff at Vladivostok. The complete failure of the reactionaries pointed to the fact that the Far Eastern Republic could and did secure the assistance of troops despatched from Soviet Russia and that the control of the Far Eastern Republic was more secure than at first supposed.

Recent developments in Siberia tended to show that there was no considerable element of the Russian people living in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic that would actually assist or participate in a counter revolution. This pointed to the conclusion that the influence of the reactionary leaders was waning; that there was no appreciable element in Siberia that would assist them, and that their following even outside of Siberia was decreasing.

The opening of the quarter found Mr. Yourin, President of the Mission of the Far Eastern Republic to China, still in Peking pursuing his negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Conflicting rumors were current as to the success or non-success of these negotiations. On May 18th, Mr. Yourin left Peking and returned to Chita where he became Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic. The Mission at Peking was left under the temporary leadership of its Vice President, Agareff.

During the latter part of his stay in Peking, Mr. Yourin addressed to the American Government, through this Legation, a request for the designation of an official representative of the United States at Chita, and for permission to send a similar representative to Washington. While no direct reply to this request was transmitted by the American Government through this Legation, the Department of State did designate a commission, composed of Commercial Attaché Abbott and Assistant Military Attaché Davis, both of the Embassy at Tokyo, to proceed to Chita to make an investigation of conditions there. These gentlemen arrived in Chita towards the end of May and were still there at the end of the quarter. This Legation was without knowledge of their impressions of conditions at Chita.

Conditions in Eastern Siberia having less direct influence on China are dealt with in more abbreviated fashion.

Blagoveschensk, following the long awaited withdrawal of

Japanese

Japanese troops, which finally eventuated in May, , failed to produce the reign of communistic terror forecasted by Japanese propagandists. Political troubles and economic distress were to be expected and quite naturally appeared. The rule of the communists was reported as corrupt and unable to maintain order. Little influence on the part of the Chita Assembly was to be felt, as yet. The peasants were said to have an effective militia organization of some 40,000 men, well armed and bitterly opposed to the small group of politicians in power. The miners were reported to be allying themselves with the peasants and to be endeavoring to make direct purchases from foreign countries of clothing and mining and agricultural machinery with gold which they were able to amass.

During the month of June, the Communists declared the town in a state of siege and established a military tribunal and staff, but later this "revolution" was reported to have been quashed.

The situation at Vladivostok continued to be one of great complexity. The conference of non-socialistic parties, held at that city, failed to bring about the prophesied new government. A tendency was noticeable in the discussions to accept a wide measure of democracy as the fundamental basis of any government which should eventually rule Russia, but there was still too great a difference between the democrats and the parties of the Right to allow them to unite on any one government.

On March 29th a small uprising took place in Vladivostok. It was said that the movement was headed by the element in the conference which was in favor of a new movement against the Bolsheviks, but was against the leadership of Semenoff. General Dietrichs was named as the military leader.

The expected coup at Vladivostok took place about May 25th, the Kappel troops, in command of General Verjbitzky, furnishing the military power. M. Merkuloff, head of the new Pri-Amur

Government

Government, attempted to function with an empty treasury, and it was therefore difficult to see how the new government could exist for long. Reports from Vladivostok left no doubt as to the interference of the Japanese in the turnover. As an evidence of the complicated feelings of the Russians there, the Semenoffists and Kappelists were reported as not friendly with each other, while the latter were also unfriendly to the Japanese, who, by removing the opposition to the Kappelists, had nevertheless enabled them to establish their government. It was considered that lack of funds and the inevitable failure of their government unless they accepted assistance from Japan was very likely to lead them to choose the easier way and accept Japanese backing in return for a few concessions. During early June, a group of Japanese capitalists arrived in Vladivostok to negotiate a loan with the temporary government. Such a loan in return for any one of the numerous concessions in the Maritime Province was easily conceivable provided the capitalists had a working understanding with the Japanese Government.

Ataman Semenoff left Dairen on May 31st by steamer and was later reported as being on board ship at Vladivostok, the new government officials not permitting him to land. Merkuloff had a long conference with him on June 5th, subsequent to which Semenoff issued a proclamation on behalf of the "Command of the Armed Forces in Russia", to the effect that the Ataman had come to Vladivostok to ascertain if conditions were favorable for a general offensive against the Bolsheviks, and that he did not desire to interfere with the policies and work of the local government.

The situation sketched above was the natural result of the failure of Japan to withdraw her troops from Eastern Siberia in company with the other allied troops during 1920, in deliberate violation of Japan's agreement with the American Government. The Japanese considered their national rights entitled them to seize, occupy

[illegible] and exploit areas in Eastern Siberia even in direct disregard of the rights, interests and wishes of the Russian inhabitants, justifying such action on the ground of the prevention of the spread of bolshevism in Japan, Korea and China. The result of such Japanese intrigue and the physical presence of their troops in Siberia and northern Saghalin could not operate otherwise than to force practically the entire Russian population to combine against what they considered unnecessary and unjustifiable interference by foreigners in Russian affairs, thereby strengthening rather than weakening the radicals in their hold on Siberia and the conduct of Japanese troops and their assistance to such extreme reactionaries as Semenoff and Kalmakoff forced the Siberian peasants to take up arms and eventually to ally themselves with Soviet Russia.

## CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

This quarter witnessed an intensification of the complex situation in which the Railway finds itself. During the absence in the United States of Mr. John F. Stevens, President of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, the Chinese authorities connected with the Railway - the Ministry of Communications under Mr. Yeh K'ung-cho and later Mr. Chang Chih-t'an, Mr. C. C. Wang and later Mr. C. S. Liu, Chinese members on the Technical Board, and General Sung Hsiao-lien, Chinese President of the Railway Board of Directors - displayed increasing impatience at the presence of the Technical Board and a disposition to take a more aggressive and independent attitude in the affairs and direction of the Railway, with the presumed object of making the Railway entirely Chinese in character. Colonel E. O. Johnson, who acted as President pro-tempore of the Technical Board in the absence of Mr. Stevens, encountered numerous difficulties in the arbitrary action of the Chinese military commanders in the Railway zone in the transportation of troops along the Railway without regard to the civilian traffic requirements, ignoring the views and authority of the Technical Board. Indeed, one commander went so far as virtually to defy the Technical Board by stating that the Chinese troops were guarding the Railway zone before the existence of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of 1919, and that therefore he did not need to be bound by any agreement which might have been made at a later time. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities complained of the action of the Technical Board in attempting to interfere with military operations by hampering the movement of military trains at a time when China's national safety was endangered by the presence of Ungern Sternberg in Mongolia near the Railway and even alleged that the Technical Board itself had recommended such concentration of Chinese troops at Hailar. Further serious cause for complaint by the American

representative

representative was the presence of bandits (Hunghutzes) along the line of the railway, whose extensive depredations, including the kidnapping of railway workers, the Chinese troops seemed incapable of controlling. It is presumed that this banditry was encouraged by the Japanese, who desired thereby to expose the incapacity of the Chinese to police the Railway and the need for handing over such duty to Japanese troops. Further cause for friction between the Chinese and Americans arose from a difference of policy in regard to the monetary standard for the Railway, the Chinese supporting a silver standard and the Americans a gold one. Irritation likewise arose over the Railway and Railway zone budget.

As the result of representations from this Legation, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Communications, General Sung and Marshal Chang Tso-lin all promised assistance in general terms to the Technical Board and gave assurances as to the suppression of banditry. At the end of the quarter, however, no amelioration had taken place.

Towards the end of the quarter another meeting of the shareholders of the Railway was being held in Peking. This was the second one to be held sincethe supplementary agreement reached in October, 1920, between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the first one having taken place in November, 1920. This meeting brought to a head the rivalry between, on the one hand, the old unprogressive Russian party on the Railroad, exemplified by General Horvath and Vice-President Latchinoff, who were affiliated with a similar Chinese group represented by President Sung Hsiao-lien, and, on the other hand, the progressive faction typified by Ostroumoff, General Manager of the Railway, an energetic up-to-date Russian railway engineer, and the modern progressive Chinese element exemplified by C.C. Wang and C. S. Liu. In this struggle the sympathies and influence of the Inter-Allied Technical Board and of the Russo-Asiatic Bank were on the side of Ostroumoff, Wang

and Liu

and Lin. This influence made itself felt in the deliberations in the shareholders meetings and toward the end of the quarter the displacement of Latchinoff as Vice-President of the Railway was foreshadowed.

Another matter of mpment for the Railway which was considered at the shareholders meetings was the qestion of the issue of debentures by the Railway. Following the October agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the November meeting of the shareholders had authorized the issuance of debentures in the sum of some Taels 20,000,000. The present meeting extended this authorization by Taels 5,000,000 additional. Of this sum, bonds for Taels 11,000,000 were to be handed to the Chinese Government in repayment of the obligation existing in the original Railway agreement between the Bank and the Chinese Government whereby it was stipulated that Taels 5,000,000 should be paid by the Railway to the Chinese Government upon the opening of traffic. This sum plus compound interest represented the debt of the Railway to the Chinese Government. The issuance of the remaining bonds of some Taels 9,000,000 to 14,000,000 was authorized, in amounts later to be agreed upon, to be placed upon the open market in order to provide funds for the Railway to meet its overdue indebtednesses and current deficits. The Railway was unable to collect the sums due to it for the transportation of the Czecho-Slovak and certain other Allied troops, amounting to several million dollars. Extravagance and negligence in management, particularly in the allotting of contractors' services and the supply of fuel, had resulted in a very large outstanding debit which was rendered doubly dangerous through the inadequacy of the revenues. It was true that during the second quarter of the calendar year 1921 the receipts had for the first time in years been of a satisfactory nature, but it was feared that this could not be depended upon to continue for long and a bond issue to secure the requisite funds was deemed unavoidable. This was the opinion of Ostroumoff and of the

Chinese

Chinese, and to a certain extent also of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. The danger that such an issue would be bought up by the Japanese was apparent and Mr. Stevens, who reached Harbin on his return from America toward the end of June, felt grave apprehensions on this score. As the quarter closed, therefore, the Legation was making vigorous representations to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Communications in an endeavor to obtain the acceptance by the Chinese Government of the principle that before bond issues of this nature were made ,the Inter-Allied Technical Board should be consulted. The situation was complicated by the fact that Mr. Nagao, Japanese member of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, visited Peking and gave free utterances to the view that the Chinese Eastern Railway was in serious need of funds; that the Chinese Government was presumably not in a position to furnish such funds and that they must therefore necessarily be obtained from Japan, presumably from the South Manchurian Railway. Mr. Nagaowent so far as to intimate in turn to Marshal Chang Tso-lin, General Sung Hsiao-lien and the Minister of Communications, Chang Chih-t'an, that the others were agreed with his, Nagao's, views, and it was only by a careful comparison of views that this trick was uncovered.

Difficulties of a technical nature in the administration of the Railway are not of immediate importance in this report. It should be noted, however, that on May 19th a conference took place at Manchouli, under the presidency of Colonel Johnson, between Ostroumoff and other representatives of the Chinese Eastern Railway and representatives of the Transbaikal Railway. The object of this conference was to secure better co-operation

between

between the two roads and to remove obstacles to freer trade between Transbaikal and Manchuria. One of the chief difficulties had been the uncertainty felt on the part of Manchurian traders that goods sent by them would not arrive in tact at their destination and free from requisition. The prohibition on the export of gold from the Far Eastern Republic and the restrictions on travel had also impeded trade.

HARBIN

The tangled situation of the Harbin municipality continued to present almost insoluble difficulties. The Consular Body transmitted to the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a recommendation for the administration of the city through a reorganized municipal council. It was proposed that, as a temporary measure and without prejudice to any other arrangement that might later be devised, there should be associated with the two Chinese directors of the existing bureau one member of the Consular Body and one Russian representative of the Railway Administration. In this way it was thought that the problem of securing more efficient municipal government in this area would be in a fair way towards settlement.

During this period the issuance of Russian and foreign passports to Russian citizens was discontinued - such passports in future to be issued by a special department under the authority of the Taoyin - thereby forming one of the final steps in assimilating Russians in the zone to the status of Chinese.

Plague conditions in Harbin continued sporadically, but with the coming of warm weather the danger therefrom steadily decreased. On April 30th the Diplomatic Corps, in reply to a

request

request from the Chinese Government for the allocation of $500,000 from the customs surplus to assist in combating the plague in Manchuria, consented to the allocation of $100,000 for that purpose and expressed the view that this was the largest sum which appeared to be warranted. The Plague Prevention Commission has in mind a project for a permanent anti-plague organization which will begin its functions automatically whenever symptoms of the epidemic appear.

The question of the issue of bank notes by foreign banks in Harbin arose acutely during the quarter. Chang Tso-lin, being interested privately in certain native banks issuing notes in Harbin, was naturally opposed to the issuance of similar notes with adequate security issued by foreign banks. The InterAllied Technical Board, in view of the proposed issue of notes by the Russo-Asiatic Bank, ruled that the Chinese Eastern Railway might accept such notes. In the meantime, an American bank, the International Banking Corporation, began the issue of notes in Harbin. This was the subject of protest by the Taoyin to the American Consul and on the matter being referred to the Department of State the American Government declined to support the bank in its plan to issue such notes, on the ground that the American Government was pledged to currency reform in China and that although such notes were issued by foreign banks in various parts of China, even Peking, a non-treaty port, the extension of such practice to other cities was incompatible with the assurances already given by the American Government to China; should, however, other banks succeed in inducing the Chinese authorities to assent to note issues by them, the American banks should claim equal privileges. It was understood that toward the end of the

quarter

quarter the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Russo-Asiatic Bank were gradually beginning to send out a few notes in Harbin.

In general, it may be said that the Chinese authorities were adopting an aggressive attitude toward Russian rights in the Railway zone. This process was greatly facilitated by the temporary removal of extraterritorial privileges of the Russians. Foreign residents at Harbin alleged that the Chinese were abrogating rights in their favor established by usage and agreement with the former Russian authorities. On the other hand, the Chinese claimed that there was manifest an intolerance on the part of foreigners of the exercise by the Chinese authorities of their sovereign rights in the railway area and that there was an unduly critical attitude displayed toward them. The Consular Body at Harbin submitted to the Diplomatic Corps the question of representations to the Chinese Government in protest against the arbitrary powers assumed by the Bureau established under Presidential Mandate of February 10th in affairs in Harbin and the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway generally. The Consular Body viewed this tendency on the part of the Bureau with apprehension, as being fraught with serious danger to all foreign interests in that area, and they regarded it also as being directly contrary to assurances given by the Chinese authorities at Harbin that in creating the Bureau in question there was no intention of interfering with the functions of the Municipal Council which would be left free to carry on its usual work in accordance with the detailed regulations and by-laws which had been in force since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1914. But before the end of the quarter, no reply had been given by the Diplomatic Corps which was awaiting the views of the American Government.

During the quarter, the Legations at Peking continued to receive many appeals from Russian individuals and firms protesting against the arbitrary actions of the Chinese authorities. At a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, held to consider these complaints, it was decided to be desirable to attempt to define in some manner the degree of responsibility of the Diplomatic Body toward Russians and Russian rights in China. In commenting upon the proposed representations to the Chinese Government, the American Government expressed the view that it was not desirable or necessary that the Diplomatic Body should undertake to prescribe or formulate the terms of China's relationship to Russian rights and that save for representing to the Chinese Government as occasion might require that it would in its own interest be well advised to act with caution, scrupulous fairness and liberality, the action of the American Legation should be limited to the protection of American treaty rights as they might be affected from time to time by the acts of the Chinese Government. The British Minister concurred in this opinion of the Department of State and observed that only on that basis would he feel entitled to join in any representations to the Chinese Government. In view of the dissenting voices of the United States and Great Britain, no action was taken by the Diplomatic Corps in this connection.

SIKKIM

Reports from Major Magruder, dated March 31st at Talifur, reported a peaceful trip. Bandits were holding the Chinese in Western Yunnan in a state of constant terror.

Frequent fighting was going on between the Tibetans and Chinese on the Tibetan frontier, combined with extortion and oppression by both brigands and officials. The Chinese appeared to be governing in the region of the Tibetan frontier in the same inefficient way as in Urga. The Tibetans, in consequence, were making constant threats of reopening hostilities. Foreign residents, however, felt that both the Chinese and Tibetans realized the value of the presence of foreigners and that foreign lives and property were not directly endangered. The Tibetan Government had mobilized forces along the Tibetan-Chinese border to protect itself against unorganized tribes.

Press reports during the quarter drew attention to the similarity of British action in Tibet to Japanese action in South Manchuria and Russian reactionary action in Mongolia, and warned that Great Britain was pushing railways into Tibet to work the mineral resources of the country, and urged that Chinese railways be constructed through Kokonor. The press also alleged that a Tibetan emissary was prevented by the British from coming to Peking.

## GERMAN RELATIONS

During the quarter the German representatives who had been in Peking for some months began to receive more attention from the Chinese authorities and serious negotiations looking to the conclusion of an agreement were begun. These negotiations terminated in the signing of an agreement on May 20th and on the following day a resume of the provisions of the agreement was officially published. Taken as a whole, the negotiations may be considered a triumph for China. Germany renounced extra-territorial privileges in China and in exchange merely secured the right for its citizens to reside in China wherever the nationals of a third power had privileges of residence and trade. The other principal features of the agreement were: an acknowledgment that all tariff matters would be adjusted by domestic legislation; an engagement by Germany to fulfill Articles 128 to 134 of the Treaty of Versailles; a renunciation by Germany of rights acquired by the Sino-German Treaty of March 6, 1898, and the rights which the Chinese Government possessed as regarded the glacis of the German Legation at Peking; an acknowledgment of Germany's preparedness to reimburse the Chinese Government for the costs of German troops interned in China; an undertaking by Germany to pay in advance a portion of the war losses indemnity representing the equivalent of one-half of the proceeds from the liquidated German property and one-half of the value of the sequestrated but not yet liquidated German property, this amount to be eventually agreed upon and to consist of $4,000,000 in cash and the balance in Tsingpu and Hukuang Railway bonds; Chinese property in Germany to be returned at the ratification of the agreement.

In return

In return, the Chinese Government promised full protection to peaceful undertakings of Germans in China and guaranteed that any lawsuits of Germans in China should be tried in modern courts according to modern codes, with right of appeal in accordance with regular legal procedure, and permitting the assistance of German lawyers and interpreters duly redognised by the court. As regards law suits in the Mixed Court in which Germans were involved either as one or both of the parties, the Chinese Government undertook to try to find a solution to insure justice and fairness to all parties concerned. All regulations concerning trade with the enemy would automatically lose their effect from the date of the ratification of the agreement. All German trade marks registered at the customs house would recover their validity if they were registered again after the ratification of the agreement at the customs house by their owners. Prior to the general application of the national tariff in China, German goods imported into China might pay the customs duties according to the tariff rate in general use. The Chinese Government declared its intention not to join the clearing house system as provided for in Artible 296 of the Versailles Treaty. In consideration of the fact that Germany undertook to pay a lump sum for war losses indemnity, the Chinese Government agreed to return to German owners all proceeds from the liquidation of German property and all German property still under sequestration. As to the German-Asiatic Bank and the Ching Hsin Mining Corporation, the Chinese authorities concerned undertook to discuss methods of settlement with the bank and the corporation themselves. The unliquidated premises of the bank in Peking and Hankow would, however, be returned to the original owner in accordance with the procedure stated above.

A considerable influx of Germans into China was expected,

and with exchange conditions favoring German imports, much competition was anticipated following the conclusion of this agreement, particularly as Germans and German goods were popular in China.

## CHINESE-JAPANESE RELATIONS

No problem of an acute nature arose during the quarter further to embitter Chinese-Japanese relations, and it seemed apparent that Japan, pending the determination as to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was pursuing a policy of a conciliatory nature towards China.

The Hunchun situation gradually lapsed into the background. On April 8th, the Japanese Minister informed the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from the Hunchun region. It was reported, however, that two hundred Japanese consular guards, or some form of special police, had been organized to function there. The matter was still unsettled at the end of the quarter.

That nightmare of Chinese politics, the unsecured Japanese loans amounting to some 150,000,000 gold yen, presented an increasing difficulty for the Chinese Government. Mr. Ono, representing the Chinese bankers, appeared in Peking and was busily engaged in negotiations looking to the regularizing of these unsecured issues on which both principal and interest are in many cases in default. These loans formed a source of great anxiety to the Premier inasmuch as he himself was instrumental in negotiating certain of them, such as the War Participation Loan. At the same time, in the face of popular outcry he could not force a settlement favorable to Japanese desires. At the end of the quarter it was not known what success Mr. Ono had had in his negotiations.

## CHANG TSO-LIN AND JAPAN

In an interview which Mr. Crane had with Marshal Chang Tso-lin in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway matters, the Marshal

stated confidentially that he was obliged to be tactful and friendly in his dealings with the Japanese because of their power in Manchuria, but that this was not to be interpreted as real friendship on his part with the Japanese. During the quarter two American army officers and a sergeant went to Mukden to demonstrate American field equipment, and General Chang's eldest son expressed very similar sentiments on behalf of his father in connection with the Japanese. Great interest was shown by General Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, in the American material, including the Browning automatic rifle, and the Americans were treated with great consideration. General Chang expressed the desire to purchase some American military equipment, particularly Browning automatic rifles, and wished to know if the Japanese had anything like them. He stated that all Chinese hated the Japanese and realized that their only friend was America; that every year Japan was taking $150,000,000 worth of material out of Manchuria, particularly coal, iron, copper and silk; that Japan was afraid of America, but that she was preparing with great rapidity for a war in the future; that Chang Tso-lin had blocked the recently attempted Japanese railway loan and that if the United States ever got into war with Japan she could count on Chang's aid.

An important conference was summoned in Tokyo for mid-May of the principal Japanese Government officials in China and Manchuria, including Mr. Obata, the Japanese Minister at Peking, the commanding general at Tsingtau, and the Consul General at Mukden. It was supposed that at this conference there would be discussed the general relations between Japan and China and that following it Japan would be prepared to make some specific offer to China in connection with the Shantung question.

The meeting of the Imperial Conference in London to discuss the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance naturally aroused the most acute interest in China. Protests were made from all quarters against the renewal of the Alliance and particularly against the inclusion of any mention of China in the text of the new agreement. It was argued that, with the disappearance of Russia and Germany, the alliance must be considered to be directed toward the furtherance of the contracting parties' interests in China.

# MISCELLANEOUS

AVIATION

There was dissatisfaction and unrest in the Aeronautical Department. Charges of graft and undue influence by foreigners were made by some of the aeronautical students against General Ting Chin (Mouhan K. Ting), Director of the Department, and it was said that Chang Tso-lin was endeavoring to have him relieved in order to get one of his own men in the position. General Ting is a trusted follower of the Premier.

A second American aviator, Mr. C. H. Dolan, together with three British aviators, have reported to the Aeronautical Department for duty.

Two Chinese aviators of the Aeronautical Department who had recently been studying at the Vickers factory in England, sailed on April 30th for America to receive training with the American air service, and the Department has asked to send two additional aviators to America for instruction.

A new delivery of aeroplanes by the Vickers Company was made during the latter part of June.

The Chinese aviation students at the Nanyuan Field were not making favorable progress and many accidents were predicted as soon as they attempted solo flights.

An aerial mail service inaugurated from Peking to Shanghai seemed doomed to early failure.

AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN CHINA

The relation of the retiring Cabinet to American interests was of interest to note, especially in the cases of Chow Tzu-ch'i, former Minister of Finance, and Yeh K'ung-cheo, former Minister of Communications. The loan contract of the Pacific Development Company, secured on the wine and tobacco revenues and concluded November 26, 1919, provided for an American associate director general, and although Mr. C. L. L. Williams had been appointed he had never been permitted to assume office until September 1, 1920, when Mr. Chow induced the Premier to recognise him nominally as in office. On the urgent representations of the American Government, Mr. Chow secured an extension of seven months of the Pacific Development Company's option, which the Chinese Government claimed expired on June 26, 1920, through time limitations and the failure of the Company to make further advances provided for. Mr. Chow also placed an American, Mr. Clifford Hewitt, in charge of the construction of the Shanghai Mint. It was Mr. Chow's regret that throughout the period of his office he had to feel a lack of support from American interests.

Mr. Yeh was instrumental in placing several large orders for railway equipment with American firms during the period of his office, while great progress was made in standardizing specifications for railway materials and equipment in such a way as to provide equal opportunity for American goods. The reason given by the Chinese for the closing of the Chu-Chin Railway Office was that this was necessitated by the failure of the Siems-Carey Railway and Canal Company to provide the requisite sums for railway

construction.

construction. It is unfortunate that the condition of the money market at home did not permit of some actual railway construction work under contracts already held by American concerns or of work on the Grand Canal.

Mr. Yeh furthermore, in the face of tremendous opposition, gave an important wireless contract to the Federal Telegraph Company. In concluding this contract Mr. Yeh incurred great hostility, but he was undoubtedly influenced in no small degree by considerations of the immense benefit the creation of these radio facilities would confer on future Chinese-American relations.

## SOUTHERN SURPLUS

The accumulated Southern customs surplus receipts amounting to some Taels 8,500,000 were turned over to the Peking Government on April 8th. This ended in Peking's favor a long-drawn-out dispute as to the disposition of these funds. The decision of the Diplomatic Corps was largely influenced in this matter by the views of the American Government.

On May 23d, Mr. Frederick W. Stevens, representing the American Group in the Consortium, left Peking on a three months' visit to America.

On June 1st, Admiral Joseph Strauss, new Commander-in-Chief of the American Pacific Squadron, and suite left Peking after a week's visit, having been received and entertained by the President and many high officials and having received decorations.

On June 17th, Mr. Charles R. Crane, retiring American Minister to China, left Peking, en route to the United States via Siberia and Russia.

PEKING TRAMWAYS

For some years there has been competition between financial interests of different nationalities to make an arrangement with the Chinese Government for the laying down of tramways in Peking and it is alleged that there are several such agreements in existence. This competition was definitely ended, however, on May 9th when the Chinese Government signed an agreement with the Banque Industrielle de Chine, followed by a specific loan agreement on the 11th for the issuance of bonds to the extent of $4,000,000 Mex., about $2,000,000 gold, one-half of which was to be for Chinese subscription. In the purchase of materials, those of French origin were to be used, or in lieu thereof, the financing bank was to receive a 2½% commission on all goods from other sources. The engineer was to be French. The company organised to operate the tramways was to have eleven directors, five Chinese and six French, among the latter the bank to be represented. Bonds to the extent of $2,000,000 Mex. were placed on the Peking market for a subscription by Chinese, and the offer was oversubscribed by several millions. However, the financial difficulties into which the Banque Industrielle fell shortly afterwards presumably placed another impediment in the way of this long deferred enterprise.

## [illegible]-SUIYUAN RAILWAY

The public opening of the extension of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway Line to Suiyuan was postponed to July 1st, although this duty was feasible earlier. The extension makes the line 403 miles in length (Peking to Suiyuan) and is within 100 miles of Paotow, a port on the Yellow River and an outlet from Mongolia. Before the close of the quarter a motor line ran between Suiyuan and Paotow and the extension of the railroad to that town was being planned.

## [illegible]-KIRIN RAILWAY

An agreement was reached during the quarter for the construction by the Japanese of the Hunining-Kirin Railway, and on May 25th a Mandate appointed Lu Meng-hsiung, Counsilor of the Ministry of Communications, Director General of the Line. The sum of Yen 10,000,000 had already been borrowed by the Chinese Government for the construction of this line, and the Government was reported to be endeavoring to borrow Yen 20,000,000 more.

## WHANGPOO CONSERVANCY

In continuation of the report of the foreign advisory board on the Whangpoo Conservancy scheme, it should be noted that whereas all the other nationalities agreed to accept £ 2,500 as fee for their engineers, the British insisted upon £ 6,000. This greatly delayed matters and caused much comment unfavorable to Great Britain.

## FAR EASTERN OLYMPIC GAMES

During the early part of June, the Far Eastern Olympic Games were held in Shanghai, the participants being Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos. The majority of prizes were taken by the Filipinos, the Japanese coming second and the Chinese third.

## CAPTURE OF BRITISH MISSIONARY STEVENS

A British missionary named Stevens was taken as hostage by Kao Chien during military operations commenced by the Tuchun of Shensi, Ch'en Shu-fan. Stevens was held for weeks under threat of death, to extort concessions from Ch'en Shu-fan, in defiance of representations from the British Legation and the effortsof the Chinese Foreign Office.

## DEBASED COPPER COINS

At the instance of the Shanghai tramways which were losing heavily on copper coins received in payment of fares, the Diplomatic Body approached the Chinese Government on the subject of the prevalence of light weight copper coins either illicitly minted by provincial mints or imported from a foreign country. The Cabinet issued on May 21st an instruction to the Currency Bureau to devise a plan for the unification of copper currency and to direct the mints for the present to cease coining copper coins.

On inquiry through American consular channels, it was discovered that in Shanghai the orders of the Currency Bureau were being observed, but that in Changsha and Nanking they were, to a large extent, ignored. The problem therefore will doubtless continue to present great difficulties for the future.

## OPIUM

During the quarter there was manifest increasing evidence of the spread of opium cultivation in different portions of China. Reports from missionaries continued to be received, particularly from Shensi, Fukien, Yunnan and Hunan. The British authorities became notably restive under the obvious infractions of the Sino-British opium agreement. On June 25th, a Presidential Mandate appointed Admiral Liu Kuan-hsiung and others high commissioners to investigate opium growing conditions in Fukien, Shensi and Honan.

Major Magruder, Assistant Military Attaché, reported extensive poppy raising in Yunnan, particularly north and south of Talifu, where the farmers were able to raise two crops each year.

This steady growth of opium cultivation is due to the encouragement given to it by the local military officials who derive therefrom an enormous income through local taxation, the local military authorities even going so far as to compel the peasants to raise opium in preference to cereals and other foodstuffs.

It appeared inevitable that Great Britain would eventually demand that China take stronger measures to repress the cultivation of poppy.

## FAMINE RELIEF AND PREVENTION

As the spring advanced, the crop conditions improved beyond the hopes of the famine workers and there was a steady and rapid decrease in suffering and in the extent of necessary relief. So much so was this the case that the various relief measures undertaken by the American Red Cross, such as the Shantung highway from Weihsien, the Shensi highway, and participation in the Peking-Tientsin highway, encountered difficulties in obtaining sufficient labor among the famine sufferers. Towards the end of the quarter the crop situation had so greatly improved due to abundant rains that foreign and domestic famine relief agencies were preparing to conclude their activities.

On May 19th, the Chinese Government requested the assent of the Diplomatic Body to the utilisation of the proceeds of the famine customs surtax; in excess of that needed to refund the loan of $4,000,000 secured thereon, for the establishment of a Famine Prevention Commission, on which foreigners should be represented. The Diplomatic Body took the matter under advisement, but on the same day, without awaiting its decision, the Government appointed Lu Cheng-hsiang as Director General of the Commission, and Yun Pao-hui as Vice Director General.

On June 24th, a Presidential Mandate was issued expressing China's profound appreciation of the friendly and generous spirit of foreign peoples and governments and of Chinese at home and overseas in contributing to the famine relief. It further stated that as the period for extending relief was practically terminated, the local authorities everywhere should take suitable measures for winding up the relief operations.

TSING HUA COLLEGE

The general control of Tsing Hua and of the indemnity students in America is vested, under the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a board of directors consisting of two officers of the Foreign Office and one officer of the American Legation. The Board of Directors refused to countenance a strike at Tsing Hua College, called in sympathy with the students of the government schools in Peking, and declared that any student refusing to take the usual annual examinations then approaching would be considered as having resigned from the College. In consideration, however, of the professed laudable motives of the students, the Directors ordered that reinstatement examinations should be held at the beginning of the next school year. When it came to the point, about 50 of the 80 graduating students decided to take the examinations that should qualify them to proceed to the United States. The remaining seniors, as well as all of the other striking students in the College, practically the entire number, are to be obliged to continue their studies through the Sophomore year in Tsing Hua College instead of through the freshman year as heretofore. The college course in America will be correspondingly lengthened. This decision, although inflicting no real hardship on the students, was not favorably received by them, and the Board of Directors and the Foreign Office were subjected to great pressure not only from the students and their relatives, but also from the other educational institutions in Peking who felt that the indemnity students had incurred this sacrifice on their account. However, no change was made in the policy described above.

It is indicative of the weakness of the Peking Government that it was obliged to capitulate in all respects to the demands of the students in the Government schools.

LILING MISSION CLAIMS:

During the quarter under consideration the Legation was able to reach a settlement with the Chinese Government in the matter of the so-called Liling Mission claims. These claims grew out of the looting by Chinese Government soldiers in May 1918 of the United Evangelical Mission at Liling, Hunan Province. The matter of negotiation looking to settlement was long and, at times, unsatisfactory, but the result is, in the Legation's belief, as good as could be expected under the circumstances. By arrangement with the central Government early in 1920 the local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Changsha and the American Consul at that place undertook, through joint investigation, to reach a decision on the damages sustained. This was to be used as a basis for settlement. The figure reached was $73,000.00 Mexican, which covered only property injuries and not personal injuries and did not provide for interest. The central Government refused interest on the ground that to do so would establish a precedent that might have far-reaching effect. It was contended that interest should run only on determined claims, that is claims respecting which both the Chinese Government and the Government of the injured national had reached a conclusion as to the exact amount due and to be paid. This theory of damages would exclude claims for interest from date of injury and would admit interest only from date of determination of damages. With the approval of the Department of State the Legation waived the specific claim for ~~damages~~ interest, but received in lieu thereof "an additional

additional

ditional sum of $10,000.00 Mexican". It was found impossible to press thejne personal injury claim that had been submitted, for $5,000.

In short, therefore, the Legation succeeded in obtaining an adjustment on the basis of $63,000.00 Mexican. In view of the penuity of the Chinese Government treasury cash payment could not be obtained, and one year treasury bills bearing six per cent interest were issued. These bills are being held pending receipt of the Department's instructions; but it is thought, in the light of the Legation's experience with Chinese Government finance, that it will be found necessary to press officially for payment in 1922.

The noteworthy point in this case is the advantage of settling claims of the sort by reference of the matter to the local authorities of the two governments concerned, that is, the Consuls and local Commissioners of Foreign Affairs in the particular provinces where the injuries of damage occurred. These officials being relatively close to the scene of injury or damage are in a good position to settle evidentiary points. The final arrangements, as to payment, etc., must of course be settled at Peking. This system has the advantage of being regarded with favor by the Chinese Foreign Office.

COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES CAUSED BY THE CIVIL WAR:

The question of obtaining compensation from the Chinese Government on account of losses caused by the prevailing civil war conditions has for a considerable time been under discussion with the Foreign Office. These losses naturally group themselves under the following heads: (a) direct losses

suffered by

suffered by foreign firms and individuals as a consequence of the war, in respect to rights, goods or property in their own hands, (b) direct losses suffered by foreign firms in respect to goods and property held on their behalf by Chinese agents in the interior, and (3) direct losses suffered by foreign firms and individuals through the action of robbers.

This Legation and the British Legation have on a number of occasions addressed formal communications to the Foreign Office with a view to securing a definite commitment that the Chinese Government will meet the losses above referred to. Constant objection has been raised to the inclusion of the second category of losses, it being the position of the Chinese authorities that goods in the hands of Chinese agents are no longer to be construed as goods of foreign firms or individuals and therefore not properly the subject of claims by the Legations of the nationality of such foreign firms and individuals in the event of damage or loss through looting, robbery or other circumstance of the civil war. Claims in this class of cases, it is stated, should be filed by the agents themselves, who will receive such compensation as is given to Chinese merchants or individuals suffering similar misfortune in the district affected. Were the interested Legations to admit this contention the effect would be a serious blow to business undertakings in the interior of China where foreign merchants and firms have been obliged to sell their goods through Chinese agents. There would be no satisfactory guaranty for the protection of

property and

property and goods unquestionably, from our point of view, foreign in ownership as well as in character. It will be recalled in this connection that the Chinese agents act as bailees; the title to the goods does not pass till sales are made; the foreign firm or merchant answers in every way the Anglo-American requirements under the law of principal and agent.

At first the Foreign Office categorically refused to even entertain claims based on losses to goods in the hands of Chinese agents. It appeared that an impasse had been reached; meanwhile valuable evidence in support of such claims was being lost through the passing of time. Finally under an arrangement consented to by the Foreign Office May 9th last it was determined that the Foreign Office would issue instructions to the provincial Commissioners of Foreign Affairs of the several provinces that they should, in conjunction with the consular representatives of foreign governments in their respective provinces, undertake to investigate "the facts concerning the losses in question, on the basis of their various classifications", it being at the same time understood that the question as to what claims should and what claims should not be paid would be left for future discussion.

This means a considerable step forward, having the particular advantage of determining evidentiary points immediately. On June 20th the Legation circularized the consuls in China to cooperate in the joint investigation, and it is hoped that many claims long pending, and others that are constantly arising, will in this way be disposed of, at least so far as questions of evidence are concerned.

ARMS EMBARGO

There were no important developments during the quarter. Complaints were received by the Legation from the Foreign Office as to the alleged presence of American engineers at the front in the armed forces of General Chen Chiung-ming and Sun Yat Sen in their struggle against the province of Kwangsi, and later against the activity of these engineers in rehabilitating an arsenal at Canton with materials imported from the United States. The first accusation was found by the American Consulate General at Canton to be unfounded. The second accusation was at the end of the quarter under consideration by the American Government. The Peking Government continued to address representations to the Legation regarding the arsenal machinery imported into Canton from the United States by the Davis Company, Limited, on the S.S. WOUDRICHEM. Having been brought into negotiation with a representative of the Davis Company, Limited, for the purchase of the undelivered portion of the cargo, the Premier sent a representative to Hongkong supposedly to effect the purchase. No funds, however, were furnished him and the representative returned in disgust.

The Consulate General at Canton reported the accusation of Sun Yat Sen that Japanese officers were serving with the Kwangsi forces and that British vessels were transporting munitions of war from Hongkong for the benefit of Lu Jung-ting of Kwangsi.

Considerable comment was aroused by the transportation by a Japanese vessel of a cargo of war materials from Shanghai to Canton on behalf of the Canton Government. It was claimed by the Peking

Government

ernment, however, that this war material was of Chinese origin and that no question of the infraction of the arms embargo came into question.

On the one hand, many Chinese have commented bitterly that the effect of the arms embargo is to deny to the Chinese Government the right to use those measures of force upon which all governments must to some extent rely for the maintenance of authority, while demanding of that government the fulfillment of their obligations and the maintenance of order. On the other hand, the Premier on more than one occasion has stated that he had as object the unification of China through peaceful means, that there were enough war materials already in China and that for the good of China it would be well to prevent the importation of any more munitions of war. This policy of peaceful penetration, however, received a signal violation in the Premier's orders to Kwangsi to attack Sun Yat Sen. It remained to be seen whether this act of illegic would not bring about his eventual downfall.

## [illegible] ANTI-MILITARISTIC MOVEMENT

As in protest against the burden of armaments, in Southwestern [illegible] an occult sect known as the "Shen Ping" (Diving Troops) [illegible] its activities, although their operations began taking [illegible] a similarity to those of ordinary bandits. The tenets of the [illegible] bear a great resemblance to those of the Boxers. Other [illegible] societies composed of individuals who regard themselves as invulnerable [illegible] bullets appeared in Honan, and proved themselves troublesome [illegible] the military authorities, the special object of their hatred. [illegible] reports from Hanking indicated the activities of the "Red and White [illegible] Spear Societies", a mystical sect, and the American Consul at [illegible] Chungking stated that the "divine soldier" movement at Wanhsien [illegible] was meeting with great sympathy in the South and Southwest of [illegible] Szechuan. It is conceivable that these movements are a direct [illegible] result of the intrigue and propaganda of the Kuo Ming Tang whose [illegible] influence has steadily increased during the quarter.

## TARIFF REVISION

During the quarter the Chinese Government requested a revision of the import tariff to bring the duties to an effective 5%. The matter was still under consideration by the Diplomatic Body at the end of the quarter.

## FOREIGN POSTOFFICES

During the quarter the Chinese Government addressed to the Diplomatic Body a request for the abolition of foreign postoffices. This matter was still under consideration of the interested governments at the end of the quarter.

This copy is for M.I.D. / OFFICE CHIEF OF ...
Copy also sent to ...
and to ...
1922 JAN 21

M.I.2
52
2657
1-2-22



Swatow, China, December 4, 1921.

M. I. 2.

**Attempt to Boycott Butterfield and Swire at Swatow.**

In connection with the boycott agitation against Butterfield and Swire at Amoy over the erection of a jetty, I have the honor to state that Representatives from Amoy arrived in Swatow last week for the purpose of instigating a boycott. By coincidence, there was a student holiday on December 1st on which day a meeting of the Students' Union was held to discuss this matter but no decision was reached. However, during the afternoon and evening, students were seen addressing small crowds in the streets, urging them to boycott Butterfield and Swire. On December 3rd another meeting was held, at which it was decided to boycott this firm and to ask the cooperation of the Chamber of Commerce. It is reliably stated that the Chamber promised the Students' deputation to call a meeting which a delegation of students would be invited to attend. The meeting has not yet been held. The Students' Union is reported to have decided to carry out the boycott even without the cooperation of the Chamber of Commerce, and, in this event, has threatened the merchants with "appropriate measures"

measure" to bring them into line.

According to information received, the attitude of the merchants may be described as uninterested. Although as claimed in some Chinese quarters, shippers have grievances against Butterfield and Swire, it is evident that they have no intention of taking up this foolhardy proposal which would work great loss to them. It is stated that at the proposed meeting the students will be asked to provide shipping facilities to take the place of those of Butterfield and Swire, which, of course, is impracticable. This is the busiest shipping season of the year, and as Butterfield and Swire operate, or are agents for, a large portion of the tonnage calling at this port, the position of the merchants can readily be understood.

The success of the students in connection with the Japanese boycott has turned their heads and has resulted in their getting entirely out of the control of their school authorities. They apparently fail to realise that they were merely expressing latent public sentiment in the case of the Japanese boycott.

A copy of a circular in English issued under the name of the Amoy Civilians' Association and sent to this office in a cover postmarked Swatow is enclosed.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. S. Ufford

Consul.

610 (800)

Enclosure: Circular as stated.

In quadruplicate.
Copy to Legation, Peking.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STA

893.6117-J-222

B. C. Tours, British Consul, Neglecting Treaty Regulations and Exercising Oppressive Measures, Transgressing the Scope of Treaties, and Shakening Friendship between Great Britain and China.

We Chinese are a peace-loving people. Amoy is a Treaty Port. Having been living under the coercion of an external force, the inhabitants have always kept an obsequious attitude. It is generally admitted by our foreign friends that we never raise a strong protest against anything unless we are oppressed to such a degree as to become exasperated.

With reference to the ownership of the Bund as well as to the construction of Butterfield and Swire's jetty, it is much to be regretted that B. C. Tours, British Consul, not only has failed to submit a clear, definite and just report to the British Minister at Peking, which has resulted in rendering impossible a smooth progress of the discussion of at the Capitol, but also has disregarded the agreement and, despite the advice of the Chinese authorities, instructed Butterfield & Swire to continue the work before the question is settled.

In view of the fact that Butterfield and Swire have acted ad libitum and in neglect of friendship, we are compelled to boycott their business, hoping thereby to appeal to their awakened conscience. Unfortunately this measure has generated a bad feeling between the parties concerned, and on the pretext of a headcoolie being wounded and in order to take revenge, Butterfield and Swire allowed the jetty laborers to seize innocent Chinese indiscriminately and beat them inhumanly cruelly. One man was severely

beaten

beaten; and when the laborers realised their mistake, they had him locked up privately. What a lawless act it was! In the meantime, the British Consul ordered a number of armed blue jackets to be landed on the Bund as a means of threatening. Oh! it is beyond all possibility to explain the reason why the British Consul should despise the Chinese authorities and people so much! His oppressive measures are intolerable; and we deem it fit to publish the following account and expect of both foreigners and Chinese an impartial discussion of the matter.

In the morning of the 19th of November, Ju, headcoolie of the gang building Butterfield and Swire's jetty, on his way to the Bund and after landing at the Tau Bee jetty, met several people who went up to him and talked to him at his ear. One of them suddenly cut off his ear with a saber. Some said it was a matter of love jealousy, while others took it for an act of revenge. And immediately after the incident all the laborers armed with axes and other tools rushed out of the shed and first caught a sampan man on the Tau Bee jetty and then the headman of another gang building the Native Customs' jetty, both of whom were beaten. There happened to be a coolie of the Native Customs' jetty, named Lim Tau, who was just taking his breakfast. The first gang of coolies thought he was the criminal and dragged him by force to the front of Butterfield and Swire's office, where they began to beat him with all their might. Following the heavy blows and fists, they lifted him high up in the air and threw him down on the ground, repeating this torture for a number of times. After that they kicked him on the stomach very vehemently until he was fatally wounded and almost unconscious.

unconscious. And despite the fact that Ju, the headcoolie whose ear had been cut off, publicly denied the man beaten to be the real culprit, these jetty coolies did not realise their own fault but first kept Lim Tau in Butterfield and Swire's office and then moved him to the British Police headquarters. And being still in great wrath they held their weapons and searched every nook and corner for the would-be criminals.

At 5 p.m. over 20 armed blue jackets from the British cruiser were landed at the Bund and stationed at the office of Butterfield and Swire, ready for any emergency. A great disturbance was consequently created.

At 5.30 the British Consul, accompanied by the captains of the two British cruisers, called on the Magistrate of Police. Strongly charging Lim Tau with having participated in the crime, the Consul demanded that he be brought over to the Chinese Police Court and held there for summoning for trial by the Consul and further urged that the other four accomplices be arrested. The Magistrate of Police refused to do as requested. Finding his bluffing trick useless, and being in want of a good reason, the Consul finally requested, in the capacity of an individual, the Magistrate of Police to do him a favor by acting promptly. The Chinese authority, however, was not a bit moved. The interview lasted fully two hours and the guest left with intense disappointment.

It happened that early on that day the Tao Yin and Commissioner Fung had left Amoy on duty. So in the next morning Mr. Fung, Chief of Staff of the Commissioner's office, called on the British Consul, and requested that the British sailors be called back to the cruiser. To this the Consul replied that they would if the Chinese

authorities

authorities would guarantee the safety of the coolies at work. Mr. Fung then demanded that both the ringleader and his associates who beat Lim Tau be given over to the local authorities for trial. The Consul refused on the ground that Lim Tau was not wounded. Arguments were thus exchanged until finally it was agreed that somebody would be sent from the Commissioner's office to accompany the Consul to examine Lim Tau. One Mr. Liang was appointed, who accompanied the Consul to Butterfield and Swire's office and found many abrasions and bruises on the head and body and limb, but was no doctor was in attendance. Mr. Liang could not tell how he was wounded internally. Mr. Liang consulted the Consul to deliver Lim Tau to the local authorities. The Consul said that he would agree on the condition that Lim Tau must be held in custody until the jetty was completed.

To-day 12 blue jackets carried a machine gun from the cruiser and set it up on the floor of Butterfield and Swire's office.

So far the British Consul has maintained a policy of using his military force to coerce the Chinese authorities and people, who being forced to anger have wired to the Peking Government and to Foochow requesting them to take up the matter strongly.

To sum up, six points may be given which indicate the British Consul's violation of Treaty regulations in connection with this case.

1. The coolies building Butterfield and Swire's jetty and those working at the Native Customs' jetty are all Chinese citizens, and any trouble between them should be referred to the Chinese authorities, the British Consul having no right to interfere.

2. The Tau Bee jetty on which the trouble occurred is perfectly on the Chinese soil. The British Consul has no right whatsoever to interfere.

3. It was already a serious violation of Treaties on the part of the British Consul in asserting the Bund to be a British concession and building walls and gates on both ends of it, thereby obstructing public traffic; and to allow the jetty coolies to beat Chinese people and permit the British police to assist in the torture by shutting the gates is still more evident of his negligence of Treaty regulations.

4. After the jetty coolies had arrested and tortured Lim Tau and realized their mistakes, the British Consul not only failed to order the delivery of Lim Tau but also strongly accused him of having cut off the headman's ear, and even tried to intimidate the Magistrate of Police to hold him in custody for trial when the Consul needed him. According to Article XVI of the Appended Treaty between China and Great Britain, concluded in the 8th year of the reign of Emperor Hamhong of the late Ching Dynasty, it is stipulated as follows:- "In the case of a Chinese assaulting or troubling an English, the former shall be punished by the Chinese authorities." Even if Lim Tau had insulted or troubled an English man, the British Consul had no right to try him, not to speak of the fact the Lim Tau had nothing to do with the crime and that the man wounded was a Chinese. It is difficult to see on what or which Treaty the British Consul is based in making his demand.

5. It is provided elsewhere in the Treaty that when the Chinese authorities arrest a foreign subject or when the foreign authorities arrest a Chinese, the man arrested shall

be

be delivered within 24 hours. Now the British Consul, because of the Chinese authorities having refused to accept his terms, holding Lin Tan in custody for over 2 days (up to the 21st of November), has obviously gone too far beyond the recognized scope of discussion.

6. For the safety of Butterfield and Swire, the British Consul should have asked for protection from the Chinese authorities. He should not have called British sailors to land with arms and machine guns, thereby creating a menace to local tranquillity and causing a fear in the heart of the foreign and Chinese merchants. Should any trouble arise, it is the British Consul to be held responsible.

After all, from the various measures taken by the British Consul in coping with the question, it is unquestionable that he has harboured a very ill feeling towards the Chinese authorities and people of Amoy. We have, however, realized the weakness of our country and resolved not to resort to violent means of redressing the wrong suffered, thereby providing an excuse for territorial aggression. But, for the welfare of the nation and of the town, it is necessary for us to resist "might" with "right". It is hoped that our foreign friends as well as the Chinese people will carefully investigate the case related above and express their just views in order that the British Consul may not act so improperly as to compel the Amoy people to resist with extreme measures. This will not only be a blessing to the Chinese inhabitants here, but to the foreign community as well.

The Amoy Civilians' Association.

21st day of November of the 10th Year of the Republic of China.

No.87.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Amoy, China.

This copy is for M.I.D.
Copy also sent to
and to
CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL. DIV.
1922 JAN 27 M.I.D.
WAR DEPARTMENT

November 26, 1921.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Boycott of British Steamship Company.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.86 of November 23, 1921, concerning the boycott of Butterfield & Swire, a British steamship company, and to inform you that on the arrival of one of their steamers, the SINKIANG, from Shanghai this morning, some trouble was experienced in landing passengers by the interference of sampan men and boycotters.

Early in the day I was approached by the local foreman of Stewart, Crane & Co., an American firm in Shanghai constructing houses on the island of Kulangsu for the Chinese Maritime Customs. This work is in no way connected with the building of Butterfield & Swire's pier, but is being done by laborers brought from Shanghai, forty-seven of whom were on the SINKIANG. At the first attempt by sampan men to prevent the landing of these men, the foreman (an American of decided Irish extraction), rushed to me with a demand that "a cutter" be gotten from the U.S.S. WHIPPLE and his men landed by force. He did not seem to care what the serious consequences of a compliance with such an absurd request at this time might have. He also does not seem to have notified the proper authorities or the Harbor Master of the expected arrival of his men. Upon communicating with the Harbor Master the men were landed in Customs boats and without interference or trouble. The captain of the U.S.S.WHIPPLE knew nothing of the affair until it was all over.

Another attempt was made by the boycotters to prevent the landing of some missionaries from the same vessel.

They were

they were met by friends and were caused some delay and annoyance by sampan men, but aside from that have no complaint to make.

These two instances are reported in order to show the local feeling, as in the first instance, of some who would welcome a chance to further involve a delicate situation, and, the second instance shows the evident intention of the sampan men to back the boycott. This intention of theirs is more probably because of their loss of ferrying passengers and baggage to and from the steamers in the event of the completion of the pier than because of any ideas as to China's sovereign rights.

The failure on the part of Butterfield & Swire to assist their passengers ashore, or to make use of the marines placed at this disposal, or in any way to provoke the boycotters, is to be noted in these instances. It may possibly show that the belief current in some places here that Butterfield & Swire are willing to call off the work on the pier is correct. However, this cannot be verified, and the fact remains that the British stand is, to all outward appearances, an unyielding one and work is continuing on the pier. In my talks with my British colleague he has expressed himself with considerable vehemence and seems to brook no compromise; in fact he was rather bitter in his remarks about Butterfield & Swire not having made use of the "men at their disposal" to forcibly effect the landing of passengers and baggage.

As a possible evidence, however, of at least a change in their position, I hear that the CARLISLE expects to leave on November 30th, upon the arrival of the sloop HOLLYHOCK. This last named, I am told, carries no marines. Whether this portends a withdrawal of the few marines still on the property of Butterfield & Swire and a slight effort to alleviate the situation cannot be said.

It is a

It is a fact that there is considerable diversity of opinion among the British themselves as to the manner in which this whole affair has been handled. From all sides I hear statements which indicate that neither Butterfield & Swire nor the British consul himself have the full sympathy of, nor the willing backing of, their nationals.

Concerning the prospective change of the HOLLYHOCK for the CARLISLE I may add that , whether it has a bearing on the situation or is only a coincidence, there is an apparent difference in the temperaments of the commanding officers of the two men-of-war. The captain of the CARLISLE is a very able officer with a splendid war record for daring, bravery and successful tactics: he of the HOLLYHOCK is, I am told, an equally able man, but one more likely to weigh all evidence and is not considered one likely to welcome a "situation". To use the words the captain of the CARLISLE used to me, the captain of the HOLLYHOCK "is not the 'swashbuckler'" that he of the CARLISLE is. Just what effect on conditions this change is to have remains to be seen, as it appears that the captain of the CARLISLE and the British consul have seen eye to eye throughout the affair, and the appearance of a man who is credited with being of a more conciliatory nature will be welcomed by some, but no change is looked for by others. It would be interesting to know if the change to be made in men-of-war is done with deliberate intent, or if it is, after all, merely a coincidence.

I shall report further developments of interest if they occur.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Thos. M. Wilson

American Consul.

Transmitted in quintuplicate.
One copy to the Legation.

810.2
TMW.

M.I.D.
from FE
7/6/5

668.

Canton, China, April 4, 1922.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL. DIV.
MAY 8
1922
WAR DEPARTMENT

893.00/4336

Political conditions.

SUN-YAT-SEN. - CHANG-TSO-LIN AGREEMENT TERMS FOR UNITING -

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

On Saturday afternoon of April 1st I paid a social call on Dr. Wu Ting Fang who is living at the home of his son C. C. Wu, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. The younger Dr. Wu, of his own volition, advised me concerning the results of his trip to Mukden. He stated that Sun Yat Sen (孫逸仙) was to be made President, while Tuan Chi Jui (段祺瑞) was to be made Vice President. The coöperation of Tuan Chi Jui was to be obtained without the support of the undesirable element in the defunct Anfu Party. The Government was to be organized along federal lines after a new parliment had been called. The present Tuchuns will be appointed Civil Governors. He stated that the unfitness of the old parliment was apparent and that, in consequence, it would be disbanded. Some sort of a public admission that the old parliment had been illegally disbanded by force would be sufficient to vindicate the principles for which the South stood. He said that Chang Tso Lin (張作霖) would support Sun Yat Sen as President with Liang Shi-yi (梁士詒) as Premier. President Hsu Shih Chang (徐世昌) is at pre-

sent

ent compelled to rely on Wu Pei Fu ( 吳佩孚 ) for support, and in view of the existing situation he will soon be forced to resign. He said that Wu Pei Fu must agree to the new coalition or be eliminated. He stated that the various details of the agreement were being worked out in consulation with the various factions. A precis of the above conversation was telegraphed to the Legation on Saturday evening. It is significant that Chu Ching Lan ( 朱慶瀾 ), former Civil Governor of Kwangtung and a henchman of Tuan Chi Jui, has been in this city for the past two weeks. He was appointed Civil Governor by Peking in 1916, but after Lu Yung Ting ( 陸榮廷 ) came into possession of Kwangtung, Chu retired of his own accord in September 1917. A week ago one of the minor officials in Canton denied any knowledge of Chu's presence in the city.

Dr Wu stated that a brother of Tang Chi Yao ( 唐繼堯 ) was now on his way to Canton and would probably arrive within a few days. He admitted that Yunnanfu had been captured by Tang. The report is current in Canton that Ku Pin Jen ( 顧品珍 ) the former Governor of Yunnan has been killed. Dr Wu also admitted that there had been some fighting in Kweichow province between the various factions.

Regarding the assassination of Teng Kong ( 鄧鏗 ), I have the honor to inform the Department that I have obtained two reports from foreign sources concerning the alleged motive for the crime. One opinion seems to be that it was perpetrated by the adherents of the Kwangsi Party; while another party is equally positive that the deed was committed by the agents of the Kwo Ming Tang as a warning to Chen Chiung Ming.

King ( 陳炯明 ).

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. C. HUSTON

Vice Consul in Charge.

800.

M/H



M.I.D.
from FE
M.E.S.

454.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

Canton, China, March 13, 1922.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Political Conditions in Yunnan. Expedition of Tang Chi Yao against Yunnan.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

893.00/4294

With reference to this Consulate General's despatch No. 439 of February 17, 1922, regarding Dr. Sun Yat Sen's expedition against the North, in which the Department was informed that Tang Chi Yao had started for Yunnan with an unknown force of troops, I have the honor to inform the Department that it is reported that the troops of Tang and those under Lu Pin Chen have clashed at Kuangnanfu, Yunnan Province.

On February 23rd President Sun Yat Sen issued a circular telegram to the Provincial authorities of Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow, denouncing the action of Tang as a direct violation of orders tending to impede the progress of the Northern expedition. He requested these Provinces to prevent Tang from carrying out his selfish scheme.

On March 6th the Canton office of Andersen, Meyer & Company received a telegram transmitted from Peking informing the local manager that Mr. Shelton, an American citizen, had been murdered by bandits in Northern Yunnan on February 16, 1922. The local branch immediately telegraphed to Yunnanfu asking for detailed information. Mr. Roar, Secretary

retary of the Y. M. C. A. at Yunnanfu, who has recently come from that Province, and who, last year, co-operated with others in bringing about the rescue of Dr. Shelton when he was held for ransom by the bandits, informed this Consulate General that robbers and bandits are in practical control of the Province. He stated that Ku Ping Chen was unable to control the situation, and that he was furnishing arms and ammunition to the villages in order that they might help in breaking up these marauding bands. He stated that many of these robbers formerly belonged to Tang Chi Yao's army.

It appears that in January an important railway center near Yunnanfu was raided and looted. Two Frenchmen were carried off as prisoners, and the authorities were informed by the robbers that if a rescue was attempted the prisoners would be shot. The Governor followed with five hundred troops and came up with the looters late the same day when a running fight took place. True to their word the bandits shot one of the prisoners the other managing to escape. For a time after this the Military Governor, Ku Ping Chen, turned over his office to one of his subordinates. I am informed that as a result of this failure of the Provincial authorities to protect life and property the French have stationed Annanite troops all along the railroad in Yunnan.

Since the Commander of the troops at Talifu commanding Northwestern Yunnan, has declared his independence of Ku Pin Chen's orders, and since it was apparently in Northwestern Yunnan that Mr. Shelton was murdered, it will be difficult if not impossible to bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. In case more detailed information concerning the death of Mr. Shelton is received it will be transmitted to the

Department

Department. A copy of the telegram received by the local management of Andersen, Meyer & Company is enclosed for the Department's information.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. C. HUSTON

Vice Consul in Charge.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram referred to.

800.

A true copy of the signed original.

Translation of a telegram received by Andersen, Meyer & Company at Canton, China from the Peking office of the company.

Received March 6, 1922.

Sent. March 5, 1922.

Following telegram is for Yunnanfu if we have a representative there. American Legation have just received following telegram from Likiang, Yunnan. Quote. Robbers killed Doctor Shelton, Sasweisan 17th of February. Signed Handy. Message ends. Please advise American Consul on arrival and furnish us any information possible for Legation.

800.

A true copy of the signed original.

M.I.D. from FE

2-1

No. 264

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Chungking, China. April 28, 1922.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: ANTI-FOREIGN SENTIMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN SZECHUAN.

The Honorable

Jacob Gould Schurman,

American Minister,

American Legation,

Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram of April 21, 1922 and to state that this telegram arrived somewhat mutilated. The sense of it was understood to be an inquiry if there was any disappointment over the Washington Conference and if there was any anti-foreign sentiment in this district. As stated in my telegram of April 27, 1922, in reply, I do not find any anti-foreign sentiment here except that the Japanese are generally disliked and distrusted by the Chinese and there appears to be some suspicions of the British over Tibetan matters. This office is aware that rumors, have appeared elsewhere in China, of anti-foreign feeling in Szechuan but careful investigation does not substantiate these rumors. Missionary residents and visitors and other visitors to all part of the province deny that there is any such sentiment here, except as noted above.

RECEIVED
1922 JUN 16 PM 3 04

All Americans in this district report that they meet with warm cordiality from the Chinese and my own contacts

with

893.00/4436

with all classes in this province have been very cordial. As throwing some light on the attitude towards foreigners it is may be mentioned that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce building in Chungking was let to the Methodist Mission to hold a conference and revival meeting the past month. This meeting was carried on for about one week and was well attended by the Chinese-both Christian and non-Christian.

The student organizations have threatened for some time to boycott the Japanese steamers that are beginning navigation on the Upper Yangtze. Two of these steamers arrived in Chungking a few days ago and true to their threats the students picketed the steamers and prevented all intercourse with the shore. One of the steamers is said to have come up without any cargo to see what would happen. Both of the Japanese steamers are remaining in port while the matter is being discussed between the Japanese Consul and the de facto Government.

The Japanese Consul informed me that the governor will not send soldiers to remove the picketers but that the Chinese authorities have held a conference with the student leaders the result of which is that the picketers will be removed in a day or two and that the steamers will not be boycotted again. The students, however, did not agree not to boycott Japanese goods. In spite of this boycott Japanese goods are plentiful in the shops in Chungking. The Japanese Consul states that the reason assigned by the governor for not using the police or the soldiers for removing the picketers was that he was afraid that it would merely enrage the

students

students and cause the boycott to become more strict. This may be part of the truth but the other part probably is because the governor is afraid that much activity on his part in suppressing the boycott would turn the boycotters against the governor himself.

It seems a little odd that the "Toba" the Japanese gunboat went down river to Shanghai a few days before the arrival of the above two steamers. This is especially so since the Japanese authorities were aware of the intended boycott. On leaving the captain of the "Toba" stated that he would not be back before the first of December and naively asked the senior British naval officer to look after Japanese interests in the meantime. So far this officer has taken no part in the boycott matter but a delicate situation will arise should the boycotters get out of hand and the British gunboat be called on to interfere.

The British are just getting over their own difficulties as the Jardine Matheson Company have had some trouble over their pontoon site. This year is their first appearance in the shipping business in Chungking and they leased a plat of river front some time ago but when the time came for the final arrangements the usual unknown and unconsulted relative of the lessor appeared and objected to the lease. Also a junk guild objected to the steamer pontoon on the ground of prior user of the location. The matter created considerable stir for a short while and while the case has not yet been settled it is on the way to a compromise.

As to the Washington Conference opinion among the

Chinese

Chinese on this subject seems divided. The more intelligent and better informed Chinese, as far as I can find out, are rather pleased with the outcome. As reported in my despatch No. 213 of February 1[illegible], 1922 to the Legation (No. 214 of February 20, 1922 to the Department) the students started some agitation, some of which got into the Chinese press. Indications are, however, that these agitators were not taken seriously by the Chinese and the agitation died out. Just after the close of the Washington Conference the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking sent out a circular report to all the provincial authorities (at least to all in Szechuan) on the conference in which it was stated in a general way that the United States had rendered China a good deal of service in the matter. This has no doubt created considerable friendly sentiment towards Americans.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

N. F. ALLMAN,

Vice Consul in Charge.

A true copy of the signed original. W.W.R.

800/885
NFA/WMP.

5 copies to the Department direct.

M.I.D. from FE Supplied

No. 150

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Harbin, China, May 13, 1922.

2657-J-260

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: LOCAL PRESS COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL DISTURBANCES IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

893.00/4439

For the information of the Department I have the
1/ honor to enclose herewith an article which appeared in the May 7th issue of the Chinese newspaper THE INTERNATIONAL on the subject of measures taken by the police authorities to put martial law into force in Fuchiatien, the native city of Harbin. The local Chinese newspapers have again started publishing their issues, but they are still subjected to severe censoring by the Chinese authorities.

It is reported that as a result of the dismissal by Peking of General Chang Tso-lin as Inspecting Commissioner of Manchuria and Tuchin of Fengtien Province, the local Chinese organizations in Harbin have been asked by the local Chinese authorities to sign a telegram to be despatched to the Peking Government requesting the latter to re-instate General Chang Tso-lin to his former post. It is believed that the text of this telegram was sent to Harbin by General Chang himself.

The local Chinese press reports that General Chang intends to reorganize his troops in order to continue

-warfare-

[illegible]are against General Wu Pei-fu. It is reported that at a military conference recently held at Mukden it was decided to use Chinese police from various districts in Fengtien to serve as a reserve army until a newsarmy could be recruited. Each magistrate has been instructed by telegraph to send one hundred police to Mukden for this purpose.

The Chinese press also reports that in order to finance further operations on the part of the Fengtien troops the Yung Heng ( )Syndicate of Kirin and the Kwang Hsin ( ) Syndicate of Heilungchiang Provinces have been called upon to send funds to Mukden for the use of General Chang. These syndicates are native banking concerns which have been issuing paper bank notes.

The local Chinese press also reports that the local Chinese gentry and merchants, having become alarmed at the withdrawal of Chinese troops near Harbin, have proposed the organization of a train band for self protection. A meeting was held on May 3rd at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at which the following three resolutions were adopted:

1. The number of the band should be two hundred;
2. These men should be hired by the Chinese business men;
3. The shops should be graded into five classes according to the amount of business done by each: the shops belonging to the first two classes should each hire two men, while those belonging to the last three classes should each hire one man. It is expected that the

-arms-

arms needed by this train band will be secured from the Chinese military authorities.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. C. Hanson
American Consul

800
GCH/TLL

Enclosure:

Chinese press notice as stated.

A true copy of the signed original.

Enclosure No. 186
with Hankow Despatch
No. 1[illegible] May 15, 1922

News Items from the Chinese Newspaper
"The International", May 7, 1922.

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES
TO PUT THE MARTIAL LAW INTO FORCE

As already published in this paper, the provincial police authorities contemplated to proclaim martial law for the maintenance of public order, and it has been learned that the following measures have been taken in this connection:

1: Beginning with 11:30 p.m. no passenger should be allowed on the streets.

2: Policemen on duty should shoulder arms both during day time and at night.

3: Police officers should be armed in day time as well as at night.

4: Theaters, prostitute quarters and restaurants should stop business at 10 p.m.

5: The Commercial public should be prohibited to carry pistols without permits.

6: Hotels and inns should be carefully inspected, and guests should be ordered back at 9 p.m. for examination by police.

7: Exportation of hard money should be prohibited.

The above measures were proclaimed yesterday by the Executive Department of the Chief Police Office.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1922 2657-S-241
WAR DEPARTMENT

## Shall the Treaty of Peace Be One of Justice or One of Infamy?

BY

# MAJ. LOUIS LIVINGSTON SEAMAN,

PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF THE CHINA SOCIETY OF AMERICA.

**Read as a part of the speech of Senator BRANDEGEE, of Connecticut, in the United States Senate.**

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, I read a document by Maj. Louis Livingston Seaman, M. D., LL. D., F. R. G. S., president emeritus of the China Society of America, entitled "An Appeal to Members of the Senate of the United States—Shall the Treaty of Peace be one of Justice or one of Infamy?"

"SHALL THE TREATY OF PEACE BE ONE OF JUSTICE OR ONE OF INFAMY?

"That is the question the United States is now called upon to consider, and the destiny of nations hangs on the decision. America entered the Great War as the champion of smaller nations—to preserve the independence of imperiled countries, and to rescue civilization from barbarism. From its birth our Republic has stood for the rights of the oppressed. Our ideals have been for liberty and justice. Our great civil conflict removed the blot of slavery from our land—our Spanish campaign gave freedom and prosperity and happiness to an enslaved people in Cuba and in the Philippines, and our compensation for the sacrifice was the gratification of our ideals. We acknowledged no masters, and we do not propose to.

"The problem to-day is the ratification of the peace treaty with the Huns and the creation of a league of nations. Shall the Fourth of July, 1919, pass into history as the last anniversary of American independence? Shall we, by agreeing to article 10 of the covenant of the league of nations surrender our sovereignty gained in 1776, to Great Britain, who by a vote of six to one, can impose upon us the incalculable obligation of preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of herself or any member of the league of nations in any part of the globe? Are we prepared to submit our traditional attitude regarding purely American questions to a tribunal in which we are in such a hopeless minority or in which the vote of New Zealand could count as equal to our own? Shades of Washington and Jefferson! What would be their verdict if they could witness the depths to which our land has been dragged in order to gratify the personal ambition and egotism of the 'too proud to fight' pacifist who in the peace conference at Paris has been so hopelessly outwitted by trained European and oriental diplomacy that to-day he is the laughingstock of

143009—20013

European statesmen, and whose refusal to prepare for the inevitable, resulted in a prolongation of the war for more than a year, the loss of more than a million lives, the destruction of property inestimable, and suffering and misery that can not be described or measured. And poor China—whose Government, in the opinion of many competent authorities, has given more happiness and individual liberty to a greater mass of humanity than any other Government in the world; whose representatives were promised by our President that if their country entered the war in 1917 their territorial integrity would be preserved—where will China stand if this unholy alliance is consummated, and Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius, sacred to the Chinese, with its 40,000,000 inhabitants turned over to the tender mercy of the Japanese, whose policy of territorial aggrandizement rivals that of the European nations, as witnessed in Korea, Manchuria, and the Pacific Isles, and whose threats of aggression, made at the point of the bayonet, prevented China's entrance in the war in its earliest days?

"On August 20, 1914, I cabled Wu Ting Fang, secretary of state of China, from Ostend, Belgium, imploring China to sever diplomatic relations and declare war on Germany at once—to immediately seize all territory in China then occupied by Germany, to refuse further payment of indemnity for the Boxer uprising, and to demand repayment of all indemnities already paid, together with substantial damages for German occupation of Chinese territory. All this I then regarded, and still regard, as the moral right of China, for there would have been no Boxer uprising had it not been for Germany's policy of barbarism and aggression, when in carrying out the Kaiser's order 'to behave like Huns,' they committed acts of 'Kultur' and cruelty that challenged those since perpetrated in Belgium and Poland. Now is China's opportunity to regain her lost Provinces and obtain justice, and the people of the United States who are familiar with the conditions and know the truth demand that the United States Senate shall secure this result.

"It was hoped that the carnival of territorial lust, which for centuries caused untold bloodshed the world over, had culminated in the partitioning of Africa—the last of the continents to be parceled off by the world's looters, who, in the division of the spoils, followed, as the robber barons of feudal days—

> "The good old rule, the simple plan,
> That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can.

"But look at China to-day—that grand old country, with its great wall which for over 20 centuries protected it from the hordes of Tartars and Mongols on the north, while its Tibetan ranges on the west and impenetrable forests on the south, permitted it to live in peace and tranquillity thousands of years, with no fear of molestation by 'foreign devils' from land or sea. And in this time the beautiful but fallacious philosophy of Confucius, which taught the rule of moral suasion rather than that by might, grew until its essence was expressed in the proverb, 'Better have no child than one who is a soldier'—this, too, in a land where it is considered a disgrace to die childless.

"And what was the natural result of pacifism? A condition of insecurity, of defenselessness, of inability to enforce that first

law of nature—self-protection—followed, which, when realized by the occidental nations, resulted in their seizing great sections of her domains upon trivial excuses, and wringing most valuable concessions from her rulers.

"As a direct result of this spoliation, the worm at last turned, and the Boxer uprising of 1900 followed, having for its declared purpose the forcible expulsion of all foreigners from the country, and the recovery by China of her despoiled possessions. I say, without fear of contradiction by those who are familiar with that issue (and I was there), that that uprising was one of the most splendid exhibitions of patriotism witnessed in modern times. The methods pursued by the Chinese, due to the ignorance of their misguided leaders, and the horrors that followed, have afforded the theme for many a tragic tale and numberless explanatory theories. But the plain fact can not be gainsaid, nor too strongly emphasized, that the essential motive of that propaganda was the freeing of the land from the hated foreigners, who, in current phrase, had 'robbed the people of their country.'

"It was then, that in reprisal and revenge, the so-called civilized world turned against them. The eight allied armies of the 'great powers' marched to their capital, slaughtered their people, raped their women, looted their temples, their treasure, and their habitations, committed brutalities that rivaled those of the Huns in the recent great tragedy, and created a sentiment in China which fairly crucified Christianity, and which should redound to the shame and humiliation of the Christian nations whose forces participated in the outrages; but which, instead, secured monstrous indemnities and subjected China to the most humiliating terms of peace that were ever inflicted upon a nation, and that have kept her poverty-stricken ever since. America, however, has some reason for pride in that she waived claims to over half the indemnity, whilst her great statesman, John Hay, succeeded temporarily in preserving the integrity of the country by his splendid policy of the 'open door.'

"Never shall I forget that winter at Ching Wan Tao, following the war, where detachments of the allied army were gathered awaiting the fate of China. They reminded me of a pack of hungry wolves around the carcass of a dead animal—each fearing to set his fangs in the carcass, lest while so engaged his neighbor might do the same with him. And so during the long negotiations that finally led to the declaration of peace the situation continued.

"Four years later I again visited that scene, and there, in smaller numbers, were found the troops of many nations, still waiting, ready to seize the first opportunity to partition the country and to secure their share of the spoil. But more pressing engagements were then imminent, involving the attention of some of the powers. The Russo-Japanese struggle was on and China was given a temporary respite. From that time until the outbreak of the revolution which led to the establishment of the Republic, China paid the indemnity claims with such regularity that no opportunity was found for interference.

"For more than three-quarters of a century, beginning with the unrighteous opium war, and even later, China has been

subjected to a series of squeezes and despoilment of her territory to an extent unequaled in history. The iniquitous indemnities wrung from her as the result of the Boxer campaign would have been reversed, and the countries now receiving them would be paying for the outrages committed had right instead of might prevailed. The powerful governments and financial institutions doing business in the Orient have become obsessed with the idea that it is legitimate business to 'squeeze' the country, regardless of right or justice, and in transferring the so-called German rights in Shantung to Japan the Big Three are to-day continuing that policy, and making our country, the United States, underwriters to the unholy deal.

"The effect upon China of the spoliation of her territory and finances created among the leading minds of her people an appreciation of her weakness and of the necessity for the adoption of occidental methods for self-protection. They saw the absolute imbecility of continuing the policy of the Manchu dynasty, and the necessity for a change of government and the Chinese Republic became a reality. The character of the revolution which made it possible was remarkable. It obtained the maximum of liberty with the minimum of bloodshed. It was an evolution rather than a revolution, the most potent factors of which were those of peace and not of war. They were the results of trade with foreign nations, the importation of modern inventions, railroads, telegraphs, newspapers; the work of Christian missionaries, schools and colleges established by them; but, most of all, the influence of Chinese students who had been educated in foreign universities, and who carried back to their native land the high ideals of occidental government. In comparison with the epoch-making wars for freedom in occidental lands—the French Revolution, England's fight for the Magna Charta, or our own great seven years' struggle for independence—the Chinese revolution was almost bloodless. It is stated that the total mortality of the war which secured the emancipation of 400,000,000 of people was less than the number lost in the Battle of the Wilderness or in single conflicts in the war just concluded.

"The moderation shown by the successful leaders to their late rulers was another striking characteristic. Instead of the guillotine or exile, they were retired with liberal pensions and allowed to retain their empty titles. The leaders enjoined upon their followers the protection of life and property, both commercial and missionary, and these orders were strictly obeyed.

"A people who carried to a successful termination such a revolution deserve the respect and recognition of the world in their present great crisis. The enemies and looters of China to-day forget the traditions of the race—that China was old when Chaldea and Babylon were young; that she saw the rise and fall of Grecian and Roman civilization; and that she has maintained the integrity and honor of her Government ever since; that her scholars discovered the compass and invented the intellectual game of chess when the Huns of Europe and the Japanese were groveling in the darkness of medievalism; that she produced her own science, literature, art, philosophy, and religion, whose founder, Confucius, 500 years before the birth of Christ. expounded the doctrine of Christianity in the saying,

'Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you." They forget that for nearly a thousand years China has been nearer a democracy in many features of its government than any other government then in existence. The fundamental unit of democracy, the foundation upon which our own Government rests, is embodied in the principle of the New England town meeting. All authorities on democracy—De Tocqueville, Bryce, and the Compte de Paris—agree in this, and in China all local government for centuries has been controlled by local authorities.

"The Chinese have never sought territorial aggrandizement but have loved the paths of peace, where the law of moral suasion, and not of might, ruled. They possess qualities of industry, economy, temperance, and tranquillity unsurpassed by any nation on earth. With these qualities they are in the great race of the survival of the fittest to stay. They are to be feared by foreign nations more for their virtues than for their vices, and in their present struggle for the maintenance of their territory they deserve our earnest sympathy and support. Will America, the champion of justice, now desert that grand old country and witness its vivisection when we have the power to prevent it?

"The Japanese claim their country is overcrowded and they require more room for their increasing population. Is this a legitimate reason that the 450,000,000 Chinese should be crowded out of the land in which they have lived for 6,000 years? Is China to become a second Honolulu, where 60 per cent of the population are Japanese?

"Japan has already been rewarded many times for her contribution to the victory of the Allies in being relieved of the threatening danger from Germany, which when in possession of Kiaochow strategetically commanded the Japanese Sea, and where a strong navy would be a perpetual menace, and also by the award of the rich islands north of the Equator, which seem to be forgotten when this subject is discussed.

"Dr. David Jayne Hill, our former ambassador to Germany, stated in the North American Review that the Senate 'can ratify the treaty of peace and at the same time can reject a compact for the league of nations.' We hope the Senate will exercise its constitutional right and defeat the creation of any league which is founded upon such monstrous injustice to a land which so richly deserves our protection, but which Mr. Wilson, who recognized it as a republic, has deserted.

"Defeated and made a laughingstock by the diplomacy of Lloyd-George and the Japanese, who, to use the language of the street, 'put it all over him' while I was in Paris in the last days of the peace congress through the bluff of recognizing no color distinctions in the league of nations—Wilson, after urging the participation of China in the war, deliberately reversed his position—granted rights that never existed to Japan and, to save his face, now seeks to have his action indorsed by the American people. Was such a travesty of injustice ever attempted before, and does he think he can 'fool all the American people all of the time,' including the United States Senate?

"The covenant of the league of nations is presumed to be based upon equity. When I studied law, the first axiom in that court

was, 'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.' Does Japan, after her treatment of Korea and her secret treaties won by bribes and threats, come into this court with clean hands? Germany had no more rights in Shantung than a robber who forcibly enters a house at night and whose expulsion could not be enforced by its owner. I was in Shantung at the time these so-called rights were claimed, and the whole world knows how baseless they are. It also knows how much value the hypocritical Hun places on a so-called 'missionary.' And now Japan, for the insignificant part she played in the war, where her entire mortality amounted to about 800, demands these so-called rights of Germany and many others as her share of the swag. And she further demands the stamp of approval of the peace commission and league of nations. And America's self-appointed representative, Mr. Wilson, and his rubber-stamp associates approve these demands. What would Lincoln and Burlingame and Hay, who won the respect and confidence of China through honest treatment and the establishment of the policy of the 'open door,' say if they were here? Would they not with one voice damn a document whose initial act was of such monstrous injustice, and will the United States Senate do less?

"China's contribution to the victory of the Allies was far greater than that of Japan. With 100,000 men in the trenches in Belgium and France—and I was there and saw many who will never return—and another 100,000 in the munition plants of England, China did her part in defeating the Hun. She did this at the instigation of the United States; and unless something is done to dissociate our name from the proposed Shantung settlement of the peace treaty the Chinese people for generations to come will regard America and Americans with suspicion and contempt.

"If the whole structure, erected for safeguarding the peace of the world and preventing a 'breaking of its heart,' depends on the rape of a nation of 400,000,000 innocent souls who trust to the honor of America for justice, then let the structure undergo reconstruction or let America refuse to be a party to such a crime. A structure founded upon treachery or injustice is not one to receive the indorsement of a nation whose inheritance of freedom was bequeathed as a rich legacy by a once hardy, brave, and patriotic, but now lamented and departed, race of ancestors, and whose duty it is to transmit it to coming generations 'unprofaned and undecayed by the lapse of time.'

"And just here it might be pertinent to ask who requested Japan's assistance or intervention in driving the Huns out of Kiaochow? Did China? Oh, no! Japan began hostilities when China was not at war with Germany. She landed her troops more than a hundred miles north of Tsingtau, and marched them through Chinese territory, subsisting them largely on the country through which they passed, thus committing what is usually called a trespass, and with the assistance of the British and Chinese the 4,000 Germans were defeated. But let it be distinctly understood that with the British fleet blockading the harbor of Kiaochow the Chinese could have accomplished the same result without assistance from Japan or any other power.

143009—20013

"In discussing the Shantung question Prof. Jeremiah W. Jenks, research professor of government and public administration and director of the Far Eastern Bureau, says:

"'In laying plans for the control of Shantung Japan has been playing for a big prize—for the control of Kiaochow and the railroads of Shantung practically means the control of the capital Province of China and of the chief normal shipping port for all of North China. The war gave her an excuse to seize Kiaochow, which she did on November 6, 1914. Her next step in China was to present, in January, 1915, a secret series of demands, which if granted would in the near future enable Japan to dominate the policy of China from the military, financial, ond political viewpoints. The Japanese Government at first falsely denied that such demands had been made, and when it saw it could not conceal the fact it gave out a list of "requests," suppressing altogether those that most endangered China's sovereignty. Under threat of war, China acceded to all the demands but group 5, which would have made her a subject nation. Japan stated that group 5 would be reserved for further consideration. From the time that Japan seized Kiaochow she has treated Shantung as a conquered Province, occupying the German buildings for military and administrative purposes, placed guards along the railway line to the capital, has assumed military control of property, and has instituted civil government over the sections she occupies. Confirmation by the big three of Japan's claims in this territory, with the unwritten understanding that Japan shall eventually return it to China, has roused a storm of indigination among Chinese everywhere, and there are reports that the Chinese will resort to their most effective weapon—a boycott against all things Japanese'—which, if not successful, may be followed by war.

"Senator BORAH stated the case admirably when he said, 'The Shantung provision should come out of this treaty definitely and conclusively. It is no different in principle from the arrangement with reference to Alsace-Lorraine 50 years ago. It is, in fact, no different in principle from the dismemberment of Poland nearly 200 years ago. Both of these transactions planted the seeds of future wars and both went far to impeach and destroy the moral prestige of all nations responsible for these crimes. The mark of Cain has been upon them ever since.'

"As already stated, the question the Senate has to determine is, whether it will indorse the decision of the peace conference in the Shantung controversy and thereby make America an underwriter of that outrage? If it decides that the fictitious claims of Japan to the so-called German rights in Shantung shall be transferred from China to Japan, it will compound a felony, it will commit an act of perfidy unsurpassed in American history, and it will be an act of injustice to China that is destined to bring about another war in the near future in which the brutality and mortality are likely to far exceed the record of the great tragedy just ended. Instead of proving an instrument for the preservation of peace its first result is likely to provoke a just and righteous war. In case China should decide to fight for the retention of her rights, on which side will America—ordered by Lloyd-George—array her armies? The Chinese have long memories. I well remember a conversation with His Excellency Li Hung Chang in his Yamen in Peking during the Boxer

143009—20013

War, when we were discussing the danger from the prolonged presence of the allied armies in China. 'Oh,' he said, 'they will not stay long.' 'Well,' I replied, 'the Manchus remained some time—nearly 300 years.' 'What is 300 years in the life of China?' was his answer. And in that time the Manchus had been absorbed.

"In the comparatively recent Ty Ping rebellion the mortality amounted to over 15,000,000. If the military awakening of China occurs as a result of the wrongs to which it has been subjected by the peace commission the war that will follow and the mortality that will result will be without precedent.

"Query: As a starter for perpetual peace, is the United States prepared to assume this responsibility? And is a league of nations based on such a damnable, fraudulent, and iniquitous foundation likely to serve as an inspiration for humanity and to bring about 'Peace on earth and good will toward men'?

"The following resolution was passed as a recent meeting of the American Defense Society:

"*Resolved*, That the American Defense Society requests the Senate not to ratify those provisions in the peace treaty which convey to Japan the rights, interests, and privileges heretofore held in the Province of Shantung by the Empire of Germany, and that a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States."

143009—20013

WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

M I D

Confidential

No. 168

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Harbin, China, May 11, 1922.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 22 1922
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-J-22

SUBJECT: ALLEGED AMERICAN SUPPORT TO GENERAL WU PEI FU.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

For the information of the Department I have the
1/ honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch of even date, No. 38, to the Legation at Peking, with sub-enclosure of a news item reporting alleged American support to General Wu Pei Fu in his war with General Chang Tso-lin.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

C. C. Hanson
American Consul

800
TLL

Enclosure:

Consulate's despatch No. 38 to the Legation, with sub-enclosure.

A true copy of the signed original.

No. 86

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
HARBIN,
CHINA.
May 11, 1922.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 20 1922
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-I-772

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING NEWS ITEM WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN SUPPORT TO GENERAL WU PEI FU

The Honorable
Jacob Gould Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking, China.

Sir:

1/ For the information of the Legation I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a news item which I have been reliably informed was handed to the Editor of the local Russian newspaper RUPOR by the Japanese Consulate General on May 9, 1922.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

C. C. Hanson
American Consul

800
CCH/TLL

Enclosure:
News item as stated.

A true copy of the signed original.

Enclosure 2

763-2-742

Enclosure with
Mukden Consulate
Despatch No. 57
to the Legation
May 11, 1922.

MUKDEN, May 4.

The secret support which America is giving General Wu Pei Fu is now (when the war activities have been begun between the Chihli men and Chang Tso Lin's forces) becoming more and more open.

Thus, on May 3rd, the American war vessels which are now near Chingwangtao, opened fire with blank shells from the cannons on the vessels, without any previous warning or notice.

When night set in the projectors of the American vessels illuminated the Japanese barracks during the entire night.

At the front of the Mukden army the American officers who are found in many places where the troops are stationed are watching closely the activities of the Mukden army. At Peking, in all stations of the railways, American non-commissioned officers are watching the situation.

According to information from German sources there is, in the rear of the Mukden army an American agent who is looking for men willing to take upon themselves the destruction of the railway tracks in the rear of the Mukden army during the general attack on the part of the Chihli army.

A movement of American automobiles is going on continuously between Tientsin and Paotingfu.

Thus a situation has come about whereby the Mukden forces are unable to make the least change in their movements without such movement becoming known to the Chihli forces. Wu Pei Fu has secured a loan of 1,000,000 Mexican Dollars.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE

9655-D-244

SUBJECT POLITICAL MONOGRAPH OF CHINA - REPLACEMENT. (G-2 Report).

From CHINA POLITICAL

No. 4038 Date June 13, 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date 19

(60) DOMESTIC POLICIES REPLACE.

CANTON GOVERNMENT:

During the past year, June 1921 to May,1922, the so-called Canton Government of Sun Yat-sen has lost considerable ground. Instead of claiming to hold under its control the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow and Yunnan, Dr. Sun admits that Yunnan,and Kweichow deserted him at the time he was organizing his first Northern expedition in Kweilin. Since his return to Kwangtung in March,1922, with his expeditionary force, Kwangtung troops have been withdrawn from Kwangsi. With them was forced to come the Canton appointed governor of Kwangsi so that that province instead of supporting Sun Yat-sen's government is hostile to it. This leaves Kwangtung as the sole province of the Southern or Canton Government. Here also is disaffection. Sun Yat-sen dismissed Chen Chung-ming as governor of Kwangtung in April,1922, because Chen did not believe in and refused to support the proposed Northern expedition to attack Peking. While some of Chen's subordinates wished to hold Canton and prevent Sun's forces entering Canton Chenfinally withdrew peacefully on April 22nd to Waichow, his home and former military headquarters,with about 8,000 followers. These, together with his troops already in that section gave him about 15,000. There are about 10,000 additional troops that are loyal to him. Thus Sun Yat-sen does not control the eastern part of Kwangtung while his hold over the remainder of the province outside of Canton and the North River is slight and banditry is rife.

The financial condition of the Canton Government is very serious, the provincial bank notes being quoted at 65.

Sun's subordinates who have the greatest influence with him are old Kuo Ming-tang men whose records are far from those of real patriots.

"Sun's recent political, economic and military activities are exceedingly fantastical. His egotism, self confidence and belief in the almost miraculous power of his personal influence are unbounded. Has alienated sympathy of thoughtful Chinese and foreigners but still strong with labor unions and radicals. Easily duped by his coterie of advisors and unscrupulous allies.

"Sun is a born leader, agitator, fire brand and is likely to retain following, especially as strikes are increasing in China. Chen(Chung Ming)is a lawyer,soldier, administrator, goal of both is unified democratic China

/with provincial autonomy.

Binding Margin

(Quote continues)

with provincial autonomy. Sun would march straight to Peking with his small and miserable army having sublime confidence in his own ability to establish and rule a unified and perfect republic. Chen sees reasonable preparations are necessary. His own program is the political-economic development of Kwangtung and the spread by force of the example and proven accomplishment of good democratic provincial governments. (American Minister's telegram to State Dept. May 10, 1922) (Quote ends).

The Canton municipal administration of which Mr. Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen is mayor is well run.

Many of the officials of the Canton Government (Southern Government) who function in Canton are returned students from America. However, those subordinates who have influence with Sun Yat-sen are old Kuoming-tang politicians.

For further report on Canton Government, see CHINA Repts. 4005, May 8, and 4024, June 1, 1922.

(63) ALIEN REPLACE.

GREAT BRITAIN:

The Cassels Agreement between the Hongkong Britisher Cassels and the Kwangsi group who were in control of the Canton government in 1920 is not recognized by Peking, Canton, or Kwangtung Provincial Government. This agreement grants large mining and other rights in Kwangtung to the Cassels company.

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1922 7-S-245
SEP 8

SUBJECT POLITICAL MONOGRAPH OF CHINA (G-2 REPORT).

POLITICAL

From CHINA

No. 4063 Date July 27, 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D./ SEP 8 1922

(41) Executive.

REPLACE:

Hsu Shih-chang, acting under pressure from Wu Pei-fu and in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese people resigned as President of China on June 1, 1922.

Li Yuan-hung, after strong pressure by Wu Pei-fu and the Chihli party leaders and with the general approval of the Chinese people, arrived in Peking June 11, 1922, took over the seals and was inaugurated President of China. (For biography of President Li, see China Year Book 1921-22, page 914.)

It will be noted that this is President Li's second inauguration to the office. Upon the defeat of Chang Hsun's attempt to restore the monarchy Li refused to return to the Presidential office. The old parliament, which he reconvened upon his becoming President in 1916 and which he dissolved in 1917, chiefly because of pressure by the northern militarists, remained dissolved until his return to office in June, 1922. One of his first mandates cancelled the mandate of 1917 which dissolved the Parliament.

Li Yuan-hung is not generally considered a strong or a particularly able man. He has a fair reputation for honesty and patriotism among the Chinese. His return to office was desired by the people because it has some bit of legality attached thereto, and because there was no outstanding national figure to take the office. Li's announcement prior to his arrival in Peking on June 11, 1922 that he would accept only as "Acting in the Capacity of President, Temporarily Pending the Determination of his Status by Parliament" together with his mandate restoring the old Parliament, indicates his acknowledgment of the questionable legality of his position. It also indicates a face saving loop-hole through which he can retire peacefully to Tientsin, should his difficulties become too great.

Formerly a member of the Chinputang he has returned to the Presidency under pressure from the Chihli party. Probably his bitterst opponents are the Kwomingtang party of Sun Yat-sen.

(42) SUBORDINATE.

REPLACE:

For brief historical sketch of Chinese Government to June, 1921, see the China Year Book 1921-22, pages 849-851. The above shows how the Chinese Government has functioned or rather has failed to function during the years from 1911-1921.

For information on theoretical functioning of Chinese Government, President, Vice President, National Assembly, Cabinet,

Binding Margin

Audit Department, Ministries, etc., see Mr. Raymond P. Tenney's article in Vol. II of the Commercial Handbook of China, published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce or the reproduction of that article in the China Year Book, 1921-22, pages 851-857.

(15) UNOFFICIAL.

REPLACE:

Unofficial advisers in China are as numerous as the sands of the desert.

In no countrymin the world is reverence shown for old age and for one's teacher as in China. Hence, practically all Chinese officials are given advice (welcome or otherwise) by individuals of the older generation who have played some part in their earlier training and development. "Sworn brothers" also play their part in the giving of advice to those in authority.

At the present moment, July 1, 1922, the outstanding individual whose advice is sought unofficially by officials is Wu Pei-fu, who claims that his advice is unofficial, never-the-less his military position is such that his advice is perhaps more nearly an order than that of any official of the Peking Government.

Wu Pei-fu in turn has many military and political advisors, while having been the subordinate of Tsao Kun for more than twenty years he must always listen to his advice.

ADD:

COUNSELLORS: (43)

The following foreigners are employed as advisors to the Chinese Government.

President's Office.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| S. Aoki. | Japanese, | Military Adviser, |
| J. C. Ferguson, | American, | Adviser, |
| W. H. Donald, | British, | Co-Director, Bureau of Economic Inf. |
| B. L. Simpson, (Putnam-Weale) | Bitish, | Statistician |
| T. Banzai, | Japanese | Military Counsellor |

Bureau of Audit.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| M. Padoux, | French | Adviser |
| M. Manevaleff, | Russian | " |

Foreign Office.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| M. de Codt | Belgian | Legal Adviser |

Ministry of Finance.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| C. L. L. Williams | American | Adviser and Associate Dir. Wine and Tobacco Administrati |

~~Ministry of Navy.~~

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ~~Capt. Tyler,~~ | ~~British~~ | ~~Naval Adviser~~ |

Ministry of Agriculture.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| J. G. Anderson, | Swedish, | Adviser (Mineralogy) |
| A. Grabau, | American | " (Paleontology) |
| F. Sherfersee, | " | " (Forestry) |

**Ministry of Communications.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| M. Picard Desiatan, | French, | De-Director of Posts |
| A. H. Eriksen, | Danish, | Technical expert on Telegraphs. |
| R. Nakayama, | Japanese | Adviser |
| J. E. Baker | American | " |
| S. Hirai | Japanese | " Railway Technics |
| T. Ohmura | " | " " " |
| L. Dertien | Belgian | " " " |

**Customs.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Sir Francis A. Aglen | British | Inspector General |

**Salt.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Sir Reginald Gamble | British | Inspector General |

**Police.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Gen. A. J. Munthe, | Norwegian | |

~~Aeronautical Dept.~~

~~Group Capt. F. B. Holt, R. A. F. C. M. G., D. F. C.~~ ~~British~~ ~~Adviser~~

Authority -- Peking Who's Who, 1922.

Paul S. Reinsch, American has acted as adviser in Washington, D.C. since his retirement as U.S. Minister to China.

(44) LEADERS.

ADD:

| | |
|---|---|
| Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen) | Kuomingtang |
| Liang Chi-ch'ao | Chin putang |
| Hsiung Hsi-ling | Chinputang |
| Tuan Chi-jui | Anfu |
| Lee Yung-hsiang | Anfu |
| Hsu Shu-tseng (Little Hsu) | Anfu |
| Li Hoh-chi | Anfu |
| Liang Shih-yi | Chiaotung (Old Communications) |
| Yeh Kung-Ch'o | " " |
| Tsao Jui-lin | Anfu, also New Communications |
| Lu Tsung-yu | " " " |
| Tsao Kun | Chihli |
| Wu Pei-fu | " |
| Tang Shao-yi | ? (Formerly Kuomingtang) |
| Chen Chung-ming | ? " " |
| Chang Tso-lin | Fengtien Group |

For information on above see Who's Who in the China Year Book, 1921-1922.

(44) UNOFFICIAL LEADERS.

ADD:
LABOR:

Labor is more highly organized in the south than in the north. The leader there is Mr. Hsieh Ying-pak. Mr. Hsieh claims to be an "American Socialist" -- not a Bolshevik. He has studied at the Rand School in New York and elsewhere in America. He speaks quite good English and has an American wife. He has been a secretary for Sun Yat-sen and for the Kuomingtang and has a great influence over Sun Yat-sen who has encouraged the labor movement in Canton. Mr. Hsieh is generally believed to have handled the Hongkong strike

for the labor unions. The strike was handled with great ability and the results in showing the unions their power continue to spread. The end is not yet.

Mr. Hwang Huan-ting is another labor leader of Canton. He is a man of less education and more radical in his outbursts.

## (17) POLITICAL PARTIES.

ADD:

The first political party in China was a revolutionary society (T'ung Meng Hui or Alliance Society) formed under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen in Japan in 1901. Its program did not obtain ready acceptance; accordingly in 1912 the membership associated itself with several smaller political groups, in the formation of the Kuo Min Tang (Democratic Party). The party obtained a majority in the National Assembly elected in 1913 and supported local self-government, nati onal centralization and government through party cabinet. Yuan Shih-k'ai dissolved the party by presidential order in 1913 and its members were ejected from the National Assembly.

In 1913 the Chin Pu Tang was formed for the purpose of opposing the Kuomintang in Parliament.

Yuan Shih-hai's attempt in 1916 to restore the monarchy was opposed by both parties, the Kuomintang, although officially dissolved having maintained its actual existence. With the reconvening of the Parliament in 1916 thr old groupings reasserted themselves.

In political opinion and action the Chin Pu Tang Contains the more moderate elements, some of whom lean toward constitutional monarchy. The Kuomintang contains the more radical democrats. However, great diversity of political opinion exists in both parties.

Authority -- Encyclopaedia Sinica, page 445.

In addition to the Kuomintang and Chinputang parties there are several groups or cliques of men who have no party platform but are simply working together largely for their mutual political advancement although in many instances it may be that many of the members are "sworn brothers", are from the same section of the country, are in the relationship of scholar to teacher, etc.

The strongest of these groups are the Chihli "party", the Communications Clique (Chiaotung), the New Communcations clique (new Chiaoting) Anfu group, Kwangsi group. Similarly, in nearly every province will be found political groups composed of the leaders or would-be leaders who come from one section of the province or another.

## (17) POLITICAL GROUPS.

ADD:

| Party or Group | Leaders | Policies | Representation in Cabinet | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kuomintang Party | Sun Yat-sen<br>Hu Han-ming<br>Chen Chiung-ming<br>Tang Shaoe-ye | Local self-government, organization of labor, provincial autonomy | None | Very strong in the south and among over-seas Chinese |
| Chinputang Party | Liang Chi-chiao<br>Hsing Hsi-ling | More moderate than Kuomintang. | Represented | Is working in harmony with the Chihli group. |
| Chihli Group | Tsao Kun<br>Wu Pei-Fu | No definite policy | Controls Government | The real strength of the party is Wu Pei-fu's military strength. |
| Anfu Group | Tuan Chi-jui<br>Hsu Shu-tseng | Pro-Japanese | None | Not strong at present |
| (OldCCommunications)<br>Chiaotung Group | Liang Shih-yi<br>Yeh Kung-cho | No definite policy | " | Financially powerful. Leaders in Japan |
| (New Communications)<br>New Chiaotung Group | Tsao Jui-lin<br>Lu Tsung-yu | Pro-Japanese | " | In disgrace. Leaders hiding. Financially powerful |
| Fengtien Group | Chang Tso-lin | Pro-Chang Tso-lin | " | Supreme in Manchuria. |

(55) RELIGIOUS.

ADD:

MOHAMEDANISM.

At the time of the Kansu earthquake of 1920 a conference of Mohamedan leaders was being held in a acve mosque in Kansu, making plans for a Mohamedan uprising. The earthquake caused the collapse of the mosque killing all the plotters.

CHRISTIANITY.

A practical Christian group is playing a considerable part in the Chinese Government. The leaders are:

Dr. W. W. Yen, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. C. T. Wang, Director of the Shantung Reorganization

Other Christian officials.

Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Tuchun of Honan, Luchun
Commander of 11th Tuchun Division.

Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, Minister of Justice and
delegate to Washington Conference

Chuan Shao-ch'ing, M.D., formerly President of the
Chinese Army Medical College and now
vice-Minister of Education.

Dr. C. C. Wang. Chinese Director of the
Chinese Eastern Railroad.

These are all Christians who are playing important parts in governmental affairs. There are a great many other Christian Chinese who are becoming prominent.

ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT.

There is a small group of radicals in China who are endeavoring to stir up an anti-Christian movement, one of their big targets for attack being the Y.M.C.A.

This movement is of practically no consequence. Well informed Chinese say the movement started among radical students of the Peking University Law School. It is not gaining headway. On the other hand the Chinese Y.M.C.A.'s are playing an increasingly important part in shaping the habits and opinions of the coming generation of Chinese, particularly the student class. It is to be expected that the radicals would attack the Y.M.C.A.

(58) LABOR.

ADD:

That labor in China is becoming more and more generally organized along the lines of the modern labor unions, there is no doubt. At present, July 1, 1922, labor is best organized in the south, particularly in and around Canton and Hongkong. This is no doubt largely due to the two facts:

1st. That the most intelligent and most capable labor leader of China, Mr. Hsieh Ying-fak makes his headquarters in Canton,

2nd. That Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Canton Government have played up very strongly to the labor unions in every way possible.

Mr. Hsieh Ying-pak claims that although labor at present is better organised in the south than in the north (which includes Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley) nevertheless, the idea of labor unions first came to the north and from there was carried south.

In Canton and Hongkong all laborers belong to unions. According to Mayor Sun Fo of Canton, there are three labor groups in Canton:

1st, The old guilds which have existed for centuries,
2nd, The "liberals" about 80 unions led by Hwang Huan-ting, (Cantonese Wong Woon Ding) and
3rd, The Radicals, about 30 unions, led by Hsieh Ying-pak

Hsieh Ying-pak has travelled and studied in America, speaks very good English, has been a secretary to Sun Yat-sen, and the Kuomintang. While Hsieh is undoubtedly a radical he denies that he is a Bolshevik but claims to be an American Socialist. Hwang, on the other hand is a man of no education except in his trade as a mechanic. The latter has made speeches that are anti-foreign in character.

It is believed that all the modern labor unions, liberal and radical are controlled by Hsieh. His cleverness, intelligence and education place him above Hwang. While the latter might lead a few unions to deeds of violence, the former is capable of organizing and conducting strikes such as the recent seamen's strike in Canton. Hsieh's intelligence will prevent him from instigating open deeds of violence, but, on the other hand it has already shown him and he has demonstrated conclusively to the British in Hongkong the power of the Chinese laborers in China if they organize and strike together.

During the past 18 months, Jan. 1, 1921, July 1, 1922 there have been an usually large number of strikes in South China. Practically all, great or small, have been successful for the strikers. In North China there have been only a few strikes in comparison with South China, however, there seems to be a slow spread of the strike idea. In Shanghai there have been several of late, one among the post office letter carriers and another among some cotton mill employees.

It is the generally accepted belief that the organization of labor is spreading throughout China and that the demands of organized labor are to become more and more felt in the future. While the labor leaders are inclined to be radical they do not seem to combine with the Bolshevik agents in China. The latter come largely from the "half baked student class."

Dr. Sun Yat-sen has always befriended the laboring class. He has encouraged the organization of labor in south China.

(20) NATIONAL.

REPLACE:

The Chinese flag has five horizontal stripes arranged from top to bottom in recognition of the five races of people in China, as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Top - | Red for the Chinese race. | ~~proper~~ |
| 2nd | Yellow for the Manchu | " . |
| 3rd | Blue " | " Mongols |
| 4th | White " | " Mohamedans |
| 5th | Black " | " Tibetans |

(59) FOREIGN POLICY.

ADD: Chinese policy towards Far Eastern Republic.

Although China would be benefitted in many ways by entering into commercial treaties with the Far Eastern Republic, she has up to the present, July 1, 1922, refrained from doing so, due in part at least to the fear of incurring the resentment of other countries.

The Chita Government (Far Eastern Republic) has an unrecognized mission in Peking. Similarly the Chinese have an unofficial delegate in Chita.

(59) FOREIGN.

REPLACE:
JAPAN.

There is a wide-spread distrust of Japan and the Japanese people due to repeated aggressions. The Twenty-one Demands and Shantung will long be remembered by the Chinese together with the over-bearing attitude of the Japanese throughout China.

Since the Washington Conference the Japanese Government has evidently abruptly changed its policy. The Shantung settlement at Washington was very fair to the Chinese. In accordance with this agreement the Japanese troops and gendarmes along the Shantung Railroad have been withdrawn. On July, 2, 1922 the Japanese troops that have been stationed in Hankow without any agreement or authority from the Chinese Government for several years were withdrawn. The Japanese Minister has brought up with the diplomatic body the question of withdrawal of all foreign troops in China. These two moves by the Japanese are being given publicity for political effect.

There are a few places in China where the boycott of Japanese goods, which was so general in 1920 is still active. That boycott still has its effect, however. Negotiations have been opened in Peking between the Chinese and Japanese over the restoration of Shantung. Mr. C. T. Wang heads the Chinese mission and Mr. Obata, the Japanese Minister to China heads the Japanese mission.

(PORTUGAL) MACAO.

Macao is truly a den of iniquity. The oldest foreign colony in Asia has lost all economic importance except for its traffic in opium, its gambling houses and its houses of prostitution. Few Portuguese remain except soldiers, officials and numerous half castes. The entire revenue of the colony comes from vice.

For several years the dispute over the Macao-China boundary has been troublesome, the Portuguese attempting, so the Chinese (Kwangtung Government) claim, to encroach across the narrow peninsula joing Macao to the mainland into Chinese territory. Several times serious armed conflicts has been narrowly averted and the feeling has run high between the Kwangtung and Macao officials.

In the winter of 1921-1922 the Portuguese Minister to Peking spent several months in Macao, Canton and Hongkong, but in spite of his endeavors he was obliged to return to Peking with nothing accomplished. The newspaper reports that Gen. Leonard Wood was to be asked to mediate did not materialize. The killing and wounding of nearly 100 Chinese on May 29th, 1922 by Portuguese soldiers and police as the result of a demonstration resulting from an alleged assault on a Chinese woman by a Portuguese African soldier has made the situation even more critical, the Chinese openly talking war on the colony.

The Canton Government on June 15th demanded of the Macao Government an apology, punishment of those responsible for the shooting, compensation for familes killed or injured, repatriation of African soldiers and prohibition of gambling. The reply of the Macao Government was highly unsatisfactory to the Chinese who blame the British authorities of Hongkong in past for the high handedness of the Macao officials.

The trouble between Sun Yat-sen and Chen Chiung-ming since June 16, 1922 has caused the Kwantung people to forget for the time being at least the Macao "incident". The feeling is very strong, however, and is likely to cause difficulties later for the Portuguese Government and the British Government in Hongkong as well.

Large numbers of Chinese have withdrawn from Macao since May 29th and there has been a boycott of Macao by the Chinese. Macao has a military force of a few hundred, largely negros from Portuguese East Africa, There is one small Portuguese gunboat and some coast defense works. There are two

or three old hydroplanes and during the winter 1921-1922 two American aviators from Manila have been employed by the Macao Government

(59) Foreign.

Chinese Foreign Policy Toward England.

ADD:

During the past few years at least, there was been evident in China a prejudice against England due, it is believed, largely to the haughty superior air of the old type of Britisher who considers himself and shows the Chinese that he considers himself one of a superior race while the Chinese are an inferior race and the latter should be glad to receive any crumbs he might see fit to pass their way. This attitude has on more than one occasion of late helped to cause friction in China. Some of these occasions are:-

1. The recent Butterfield & Swire dock case in Amoy the winter of 1921-1922

2. The friction between the British Minister and the Premier, Dr. Yen, during the winter 1921-1922.

3. The handling of the seamen's strike situation in Hongkong in then winter 1921-1922.

The day of the old type arbitrary Britisher in China has passed. In Canton the feeling against the British is very strong. In the north it is not as evident, but one often hears an educated Chinese in the north express resentment towards their actions.

With the throwing over of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, England has made one move of which the Chinese approve. The return of Wei'hai'wei will , of course, have some effect. But the most essential thing is to throw over the old over-bearing attitude and adopt a man to man policy of dealing with the Chinese. There is much evidence to indicate that that is being done. e.g. The British Consul in Amoy who could not handle the B. & S. Dock difficulty was "given leave" and a new man sent who very quickly arranged a settlement. The Governor of Hongkong, Sir R. Stubbs, has just sailed for England and is not expected to return. One finds many British in China who are greatly concerned over the attitude of the Chinese towards them.

ADD:

UNITED STATES.

The attitude of China toward the United States is friendly, unquestionably more friendly than towards any other nation. This is due to several causes:

1. The U. S. has never taken advantage of China's weakness by forcing her to give up territory or to make other unfair concessions in favor of the U. S.

2. The return of the Boxer Indemnity has helped greatly.

3. The Sympathy and financial help of America in China's periods of famine and flood.

4. The large number of American returned students and the far greater number of students of American Missions and Y.M.C.A. schools in China, who absorb a large amount of the spirit of Americanism.

5. The fact that the United States is a Replublic in fact and the Chinese aspire to have China also eventually a republic in fact and copied largely after the United States.

(44) DOMESTIC POLICIES. Cont'd.

SUFFRAGE.

There is no record as yet of a proper political election in China. The theory of elections has not worked out practically thus far. In the recent elections in Hunan under the newly adopted provincial constitution votes were sold in bundles prior to the election. When the votes were counted after the election it was found that they had been deposited in the "ballot box" still tied in bundles. The candidates who could buy the most votes won. This was in an autonomous province which had had many of the most progressive men in China assist the provincial officials in drafting a new modern provincial constitution

PROVINCES.

ADD:

The original idea of government in China required the provinces to make remittances of certain of their revenues to the Central Government in Peking. Thus the Central Government received the Customs, salt, wine and tobacco stamp, government railroad and certain other revenues.

Since the days of Yuan Shih-kai with the rise in power of the military, the military officials have seized more and more power and funds which formerly belonged to the Central Government until at present, with the possible exception of Shansi, no provincial officials remit money to the Central Government. Thus far the Chinese customs funds, due to the close foreign control to protect foreign loans, have not been molested by provincial officials The salt revenue is taken over by the provincial officials in Manchuria, Hunan, Szechewan, Kwangtung and several other provinces. Railroad revenues have been seized from time to time by Wu Pei-fu, Chang tso-lin and others. The wine and tobacco tax brings in very little to the Central Government. Thus, at the present time the question becomes --What is the policy of the provinces towards the Central Government? The Central Government controls no troops unless its policy is such that some military leader approves of it and is willing to back the Government with his force. For the moment at least, July 15, 1922, Wu Pei-fu might do this. Without such support the Central Government is helpless. It has no force whatsoever to ensure the enforcement of its laws. In fact it is at the mercy of the military leaders.

During 1921 Chang Tso-lin dictated the policy of the Peking Government. Because Wu Pei-fu opposed Chang, the latter brought his troops south to destroy Wu. Chang was defeated instead and has withdrawn to Manchuria. Wu Pei-fu has voluntarily withdrawn to Loyang, Honan. He will probably attempt to prevent other outsiders from dictating to the Peking Government. But still the Peking Government remains helpless without his military force. If or when the Peking Government fails to furnish Wu funds for his troops or fails to act as he desires, he may withdraw his support and play the part of an ordinary tuchun.

In theory each province has a Civil Government and a military governor (tuchun). These are appointed by the Central Government. Due to the rise of military rule in China since Yuan Shih-kai's day, the tuchun has become the most influential man of the province because he controls the military force. Very rarely a civil governor, because of his personality or because he too has troops, is stronger than the tuchun. The appointment of tuchuns in various provinces is controlled by the "super-tuchuns" as a reward from the Central Government for their support.

ADD:

PEKING GOVERNMENT.

Cabinets and Presidents come and go in Peking. In 1920 the Anfu, Pro-Japanese crowd, who for their own ends obtained large loans from the Japanese in return for political and economic concessions, was eliminated. With their departure practically [redacted] China stopped until

there is a reorganization. In 1921 Chin Yung-peng, Pan Fu and others equally as corrupt, were elected. With the departure of them and their immediate successers went the support of many of the large banks of China who had been financing the Peking Government at exorbitant rates of interest.

In 1922 Wu Pei-fu forced the exit of President Hsu and obtained the return of ex-President Li Yuan-hung and with him some of his personal followers for cabinet positions. Their problem of obtaining funds remains to be solved. Without a military force behind them it is not to be expected that the tuchuns will hear their cry for remittances from the provinces. Wu Pei-fu has returned to Loyang and apparently has left the cabinet to its own troubles. President Li Yuan-hung is generally considered to be well-meaning but lacking in force. The cabinet is probably more honest and patriotic than those of the past two or three years. Without funds, without credit foreign or domestic and without a strong arm to put through and continue needed reforms, the life of this or any other cabinet is uncertain. The strengthening of the power of the Central Government might have a beneficial effect.

## (60) DOMESTIC POLICIES.

ADD:
MANCHURIA.

Manchuria, since the decline of the power of the Central Government and the ascending of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, has been left for him to deal with largely as he willed or as he was permitted by the Japanese. With a Japanese railroad (the South Manchurian) as his sole line of communication north from Mukden to Chang Chun where the Russian line (Chinese Eastern R.R.) continued north to Harbin and from Harbin East and West to the Siberian borders, with a large force of Japanese troops along the Japanese railway zone and more along the Chinese Eastern R.R. during the last four years and with Japanese police and at times Japanese troops in Manchuria around the Korean bo border, Chang's style has been somewhat cramped. One of the stock topics of conversation in China is "Is Chang Tso-lin pro-Japanese?" He has had for years Japanese Advisers and has many commercial interests with them. In general it is believed, however, that he is ~~very~~ pro-Japanese only so far as it is to his own interest to be so.

There are several inportant problems to be handled in Manchuria:

1. The Japanese pressure
2. The Chinese Eastern R.R.
3. The Korean situation
4. The Bandits
5. The Russian activities.

1. Perhaps Chang Tso-lin has resisted and combated Japanese pressure in Manchuria as successfully as it could have been done. He has been more successfully at that than in the other problems.

2. Outside of appointing Dr. C. C. Wang as Director-General of the Chinese Eastern R.R., Chang has done little to help it over its difficulties. He has failed to station along the railroad a sufficient number of good troops to keep the bandits from interfering with the operation of the road to say nothing of interfering with agriculture and trade in the area along the railroad.

3. In Manchuria along the Korean border the population is by a great majority Korean. Among these Koreans are many outlaws, many revolutionists against Japan and many whose property in Korea has been seized by Japanese and many others whoare ordinary simple farmers. Chang Tso-lin has failed

Manchurian residents from the first group and failed also in preventing the second group from organizing, arming and training themselves in Manchuria and from at times making raids across the border into Korea. As a result, in the winter 1920-1921 after having been warned by the Japanese authorities, Japanese troops entered Manchuria in the Hunchun-Chientao districts as well as farther south. These troops crushed the Korean independence movement, but in so doing inflicted great damage and suffering on the innocent as well as the guilty.

A sufficient force of Chinese troops properly commanded and instructed might have taken the steps necessary to prevent the Japanese invasion

4. Chang Tso-lin is an ex-bandit and many of his troops are ex-bandits; naturally there is great reluctance in taking aggressive steps to crush the bandits in Manchuria.

5. Chang Tso-lin has not been sympathetic with the thousands of Russians in Manchuria. In fact since the downfall of the old Russian Government the treatment of the Russians even in courts of justice in Manchuria has been heartless and unfair. Instead of attempting to enter into negotiations with the Chita Government to improve trade conditions Chang Tso lin has refused to have anything to do with the Far Eastern Republic.

(60) DOMESTIC POLICIES.

ADD:

MONGOLIA.

Conditions in Mongolia are very unsettled. The Government of Mongolia is a soviet run under the close supervision of Russian soviet advisers, each Mongol Chief of a bureau or Ministry having a Russian or Buriat Bolshevik adviser. There are also Soviet troops in Urga. The Mongol hatred for the Chinese is still very bitter. No Chinese officials are in Urga nor would one dare attempt to go there.

Americans who have attempted to carry on business in Urga are giving it up and withdrawing. While many Mongols would prefer to get rid of the Russians and their soviet government, there is no indication of a Mongol uprising to attempt such action. The American Consulate Kalgan has made frequent trips to Urga. He has never been molested, neither has he been able to get any satisfaction from the Mongol Government on matters in question.

Copies to :

3 to M. I. D.
1 Manila
~~1 Legation~~ Tientsin

MID

1 Encl

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV

761.94/1922

761-J-347

2

WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN CONSULATE

No.94 Kalgan, China, August 21,1922

Subject: M.Joffe's Mission to China
and
Bolshevik Propaganda in China.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.92 of August 18th,1922, File No.800, on the above subject, and to transmit herewith an editorial from the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, the leading British paper of North China, of August 19th, on the present situation in China. The editorial expresses the same opinion expressed in this Consulate's despatch of August 18th-that the visit of M.Joffe, the noted Bolshevik emissary, to China at this time, is of considerable significance, and it is implied in the editorial that M.Joffe's visit is in connection with Bolshevik propaganda in this country

The Consulate agrees with the editor of the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES that "the Chinese Government, if it were not entirely impotent, would be well-advised to exercise strict precautions against Bolshevik propaganda", but I would go somewhat further and state that it behooves the foreign governments represented in China to exercise an even greater precaution against Bolshevik propaganda for

the reason

033.61 Sov

the reason that the aim of Bolshevik propaganda in China is directed against so-called foreign imperialism and domination and not so much against Chinese capitalistic institutions. The end is the destruction of the foreign capitalistic privileges in China; the means is the firing of the Chinese nationalistic spirit, and it behooves the foreign governments to take steps to protect the interests of their nationals in China.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

SAMUEL SOKOBIN

American Consul

In quadruplicate
Copy to Legation
Copy to Tientsin

Enclosure:
1. Editorial from
P.& T.Times,
August 19,1922

800 SK

A true copy of the signed original.

Enc 1

SEP 1 1922

893.7-J-247

2

## A DARK OUTLOOK IN CHINA.

It is impossible, as yet, to discern even a glimmer or light through the dark clouds that threaten China's immediate future. The Cabinet question has remained unsettled, and apparently insoluble, ever since General Wu Pei-fu's truculent veto of president Li Yuan-hung's nominations. Several portfolios still remain unoccupied, and the Acting Premier, Dr. Wang Chung-Hui, seems determined to resign. Conflictung reports are in circulation regarding intrigues which are said to afoot in various parts of the country, to which Chang Tso-lin, Tsao Kun, Wu Pei-fu, Sun Yat-sen and Lu-Hsiang, the Chekiang Tuchun, are said to be parties. One thing only seems to be regarded as certain, and that is that President Li Yuan-hung will be unable to retain office much longer, with dignity to himself, or benefit to the country, posible candidatures for the Presidency and Vice Presidency are being discussed officers were the perquisites of the Militarists momentarily in power, rather than being at the disposal of the Legislature, and it is noteworthy that the name of Tsao Kun, one of the worst possible choices for either post, is still frequently mentioned. A serious mutiny in the vicinity of the Capital during the past week has added to the general anxiety, and so it is reported, caused the distracted Government to appropriate, for military pay, a sum that had been earmarked for parliamentary salaries, the financial situation to-day is simply appalling. Not only is there no Minister of Finance, but there are practically no revenues of any kind reaching Peking from any quarter. Save for those foreign obligations which are secured on the Customs and Salt Revenues, not one is now being met, nor is it possible to see how they can be met, in the near future. Even the Salt Revenues must now be regarded as a poor security, seeing that Chang Tso-lin has set the bad example of impudently misappropriating the Manchurian collections. A year ago the financial plight of China seemed bad enough. To-day the nation's finances are in inextricable confusion. Even the Chinese constabulary who were sent to the Shantung Railway to replace the Japanese military guards are reported to be clamouring for overdue pay. The redition of Tsingtao and Weihaiwei will simply become a farce if the Chinese Government is incapable even of finding the funds necessary to pay for the policing of these territories after their restoration. Rumours of foreign loans may be dismissed as absolutely absurd. Countries whose credit stand far higher than that of China are finding it difficult to raise money from abroad under the prevailing conditions of world finance. The present Chinese Government could not secure a loan of a mere fraction of what would be required to set it on its feet, when it has no security of any kind to offer for repayment and service.

Sun Yat-sen has returned to his bolt-hole in the Frenenh Concession at Shanghai, with the avowed intention of "Working with the people" to further his own aims. It may be considered significant that he was preceded thither by his benchman Hsieh Ying-pai, the notorious socialist agitator, who has played so conspicuous a part in the various labour agitations at Canton. Mr. Hsieh is stated to be well supplied with funds, and will doubtless continue his mischievous activities in the Model Settlement unless the police interfere. Dr. Sun still poses as a political martyr, and a victim of base treachery. This of course, is a characteristic pose whenever he finds it expedient to return to Shanghai from one of his periodic adventures in the South. He conveniently forgets that he provoked his own overthrow on this occasion by publicly announcing that Chen Chiung-ming's troops must leave Canton within ten days or incur the risk of being destroyed by "eight inch guns with poisonous shells." Perhaps, also, if he liked, he could tell us something about the attempts that were made, previous to the final breach, to assassinate Chen Chiung-ming. By whomever they were actually instigated Sun Yat-sen can hardly be ignorant of the fact that such attempts were made.

IT IS NOT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE THAT AT THIS TIME OF GRAVE UNREST ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF BOLSHEVIK AGITATORS SHOULD ARRIVE AT PEKING, WITH A CONSIDERABLE SUITE, ON THE PRETEXT OF ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY BETWEEN CHINA AND SOVIET RUSSIA. M. JOFFE WAS FORMERLY THE BOLSHEVIK AGENT IN BERLIN, AND WAS, IF OUR MEMORY SERVES US RIGHT, REPRIMANDED, BY THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES, IF NOT ACTUALLY EXPELLED FROM GERMANY, OWING TO HIS CONNECTION WITH ONE OF THE SPARTACIST OUTBREAKS. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE JOURNALISTS AT HARBIN THIS BOLSHEVIK AGENT IS REPORTED TO HAVE STATED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT OF A SINO-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE BEING HELD AT PRESENT, AND RUSSIA HAS NO INTENTION OF HOLDING IT FOR THE TIME BEING." IF THIS BE A CORRECT VERSION OF HIS STATEMENT, ONE MAY BE PERMITTED TO INQUIRE WHAT PRECISELY HAS BROUGHT HIM AND HIS PARTY "OF TWENTY-FOUR PERSONS" TO THE CHINESE CAPITAL. WITH SUN YAT-SEN AND HSIEH YING-PAI AT SHANGHAI, AND M. JOFFE AND HIS PARTY AT PEKING, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, IF IT WERE NOT ENTIRELY IMPOTENT, WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO EXERCISE STRICT PRECAUTIONS AGAINST BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA. IMBOTENT AS THE GOVERNMENT IS IT MIGHT MAKE M. JOFFE'S CONTINUED SOJOURN IN THE CAPITAL DEPENDENT UPON A CATEGORICAL UNDERTAKING THAT HE AND HIS PARTY WILL ABSTAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROPAGANDA WHILE ON CHINESE SOIL. THE DALTA AND ROSTA NEWS AGENCIES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN WORKING OVERTIME SINCE HIS ARRIVAL.

It is quite impossible to forcast what will happen in China in the immediate future. It may, however, be considered certain that unless a complete change comes over the situation President Li Yuan-hung will very soon return to his Tientsin residence, and wash his hands of Chinese politics What has occurred during the past two months can hardly have failed to convince him that he has been betrayed by the very men who jocked him back into the Presidency. Had he been given the support which they pledged, the whole outlook might have been very much better today.

As it is the

As it is the Chihli-Fengtien struggle seems to have achieved nothing but pave the way for another conflict in the near future. In the interval one can foresees nothing but chaos. No constructive work, no reorganization can even be attempted under the conditions that previal to day.

MID TRIPLICATE

Transmitted in quintuplicate.

No. 1791.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Tientsin - China.

1 Enclosure

August 25, 1922.

861.9-2477

Subject: Bolshevik Propaganda in China.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch No. 1786 of the 21st instant, and previous reports, in regard to Bolshevik propaganda in China, I have the honor to transmit herewith the original and four copies of some propaganda received here on the 21st instant, by the English language newspapers. This apparently emanated from the office of the Soviet representative Joffe. Copies have been sent to the American Legation at Peking and to the American Consul at Kalgan.

893.00 B/24

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

STUART J. FULLER

American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1: Original of propaganda sheet;

2: Four copies of the same.

SJF:F

800

A true copy of the signature in the original

FHF

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
IN DESPATCH
DATED AUG 23 1922
# 1796
893.7 J-247
TIENTSIN, CHINA.

From the Information Bureau of the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Envoy of Russia to China.

With reference to the questions raised in the local foreign press about Russian policy in China the Information Bureau of the extraordinary Plenipotentiary Envoy of Russia to China although it believes that majority of those questions can be solved only through direct negotiations between duly empowered representatives of Russia and China yet deems it necessary, for the sake of establishing the truth, to state the following:

1. By sending and Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Mission to Peking the Russian Soviet Government has not pursued the special aim of negotiating a trade agreement with China, but that of establishing good friendly relations between the Russian and Chinese peoples. True, the Russian Mission does believe that formally established normal relations between both Republics as well as the conclusion of a trade or any other agreements would equally benefit both sides; but it does not however wish to press upon the Chinese Government in this respect and is quite willing to wait for a start being made from the Chinese side.

2. With regard to the Mongolian Question the Information Bureau lays down the following facts:

Russia had never occupied Urga and its environments. The R. S. F. S. R. had had to bring her troops into Mongolia in order to liquidate the bands of Baron Ungern which had been constantly harassing the R. S. F.S. R. and the Far Eastern Republic from Mongolia; the troops were sent there also in order to protect the property and lives of Mongolian

citizens

citizens from the Ungern bands. The reasonableness and timeliness of this measure were recognized by the Chinese Government as well as by the public opinion in China.

The fact that different white guard bands and leaders are still to be found in Chinese territority does in no way guarantee safety and peace for the R.S.F.S.R. and F.E.R. Just the reverse: were the Russian troops to be withdrawn, this fact would create a constant menace of a new concentration of white guard bands on the territory of Mongolia and new attempts at attacking Far Eastern Republic from the back. And yet, in spite of all that, Russia, After she had crushed Ungern, was quite willing to withdraw her troops from Mongolia, but complying with the request made directly by the Mongolian people and the People's Government of Mongolia, she was obliged to leave in Urga and its environs a part of the troops.

There are many promisent men and influential circles in China herself who, today, are prone to believe that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia would not so much ensure her independence as make her a prey for one or other of her neighbours which would not be in the interests of the Chinese people.

Be it as it may one thing is certain and, that is, that Russia does not pursue any personal lucrative or-still less- any imperialistic aims in Mongolia. Such a policy would have been in flagrant contradiction will all the principles of the foreign policy of Russia. This can be perfectly confirmed, for instance, by the fact that when, pursuing Bakitch's bands, the Russian troops were obliged to cross over the boundaries of Eastern Turkestan, Russia, after Bakitch had been defeated, immediately withdrew her troops - in

spite

spite of the request of the people of Eastern Turkestan to leave them there. This Russia did because there existed at that time in Turkestan no such circumstances of special interest to China as are existent with regard to Mongolia.

3. Some papers seems to draw a parallel between the "former" and the "actual" attitude of Russia, whereas they are championing China's sovereign rights and loudly praising the "former policy" of Russia. Well, the same papers should not forget that it was precisely this "former policy" that on the strength of a formal treaty gave Russia the right to keep her troops in Mongolian territory and, caused Mongolia to be "de facto" severed from China. As for Russia's "actual policy", if the gentlemen sitting on the editorial staffsof the same papers wished to have a correct idea of it, they need but make enquiries among some of their friends belonging to groups more akin to them than are the Chinese people, in whose name they claim to speak. Such a friends of theirs could certainly help them to realise the real "position" of a State upon which all the imperialist world had been waging a bloody and strenuous war for more than four years, a war after which the imperialists had to recognize their defeat and propose peace negotiations.

4. Again the same worn-out allegation of propaganda is being made to which Europe is well accustomed now and which is no more fashionable there. Yet a tiniest dose of quite primitive decency shoudl suffice to recall to those who are caluminating the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Soviet Mission that the latter has arrived in China but a few days ago coming hither, as has already been mentioned, for the purpose of establishing friendly relations: certainly it

was

was a physical impossibility that the Mission should have afforded the slightest grounds for any blame whatever. These gentlemen should bear in mind that by starting in advance such groundless allegations against the Russian Mission they themselves contribute to the dissemination of most phantastical rumpurs about Russia and the Soviet Mission - thus incurring the guilt of a deliberately wicked and calumniatory compaign of propaganda against Russia.

It would not perhaps be an idle question to ask in conclusion: why the foreign papers edited in China, which today are so valiantly champoining this country's sovereignty, do not always and ever act in the same way? Why do they not, e.g., address "open letters" to the Representatives of other foreign nations in China whose Governments keeps troops not in some remote part of China, but in her very heart, Peking, the capital of the country - doing this without any out spoken wish on the art of the Chinese people?

The Information Bureau of the
Extraordinary Plenpotentiary
Envoy of the R.S.F.S.R. to China.

Peking, August 21, 1922.

MID

2657-S.2268

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Peking, October 7, 1928.

No. 1021

893.00/11

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 372 and 389, dated September 18, 5 p.m., and September 27, 6 p.m., respectively, relative to the recent Conference at Changchun, I have the honor to forward herewith for the Department's further information a resumé of the proceedings of this Conference which has been compiled from the reports placed at the disposal of the Legation.

The Changchun Conference held its first meeting

September

September 4th at the Japanese Consulate at Changchun. Mr. Yoffe, special representative of the Moscow Government, and Mr. Jansen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, represented Russia, while Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Matsushima represented Japan. The only business transacted at this meeting was the examination of the credentials of each of the representatives and a preliminary exchange of views as to the object of the Conference.

The second meeting of the Conference took place on September 5th and an immediate conflict of opinions ensued. The Japanese delegates protested against the fact that Mr. Yoffe and Mr. Jansen both held credentials issued by the Soviet Government as well as by the Far Eastern Republic and objected to Mr. Yoffe's occupying the senior chair of the Russian Commission. The Japanese delegation claimed that they had come to Changchun to negotiate with the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic only and were unwilling to grant signatory powers to a representative of the Soviet Government. Moreover, the Japanese delegation desired to limit the scope of the agenda to the settlement of the outstanding questions between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic with a view primarily to entering into a trade agreement with the Far Eastern Republic only, and further insisted that the unsigned Dairen agreement be used as a basis for the continuation of the negotiations.

The Russian delegation on the other hand claimed

that no questions affecting any part of Russian territory could be taken up without affecting the Moscow Government and therefore the Soviet representative must be given signatory powers. Furthermore, the Russian delegates demanded that the agenda should include all the outstanding questions between the Japanese Government and the Governments of "All Russia" and refused to limit the scope of the Conference to the agenda of the Dairen Conference or to the questions affecting only the resumption of trade relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic.

As a result of these divergencies of opinion between the Japanese and Russian delegates, it was found necessary to adjourn the Conference on September 7th before it had even properly commenced to function, in order that each delegation might communicate the views of the other delegation to its home government and receive further instructions therefrom.

On September 10th the Conference resumed its sittings but nothing was accomplished owing to the firm attitude of the Russian delegation, which, acting upon further instructions from Moscow and Chita, maintained that the negotiations must be carried on between Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic on the one hand and Japan on the other. The meeting which was to have taken place on September 11th was postponed owing to the fact that the Japanese delegates who had telegraphed Tokyo for further instructions had not received them at that

time.

time. At the meeting which took place on September 13th the Japanese delegation upon further instructions from Tokyo reaffirmed their previous position, viz., that Japan could only deal with the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic with a view to reaching a trade agreement and that the agenda must be limited in scope to the unsigned Dairen Conference. This meeting was particularly stormy and the discussions recriminatory, and had it not been for the intervention of Mr. Matsudaira, the chief Japanese delegate, who ventured "personal" views, in which he hoped his Government might concur, the Conference would probably have been then brought to an abrupt end.

At the meeting which took place on the 14th of September a compromise between the delegations was eventually reached whereby Japan conceded the right of signature to the Soviet representatives provided only such questions as affected the Far Eastern Republic were taken up, while Russia, on the other hand, agreed to limit the scope of the conference to the unsigned Dairen pact, provided this agreement were taken up on a new basis. Arrangements were also made at this meeting whereby the Japanese agreed to hand over their munitions at Vladivostok to the Russians who in their turn agreed to assume the responsibility for order after the Japanese evacuation.

It was furthermore agreed that as soon as this present conference should be brought to a satisfactory conclusion Japan would agree to hold another conference with the Soviet Government, which, according to a statement made by Mr. Jansen to Major Magruder, Assistant Military Attaché to the Legation, would cover comprehensive Russo-Japanese relations.

At the meeting which took place on the 16th of September the provisions of a draft agreement between the two delegations were discussed and an agreement thereon was reached. Both parties promised to abstain from propaganda and any hostile actions, vis-a-vis the citizens of their respective countries. The protection of life and property for the subjects of both countries was assured and various arrangements were made whereby liberty of entry and travel of the citizens of each country was permitted.

At the meeting which was held on September 18th rapid progress was made in the conference and further provisions in the draft agreement were arranged whereby the nationals of each country were allowed to engage in commerce, industry and professions within the territories of the other. Arrangements were made for the freedom of trade and navigation as well as for the opening of postal and telegraphic communications. A revision of

the Russo-

the Russo-Japanese Fishing Convention was completed and the resolutions hitherto imposed on foreigners relative to mining, forestry and other such enterprises were abolished.

At the meeting which took place on September 19th serious complications again arose when the Russian delegation brought up the question of the Japanese evacuation of the Priamur and Maritime Provinces as well as the evacuation of Saghalien. The Japanese delegates stated that they expected to evacuate the Priamur Province by the end of September and Maritime Province by the end of October, but as the occupation of Saghalien was due to the Nikolaievsk affair the former question could not be settled until the latter question had been disposed of. Moreover, the Japanese delegates maintained that they considered it impossible to settle the Nikolaievsk affair until after the conclusion of the present negotiations. Furthermore the Japanese delegation proposed that the preamble of the present draft agreement should stipulate that all clauses of the agreement in question should relate only to the Far Eastern Republic and that they should add an appendix which would indicate such clauses as were intended to apply to Soviet Russia. Again the Russian delegation objected to the Japanese construction of the clause dealing with "the mutual abstention from and

support

support of hostile activities against each other" to apply to the Far Eastern Republic only. As a result the Russian delegation stated that they found it necessary to communicate with the Moscow Government before replying to the abovementioned points of difference and consequently the conference was adjourned during this interval.

When the Conference reconvened on September 23d, Yoffe, who had by that date received further instructions from Moscow, stated that Russia was willing to have two consecutive agreements as proposed by Japan and was further willing to permit that the clauses of the first agreement should apply only to Japan and the Far Eastern Republic provided that (1) the appendix thereto should obligate Japan to enter into negotiations with Soviet Russia for another trade agreement, and that (2) the appendix thereto would make the clause relative to "the mutual abstention from and support of hostile activities against each other" applicable to Soviet Russia as well. Yoffe, moreover, stated that under no conditions would Russia agree to the Japanese statement that the evacuation of Northern Saghalien be conditional upon the settlement of the Nikolaievsk affair, for which incident both Yoffe and Jansen refused to assume any responsibility whatsoever. In this connection Yoffe further insisted that the first agreement between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic should contain a clause

<u>whereby</u>

whereby Japan would agree to evacuate all Russian territory.

The Japanese delegation agreed to inserting a clause in the appendix of this first agreement which would make the mutual abstention from and support of hostile activities against each other applicable to Soviet Russia, but flatly refused to change their position on the evacuation of Northern Saghalien and the Nikolaievsk affair. Consequently the Conference was again adjourned on September 25th and on September 27th the Japanese Legation, Peking, issued a statement which I forwarded to the Department in my despatch No. 1006 of October 3, 1922, announcing that the Conference was at an end.

I am also transmitting herewith for the Department's information certain newspaper clippings as listed below which may throw some additional side-lights on this Conference.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Jacob Gould Schurman

MAE*JBC

Enclosures:

1. Editorial from PEKING LEADER, September 13, 1922, entitled "The Prospects at Changchun".

2. Clipping from PEKING LEADER, September 13, 1922, entitled "Chang Protests Holding Conference at Changchun without his Permission.

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CHIEF OF [illegible]
INTEL

2657-9-45

DEC 29

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DEPARTMENT

[illegible] Wednesday, September 17, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Russians at Changchun

It is perhaps too much to expect that the Japanese and Russians at Changchun will settle down to the real business of arriving at an understanding for some days yet. Not only is there the usual jockeying for the preliminary advantage which goes on at most such conferences, but in this case there also is at stake the question of just who is doing the bargaining.

The Russians have taken the attitude that the Far Eastern Republic delegation, if there is a special delegation from China, is to be under the tutelage of the Moscow representatives. (The relations between these two delegations, that is, is like that which Japan tried to establish between the Japanese and Chinese delegations at the Versailles Conference.) The Japanese have said they had not understood the arrangements that way.

If the Russians establish their position, it will mean, among other things, that Japan is dealing with a combination which has at its back something like two million thoroughly efficient soldiers, organized into an army which has amply demonstrated its willingness and ability to protect its interests, instead of with a small country which practically has no army worth mentioning.

Naturally, Japan thinks she would be in a relatively stronger position if she dealt only with the Far Eastern Republic, as she did at Dairen. Naturally, too, the Far Eastern Republic representatives, since they are thoroughly in sympathy with the men from Moscow, are not at all unwilling to have the negotiations go on under the shadow of the two million Russian bayonets.

Moreover, it is just because of those bayonets, and because Russia has at last got to the stage where she is not compelled to keep them busy protecting herself in Europe, that Japan is likely to make the best of what some Japanese may think is a bad bargain—and deal with the Russians on their own terms. Trotsky said over a year ago that as soon as Russia was free in the west she would see what could be done about freeing the eastern Russian districts from foreign aggression. The Far Eastern Republic was independent of Moscow at the time, as it is to a certain extent at least now. But it was perfectly plain that Trotsky was serving notice on Japan that she should get out of Siberia at an early opportunity.

Then came the definite statement from Secretary of State Hughes that he hoped Japan would withdraw from Siberia within the year. He did not say what the United States would do if Japan did not do her part to realize this hope, but America easily could make Japan's position exceedingly difficult if she chose to call public and emphatic attention to Japan's failure to keep her promises to get out of Siberia.

This pronouncement by the American Secretary of State, plus the increasing realization that if Japan did not leave Sibera before long of her own will she stood in serious danger of being kicked out by Russia, undoubtedly helped the military elements in Japan to appreciate the arguments of the liberals there about how international justice and fair dealing demanded that Japan should withdraw her troops from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

This is not intended to imply that, in Japan, there are not now, and have not been in the recent past many who are thoroughly convinced that Japanese troops had no right to be in Siberia, and that, without reference to [illegible] from outside, they should get out. The liberal forces in Japan unquestionably are gaining ground steadily, and in due course they may secure control. In this particular case, however it is worth remembering that the Japanese reactionaries have had sufficient influence to keep the Japanese troops in Siberia inspite of often repeated and most solemn assurances from the Japanese Foreign office that they would be withdrawn promptly. In view of what has been the situation in the past, there seems little doubt that the threat of a Russia freed from the danger of interference in the west, together with the publicity given at Washington, to Japan's Siberian doings, went far to force upon the Japanese reactionaries the realization that a new policy was necessary.

However that may be, that fact remains that the Japanese delegates must have gone to Changchun with the possibility pretty clearly in mind that the Russians would take exactly the stand they have. M. Yoffe and others have been sufficiently frank about what they represented and for whom they were going to speak in the negotiations with Japan.

Knowing this possibility the Japanese must have thought out in advance what they would do. And the logic of the situation is that they should at first try to put across a "We are dealing only with the Far Eastern Republic, and on a Dairen Conference basis" bluff. When this failed, they would "consult their home government". Then, if another bluff failed to work, they would get down to the real business of coming to an agreement on trade and other matters with the Russian countries.

Moscow and Chita now are in a much stronger position than Tokyo, in Siberian matters. The Russian countries can wait until Japan is ready to agree to their terms. But the longer they are forced to wait, the less they will be willing to give Japan. Not only that, but Japan can do something to wipe out the memory of her Siberian record by going at least the full half-way, without quibbling or hesitation, in the present negotiations.

All things considered, therefore, there seems reason to expect that in due course the conference at Changchun will get down to business and it may get through with its business in a comparatively a short time,

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1922

THE PEKING LEADER, Wednesday, September 13, 1922.

## Chang Protests Holding Conference At Changchun Without His Permission

### Japanese Say Negotiations Are Being Held In Consulate, so No Permission Is Necessary

*Chang Hsu Service*

PEKIEG, September 12.—A report from Manchuria tells of a protest lodged by General Chang Tso-lin with the Japanese over the holding of the conference between the Russians and Japanese at Changchun without getting permission of the Chinese Government, or more particularly General Chang himself. It is said that in reply he was told that the conference was being held in the Japanese Consulate and in the Japanese Railway concession so that it was on soil that is nominally Japanese and consequently none of China's business.

On the other hand, M. Yoffe, the Russian delegate when this question was put to him, is supposed to have been more conciliatory and replied that he had the consent of the Peking Foreign Office to hold the meeting at Changchun.

There is a Chinese observer, representing the Waichiao Pu at Changchun but he is not admitted to the actual conference. The local authorities in Changchun, were naturally hurt at being disregarded when arrangements were being made for the conference. They feel that they should have been consulted, if for no other reason than to have prepared for the usual courtesy offered by the Chinese official to any guest within his jurisdiction.

**Session Postponed**

*Reuter's Service*

CHANGCHUN, September 10.—Monday's meeting of the Conference has been postponed pending instructions from Tokyo regarding the disagreement over the nature and scope of the Conference. The Japanese maintained that the Conference should discuss Far Eastern questions only, while the Russians insisted on negotiating for a general agreement between Japan and all Russia.

Note: for further information about the Changchun Conference see Page 4 and Page 6 of today's *Leader*.

3-1

2657-S. 248

1922 NOV 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: THE CHANGCHUN CONFERENCE AND CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA.

(G-2 Report)

From: CHINA.

No. 5018 Date: September 23, 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date: RECEIVED G-2 W.D. NOV 1 1922, 19

During the first part of September rumors were persistent in Peking regarding a renewal of hostilities between the Chihli Party and the Fengtien Party. These rumors had it that either Wu Pei-fu or Chang Tso-lin might initiate offensive action. Newspaper reports indicated that Wu Pei-fu was concentrating troops in the area about Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan, and that Chang Tso-lin was gathering his forces about Chingchow and near the Wall. In order to get first-hand information of what was happening, Major Magruder was sent to Mukden, on September 9, with instructions to spend a few days there and to continue to Changchun for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the Changchun Conference. He spent September 9th at Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan; the 11th, 12th and 13th at Mukden; 14th at Changchun, and returned to Peking September 16th.

The following telegram was prepared upon the advice of the Minister for transmission to the State Department and is quoted for the purpose of furnishing a resume of information obtained at Changchun.

(Quote)

September 9th sent Major Magruder to Mukden and Changchun, returned 16th. Reports following: Conference opened September 4th, immediate conflict on questions of Soviet Russian participation and scope of agenda. Japan demanded unsigned Dairen agreement as basis negotiations with F.E.R. and denied signatory powers to Soviet delegation. Russia demanded agenda include questions outstanding between Japan and all-Russia, signatory powers for Soviet Russia. Conference suspended seventh, eighth, ninth, awaiting advice home governments; 10th nothing accomplished; 11th postponement; 13th Japan reaffirmed expressed position; Russia threatened terminate negotiations. Conference stormy and discussions recriminatory. Matsudaira prevented disorderly conclusion by venturing "personal" views in which he hoped his government might concur. September 14th Japan conceeded right of Soviet Russia to participate and sign provided only Far Eastern questions covered. Russia agreed to Dairen pact agreement with changesas basis of discussions.

Following opinions of foreign journalists at Changchun: Japan eager for agreement permitting trade with F.E.R. and development timber and mining concessions. Russians consider attainment Soviet signatory rights as tacit recognition. If Japan introduces questions inland navigation or Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia will demand Chinese participation in conference.

In confidential interview with Magruder September 14th,

16th, Yansen stated as follows: An understanding has been arrived at providing for future conference covering comprehensive Russo-Japanese relations. Present conference likely cover Dairen pact agreement with modifications; and immediate provisions necessitated by Japanese evacuation Siberia, including munitions at Vladivostok. Future conference likely cover general relations between Russia and Japan, including fisheries, Nikolaevsk and related North Saghalien. He agreed that practically most important work of conference was fixing agenda for future conference. End interview.

Following points worthy especial mention: (a) The understanding regarding future conference from which Russia doubtless hopes for recognition.

(b) Japan eager to reestablish trade facilities and to adjust immediate Far Eastern questions but maneuvering to avoid recognition Soviet Russia.

(c) Russia dropping fiction of F.E.R. as separate political entity and insinuating Soviet delegation with supreme powers.

(d) Russians consider concession signatory powers to Soviet Russia as important step toward greatly desired recognition.

SCHURMAN.

(Quote ends.)

## CHIHLI TROOPS NEAR GREAT WALL.

Despite the rumors that Wu Pei-fu had advanced a division and a half of troops in the area of Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan, a visit to these cities and conversations with various foreigners in best position to know of troop movements proved almost conclusively that guard detachments totaling at most four hundred men, were the only troops in the area. These troops are believed to have been detached from the 15th Division which is known to have its headquarters at Lanchow. The only Chihli troops known to be north of Tientsin, along the Peking-Mukden Railway are the 15th Division and the 13th Brigade, with headquarters at Lutai.

## FENGTIEN TROOPS NORTH OF THE WALL.

So far as could be ascertained from the train in passing, there was no unusual activity among the Fengtien troops between the Great Wall and Mukden. Small detachments of troops were seen at all stations along the line. These were all from the 27th Division with headquarters at Chinchow and the 1st Division with headquarters at Lienshan. There were no indications of any mobilization of troops or resources along the railway.

## MILITARY SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

The following are some of the persons interviewed in Mukden: Chang Tso-lin; Chang Tso-lin's son, Chang Hsueh-liang; Commissioner of Foreign Affairs; the American Consul-General; British Consul-General; Mr. Baker, Advisor to Chang Tso-lin; and numerous business men whose activities extend throughout the three Eastern Provinces. From these sources the unanimous opinion was that Chang Tso-lin did not contemplate any offensive movement in the immediate future in China proper. It is undoubtedly true that Chang Tso-lin is very energetically pursuing a policy of reorganization and equipment of his forces with the object of making it an effective fighting force. He assures all interviewers that his purpose is to perfect

/ his troops

perfect his troops for defensive purposes against a possible Chihli invasion, for the defense of his outside frontiers, and for the effective suppression of bandits. Whereas it may be true that he needs good troops for these purposes, one cannot but feel that the magnitude of his preparations points to a more ambitious employment of his forces in the future.

There is in progress a plan of reorganization which involves the disbandment of certain of his organizations, a culling out of inefficient officers and a more careful selection of future officers. Also it is mentioned that Chang intends to organize his forces into brigades of uniform strength and composition instead of the present heterogeneous divisions, mixed brigades and independent units. This plan is now believed to be in progress, but it is almost impossible to obtain definite information as to what has been accomplished. It does not appear that any reduction in strength is contemplated, as he would have the public believe. In fact, recruiting continues at the present time. The estimated strengths of his forces are as follows:--

| | |
|---|---|
| Fengtien ..... | 70,000 |
| Kirin ..... | 30,000 |
| Heilungkiang..... | 20,000 |
| Total..... | 120,000 |

An attempt is being made to improve the quality of recruits. The 3rd and 8th brigades stationed near Mukden, it is true, are show brigades, the 3rd being commanded by General Chang Tso-lin's son, but in these brigades only men who can read and write are accepted. The appearance of the men in these two brigades is exceptionally good from the standpoint of cleanliness, physique and intelligence. They were observed at their routine work without previous knowledge that visitors were coming and they were found to be undergoing very systematic and strenuous garrison training. One could hardly believe that he was observing Chinese troops when witnessing their work. Barracks, stables, picket lines and garrison paraphernalia were all in excellent condition. The following formations were observed and noticeably well conducted: calisthenics, infantry close order drills, standing gun drills, pack artillery drills, class-room work in reading and writing.

A great quantity of uniform cloth is being supplied to the Army by a British firm whose local representative is believed to be an American. The atmosphere of Mukden is full of rumors of arms, ammunition and equipment being supplied to Chang Tso-lin. All business men speak of the facility of doing business with the "government" and of the ready cash in payment for any supplies furnished. Because of the Arms Embargo, all those engaged in furnishing munitions are very wary of giving information on this subject, particularly to an official. The general impression is that arms and ammunition are being sold by Japanese from stores easily imported into the South Manchurian railway zone. Also, rumors are rife of quantities being imported from Vladivostok through Japanese and Russian agents. A considerable quantity was being held up at Pogranitchnya by the Commissioner of Customs. The Commissioner being a Britisher, Chang Tso-lin made complaint to the British Consul-General that this was another evidence of British feeling against him and requested the Consul-General to instruct the Commissioner of Customs to permit the arms to come through. The British Consul-General does not doub t but that ultimately Chang will introduce these arms by force in spite of the Customs officials. The arsenal equipment contracted for by a Danish firm is wtill being held up by the customs officials, but itis rumored that some equipment is being placed in the new arsenal by Japanese firms. One gathers the impression in Mukden that no importing firm of any nationality is entirely innocent of attempting to benefit from Chang's ready money in payment of some form of war materials, and resort is made to all manner of intrigue to escape the customs berriers.

From information believed to be reliable it appears that Chang Tso-lin is negotiating or has negotiated with the Diederich Government at Vladivostok for the purchase of a large amount of munitions from the stores furnished Russia by the Allies and now piled up at Vladivostok. Originally there were 300,000 tons of munitions consisting of explosives, ammunition, small arms, machine guns, lead, copper, Etc., Much of this has disappeared and the explosives are said to have deteriorated and are now extremely dangerous. The disposition of these munitions is subject to be discussed at the Changchun Conference but, in the meantime, it is being charged that the Japanese are permitting the white Russians to dispose of large quantities by arming their own partisans, by sale to Chang Tso-lin, by sale to Hung Hutzes, and some, it is rumored, is being transferred to Hailar for the future use of White Russian troops who might be expected to withdraw westward along the Chinese-Eastern Railway upon the evacuation of Vladivostok by the Japanese.

So far as could be ascertained, only six Russian officers are at present in the employ of Chang Tso-lin. These are engaged in technical work in the arsenal. There were rumors, however, of others being engaged in Harbin to be used as instructors with troops.

## INTERVIEW WITH CHANG TSO-LIN.

In an interview with Chang Tso-lin on September 12th, he stated very definitely that he would not again interfere with Peking politics. Once, he said, he attempted to bring about unification and had sent his troops south of the Wall upon the express invitation of Hsu Shih-chang. The latter "double-crossed" him however and Wu Pei-fu unjustly attacked him. His intention now is to devote all of his energies toward the economic development and the political reorganization of the three Eastern Provinces. The energetic training of his troops, he stated, was for the sole purpose of maintaining internal order, defending his frontiers and preventing any agression on the part of the Chihli forces. When asked if he expected an attack from Chihli, he said that he did not know but repeated that he himself had no offensive plans. Asked about his attitude toward the Russians, he said that his feelings were absolutely neutral and that his only policy was to protect China against the incursions of all Russian factions. As to the Chinese Eastern Railway, he insisted that he was responsible for its defense but otherwise he would not meddle in its affairs. He added, however, that a share-holders meeting was soon to be held, the place and date of such meeting he did not know. He made several allusions to the chaotic and bankrupt condition of the Peking Government in contrast with the prosperity and wealth of Manchuria.

Chang Tso-lin broached the subject of the Liaotung Peninsula, stating that there was considerable publicity being given to the fact that the original Russian lease-hold will expire next March (1923), and added that the foreign governments, particularly the United States, "should" assist in regaining the territory for China. I suggested that the foreign governments had assisted China at the Washington Conference in the matter of Shantung, since when China had done little to help herself, and mentioned the possibility of China's having to borrow money from the Japanese for redeeming the Shantung Railway, in which case Japan's hold on Shantung would be as effective as a present. At this Chang appeared to chuckle rather gleefully over the plight of the Peking Government.

The Warlord was reserved in his manner and, it will be seen, he gave only the most conventional answers to my questions. There are sufficient reasons for believing he holds deep revenge against Wu Pei-fu, that he does not intend indefinitely to keep his hands out of Peking politics, and that he hopes in the future again to employ his troops for furthering his ambitions which are not confined to Manchuria. Further, there are evidences of his interfering in Chinese Eastern Railway matters, and that his attitude toward the Russians is not one of strict neutrality. He is dealing with the White Russians for the purchase of arms and doubtless negotiating politically with them as well.

Nothing was said regarding his relations with the Japanese. The foreigners encountered in Mukden suspect Chang Tso-lin of being pro-Japanese. His position in Manchuria is such that the Japanese are at once his greatest menace and his most dependable supporters. On one hand he fears them and to a certain extent must do their bidding, on the other hand, when threatened from the outside, he must depend upon them for his only material support. It seems evident that with the existing status in Manchuria the Japanese are well content with the autocratic and comparatively effective control which Chang asserts. Should the Japanese policy develop into one of territorial aggrandizement, Chang could be quite easily unseated. The question of Chang's pro-Japanese or anti-Japanese tendencies is immaterial. Whether he would or not, he must play within limits the Japanese game, but it is believed that he combats both their encroachments and their overtures of friendship as effectively as any other Chinese leader would do under like circumstances.

## POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA.

It is the general belief in Mukden among both foreigners and Chinese that Chang Tso-lin is suffering more smartly from the deprivation of his rank and titles than from any other cause. He would make almost any concession to Peking in return for a mandate legalizing his position. At present he calls himself the Commander-in-Chief For Peace Preservation of Manchuria. Sun Lieh-cheng of Kirin and Wu Chun-sheng of Heilungkiang are Vice-Commanders-in-Chief For Peace Preservation of Manchuria. These two officials still hold rank as Military Governors from Peking. Fengtien has no Military Governor. Each of the three Provinces has a Civil Governor and a Provincial Assembly. In Mukden, there is sitting an Inter-Provincial Assembly consisting of about twenty members appointed by the three Provincial Assemblies. This body is purely advisory and exerts but little influence. Wang Yung-kiang, Civil Governor of Fengtien, is said to be an extremely capable man and to be largely responsible for the economic developments of which Chang Tso-lin boasts. Sun Lie-cheng of Kirin is said to be in entire sympathy with Chang Tso-lin, while Wu Chun-sheng of Heilungkiang is considered to be a man with patriotic motives and is believed to hold his first allegiance to the Central Government.

Chang Tso-lin, contrary to opinions frequently expressed, is not idolized by his people. The peasants, as elsewhere, are indifferent to their government, but in Fengtien particularly they look upon Chang Tso-lin as their protector from banditry. The merchant classes are believed to disfavor the present independent status of Manchuria and would prefer closer affiliations with Peking. The general impression of foreignbusiness men is that Chang Tso-lin can maintain himself securely in power so long as he remains in Manchuria and devotes himself to economic development, but it is frequently stated that were he to attempt another invasion south of the Wall the people would rise against him. Chang Tso-lin and all of his backers boast of having the strongest and most prosperous government in China, and the most effective suppression of banditry. This is perhaps true of Fengtien. In the other two Provinces however it is said that banditry is worse today than at any time during the past eight years. It is undoubtedly true that the very efficient Japanese organization along the South Manchurian Railway zone exerts a great stabilizing influence in Manchuria. It is also true that the most orderly conditions and the greatest prosperity are found along the Railway zone. It is a debatable question, therefore, whether Chang Tso-lin is superior to other Chinese militarists as an executive or whether his apparent success is not due largely to the stabilizing influence of the excellently policed South Manchurian Railway zone and to the economic benefits resulting from the Japanese industrial development.

There are numerous evidences that Chang Tso-lin is working in agreement with Russian reactionary factions. This may be a policy forced on him by Japan or it may be his own policy for combatting Red influences. His extensive deals for obtaining arms and ammunition from the Vladivostok Government may account in part for his apparent leanings toward the whites. Mrs. Margaret E. Harrison, representing Hearst publications, has made investigation

[illegible] is responsible for the statement that Chang has closed a deal with the [illegible]terish Government for about seven million rounds of small arms ammunition and fifty eight thousand rifles, a part of the munitions at Vladivostok furnished by the Allies. The Chita authorities go so far as to say that Chang is working with the Whites and is even contemplating the employment of certain White troops which may withdraw from the Maritime Province into Manchuria after the Japanese evacuation. Mr. Yansen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, F.E.R., stated that there was a large plan under consideration for the capture of Urga by Chang Tso-lin, employing his own and White Russian forces, the expedition to be based on Hailar. These activities of Chang Tso-lin are at present hazy and are to be suspected as being the creatures of rumor.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA.

Unlike all other localities in China, an atmosphere of optimism pervades business circles in Manchuria. Everywhere one hears expressions of satisfaction with present conditions and of boundless possibilities for future developments. More than an eighty percent crop is being harvested this year and all indications point to great prosperity among all classes. Whether or not Chang Tso-lin is responsible for general conditions in Manchuria, business men all express the greatest satisfaction with his regime which permits the transaction of business under the most satisfactory conditions. Chang's "Government" is said to place no hindrances in the way of foreign trade. On the contrary, it offers every assistance to the free transaction of business. All firms are eager to enter into contracts with the Manchurian Government since it is a noteworthy fact that Chang Tso-lin pays cash upon delivery. Only the most favorable comment was heard regarding the service rendered by the South Manchurian Railway.

It is interesting to note that all foreigners resident in Manchuria are boosters of the country. Our own West in its palmiest days did not furnish an atmosphere of greater optimism and business adventure than one feels in Manchuria. Foreign residents point proudly to the continuous, cultivated fields extending along the railway and remind you that since only three percent of the area of Manchuria is under cultivation, the development of the country has only begun.

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U. S. S. RIZAL, Flagship. Place Manila, P.I. Date 15 November, 1922.

Name of Intelligence Officer Lt. J.P. Bowden, USN Name of C. O. Cinc. Asiatic Fleet.

Source Consuls and C.O.'s dumboats. Reliability of source (mark on scale 4.0) 4.0

Subject CHINA Provinces of Fukien and Kwang-tung. Political Conditions.
(Nation.) (City.) (Index title.) (Subtitle.)

1923 1217-9

The following reports relative to recent political and military events in and around Foochow and Amoy in the provinces of Fukien are submitted: Extracts are taken from Consular reports; and reports submitted by the Commanding Officers of the U.S.S. RIZAL and U.S.S. ASHEVILLE which were at Foochow during the recent disturbances.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

General Survey leading up to the present situation, October 25. (Consul at Foochow).

1. During the spring of 1922, the so-called "Constitutionalist Party" in Kwangtung Province, with Sun Yat-sen at its head, prepared a "Punitive Expidition against the North". The Constitutionalists regarded Sun Yat-sen as the rightful President of China and the Government then, and now, functioning in Peking as illegal. This punitive expidition, headed by General Hsu Ch'ung Chih, with Generals Li Fu-lin and Huang Ta-Wei as subordinates, had fought its way well into Kiangsi Province, when it was suddenly cut off from its base at Canton by a coup d'etat, by General Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, who seized the Provincial Government of Kwangtung and forced Sun Yat-sen to flee.

2. The army of Hsu Ch'ung-Chih, therefore, found itself under the necessity of choosing between the alternatives of fighting its way back to Canton or making its way to some intermediate base from which to starts its campaign to retake Kwangtung for the Constitutionalist cause. Just about this time it so happened that an organization of Fukienese with its headquarters in Shanghai, was starting an agitation to drive out from their native province, Governor Li Hou-chi. This organization is said on good authority to have invited the foot-loose army of Hsu Ch'ung-chih to assist in this task, an invitation which, fitting well into the plans of the army, was accepted. At the outset, therefore, it is believed, the invasion of Fukien by the Cantonese army was initiated by the Fukienese themselves, and Sun Yat-sen was not directly connected with it. His re-entry into the scheme came later.

3. The middle of August, 1922, found the Cantonese Army, 20,000 strong, about at the point of the junction of the border of Fukien with Kwangtung and Kiangsi. To meet this threatened invasion Governor Li of Fukien despatched an army of approximately 6,000 men, a brigade and a half, under command of General Wang Hsien-chen into South Fukien. It is not yet clear just what happened to this expedition, but it now seems probable that Hsu Ch'ung-chih retired slowly before the advance of Wang Hsien-ch'en in the direction of North Fukien, drawing Wang after him. At the city of Tingchow he evidently left a small portion of his force to continue to engage the enemy, and meanwhile set out with the main

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Submitted by J.P. BOWDEN, Lieutenant, USN (To be signed by originating officer in this space) Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Forwarded E.A. ANDERSON, Admiral, USN. Commanding Officer. Commander in Chief.

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body of his army on a circling movement toward Foochow.

4. The speed, precision and effectiveness of this movement were such as to excite one's admiration as a purely military feat. We have reliable information to the effect that the Southern army, still approximately 20,000 strong, arrived at Shaowu, North Fukien, about the middle of September, having come overland via Liencheng, Ninghau, Chiennighsien, Taining, a distance of about 250 English miles; that on September 25th this force entered Chiennigfu, via Chienyang, another 80 miles overland, meanwhile having made forays to Chungan and Phoheng; that on or about October 1st it left Chiennigfu and arrived at Kutien - 80 miles distant, on October 6th; and in two more days had covered the 50 miles from Kutien to Foochow, and after a 36 hours battle entered the city on the morning of October 12th. Altogether, this army had covered about 440 miles of hard, overland travel; carrying all its arms, artillery, ammunition and other equipment on the backs of men; and fighting a series of small engagements en route; in something less than thirty days. It had entirely surrounded the enemy forces, and cut it up into at least three and possibly four detachments, which it found no difficulty in defeating piece-meal.

5. At the present writing, October 25th, the Cantonese army, - or about 11,000 of it, - are firmly entrenched in Foochow; the Provincial Government has fled and its army entirely defeated. A second distinct factor in the present situation consists of Admiral Sah, four naval vessels belonging or owning adherence to the Peking Government, and a force of about 300 "Northern Government" marines. Sah Chen-ping, retired admiral in the Chinese Navy and now holding no substantive post therein, came to Foochow at the time when the Southern invaders were approaching the city. He placed a gunboat near the Lower Bridge connecting Foochow City with the suburb on the Island of Nantai, and stationed a force of 300 marines with machine guns on "Middle Island" between two sections of the bridge. He thus commanded the bridge and the approach to Foochow from the sea. His presence here was nominally - and it appears, honestly - for the protection of his native city, Foochow, so far as he had the power. The naval force declared martial law along the lower reaches of the river, including the Lower Bridge, and during the time of actual military operations undoubtedly did much to safeguard the city from looting by both sides. Admiral Sah had the unique distinction of accepting surrender from groups of soldiers of both sides, who feared to turn themselves over to their enemy. Altogether Admiral Sah has received, disarmed and sent back to North China about 3000 soldiers of the Provincial Government, including the Governor himself. He received the surrender of about 300 Southerners, as well, who, during the fighting, had become detached from their main armies. Admiral Sah, at the behest of the Fukien Provincial Assembly, and under mandate from the President in Peking, has declared himself

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"Provisional" Civil Governor, until such time as a permanent Civil Governor is elected. His position, both from a military and a political viewpoint, however, is quite impossible, unless the Peking Government can give him greater support. From a military viewpoint he cannot offer real opposition to Southerners, for they have forces sufficient to capture, by land, the forts which dominate Pagoda Anchorage and hence the fleet in it. From the political viewpoint he is fundamentally inacceptable to the Southerners, as he is a Peking Government man, and they are in revolt against Peking. There is no prospect of his turning over to their cause. They undoubtedly like Sah and would be glad to see him Governor, as he is a good man and the undoubted choice of the Fukienese. On his part he respects the Southern Generals personally, and admires them for their restraint in not permitting the city to be looted or harmed. With probably mutual regret, Sah will have to withdraw, unless assistance from Peking, not now in sight, comes. A third, and the most sinister, factor, has been injected into the situation, in the persons and aims of Generals Wang Yung-chuan, and Hsu Shu-cheng, the erstwhile notorious leader of the defunct "Anfu" Party in the North. The initiation of the expedition against Foochow by the "Punitive Expidition" found Hsu Shu-cheng, "Little Hsu", so-called, carrying on negotiations with Sun Yat-sen, the "Constitutionalist" leader, in Shanghai and Hangchow, the capital of Chekiang Province, for a new coalition of the "Anfu" and the Constitutionalist" Parties.

6. The success of the invasion presented to both Little Hsu and Sun Yat-sen a most excellent opportunity for recouping their lost fortunes. Sun could command the obedience of the Southern Generals; Hsu - by reason of an ancient relationship of master and servant - could command Wang Yung-chuan, the disaffected Brigade Commander at Yenping, the strategic center of North Fukien, Wang, already influenced by the dictates of discreation, was readily influenced to throw in his lot with the invaders; the Southern Generals were instructed by Sun Yat-sen to cooperate with Wang Yung-chuan. The result has been that although the Southern army did all the fighting and actually control Foochow and North Fukien, they have been forced to recognize a government called the "Reconstruction Military Government" of the "Government for the establishment of the Nation", of which Hsu is presumed to be the head, though Wang Yung-chuan has been made the "General Administrator" for Fukien, with both military and civil powers. There is reason to believe that this arrangment by no means pleases the real Southern generals, and there is prospect of a rupture at any time.

7. By reason of the delicate balances of power now obtaining in both North and South China, it does not seem probablee that any serious movement to oust the present rulers from Foochow can get underway from either Peking or Canton, though both Wu P'ei-fu, and Ch'en Ch'Iung-ming, of Canton, must be making preparations to this end. The obvious purpose of the Southerners, a purpose

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FILE No. (from index sheet) 108-100

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Name of Intelligence Officer ..... Name of C. O. .....

Source ..... Reliability of source (mark on scale 4.0) .....

Subject .....
(Nation.) (City.) (Index title.) (Subtitle.)

which is so compelling that it has caused them to acquiesse in the self-aggrandisement schemes of Little Hsu, is to get back as quickly as possible to their natural and most effective base, Canton. This means a serious military campaign against a strong foe, General Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, the Commander in Chief of the Kwangtung Army. To accomplish this purpose they must have money and supplies. The money Little Hsu is prepared to supply from the still ample coffers of the old Anfu Party and, it is believed, from Chang Tso-lin, the warlord of Manchuria, who also sees in this situation an opportunity for possible return to power in Peking. The supplies must come from Foochow, and the only possible means of insuring their production is to have a government in Foochow friendly to or allied with the cause. The administration of Fukien represents the quid pro quo of the expedition against Canton.

8. Thus the situation now stands, Sah, as Provisional Civil Governor, has been making appointments to Provincial offices. Wang Yung-chuan, as "General Administrator" for Fukien under the "Reconstruction Military Government" has been doing likewise. Sah, as the appointee of the Peking Government, has the recognition of the foreign consuls but is practically power less, and will probably have to withdraw. Wang has material power but no recognition and no prespect of obtaining it. Sah is a good man and has the backing of the Fukienese. Wang has very bad reputation and is a rank outsider. The measures which have been taken for the protection of American lives and property have been made the subject of a special despatch. No anti-foreign sentiment is involved, and up to the present Americans have suff ered no direct losses. Business is at a complete standstill, and will stay thus as long as the present political stalemate exists. In the interior utmost confusion reigns. Certain regions have been terrorized by the wandering bands of defeated Northern soldiers who chose brigandage to surrender. In other regions the local Northern garrisons and civil officers have fled in anticipation of the arrival of Southern forces, and in tose places no semblance of a government exists. Were it not for the innate tendency of the Chinese to be peaceful and orderly these places would be in utmost chaos, In still other places various "self government" bodies have appeared, but the equally strong Chinese tendency to disintegrate into small factions has made these movements so far unsuccessful. The general attitude of the Chinese people in this whole district seems to be one of wistful waiting for someone to govern them who will give them a chance to go on with their regular vocations. Not a single worth while effort seems to have been made to get up effective self-government.

Measures taken for the Protection of American Lives and Property in Foochow during Political Disturbances.

9. The threat of military invasion of Foochow had, by

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| Inven-tions | Oil | Commander in Chief | | | Commander | | Attaché at ..... | State | Justice | Inter. | Com. | Labor | Ship Board | Return to Room No..... |
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Subject .....

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October first, brought about an acute financial crisis locally. The tightness of silver coin had suddenly revealed the fact that the official Provincial Bank of Fukien had issued approximately $1,500,000 of unsecured notes. The troops of the Provincial Governor had just been paid in those notes, and it was feared that with the approach of the Mid-Autumn Festival, October 5th, one of the Chinese Quarterly Settlement Days, and the imminent threat of Military Invasion, the local garrison would mutiny and loot the city. A tremendous panic developed in the native city, and literally tens of thousands of Chinese fled, bag and baggage, to the fancied greater security of the foreign settlement on Nantai Island. So menacing had the situation become by October 4th that on that day I called a meeting of all Americans at the Consulate, to discuss plans and devise means for meeting with the situation that threatened. At that meeting I outlined the facts as I saw them and issued a sheet of suggestions for all Americans to follow, if they agreed. The suggestions, of which a copy is enclosed, provided for uniform and concerted action both immediately and for the threatened emergency. Before the meeting closed reports of military reverses up river came in, together with rumors that the Governor intended to flee that night. The decision being left to me I took the responsibility of telephoning to Pagoda Anchorage to the U.S.S. RIZAL which had just arrived, asking that a landing force be sent that evening. The force, 48 men, arrived early the next morning. British and Japanese forces of about the same number were landed during the day also.

10. The night passed without trouble, the soldiers evidently being disposed to trust the Government's promise to resume silver payment after a moratorium of five days. In my opinion and that of many others, the fact of the presence of foreign forces at the Consulates did much to steady the situation, also as it seemed apparent that the next crisis would come when the invading armies actually attached the city, a fact of which we would have ample warning, and as I was reluctant to have American armed forces in Foochow even with the approval of the Governor which had been obtained, half of our original force was withdrawn immediately and the balance later. Meanwhile I had obtained from local American residents an inventory of privately-owned arms and ammunition; of American owned property; and a revised record of exactly where each American lived. I also appointed a committee, headed by an ex-service man, to act as a "Committee on Communications and Emergency Relief". To this committee I gave the duty of allocating the Government-owned arms and ammunition in the Consulate, to be distributed in the event of emergency. The next crisis occurred as expected and has been fully described in other despatches. I need only state that on the evening of October 11th I asked that a force be again landed from the U.S.S. RIZAL. The next morning the city was taken by the Southerners. On October 13th and 14th, the main army of the Provincial Government, which had

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Source ..... Reliability of source (mark on scale 4.0) .....

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been cut off up river, made a serious attempt to retake the city but was entirely defeated. It was merely the fortunes of war which saved the city from boardment and possible serious injury.

11. By this time all semblance of civil administration in Foochow had vanished. Not a civil official remained, and both the city and Nantai were without police. Under these circumstances I suggested to the Commanding Officer of the American destroyer that his force be increased and that it be so distributed in several concentration centers that American residents could, with practicability, be warned in case of sudden emergency and be concentrated in those centers. Up to that time the plan had been for concentration at the Consulate only, which neither I nor the American residents considered practicable. I was particularly concerned for the safety of the 48 Americans living in Foochow city, and I was convinced that even the 160 Americans living on Nantai Island could not be concentrated at the Consulate in the event of a sudden emergency. The Commanding Officer replied that to increase his landing force of 30 men and 2 officers would cripple his ship, and that it was contrary to military strategy to divide his force.

12. Under these circumstances, and as I considered that the entire absence of lawful - and for the most part, actual authority, presented a situation in which American residents might swiftly be emperilled, either by organized or disorganized bodies of troops, I telegraphed the Legation at Peking and also sent a radio message to the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, asking for additional naval forces. The American Association of Foochow independently endorsed this request. This was October 14th. On October 15th, the Commander in Chief, Admiral Anderson, himself arrived in Foochow, on his yacht, the GENERAL ALAVA, the Flagship HURON, remaining at the mouth of the river. He and his staff immediately entered into conference with local American representatives, the Commanding Officer of the RIZAL, and myself. The result of this conference was a "Combined Plan for the protection of American Nationals in Foochow and Nantai", a copy of which, with the covering letter to American residents, is enclosed herewith. This plan provided for the stationing of a force of 30 marines at the Consulate, with the forces of the naval vessel in port at Pagoda as a reserve; and for the concentration of all Americans, in case of danger, at three concentration centers on Nantai Island, where they would receive military protection. The Admiral felt it still impracticable to station, either at once or later, any force in Foochow or on the other side of the river.

13. I am still concerned for the Americans who live in Foochow city and the suburb on the other side. While most of the women and all the children could and would come to one of the three concentration centers on Nantai Island in the event of danger, the men and certain of the women would feel morally bound to

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remain and take their chances, a compulsion which any honorable American would, under the same circumstances, feel. Four young American women have charge of a school of about a hundred and fifty girls, residents of places outside Foochow. To send these girls home would be to invite them to commit suicide or worse, in view of conditions now obtaining in the interior. To move the school bodily into already overcrowded Nantai would be extremely difficult. To abandon them would be impossible. In the city another group of Americans have charge of a boys' school of nearly 1000. Their position is almost equally difficult. Another group has a hospital and still another has charge of relief work, with homeless refugees under their care. It is easy to understand, therefore, that when the Commanding Officer of the RIZAL on the afternoon of October 13th invited the Americans living in Foochow city to come to Nantai Island most of them courteously refused and said they must take their chances.

14. The position of the Admiral, as he explained it at our conference, is just this: It is both his duty and his desire to protect American lives, and secondarily American property, in the event of danger. The dictates of international law compelled him, however, to do so only in the event of real danger and then as inconspicuously as possible. To station a force sufficient, from the point of view of military strategy, to protect American lives even in one concentration center across the river, would mean a conspicuous violation of the sovereignty of China. Therefore, the best he could do was to offer protection to American lives in three concentration centers on Nantai Island, one of these being the Consulate and the other two to be used only in case of urgent danger. It is still a question in my mind as to whose would be the responsibility if any of those Americans in Foochow city, who acting on the dictates of conscience remained loyal to their charges - defenseless girls, children, and sick, were killed or injured. We can but hope that this may never happen, but I feel it is possible. The best I can do is to warn them of this possibility, and urge them to come to Nantai, where, within all reasonable possibility, they would be safe. The British and Japanese are maintaining Consulate guards of about the same size as ours, 30 to 40 men, which can be supplemented on fairly short notice from the naval vessels at Pagoda. The Japanese Consul General informed me that two Japanese subjects were killed in Foochow on October 13th, during the fighting. He did not know just what were the circumstances under which they met their death, except that they had evidently "foolishly exposed themselves during the fighting". The American civilian committee is cooperating with the naval force. The community has acted well and has shown a spirit of excellent cooperation.

Combined plan for the Protection of American Nationals in Foochow and Nantai.

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(Nation.) (City.) (Index title.) (Subtitle.)

15. During the recent visit to Foochow of the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, there was drawn up a "Combined Plan for the Protection of American Nationals in Foochow and Nantai". This plan was drawn up with considerable care and with the cooperation of the American Consul and representatives of the local American Association, and represents the net result of their mutual best endeavors. American citizens resident in Foochow, both city and Nantai, are earnestly requested to give this matter their most serious consideration and utmost cooperation. May I ask your special attention to the following points:-

First:

As you will note from a perusal of this plan our naval authorities have decided that the utmost they can attempt to do is to offer protection to American lives in three concentration centers on Nantai Island, and that therefore the plan contemplates the concentration of all Americans in case of danger in those centers. Their primary mission, as you will note, is to protect lives; the protection of interests and property is secondary ; and will be afforded "where this will not interfere with the primary mission".

Second:

The plan, as far as it involves the individual American resident and his charges, consists in a series of measures, described as "Preparatory", "Preliminary" and "Emergency". The "Preparatory Measures" go into effect immediately; the "Preliminary Plan" is to be put into effect as described in paragraph thereof -"When information indicates the approach in the near future of troops toward Nantai under conditions where looting is a possibility" the "Emergency Plan" is to go into effect "when troops are seen approaching Nantai". These three plans, as far as they involve action by the individual civilian American, are reviewed briefly herewith.

"Preparatory Measures":

The principal thing to be noted is that each of you is assigned one of three concentration centers to which you, your family and your students are to go in case of danger and on signal. There is enclosed a list showing the assignments. If any person has been omitted or if you know of any reason why the assignment in your case should be altered please inform the Consul at once.

In preparation for a possible concentration it is requested that you prepare for yourself, your family and your

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students who might go with you sufficient food and other necessities to subsist on for two days. All that can be provided for you at the concentration center is shelter.

Another preparatory precaution not noted in the "plan", is that, in case you have no telephone, you maintain some sort of regular messenger service to or observation on the concentration center to which you are assigned. While danger is not now considered imminent, it is very possible that, under present conditions, an emergency might arise very swiftly, and you should be prepared to note it and act promptly.

"Preliminary Plan:

Under this plan, which goes into effect "when information indicates the approach of troops toward Nantai in the near future", the individual civilian on Nantai is to do nothing beyond standing in readiness to move on signal; the individual citizen in Foochow should follow paragraphs 5 and 6 of the "Preliminary Plan, i.e. the women and children should come to their concentration centers on Nantai, while the man should prepare for defense by obtaining arms and ammunition and signalling pistols and should prepare to concentrate in the American Board Compound. These arms will be supplied from the Consulate.

"Emergency Plan"

This part of the scheme goes into effect when danger becomes imminent. So far as the individual citizen on Nantai is concerned, you should watch for the red rockets from the Consulate or the telephone or personal message therefrom, and then proceed to your assigned center, bring ing your subsistance with you as previously indicated. The Americans remaining in Foochow city including Penasang if any, should at once concentrate in the American Board Compound. In case they are in danger they should fire red stars or adopt whatever daylight signal has been arranged, and the guard Commander will use his discreation as to sending a party to their assistance.

"Conclusion":

Under this plan, if faithfully carried out, it is believed that American civilians living in this port will receive the maximum possible protection first to their lives and the lives of those in their charge, and second to their property and other interests; and can meanwhile, until the emergency arises, continue on with their regular vocations as usual. It should be borne in mind that conditions are changing rapidly. At the time this plan

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FILE No. (from index sheet) 103-100

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Was drawn up it appeared that the chief and perhaps only danger came in the direction of West and South of Mantai Island, from scattered bands of fugitive soldiers. Just since then, however, the situation in Foochow city has taken on a more critical aspect.

Report of Commanding Officer USS RIZAL - Commander W.N. Vernou, USN. - Conditions - FOOCHOW - October 4 to 15th, 1922.

16. Arrived at Pagoda Anchorage at 1630, 4 October 1922. At about 1900 I received a telegram from the American Consul Foochow, Mr. E.B. Price, which stated that everything was quiet and that he would call on me in the morning. I had previously telegraphed Mr. Price informing him that I would be in Foochow the following morning and that he need not make first call. At about 2100 I got a telephone message from Mr. Price, through the Customs at Pagoda Anchorage, stating in substance that although he had previously telegraphed me that everything was quiet that the situation was critical and he requested that I send a landing force of forty men at once. He further stated that he had obtained the use of the Customs launch for this purpose. This struck me as a sudden and remarkable change of front but as I had no information on which to act other than that received from the Consul I sent him word that I would start a landing party of forty-eight men for Foochow, via Customs Launch, within an hour. The party of two officers and forty-eight men shoved off from the ship at 2145, fully equipped and with provisions for forty-eight hours. It might be well to add here that had we not had the use of the Customs Launch which the Customs Authorities so kindly allowed us to use it would have not been possible to have effected this landing. In our boats it takes approximately two hours to make the trip with favorable tide. We have not sufficient boat capacity to have landed this force, with equipment and provisions in one trip. It is necessary to have a local pilot even to take small boats up the river. There was no pilot available. The landing force was met at Foochow by the American Consul and a Mr. McConnell, a Y.M.C.A. representative, a Mr. Parker, another Y.M.C.A. representative and three other Americans names and occupation unknown. Ensign Padley was in charge of the landing force. My last verbal instructions to him were to guard against dividing his force and to take his force to the American Consulate. When Ensign Padley landed he was confronted by a scheme of defense which had been drawn up by the Consul and his civilian advisers which called upon him to divide his force into six groups five small ones and one reserve.

17. Ensign Padley telephoned to me for orders. The message I again received through the courtesy of the Customs Authorities via telephone and boat. I sent Ensign Padley orders to use his own discretion and report action to me, that I would be up in the morning. I felt that there was no danger to fear

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4—5233

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on that night and that dispositions could be rectified the following morning. Ensign Padley felt the same way so he disposed his men as requested by the Consul. He was given to believe that he could easily consentrate his force within forty five minutes if he disposed them as requested which he consented to do. The force was therefore divided into six groups, five small groups being placed at remote points in various parts of Foochow, four points withingthe walled city one outside the wall. The reserves were sent to the Nantai side and quartered at the home of a Mr. Munson, the leading Y.M.C.A. representative of Foochow. None of the force, other than the two officers, were quartered at the American Consulate this night, nor were they quartered there until Monday, 9 October, the day on which Mr. Munson returned, and the day on which the first landing force was withdrawn as a result of a request by the Consul to me. I arrived at Foochow about 1100 Thursday 5 October. After discussing the situation with the Consul and Ensign Padley I found that Ensign Padley had been misinformed on the previous evening and that it would take him from three to four hours to assemble his men. I immediately ordered him to withdraw his men from the Foochow side which was done. The Consul did not offer serious objection to this as he stated that the "first crisis had passed" and "the situation had changed". However, a little later on a Dr. Cowdey a Missionary in charge of a boys' school on the Nantai side, and Mr. McConnell, a Y.M.C.A. representative, injected themselves into the conference and offered numerous objections to the men being removed from the Foochow side. Among other things they were perfectly safe there. My answer to this statement was that if Nantai was the safest point and if the danger existed that I had been led to believe that the best place for Americans was in the American Consulate at Nantai where I could concentrate my whole force for their protection. They replied that there were practical difficulties to this arrangement.

18. The practical difficulties as near as I could gather consisted in the fact that the Americans did not wish to leave their homes and it was inconvenient for the Consul to house so many. After a little further discussion I decided to leave but one officer and twenty-five men in Nantai. The Other officer and men I returned to the ship. The Consul stated at that time that he thought twenty-five men were sufficient to control the situation. I agreed to allow the men to be quartered at the home of Mr. Munson which is only about a five minutes walk to the Consulate. I was assured that Mr. Munson approved of this agreement. As previously stated I had arranged to subsist my men from the ship and if the Americans wished to subsist them that it must be purely voluntary on their part. One of my Officers, Lieutenant Eberhart, was present during this conversation. The Consul has never made any representation to me that he wanted me to subsist the men since this conversation. The first information I had that the Americans felt they were being imposed upon was on the eve-

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ning of Friday 13 October when Ensign True reported to me that Mr. McConnell had asked him if the Americans could be reimbursed. I started subsisting my men from the ship the following day. On the afternoon of 5 October I called, with the American Consul, upon Governor Li who was at that time in control in Foochow. I told Governor Li that I had an armed guard the Consulate and he stated that he had no objection to my maintaining this guard or to my sending armed patrols through the city for the protection of American lives and property.

19. After my conversation with the Consul on 5 October I had no further requests from him of any importance. Everything apparently was running smoothly and the Consul and Americans were satisfied. Our force was the first foreign force to land. On Saturday, 7 October I again went to Foochow and on this trip I took the British Consulate guard from H.M.S. Foxglove. This guard consisted of seven men. I took them up at the request of Captain Palmes, R.N. At that time I had the use of the Standard Oil Motor launch Albany. I also had the use of this launch on the evening of 5 October to return part of my men from the first landing party. On Friday, 6 October Mr. Hoyt, who at that time was acting Manager of the Foochow branch of the Standard Oil, very kindly sent the Motor Launch Albany to me asking me to make such use of her as I saw fit. I had practically unrestricted use of this launch from Friday 6 October until Tuesday, 10 October. When not in use the launch was at my boom. We fed the crew of the launch during this time. On Tuesday, 10 October Mr. Livingston the Manager of the Foochow Branch of the Standard Oil Co., returned. Since his return I have had no use of the launch for the ship. On my visit to Foochow on 7 October the Consul seemed thoroughly satisfied with all arrangements. If they were not satisfactory to him he certainly did not so represent the facts to me. On this trip I visited four of the principal American centers in Foochow. All the Americans with whom I talked seemed calm and satisfied with the arrangments that had been made for their protection. The points visited by me on this occasion were four of the points at which my men had been stationed on the first night. It took me in the neighborhood of three hours to make the rounds by rickshaw.

20. The Consul came aboard the Rizal at Pagoda Anchorage on Monday 9 October. He stated that everything was quiet, that conditions were much improved and requested me to withdraw my landing force. The entire landing force was withdrawn that evening (Monday, 9 October). The following morning, Tuesday 10 October I learned that the British were reinforcing their landing force. Upon gaining this knowledge I had my landing force standing by. On Wednesday, 11 October I sent an Officer to Foochow with orders to see the Consul, get a report of the situation and to inform the Consul that I was ready to land men if he desired them. Wednesday, 11 October at about 2000 I got a mess-

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age from the Consul requesting me to land thirty or thirty-five men, stating that it might be necessary to evacuate the Americans from Foochow that night. I again imposed upon the generosity of the Customs Authorities and got the use of their Motor launch. It was necessary to wait until the tide served so the landing force did not shove off until midnight. Ensign True went in charge of this landing force which has been quartered at the Consulate to date (Sunday, 15 October). The force landed on 11 October consisted of one officer and thirty-one men. No request has been made to me to increase this force.

21. On Friday, 13 October I again went to Foochow. In the presence of the Consul I directed Ensign True to take not less than ten armed men and go into Foochow and see what the conditions were and see if any Americans at their property had been disturbed. The Consul said that he did not think it was a good idea and that he would prefer that no armed men be sent into Foochow. He gave as his reason for not wishing me to send armed men into Foochow that the Japanese had men all over the place and our sending them would give them an excuse for having them there. (The Japanese Captain stated to Ensign True at a conference yesterday, Saturday 14 October, that the only men he had in Foochow were at a Japanese Hospital). At this point our conversation was interrupted and when the Consul returned he said that he would defer to my judgement and would like to accompany us into Foochow, stopping at the Middle Ground to call upon Admiral Sa. Within a very short time after the Consul offered objection to my sending armed men into Foochow he was trying to urge me to send a permanent detachment to the American Board Mission Compound which is within the Walled City of Foochow. I called his attention to this and his explanation was "the situation has changed". In what way it had changed I still not able to understand. Before starting into the city with my armed patrol the Consul received a report that the troops of the former Governor Li, which they refer to as Northerners, were just outside the city gates, that serious fighting was going on, that the Southern troops in Foochow were stampeded and that the Northerners would probably retake Foochow during the night. As soon as this report was received the Consul said to me that it would be a dangerous night and that the situation was the worst yet, that there would probably be fighting in the Walled City that night. I said that if that was the case the thing to do was to get the Americans over to Nantai at once, to notify them that we would arrange to get them over the bridge and would have armed men meet them at the South gate. I further asked him to say to them that if they remained in Foochow they did so at their own risk. The Consul acted upon this advice. The Consul then accompanied me to call upon Admiral Sa. I informed Admiral Sa that I had an armed guard ashore and that I had an armed patrol with me that I wished to take into the Walled City to bring back Americans who were leaving the city that night. Admiral Sa gave the necessary orders to assist me in this matter. I remained

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at the South gate with Ensign True and the armed patrol until the last of the Americans who intended coming out of the City that night arrived and we took them across the bridge to Nantai. The Americans that I saw who intended to remain in the city were perfectly calm and did not seem to think that they werd in any danger. The only ones that seem to be alarmed are the members of the so called "American Society Board". The names of these members I am trying to obtain.

22. During October 15-16 the forces of ex-Governor Li Hou-chi have been entirely defeated. 3000 of his army have now surrendered to Admiral Sa Chen-ping, and about 2000 have fled back into the interior. These latter are liable to turn bandits unless measures are taken for rounding them up. The total casualties on both sides are estimated at approximately 700. General Hsu Ch'ung-chih, the Southern Commander in Chief, entered Foochow today. (October 17th). The total number of his forces now in or about Foochow is believed to be about 11,000. Admiral Sa states that he is on friendly terms with the Southerners, although unquestionably his position is a delicate one. The Cantonese leaders are said to have announced that it is not their desire to remain in Fukien, but to return to Kwangtung after turning the local Government over to popularly elected local officials. The Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet is now here, and is making investigations, personally, into the question of measures to be adopted for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens. The large numbers of fugitive Northern soldiers are considered to constitute the greatest danger at present.

**Combined Plan for the Protection of American Nationals in Foochow and Nantai.**

1. **Mission.**

Primary Mission:- To protect the lives of American residents and Chinese Students under their supervision. Secondary Mission:- To protect American interests and property where this will not interfere with the execution of the primary mission.

2. **Chinese Forces.**

The Southern Army operating in Foochow and up the Min River consists of about 10,000 good troops, hardened with long marching and fighting and led by good generals. There remain along the Min River only about 2000 troops of the northern army. These are demoralized and are selling their rifles and equipment. They have offered to surrender to Admiral Sah, but he has refused to give them the pay they demanded.

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It is probable that many of them will become bandits and they may cross by the Northern bridge to Nantai Island and enter the foreign settlement. There is no danger that they will attack Foochow which is securely held by Southern troops, or that they will be able to cross to Nantai by the Middle Ground Bridge, which is secured by Admiral Sah's Marines.

3. Our Own Forces.

We have one Officer and thirty Marines at the American Consulate. The RIZAL is at the Pagoda Anchorage and is capable of sending to Nantai a landing party of 45 men in about six hours. After about 20 October the RIZAL will be relieved by the ASHEVILLE, which vessel can place on shore a landing force about eighty men, including about twenty marines.

4. Preparatory Measures.

1. Retain at the American Consulate one officer, thirty marines and one Pay Clerk. The Consulate will be a concentration center.

2. Hold RIZAL'S landing force of 45 men in readiness at Pagoda Anchorage to proceed to the American Consulate on one hour's notice.

3. Make arrangements for the quartering of ten to twenty men at Hua Nan and at Tai Maui and for holding these positions as concentration centers, and for subsisting Americans in them.

4. The Consul to assign each American to one of the three concentration centers to which he will proceed on signal with his family or Chinese Students under his supervision.

5. The Consul to arrange to inform, by runner or telephone, all American Residents that concentration in the three centers has been ordered.

6. The Commander of the Consulate Guard to arrange to charter a motor boat or sampan capable of nagigating the river up to the North Bridge.

7. The American Residents to form a volunteer detachment to operate under the instructions of the Guard Commander in case of necessity.

8. The Guard Commander and the American in charge

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of the volunteer detachment will arrange a plan for maintaining a party of one civilian and two enlisted men on the road leading from the Northern Bridge to Nantai, every night, using the boat mentioned in Paragraph 6, for transportation. This party will be provided with a Very pistol and will be called the "Outpost".

5 Preliminary Plan.

1. When Information indicates the approach in the near future of troops toward Nantai under conditions where looting is a possibility, parties of about ten men each will be dispatched to Hua Nan and to Tai Maiu and quartered there.

2. The landing force from the RIZAL, or additional force from the ASHEVILLE, if that vessel has relieved the RIZAL, will be at once sent to the American Consulate, and about five additional men will be sent to Hua Nan and five to Tai Maiu, on arrival of these men at the Consulate.

3. The outpost will be sent to its position in the chartered boat or sampan.

4. The guard at Hua Nan will station one lookout on high ground near the river to keep watch on the Northern Bridge with glasses and will be on the lookout for signals from the "outpost.

5. The women and children from Foochow will go to Nantai.

6. The American Board Compound will be prepared for defense and a Very pistil will be issued to it for signalling purposes. Arms and ammunition will be supplied by the Navy if desired.

6. Emergency Plan.

1. The outpost will fire green stars when troops are seen approaching Nantai.

2. The lookout will answer with a green star and get the information to the Consulate as quickly as possible.

3. The Consul will pass the work by telephone and runners. The guard will fire red rockets. Upon receipt of this signal all American residents in Nantai and Chinese Students under their supervision will proceed to their assigned centers.

4. The American residents in Foochow will concentrate in the American Board Compound. If they require assistance they

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Oct. 15, 1921

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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SERIAL No. 66-9 FILE No. (from index sheet) 105-100

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will fire Red Stars, which will be repeated at the Consulate as an acknowledgment. The Guard Commander will use his discretion as to sending a party to their assistance.

5. Any concentration center requiring assistance will fire red stars.

6. Other foreign Nationals will be received in our concentration centers.

Reports of Landing Force Operations at Boochow, China, October 17-22, 1922. Captain John F. Talbot, U.S.M.C., Commanding Marine Detachment, U.S.S. HURON.

23. I have to report the following for the preceding twenty four hours, 19 October. During forenoon visited the designated concentration centers Tai Maiu and Hua Nan. At tai Maiu was informed by Miss Bonafield, in charge of that place, that she had not been notified that her place was to be used as a concentration center. I explained to her the proposed plan and stated that it would be necessary that a force of nine men or more would have to be quartered and subsisted at that place; that it would be impracticable to move the troops from there once they were established during the existence of the emergency. I explained to her that I was interested only with the subsistence of our own troops and that the feeding of such Americans as would be concentrated there would be a matter for the American Consul and his advisers to arrange. Miss Bonafield informed me that she could provide quarters and subsistence for our troops; that she had an adequate supply of dry stores on hand, that there were three good wells on the property that would furnish an unlimited supply of water. Miss Bonafield is an elderly woman with more than twenty years residence in China; was in this country during the Boxer uprising and during several subsequent revolutions.

24. At Hua Nan I met Miss Herbert, housekeeper of the school and the representative of Miss Trimble, principal of the school. I gained the impression that those in charge there had previous information of the proposed plan of concentration, but later learned that this information was obtained informally at a reception at the Consulate Tuesday afternoon. I talked over the situation with Miss Herbert, explaining to her the necessity for having our men quartered and subsisted at Hua Nan. She said that quarters and subsistence could be provided easily and that she had a sufficient quantity of dry stores on hand to care for our troops. I informed her that I was not concerned with the subsistence of American nationals and their retainers; that those arrangements would have to be worked out by the Consul and his advisers or representatives.

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25. The small detachments, such as we would be able to furnish from our present force, are hardly adequate for the defense of these two places. Both properties are quite extensive and there are numerous difficulties in the way of broken walls, open spaces and Chinese dwellings abutting these properties. However, by disposing automatic riflemen at certain places a fairly good defense could be made. At three o'clock in the afternoon I called upon Admiral Sah, Commanding the Naval forces at this place and the recently Peking Appointee Provisional Civil Governor of Fukien province. Admiral Sah said that the situation was practically unchanged. He said conditions were good; that he was sending back to the north the northern troops who had surrendered to him and who are now aboard junks near Pagoda Anchorage. There are about three thousand of these troops. It is expected that they will sail shortly for Shantung province. Admiral Sah said that the southern troops would move shortly toward Canton, where it was planned by their general to launch a campaign against the troops opposing the Sun Yat Sen Government. When asked as to whether there was any truth in the rumor that a considerable force of northern troops was enroute to Foochow to oust the southerners who now hold the city, Admiral Sah replied that he had no such information and was inclined to believe that there was no truth in the rumor or report. Admiral Sah said that three Chinese Generals representing three different parties arrived in Foochow late Tuesday, October 17, 1922. These generals are: Hsu Chung-Chih, Commander in Chief, (Sun Yat Sen party); Hsu-Shu-Cheng, better known as "Little Hsu", (An Fu party), and Wang Yuan-Chuen of the Feng Tien party, (Chang Tso-Lin party). Admiral Sah said that he had arranged for a conference with these generals to be held on Saturday, October 21, 1922. He did not inform me as to where this conference would be held. He invited the American Consul to be present at this conference. He did not extend an invitation to me to attend this conference. Admiral Sah seemed to think that good results would come from this conference, as these generals represent different factions. Admiral Sah stated that he was very glad that the Marines had been landed; that the presence of a Naval force here at the American Consulate would have a tendency to allay the fears of the American nationals; that however he thought there would be no need to call the American landing force into action. Admiral Sah stated that he had been informed, whether officially or unofficially he did not say, that the provincial assembly had approved of his appointment as Provisional Civil Governor of this province. As near as I can determine from the complicated Chinese political situation this seems to augur well for an early peaceful settlement of the trouble here.

26. At present there are in or near Foochow the following Cantonese generals: Sun Yat Sen party - Hsu Chung-Chih, Hsung Ta Wei, Li Fu-Lin; An Fu party - Hsu Shu-Cheng (Little Hsu); Feng Tien party (Chang Tso-lin party) Wang Yuan-Chuan. There have been no disturbances in Foochow or in Nan Tai so far as I have been

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able to learn. At 11:45 P.M. the lookout on watch at the Consulate reported to me that six shots were fired in the direction of the north bridge at a distance of about a mile and one half or two miles from the Consulate and that three shots had been fired at or near the middle ground bridge. These shots having been fired on the Foochow side of the river. At about 3:40 o'clock this morning the lookout on watch at the American Consulate reported to me that a fire had broken out on the Foochow side of the river at a point about one mile distant and in a north westerly direction from the Consulate. This fire spread from west to east and swept an area from the waters edge to the second street inland and embraced the territory five blocks, approximately, to the east of the starting point. Most of the buildings destroyed were of flsame construction, although several substantial structures were swept by flames. I have not yet ascertained the origin of this fire. No shots weres heard during the progress of this fire, and through field glasses I could not observe any looting. I will endeavor to ascertain this afternoon the origin of this fire and to get all possible information concerning same. Up to the present time, so far as I have been able to ascertain, there has been no volunteer detachment organized as provided in paragraph 7 of section 4 of the combined plan for the protection of American nationals here. The American Consul informed me that he was working on the matter.

27. 20 October, 1922. Took the non-commissioned officers who are to have charge of the detachments at the two concentration centers - Hua Nan and Tai Maiu.- to those places and made a short reconnaissance of the grounds and outlined plans for the defense of those places. Found that at an ordinary marching pace can get men to Hua Nan in four minutes, taking time from the gate of the Consulate to the entrance at Hua Nan; that can post men at Tai Maiu within seven minutes from the time of leaving the Consulate. So far the civilian volunteers, who are to assist in the outpost scheme of defense, have not been organized. I took this matter up with the Consul early yesterday afternoon and he assured me that he was looking after the efganization of that body. At about 3:30 p.m., the Consul summoned to his office an American named Brewster, a former Captain in the National Army, and at present connected with a local bank. Brewster is to have charge of the volunteers, having been designated Commanding Officer by the Consul. I talked with Brewster and he said he could probably muster about nine men. He said there would be some difficulty in getting these men together, but that he thought he could work out a plan whereby he could make his unit effective. He said that he would get in touch with the man in charge of the British volunteers and endeavor to arrange to cooperate with them. Brewster said that he would see me some time this afternoon and advise me as to what arrangements had been made. I have been

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informed that the British volunteers are doing patrol duty in Nan Tai. This has not been verified however.

2&2 In order that the ramifications of the local situation may be followed with some degree of clearness I herewith list the contending political factions:

(a) Local Fukienese party, headed by Admiral Sah. Military backing, Northern navy, consisting of approximately four or five vessels. Locally organized. Military force of approximately 1500 indifferent troops. Admiral Sah nominally belongs to the so called Chihli or Pei Yang party of which Wu Pei Fu is now political head - de facto head.

(b) The Constitutionalist or Sun Yat Sen party, represented in Foochow by the Victorious southern army, of which Hsu Chung-Chih is Commander in Chief. Military strength in and about Foochow is approximately 11,000 first class troops, mostly Cantonese. Presumably Hsu takes orders only from Sun Yat Sen although probably the personal desire of himself and army is to return to Canton as soon as possible.

(c) Feng Tien or Chang Tso-Lin party, represented in Foochow by Wang Yung-Chuan, former brigade commander at Yen Ping, (a town north of this place) under former Governor Li Hai-Chi, who turned traitor to his chief.

(d) The old Anfu party, represented in Foochow by Hsu Shu-Cheng (Little Hsu).

Wang Yuan-Chuan has about one and one half brigades, comprising approximately 6,000 troops. These men are northerners, indifferent soldiers and of questionable morale. Little Hsu has no military backing locally. The party mentioned in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) desires merely to preserve peace in the province of Fukien and to establish a government here by and for the Fukienese. It is believed to be fairly indifferent to either the north or the south, although Admiral Sah is nominally a Chihli party man. The party mentioned in subparagraph (b) of paragraph (5) - The Constitutionalist - Their army wants to get back to Canton and probably will seek to do so, although Sun Yat Sen may wish them to attack the northerners at once. The parties mentioned in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph (5) represent the spare parts in Chinese politics. They apparently have but little standing and are at outs with those in power. The first two parties are said to have some admirable ideals while the last two mentioned are reported to have none whatever. Those cognizant of Chinese politics say that harmony between these four groups seems to be an impossibility.

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29. The invaders, those now holding the city claim to have promised their troops $150,000 provided they captured the city of Foochow and did not loot it. They are now asking this sum from the local chamber of commerce and state that unless it is paid within two days time they will give the soldiers liberty to loot the city of Foochow. The time limit expires the night of Friday, October 20. It is believed by those who are familiar with Chinese affairs that the money will be forthcoming. Admiral Sah is said to have taken steps for erecting a radio station on Nan Tai island. In view of what has gone before, those who have followed the Chinese situation here think it improbable that either the Peking government or the present Canton government will permit the present situation to go unchallenged although it is not anticipated that either side can send effective forces against the present holders of Foochow for some time. In various parts of the upper country, that territory along the Min river, there are about six thousand troops - southerners. The southerners are believed to control, without opposition, the whole of Fukien province.

30. At present there is a possibility of friction, or open conflict, between Wang Yuan-Chuan, who is a northerner and has 6000 northern troops, just how many I am unable to state, are in Foochow, having gone over to the southern side during the recent battle. Wang Yuan-Chuan seems to have taken the supreme command of the invading forces, the troops now holding Foochow, out of the hands of Hsu Chung-Chin. The probable reason being that the real southerners are anxious to get back to Canton and to do so must have a friendly base. This act of Wang Yuan-Chuan in taking supreme command occurred late Thursday October 18, so I was informed late yesterday. It is displeasing to the southerners and trouble may result. The fire that started early Thursday morning on the Foochow side of the river is said to have been of incendiary origin.

31. October 21. Returned to consulate at 3:00 p.m., this date from a trip to the upper bridge. I went to the upper bridge with Dr. Beard, who is in charge of the American Board Mission in the walled city of Foochow. My purpose in making this trip was to enable me to decide whether or not to maintain an outpost in that vicinity or a motor boat patrol between the Consulate and the upper bridge. From the information that I have been able to obtain and from my observation, I find that an outpost there is unnecessary and that a river patrol would be a waste of time. I talked with the Chinese named Ho, whose rank as near as I could learn is that of Colonel. He is in command of three ying, a ying being a Chinese Battalion of three hundred men. According to this table of organization there are now nine hundred Chinese troops - southerners - in that immediate vicinity. Of this number, three hundred, approximately, are quartered at the new arsenal, mint, or ordinance

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depot on the Nan Tai side at a place known as the old arsenal. The new arsenal is about four miles distant from the Consulate and the old arsenal about five or six miles. From the bridge-head, at a village known as upper bridge village to a small settlement one mile distant, in the direction of Foochow there are approximately three hundred troops - southerners.

32. The Chinese Commanding Officer at upper bridge village, where headquarters are being maintained informed me, that he had an adequate supply of provisions for his men; that his troops were in hand and that he had no fear at all of any straggling or breaking away. He informed me that last night five hundred northern troops, without arms, came into head-quarters and surrendered. These men, he said, had come down the river from the upper country. These men, he stated, were sent into Foochow, where southern troops are quartered. There they will be subsisted. They will be given the option of join-ing the southern forces or being sent down to Pagoda anchorage and returned to their homes in the north. He was unable to state as to what they would decide to do. I asked the Chinese Officer as to whether or not the city of Foochow would be turn-ed over to the southern troops to loot in the event $150,000 was not provided by the local chamber of commerce. He said he had no information as to such a demand having been made; that he did not fear any trouble. However, I learned subse-quently from an educated Chinese - H.W.B.Lee - associated with the firm of T.M. Wilkinson & Co., - that such demands unquestion ably had been made upon the local chamber of commerce or the principle merchants of this city by generals Li Fu-Lin and Huang Ta-Wei, southerners, Hsu Chung-Chih, being their Commanding Officer. Mr Lee informed me that they had reliable information to the effect that the merchants had agreed to furnish the money and are now engaged in collecting it. Mr. Lee Further stated that a meeting of the local chamber of commerce will be held late this afternoon, and he promised me that he would supply me with all information concerning this matter either late tonight or early tomorrow morning. Mr. Lee said that no time limit had been placed by these generals, but that they had notified the chamber of commerce, or the merchants, that the money must be forthcoming as soon as possible.

33. In order to comply with the provisions of the combined plan for the protection of the American nationals in Foochow and Nan Tai, I have arranged to have at the disposal of the officer commanding the landing force at this place a motor boat. This arrangment was made with Mr. W.F. Brewster, a business man of this place, whose office telephone is 655 and whose residence telephone is 605, Mr. Brewster, in the event his boat is engaged will arrange to have another boat to be supplied by one of several firms owning such craft. I also

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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial No. [illegible]

File No. (from index sheet) 105-100

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arranged with Mr. H.W.B. Lee, whose office telephone is 241 and whose residence phone is 604, for the use of his motor boat when it shall have been repaired. His boat will be available for use within five or six days. He promised to cooperate with Mr. Brewster and the officer in command of the landing force. From my observation I find no immediate prospects of any trouble occurring in Foochow. Everything was quiet during my tour this afternoon, although some of the merchants have their places closed and others have only a part of their stock displayed. I have as yet been unable to learn definitely the origin of the fire that occurred early yesterday morning. The only information that I have was from the Consul who said that it was reported to him that it was of incendiary origin. I am not apprehensive of any immediate trouble, however, I believe, that in view of the many complications that there will be disturbances at a time not far distant.

34. October 22, 1922. I have to report the following for the preceding twenty four hours: At 8:30 a.m., had all gear stacked and ready for transportation to the dock. Was awaiting the arrival of coolies to move the same when received the message from the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. RIZAL that relief of this detachment would not be effected until the following day on account of the non-arrival of the U.S.S. ASHEVILLE. Belayed the order to move. At nine thirty a.m., I saw Mr. Lee, who informed me that, at the meeting of the local chamber of commerce late Friday, October 20, plans had been perfected for raising the money demanded by the Chinese generals mentioned in my previous report. According to Mr. Lee, the plan is for each merchant and business man doing business in the native city to turn over to a committee one month's rent. The collection of this money probably will cover a period of two or three weeks. This plan, according to Mr. Lee, is satisfactory to the generals concerned, and it is believed that there is no immediate prospects of any looting in Foochow. There is no question but that trouble is impending because of the leaders of the contending factions evidently being adverse to making any settlement among themselves.

35. I attended the tiffin given by Admiral Sah at his headquarters in Foochow, just outside the walled city. He moved to that place about two days ago. The tiffin was a success so far as the social end was concerned, but it was a failure as a get-together meeting, for the reason that the guest of honor - the Chinese Generals of the various factions - failed to appear. There was a decided Japanese atmosphere at the tiffin. The Japanese Consul occupied a seat at the right of Admiral Sah. Two other Japanese, evidently attaches of the local consulate, sat nearby. Directly across from Admiral Sah was a Chinese general whose name I was unable to learn, but who was the Chief of Staff of Li Hou-Chi, former governor of this province. This general is reputed to have been the representative of the Japanese Govern-

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| Inven-tions | Oil | Commander in Chief | | | Commander | | Attaché at ..... | State | Justice | Inter. | Com. | Labor | Ship Board | Return to Room No. ..... | | | | | | |
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ment at the Yamen, during the administration of Li Hou-Chi. This general talked at considerable length during the tiffin with Captain Morita, commanding the Japanese Cruiser now anchored at Pagoda Anchorage. In view of the fact that Governor Li Hou-Chi now is virtually a prisoner of Admiral Sah, those conversant with local affairs believe that the fact that this former Chief of Staff is being allowed his liberty is significant that Japanese influence was brought to bear on those controlling the local situation. No political questions were discussed at this tiffin. At about eight o'clock last night the lookout on watch reported a small fire in a north easterly direction from the consulate, distant about four miles, in Foochow. Fire soon burned out and evidently was confined to one small frame building. Have not as yet learned the location or the origin of this fire.

Political Conditions Foochow - November 1st, 1922., as reported by Commanding Officer USS ASHEVILLE and American Consul.

1. It is now apparent that the position of Admiral Sah and the naval forces at Pagoda Anchorage was getting untenable, as the Southern leaders were demanding the surrender by navy of the forts at the Anchorage. The loss of these forts would put the naval vessels at the mercy of the Southerners. Sah has not yet gone, however, so evidently the Cantonese are not pressing him, for they realize he has the backing of a considerable portion, though not by any means all, of his fellow provincials. There is reason to believe, also that the real Southern leaders hold Sah in high personal regard, and only regret that, from their point of view, he belongs to the wrong party. Meanwhile, as I further reported in the radio message, there has been a shifting of forces and a considerable modification of program in the local political arena. The real "Constitutionalists", that is, the followers of Sun Yat-sen, are viewing doubtfully their new-found "Anfuf brethern, and were clearly alarmed at the sweeping assumption of power by "Little Hsu" and Wang Yung-chun, Wang Ching-wei, the personal representative of Sun Yat-sen, Hieu Sou, a Fukienese Constitutionalist and others, were sent here to attempt to dissuade little Hsu from his plans. The result has been the announcement given out to a general meeting of local gentry, - representative of the Fukien Provincial Parliament and of the Chamber of Commerce, - reported in my radio message. According to this announcement, a distinction was made between the real Southern army and the army of Wang Yung-ch'uan by giving to the former a new name: "The Army for the Subjugation of Brigandage", and clearly declaring that this army would soon be leaving Foochow and hence would have nothing to do with the local administration. It was further announced that Wang Yung-ch'uan, as head of the Fukien Department of the "Military Reconstruction Army, would be merely "Commander

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in Chief of the army in Fukien with purely military functions, and that a Fukienese would be chosen as Civil Governor, and that the latter would control all civil affairs in the Province. At the close of this announcement the name of Lin Sen, previously mentioned in this despatch, was proposed for Civil Governor and he was elected by acclamation.

37. The people seem much relieved over this announcement though it remains to be seen whether Wang Yung-ch'uan will actually "climb down" and whether Liu Sen will actually assume this post. It is reported that Lin has conditioned his acceptance on the clear understanding that as Civil Governor he will take orders solely from Sun Yat-sen and not in any way from the "Military Reconstruction Government" of Little Hsu. How the Constitutionalists and Anfuites are going to work out their coalition remains to be seen. In a personal conversation which I had two days ago with General Hsu Ch'ung-chih I asked him point-blank whether Sun Yat-sen was going to subscribe to the "Military Reconstruction Government", and take orders from Hsu Shu-chong. He replied "No". I then asked him whether Little Hsu and Tuan Ch'i-jui recognized and took orders from Sun Yat-sen, and he said "No". He explained that the full details had not yet been arranged, but that up to the present the two parties were merely working together for the same cause, the driving out of illegally constituted authority both in Canton and Peking, and that the "Army for the Subjugation of Brigandage" and the "Military Reconstruction Army" were "Allies". As for the actual political and military situation in North Fukien at present my judgment is as follows: The Cantonese invaders maintain and will maintain as long as they are here, a strong de facto control, which is not seriously threatened either from without or within. They will stay here long enough to recoup themselves and prepare for the return to Canton. So far, the recouping has not been at the expense of Foochow, the money evidently coming from Little Hsu. Even if they should break with Little Hsu he has not military force seriously to threaten them, and they could then fall back on levies on Fukien for their expenses, something which they have so far remained from doing. Little Hsu is so unpopular here that he will probably want to transfer the base of his operations elsewhere. His sole card is money, for Wang Yung-ch'uan's force of 6000 to 8000 men is insignificant. As long as he supplies money the Southerners will tolerate him and give his protege as much rope as they dare. The Fukienese, as might be expected, are divided amongst themselves. There is an undoubtedly strong pro-Sun Yat-sen sentiment here, which has reacted to a certain extent against Sah. But as between Sa and Lin Sen I believe most Fukienese would still choose the former, if they dared. Most of all they want to be left alone. I find no very compelling sentiment in favor of actual self-government. They want a Fukienese Governor but they wish him to do the governing and leave them along, to go about their business. Everything considered, I

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believe we are in for a period, - possibly a short one, but nevertheless a period, of comparative quiet. This belief my consular colleagues share. We are therefore each making recommendation to our respective naval commanders that the landing forces be withdrawn from the Consulates to the ships at Pagoda anchorage but that the vessels remain in port here if possible, for some time, until such time as a stable government of some sort is actually evolved. It is probable that appointments to local offices will be made by the newly elected Civil Governor and that some sort of de facto administration will again begin to function. As for the prospects of military invasion against the present holders of the political power in Fukien, I think it will take some weeks and probably months for such an undertaking to get underway. The Cantonese General - Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, will probably hesitate to upset the balance of power in Kwangtung by detaching a really serious force into Fukien, and will probably decide to prepare to resist invasion himself. Wu Pei-fu will probably move eventually, but his position is not much be,-tter, with Chang Tso-lin standing by as a menace.

Political Conditions FOOCHOW 6 November, 1922.
Radio sent to American Legation, Peking, China.

"Admiral Sah Cheng-ping still holds the post of Provisional Civil Governor of Fukien, and has not yet left. He states he is prepared to resign in favor of Lin Sen. The latter, being unwilling to recognise the Government set up by Hsu Shu- Chong (Little Hsu), at first refused to accept the position, but as Hsu has left Foochow after having made public announcement that he had given up his scheme, it is said that Lin will take up the position on November 8th.

An army, said to be of a strength of approximately 10,000 men, commanded by General Ch'ang Te-shong, is reported to have crossed the provincial border from Kiangsi. This report has greatly excited the local populace, as the reputation of this army is notorious. The people fear that its main object is plunder. Following the uniformly good conduct of the Cantonese forces, any looting by a northern army would, it is believed, have the effect of throwing public sentiment in Fukien solidly in favor of the Southern cause.

38. The situation in this Consular District now stands as follows: "Little Hsu, whose entry into the local situation came about, it is believed, solely through his ability for furnish money, has abandoned his Utopian scheme of a "Reconstruction Military Government" for China, at least for the present, and has left for Shanghai. His protege, Wang Yung-ch'uan, trimming his sails to suit the wind, has graciously condescended to give up his euphonious title of "General Administrator" for Fukien, - and has been "elected" Commander in Chief for Fukien.

Submitted by ..... Forwarded .....
(To be signed by the officer who compiled this report.) "U. S. N." (Sign only Page 1 of original.) Commanding Officer.

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Lin Sen, a Fukienese and a follower of Sun Yat-sen, has been elected civil Governor of the Province, and will probably assume office. Admiral Sah and the naval vessels are still in Foochow or at Pagoda Anchorage, and Admiral Sah declares that with or without a position and whether the navy stays or not he will remain in Fukien, which is his home. Li hou-chi, former military and Acting Civil Governor, is reported to be now in Amoy attempting to head a movement to recapture Fukien. Tsang Chih-p'ing, former Division Commander at Amoy and removed from his position by Li Hou-chi, is also in Amoy, where he professes to be still loyal to the Peking Government, though some believe secretly intriguing to get the forces formerly under his command in South Fukien to turn over to the Constitutionalist cause. An Army under the command of Ch'ang To-sheng, and presumably under instructions of Wu P8ei-fu, has crossed over from Kiangsi with the supposed intention ot taking Foochow from the Southerners. The Southern armies under Hsu Ch'ung-chih still control North Fukien and Foochow. Ch'on Ch'Iung-ming of Canton has decided not to send an expedition into Fukien for the present, but to prepare to resist invasion himself. The Fukienese are seeking to get the present invaders out and keep other invaders from coming in.

39. Meanwhile there is being forced upon the Fukienese a political self-consciousness which they would not have gained in any other way. The majority of the people still have no with to govern themselves buty they have got the idea that they want to be governed by their own provincials, which is a big step toward self-government, and there has been created out of the exigencies of the situation an assembly of representative people of Foochow which has actually functioned in much the manner of a parliament. It was this assembly which, with much circumlocution, conveyed to Hsu Shu-chang the idea that neither he nor his schemes were welcome to Fukien; which brought about the concession of the division of the provincial government into civil and military and the appointment - referred to the assembly for ratification - of a Fukienese as Civil Governor; and which obtained the further concession that, as rapidly as possible, the army in Fukien would consist of Fukienese headed by a Fukienese. I have been reliably assured that this assembly, or general citizens' committee, has in it most of the solid business men of Foochow, and really represents the brains and money of the city, the general chamber of commerce being the nucleous of it.

Report of Commanding Officer U.S.S. ASHEVILLE, Political Conditions, FOOCHOW, 8 November, 1922.

40. On 6th November, the Navy Yard Arsenal and forts about Pagoda were under the control of representatives of the Peking Government, whose orders from Peking is not to surrender them. The marines ashore at the Consulate in Foochow from the ASHEVILLE returned to the ship.

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**Conditions in Foochow quiet.**

**Report of Conditions AMOY, China, 4 November, 1922, by Commanding Officer U.S.S. HELENA.**

**41. I have consulted the American and British Consuls, the leading Chinese officials and various American British men, resident here, All agree there is no probability whatever of trouble on the island of Kulangsu, and practically none in Amoy, unless as a result of the visit of the Ralph Moller. The present trouble is in no sense anti-foreign. The manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank informs me that the Chinese, who were almost panicky in depositing their money in his bank, are now withdrawing it. As reported by radio, the British steamer Ralph Moller left Nankin on 3rd November with 100 Officers, 50 soldiers and $80,000 silver for Amoy. Both the American and the British Consuls consider this disquieting, and the latter has asked for a Naval vessel. Practically all American interests are concentrated on the Island of Kulangsu except the Standard Oil Pland on the mainland. The only property in Amoy requiring protection by American forces is the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.**

**Report of Conditions Amoy, China, 6 November, 1922. by Commanding Officer U.S.S. HELENA:**

**42. On 6 November the steamer Ralph Moller arrived in Amoy from Nanking with General Li Honchi, 82 army officers and $80,000. No other soldiers or munitions. General Tsang Ping is trying to obtain funds in Amoy for an expedition against Foochow. English gunboat Marazion arrived the 6th in response to Consular request. Reported English cruiser Carlisle expected in few days. On 7th November General Tsang Ping attacked Li Honchi in Amoy. Li escaped to Kulangsu. Tsang how holds Amoy with approximately 6,000 troops. Tsang Ping is an admitted ally of the Tuchun of Chekiang.**

**Report of Commanding Officer USS HELENA, November 11,**

**43. During the fight of November 7th, General Li Honchi had the assistance of General Kao, who up to that time was in command at Amoy; but General Tsang ping in command at Chang-Chow defeated them with a small body of troops. Kao fled to Shanghai and Li Honchi to Kulangsu. Li had previously requested asylum in the American Consulate and later aboard the USS HELENA both were refused. General Tsang ping is now in undisputed control of Amoy. He is an admitted ally of the Tuchun of Chekiang. Whether he is a partisan or not of Sun Yat-Sen am unable to state. About November 17th Li Honchi left Kulangsu for Hong-Kong.**

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OFFICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial No. ____ File No. (from index sheet) 105-100 J-2-245

U.S.S. Lt. J.P. Bowden, USN. Dist. Asiatic Fleet.

Name of Commander Yangtze Patrol Force. Name of C. O. 4.0

Source CHINA. POLITICAL CONDITIONS. Reliability of source (mark on scale 4.0) YANGTZE VALLEY.

Subject (Nation.) (City.) (Index title.) (Subtitle.)

**Report of an Inspection of Upper Yangtze River by the Commander, Yangtze Patrol Force, Rear Admiral W.W. Phelps, U.S.N.**

1. Arriving at Chungking Thursday 21 September the Force Commander held an Efficiency Inspection of the MONOCACY, finding her in an excellent and highly creditable condition. Accompanied by the American Vice Consul in Charge, called upon the Szechuanese general in temporary charge at Chungking, who received us in company with his chief of staff, and protested against firing on American shipping, and sending boarding parties of soldiers on board American shipping at Wanhsien. Visited the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and told him to keep these protests before the local Szechuanese generals. General Tan Mo Shun had left for Chengtu where all the high Szechuanese military chiefs are gathering for a general conference. In the afternoon the Consul tendered a reception to the Force Commander at the American Consulate, at which the above Chinese officials, the consular body and the captains of foreign gunboats called. There is one French gunboat BALNY and one Japanese gunboat TOBA representing those interests along this entire stretch (556 miles). They are not very active, remaining for the most part at Chungking. The Japanese Consul told us that his government were building four upper Yangtze river type gunboats. Under Commander Corlett, R.N., who has been Senior Naval Officer, Upper Yangtze, for the past two years, the American and British gunboats work with hearty co-operation.

2. The Force Commanders' appreciation of the general situation is this:-

The Szechuanese, inclined throughout all their history to resist submission to a central Chinese government, have through long generations of inheritance, a sense of independence and sovereignty, and a highly developed feudal mind. They expect to be ruled by some strong autocrat. This autocrat sets his own laws, owns the magistrates, owns the police (who are his soldiers). Sets the tribute to be collected. Owns the tribute collectors. Owns and operates the "Escort Bureau", which for a sum is supposed to furnish "military protection from river pirates to all junks. He is supposed to supress banditry and piracy, but when he is confronted with a bandit too strong for him, he incorporates said bandit and band into his army, giving the bandit-chief a general officer's commission. He commandeers at will junks for his transport, and coolies for his labor. Each private soldier is supposed to have the right to own a coolie, and the natives are ruthlessly enslaved, homes broken up, the bread winner to be carried around with the military. Beyond the Chinese traditions and customs there is only martial law, Life, death or torture is in the word of the local general. Crime or opposition to the ruling general usually means a beheading or execution by shooting, the fashionable method being to blow in the base of the victims skull, as he bends over kneeling, by a rifle

Submitted by J.P. BOWDEN, Lieutenant "U.S.N." Forwarded E.A. ANDERSON, Admiral, U.S.N
(To be signed by the officer who compiled this report.) Intelligence Officer (Sign only Page 1 of original.) Commander in Chief. Commanding Officer.

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shot very close to. (From the American Consul's verandah at Chungking, one can see the execution place, and on an average one execution a day). Then they let the body lie for a day as a warning. Such is the prevailing autocrat rule. Whether the autocrat is called general or duke the effect is the same. This goes on until the autocrat amasses a fortune in a bank in Shanghai and jealousy brings about a coalition against him, and he is driven out. Then his army melts away, some return to the banditry from whence they came, some are incorporated as organisations into the victorious army. In the victorious coalition, one is the strongest. Gradually he out-intrigues the others, drives them out and rules as the autocrat for a time. Then the cycle is complete, and the same things recur. Whenever there is fighting "soldiers" of all factions are apt to begin firing on all foreign flag shipping. One can only guess why. They wish to stop all communications that might help the enemy, by movement of men or supplies. They cannot understand that foreign flag shipping can be neutral. Any general will do his utmost to get a foreign flag steamer to engage in transport for him. Consequently he is sure that is he is not using that steamer the other side is. Or perhaps in the general excitement and disorganisation characterising their fighting, the Chinese feel a general lifting of restraint, and give way to their hatred of the foreign interloper, and show it by shooting into unprotected and defenceless steamers. Judging from very superficial appearances, one would not say that the Szechuanese amount to much as fighting troops. The soldiers are inferior physically, like most of the Szechuanese probably from the widespread vice of opium smoking. Among them there seem to be many in extreme youth. As for their weapons, judging from the rifles carried by the Chungking police sentries and those carried by the guards of honor, they are badly rusted about the locks, some appearing as though they might be entirely frozen up. One sees platoons drilling everywhere, But never at anything else than the "goose-step" without arms. It is said that the Japanese instructors firmly planted into the Chinese the theory that the "goose-step" develops the perfect fighting man. If they knew the "goose-step" they need not know anything else. No better method could be devised by the Japanese to fool the Chinese into thinking that they were developing a formidable army (of goose-steppers).

3. One of the chief sources of revenue for the river autocrat has been the tribute exacted from junks. For centuries a large river population has lived on the revenue from the junk carried freight and passengers. A vast tribute went to the autocrat from the junk trade in two ways. Whenever a junk tied up for the night, he might be boarded by the local military to collect the prevailing local military tribute on the freight. In addition the "Escort Bureau" (of the military) had to be paid for furnishing a squad of soldiers for protection against robbers. In some cases it has been thought that robbers and "Escort Bureau" worked hand in hand. If a shipper paid his Escort Bureau tribute, he was not molested by robbers whether the junk carried soldiers or not. Circumstantially this had led to the belief that the Escort Bureau divides up with the

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robbers, for any junk purchasing immunity. This is apt to become the practice where the banditry become too strong, and is the fore runner to the incorporation into the autocrats army of that bandit chief and his band. Numbers of coolies have lived on the labor of trecking the junks up the rapids. A big junk in a rapid requires upwards to 60 trackers on the tow rope to get up the winter rapids. So for centuries the autocrat, his army, the junk men, the trackers and the robbers have thrived on the junk carrying trade.

4. Since the arrival of the dozen or so steamers on the Ichang - Chungking run the junk men have almost had to go out of business. In desperation they claim the down stream salt carrying monopoly. This is about the last commdity left to them, and the following circumstance will illustrate how intensely they feel; A few weeks ago the steamer FOOK YUEN flying the French flag was lying in Chungking. Some distance down stream was lying the French gunboat BALNY. The junk men learned that the FOOK YUEN had accepted a cargo of salt for down stream. Several hundred of them simultaneously boarded the FOOK YUEN armed with clubs and smashed up things to the damage of $25,000,00. They were not awed by the presence of the French gunboat BALNY. The FOOK YUEN not only did not carry the salt but is now repairing in Shanghai. All steamers under the Chinese flag are not out of the trade. There seem to be two reasons for this: During the last fighting all Chinese flag steamers were taken over by the military for transport. This of course ruined their business and ran them into debt. Secondly in normal times the Szechuanese military heavily "squeeze" their earnings.

5. At Wanhsien(below Chungking) and at Luchow (above Chungking) the local military collect tribute from foreign flag steamers bound both ways. This tribute which they call a "war tax" to support the military - is a regular enough fixed tariff. It is published and furnished to all native shippers and to the ship owners. It is not levied on goods shipped by foreign shippers; it is levied only on goods shipped by native shippers. Formerly it was collected at the port of lading from the shipper by the steamer compradore and by him paid to the "Military Tax Bureau". It is understood that one Japanese steamer undertood to pay this tribute, supposedly to carry favor with the Szechuanese. The native shippers promptly stopped payment, thus forcing the payment on to the steamers. This tribute - or "war tax" - is of course illegal. It is a provincial tax. It does not have the sanction of Peking. It is outside the Chinese Maritime Customs. When this tribute is refused, the military organize a boycott of the steamer, and prevent junks, sampans and coolies from putting off. The steamer can neither handle cargo, passengers nor get coal, without which, bunkered in at Wanhsien, they can go no farther. There is absolutely no way to beat the boycott, hence the steamers pay the military tribute.

6. The military arrogate to themselves the right to visit and search. Since they claimed that the river steamers under foreign

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flag are transporting the military of the opposing faction (which they would do in a minute if the steamer would yield), they claim the right to search for "spies". This searching party tends to come armed, except where there are British and American gunboats. There they still come unarmed. The whole thing is illegal, but the foreign forces on the river are inadequate to stop it everywhere. Constant protests are made to the local generals, but the same thing goes on. It will only be stopped for all time, when there are enough gunboats to have one stationed at every port of call. One supposes that the Szechuanese mind reasons that, since Szechuan does not recognize Peking they will not recognize treaty rights under any treaty made by Peking. For them that means that, within their own borders on their own river, they do not recognise extraterritorial rights, but consider foreign shipping wholly coming under the whim of the local autocrat, entirely under "municipal" law, never under international law.

7. Along with the Szechuanese hatred for foreign shipping caused by the serious loss of revenue to junkmen, military, Escort Bureau, trackers and robbers, is an antagonism felt by every Szechuanese along the river because of the great loss of life in the river since the advent of the steamers. Big junks with crews of 60 and upwards, deeply laden, some carrying soldiers in addition, have been sucked down in the rapids unable to prevent being swamped in the turbulence created by the steamer's wash. So keen is the competition to earn a days food supply, that, whenever a steamer makes a port of call, crowds of sampans heedlessly make for the ship no matter what her way on, each eager to get a fare ashore. There being no such thing as shore control, the sampans, not heeding the warning of the ship's people, charge the ship and each other, every Chinese shouting and screaming in the excitement to lay hold of the steamer. This sort of situation is beyond control of the steamer's people, and occasionally a sampan is capsized. One supposes that the Szechuanese mind reasons this way:- No steamers, much less loss of life. Consequently the steamers are always to blame. Therefore we don't want the steamers. The Chungking postmaster (British) told the Force Commander that Tan Mo Shun, chief general of the forces along the upper river, said to him: "you have seen barges in the Thames deeply laden. But you do not see any Chinese steamers madly rushing up and down the Thames sinking British barges and drowning their crews. Well we're going to stop foreign ships rushing heedlessly up our river sinking our Chinese junks and drowning their crews".

8. The Szechuanese being semi-independent, having inherited the Upper Yangtze and its revenue, the only line of communication out of Szechuan, down all the centuries gone by, can scarcely be blamed for resenting that the Peking Government has given to foreigners these shipping rights which have cut deep into their revenue. They can scarcely be blamed for a stronger feeling when these foreigners cause sinkings among the few remaining junks, and drownings in large numbers. All masters of foreign ships are

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now operating with great care, but sometimes a steamer meets junks in the rapids, and speed must be kept on the steamer else the steamer goes on the rocks. The Chinese Maritime Customs ought to put signal stations on each side of rapid, to signal to the steamer to slow until the junks get through. The shipping companies could easily stand the expense.

9. The Force Commander believes that these are the causes of a widespread latent antagonism, that the Szechuanese have something on their side, that it behooves foreign interests to move cautiously and tactfully, and that the portents are sufficiently plain to cause one of two courses to be followed. Either eventually foreign shipping must withdraw and restore the carrying of trade to the junks, or the Treaty Powers must place on the river force everywhere sufficient to exact respect for the treaties. Before leaving Ichang, information came to the Force Commander from a French priest who has a local reputation for getting advanced information, that a boycott of all foreign steamers was reported to be beginning at Wanhsien on or about 25 September. Even though the boycott may not have materialized on that date, this shows what sort of tendencies are in the Szechuanese mind. The powers today for lack of force are gradually losing prestige - losing-"face". Up to two years ago the Szechuanese never thought of firing on American or British flag shipping, much less on a British gunboat. The Szechuanese appear to have found out a new method of attack. A few weeks ago, they occupied an Asiatic Petroleum Company's compound and opened fire on the British gunboat TEAL. The TEAL was obliged to put a shot into the British property. Treaty rights are flouted. The powers are assuming temporarily "the attitude of capitulation" - tolerating indignities they are helpless to prevent by force. With an autocratic people such as these Szechuanese this is a dangerous situation. It is a situation that is bound to worsen if the Powers do not strengthen their forces on the upper river. The Legations at Peking are utterly helpless because Peking cannot control Szechuan. We must deal with the local autocrat for the time being whoever he might be.

10. The Force Commander left the following directions with the captain of the MONOCACY: To endeavor to bring about a conference of the senior naval officers of the four Treaty Powers, American, British, French, Japanese under the presidency of the senior present; with a view to preparing a proclamation, on the one side promising neutrality of steamers, great care in navigating steamers and compensation in case of damage if it is proved to be the fault of the steamer. On the other part to urge that the Szechuanese be restrained from firing on the steamers, and from illegal visit and search. The idea would be to have this proclamation countersigned by the consular body with its approval. This proclamation then to be printed in Chinese and delivered to the local military everywhere along the river. Owing to the certainty that it would be met by the boycott, it would not seem

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expedient to press at this time for the abolition of the military tribute, the "war tax" collected by the "Military Tax Bureau". It is thought that one difficulty in getting the Szechuanese to respect foreign flags, lies in the circumstance, as we are informed, that ninety percent owned Chinese steamers can get under the French flag if the French own ten percent of the steamer. The Chinese know this; and perhaps they think that there can be a Chinese majority ownership under all other flags. It is not known what the Japanese law is. It would be an excellent thing if the Legations in Peking could come to an agreement so that, on the Yangtze, the right to fly the foreign flag requires fifty one percent of that foreign owned ship. If this could be done, all Consular officers could be instructed to notify all the military, and perhaps all foreign flags would receive more respect. Thorough unity of action on the part of the Treaty Powers is needed to deal successfully with the Szechuanese. It would be a good thing if all Legations simultaneously would direct that all their consuls to impress unmistakably upon the ship owners that extraordinary care must be exercised to the end that the sinking of junks shall cease. This one thing would do more than everything else to mollify the prevailing Szechuanese antagonism along the river.

11. The Force Commander reports that he gave the following to the Associated Press Correspondent Lieutenant Commander Loftin, Commanding U.S.S. ISABEL: "Rear Admiral Phelps returned from inspection up river states conditions unsettled but quiet firing on steamers practically ceased navigation open stop while some anti-foreign feeling exists among Szechuanese unlikely take active form near future although some rumors to contrary stop apparent tendency situation gradually grow worse with severe fighting and attacks on foreign shipping likely next spring stop American naval force on upriver inadequate fully protect American lives under all conditions unquote".

Endorsement by Commander in Chief:-

12. The Commander in Chief considers this a most accurate representation of the situation on the Yangtze River. The unsettled conditions on the Yangtze, and particularly on the upper reaches of the River, show clearly the necessity for maintaining an effective Patrol on the River.

13. The vessels now available for patrol duty on the Yangtze are generally obsolete and have such small excess of speed over the river current that they are unable to maintain a patrol of the necessary effectiveness. Due to their great age they require an unusual amount of repairs, thus making their use very uneconomical. The Yangtze Patrol Force should be augmented by modern vessels of such speed and draft as to enable them to navigate all parts of the River and make good a reasonable speed against the current. This also emphasizes the importance of having a

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Consul at Ichang so that proper control can be exercised over American merchant craft operating on the River.

Commander Yangtze Patrol Force letter relative to "Joint Actions of Treaty Powers, Upper Yangtze".

14. The Force Commander's idea of getting together the Senior Naval Officers on the Upper Yangtze with a view to issuing a conciliatory and educational proclamation to the Szechuanese military chieftains along the Upper River (previously mentioned) having been wrecked by the information from the captain H.M.S. WIDGEON that such action as contemplated would, in British practice, have to originate with the British Consul, the Force Commander, in calling on Rear Admiral Kobayshi, gave to him an outline of the joint action contemplated. When Rear Admiral Kobayshi returned the Force Commanders call, his secretary said that Rear Admiral Kobayashi thought that this idea was worth examining - in fact that it seemed to him to be the only promising way in which the Treaty Powers could work towards tranquilizing the Upper River - and requested the Force Commander to furnish him a written memorandum. The American Consul General told the Force Commander today that Y. Kifune, Japanese Consul at Chungking told him that Kobayashi had spoken to Kifune about it in favorable and receptive terms. Last September, at Ichang, Yang Sen, the lately defeated general of the 2nd. Szechuanese Army, sent word to the Force Commander that the Szechuanese military along the river ought to be reached and instructed: and today Hsiao, Military Governor of Hupeh, on whom the Force Commander was calling, said that the Szechuanese government "was backward" and needed to be educated.

15. With these encouragements, it is the intention of the Force Commander to circularize simultaneously the British Rear Admiral, the Japanese Rear Admiral, and the Senior French Naval Officer in the Yangtze district. Following this, it may be possible to get a conference of these officers underway, presumably in Shanghai, where the British and Japanese Rear Admirals make headquarters. This the Force Commander will undertake to propose.

Letter of Commander, Yangtze Patrol Force to the "Robert Dollar Co., The American West China Navigation Co.".

16. The undersigned, lately returned from an inspection of the Upper Yangtze as far as to include Chungking, thinks that it may serve usefully to submit to you his estimate of the situation. He must admit that his stay in Chungking (one day) might be said to be too short to be of the greatest value, but he believes that the views herein, on this subject of American operations and interests in their broadest aspect, are fundamentally sound.

17. If we consider the history of Szechuan and the well known characteristics of the natives, we should be able to draw

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| Inven-tions | Oil | Commander in Chief | | | Commander | | Attaché at | | State | Justice | Inter. | Com. | Labor | Ship Board | Return to Room No. | | | | | |
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conclusions as to their reaction to the economic phases of the penetration of the Upper Yangtze by foreign flag shipping. If we find this reaction to be unfavorable to American interests in their broadest aspect, we will be in a position to inquire whether the method of our economic penetration can be in any way modified so as to ameliorate whatever unfavorable reaction we may find inevitable.

18. According to the history of Szechuan, this province has always resisted subordination to any Peking Central Government. It has therefore, inherited strong independent or semi-independent consciousness. It has always been an autocratic community. As we know, autocracy breeds selfishness and cruelty. Beyond Szechuanese tradition and customs what laws they have, have not been enacted by a representative body, they have been the mandates of the autocrat. In such an autocracy we have the condition where the autocrat (or his agents) become at one and the same time accuser, police, prosecuting officer, judge and executioner. The inevitable result is that the autocrat is in danger of becoming unrestrained, while at the same time exercising severe restraint upon the masses. The masses, who take the autocrat as their example, themselves become unrestrained when there is a lifting of restraint in the disorganized times of civil war. If we find that the predominating characteristics of such a people are greed and cruelty, we may expect them in the ordinary course of human nature to give vent to these instincts.

19. These people for generations have inherited their Upper Yangtze, and all that it means to autocrat, military and river folk as a source of fortune and livlihood. Now comes along the Central government and gives away to foreigners by treaty about which the Szechuanese were not consulted, river rights that have for so long meant fortune and livlihood. For many years it meant nothing to the Szechuanese, not until the foreigners began to take the business away from the junks. Even then for some years the commerce handled by foreign flag shipping was so small as to be almost negligible. But shortly after the war ended the sudden expansion of the foreign flag upper river fleet made serious inroads into the revenue which had been flowing to junkmen, trackers, Escort Bureau, Military, robbers and autocrats. It is not unnatural that foreign flag shipping should now be beginning to feel the concentrated antagonism of all these folk. The intensity of their feeling is eloquently expressed in the very recent FOOK YUEN incident, and in the occasional rumors of impending boycott against foreign flag shipping. We know that this antagonism is not confining itself to purely economic retaliation. Beyond the boycott they have no way to retaliate economically like civilized people would retaliate. It is here, in the natural and to be expected retaliation, that we should not be surprised to find their primitive natures resorting to force.

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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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No. 61-7 — File No. (from index sheet) 105-100

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It is the only agency that ever can bring about a change in the character of the river folk. The river folk can be restrained by physical force but the character does not undergo any change. In fact the savagery is more apt to become pent up.

25. Along the river we have American commercial interests, and these do not seem to be enjoying good will. American commercial interests are in the nature of the case antagonistic to native commercial interests and may never expect to enjoy the same sort of good will that American spiritual interests enjoy. But American commercial interests should endeavor to operate so as not to endanger spreading the ill will of the river folk into the interior. For if that should ever happen, then American commercial interests would be destroying its greatest ally, American spiritual interests, an influence that is working to change the antagonism of the river folk from savage and primitive warfare dangerous to life, to civilized economic warefare in which killing has no place. Furthermore American interests are not confined to the upper river. Our interests there are small compared with American interests in China. And our commercial operations on the Upper Yangtze ought to be of such character as to react in favor of American Interests over the whole of China. What, therefore, can be said to be the primary duty as to the method of operation of American commercial interests on the Upper Yangtze? It is believed that the primary duty of American Shipping on t he Upper Yangtze is: So to operate as to diminish the ill will now manifested by the river folk. Among the courses of action tending towards this end there is one that can eradicate that part of native antagonism due to the sinking of junks, and that is to stop sinking junks.

24. The undersigned, in making the voyage in the ALICE DOLLAR observed that the Master operated with proper care in this respect. But it is understood that situations arise - meeting junks in the rapids - that present the most serious difficulties for the steamer captain. He can not take the speed off his ship, else she goes on the rocks. Recognizing that already there is a system for signalling junk to steamer, and it is thought that a better feeling would ensue if there was inaugurated a system at all rapids which would be a visible manifestation to the junk folk that their junks were equally given consideration . Therefore it is suggested for the consideration of you gentlemen, that you combine with other shipping firms, and offer to stand the installation expense, if the Maritime Customs would establish signal stations on both sides of all rapids. The Captain of the ALICE DOLLAR had taken the excellent course of appealing to the Wanhsien magistrate to exercise shore end control over sampans to prevent them madly charging the steamer and each other while the steamer would be maneuvering with a good way on in coming to for passengers, the sampans to be held in shore until signaled for by the steamer. This ought to be done at every port of call.

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No. 63-7 File No. (from index sheet) 103-100

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20. As if it were not enough that the upper river steamers should cut their revenue and their living, there have, in the not distant past been so many junk sinkings and drownings that these sinkings and drownings have been common talk both among the foreign shipping people and among the Szechuanese. A foreigners in Chungking (on 21 September) told the undersigned that TAN MO SHUN had said to him:- "You have seen deeply laden barges in the ----- River. But you have never seen Chinese steamers rushing up and down the ----- sinking those barges and drowning their crews. You would not permit it. Well, we don't intend to permit foreign steamers heedlessly to rush up and down our river sinking our junks and drowning our people". Note the use of the word "our". Is it not natural that the Szechuanese should feel a proprietorship over their river?

21. If we can conclude that those Szechuanese who heretofore drew fortunes and livlihood from the River naturally bitterly resent the surrender of these "Their rights" by treaty negotiated by an authority they have never recognized, shall we not expect them to show their resentment by primitive and savage attacks when added thereto the foreign steamers sink their junks and drown their people? Doubtless the Szechuanese mind sees only the steamers to blame. These primitive minds would not be able to reason that any junk could be to blame, although we know that in an admiralty court the contrary decision would often be rendered. And here it is appropriate to recognize the difficulty the native has of appealing to law. Treaty gives us extraterritorial rights. That means that the claim of a native against an American is taken to an American judicial officer. Where there is an American Consul hh acts as such. In his absence if there is an American gunboat, that power vests in the Senior Naval Officer. In the absence of both, there is no court of appeal. This is the situation along most of the river, and it will continue until the government judges that the situation required more consuls and more gunboats. And the river folk cannot go up river to Chungking with their appeals. At least they will not do it. So it is believed just to say that the natives have much on their side of the situation.

22. Now we come to what are American interests in their broadest aspects. Up in Szechuan there are two classes of American interests and both rest upon good will. Scattered along the river and through the interior is a missionary body upwards of 150 Americans. These seem to be enjoying good will among a people in whom there is no anti-foreign feeling to speak of. This body is working to instill into the natives the very qualities that are lacking among the antagonistic river folk, namely, a respect for obligations and an appeal to law instead of to force. The missionary body is laboring therefore towards influencing the native to respect life and property. The missionary body is consequently the spiritual force that in the end must spread its influence to the river folk.

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FILE No. (from index sheet) 103-100

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25. The gunboat captains up river should apply to the local military everywhere also with this end in view. The undersigned suggested to the captain of the ALICE DOLLAR that it would keep the record straight and keep up the pressure, if the steamer captains would, whenever there were evidences of failure to exercise shore control, protest to the local magistrate. If copies were sent to the Consul and the Naval Officer, the Navy would be able to repeat the pressure on the local military. It is realized that for steamer captains with pressing duties and great responsibilities this would add something to their work, but it is believed that any trouble is not too great, if it tends to prevent accidents to the natives. From personal observation the undersigned knows that the ALICE DOLLAR, for example, does all that can be done to prevent sampan accidents alongside her, but the ship, in the nature of the case is helpless. Control must be exercised at the shore, or there can be no control.

26. Then there is the matter of unneutralservice. In general it may be said that it is unneutral service to carry fuel, arms, ammunition, men, supplies, dispatches or information destined for the service of either faction at civil war. The obligation to avoid unneutral service of either faction at civil war. The obligation to avoid unneutral service rests, in the opinion of the undersigned, upon the ships of American registry. The U. S. Naval Force on the Yangtze recognizes its obligation to prevent American shipping from having unneutral service forced upon it, and to that end it is desirable, when there is civil war impending or on, that all American shipping should so adjust sailings as to put themselves under convoy of an American gunboat. It follows that the agents and masters should keep in close touch with the American gunboat captains.

27. Business is business, and there is generally not much sympathy linked up with commerce and trade. But American interests on the River, if they recognize that they are enjoying rights wrested from a people without their consent or advice, should operate, without sacrificing any of their "rights", in a spirit of conciliation and strict neutrality, and with the greatest possible precaution against drowning natives. As the undersigned sees the situation, American interests, viewed broadly, demand this. The duties of U.S. Federal officials in respect to exerting a measure of preventive control over U.S. Citizens operating within China are explained on pp 776 and 777 of Volume II International Law by Charles Cheney Hyde (ppblished by Little Brown and Company, Boston). The undersigned is inclined to believe that if steamers next season, can by act, overcome any reputation for sinkings they may have had attached either justly or unjustly, if they can establish a reputation for strict neutrality in the matter of the transport of the military the shooting at American steamers will diminish materially and may eventually cease. At least the hope is worthy of following out the courses of action indicated.

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**Endorsement by the Commander in Chief:-**

**28. The Commander in Chief considers that the enclosed letter of the Commander Yangtze Patrol Force is an excellent representation of the cause of existing trouble between natives of Szechuan Province, on the Upper Yangtze, and foreign owned steam-ships. The Commander in Chief believes that a better understanding would obtain if this letter is brought to the attention of the State Department with the recommendation that its contents be made known to the Consular Officials located on the Yangtze that a working understanding may be brought about and certain unfavorable conditions, now existing on the river, be eliminated.**

**Political and Military Conditions - SZECHUAN under date of September 30, 1922 - Commanding Officer USS MONOCACY.**

**29. Information has been received that instructions have been issued to abolish the Temporary Headquarters of the Generalissimo of Szechuan at Chungking. (This is the headquarters visited by the Force Commander during his recent visit to Chung king). This means the establishment of the headquarters at Chengtu. General Wu Pei Fu has decided to invade Szechuan and also to go the help of Hunan. General Hsiao Yao-nan of Ichang has promised General Yang Sen (Commander of the old Szechuan 2nd Army), the military expenses of an expedition into Szechuan. General Hsiao Yao-nan is a subordinate of Wu Pei Fu. He has also placed the cities of Lichwan and Chien Shih (Kien Shih sien) at the disposal of Yang Sen as bases for his operations. Yang Sen is not to have anything to do with the civil affairs of these cities. This means that next spring Wu Pei Fu intends to invade Szechuan, to replace Yang Sen and force the recognition of the Peking Government by the Szechuanese. Naturally this invasion depends upon the conditions that exist in North China as far as Wu Pei Fu is concerned.**

**Commander Yangtze Patrol Force's report of Political and Military Situation, week ending 5 September, 1922.**

**30. The situation on the upper river continues grave although latest reports show some vessels making the Chungking - Ichang trip being subjected to little or no firing. Sailing schedules are being resumed. The MONOCACY has been lying at Ichang since 11 August (25 days) unable to proceed beyond Ichang; reason, low ship speed and swift current. During this time the Chinese have been firing on all merchant shipping indiscriminately above Ichang. Communications between Ichang and Chungking have been cut,**

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and American Naval forces have been unable to stem the current in order to open them. It should be a matter of deep humiliation to all of us that American lives and property above Ichang have had to depend on foreign men-o-war for protection, while the American Navy is unable to get above Ichang. Immediate steps should be taken to provide this station with American gunboats capable of protecting American lives and property at all times and under all conditions as far up river as American shipping can go. It is thought that conditions on the upper river will be determined by Wu-Pei-Fu's attitude toward sending troops to help General Yang of the second army to regain lost ground.

Commander Yangtze Patrol Force's report of Political and Military situation, week ending 12 September, 1922.

31. Exchanged calls with Lieutenant General Sun at Ichang (Wu-Pei-Fu faction) commanding Chinese army in this locality. General Sun told the Force Commander that no further fighting along the upper river might be expected this year, but that there would probably be severe fighting next year. Sun may have had in mind only his own prospective part in operations, because it was current news a short while ago that Yang had appealed to Wu-Pei-Fu for help, and that General Sun was concentrating from Ichang to Patung for this purpose. But it seems more likely that sun was concentrating to oppose the threatened invasion of Hupeh by the victorious 1st and 3rd Szechuanese armies, then driving Yang's 2nd Szechuanese Army before them close to the Hupeh border. Possibly Sun is not informed as to intra-Szechuanese conditions, for Mr. C.H. Lamb, Ichang agent for Butterfield and Swire, told the Force Commander in calling 13th September, that he (Lamb) had recently come down from Chungking, and that the 1st Szechuanese Army, General Liu, and the 3rd Szechuanese army, General Tan, who were allies when they drove Yang off the river a few weeks ago, are seeming to begin to quarrel over the division of the river revenue bearing barriers, and may end in fighting each other. Tan is said to be anti-foreign. Yang is known to be quite pro-foreign, and as long as Yang was in power, river conditions were less disorderly and undisciplined.

32. Exchanged calls (in civilian dress) with General Yang, lately defeated general of the 2nd. Szechuanese army. General Yang is in temporary retirement here, and is the guest of Lieutenant General Sun. We get the impression from conversation with him that he expects to take the field next year with the help of WuPei-Fu faction to regain his position and power in Szechuan. This tendency to recurring fighting along the upper river makes it appropriate to report upon the inadequacy of the U. S. Naval force capable of operating above Ichang. From Ichang to Chungking is 358 miles. From Chungking to Suifu is 202 miles. From Ichang (Hupeh) to Suifu (Szechuan) is therefore 560 miles. Along this stretch there are Kweichow (Hupeh) Patung (Hupeh) Wushan (Szechuan) Kweichowfu (Szechuan) Wanhsien (Szechuan)

Submitted by ..... Forwarded .....

(To be signed by the officer who compiled this report.) "U. S. N." (Sign only Page 1 of original.) Commanding Officer.

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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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Serial No. 43-7

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Name of Intelligence Officer ..... Name of C. O. .....

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(Nation.) (City.) (Index title.) (Subtitle.)

Chungchow (Szechuan) Fochow (Szechuan) Chungking (Szechuan) Luchow (Szechuan) and Suifu. When fighting is going on, any one of these ports is apt to become the center of a stretch along which undisciplined Chinese soldiers are apt to open fire on American flag shipping. The missionary body in Szechuan who would evacuate towards Chungking, Luchow, and Suifu numbers around 152. American commerce and shipping is beginning to get a firm footing from Ichang upriverwards.

33. The only way to prevent indiscriminate firing on American flag shipping would be to convoy American shipping both ways. This requires two boats with speed a little in excess of the speed of the gorge steamers (16 knots is required). To be prepared to protect American lives on shore along this stretch requires two more boats. To take care of this stretch of the river the United States has only the PALOS and MONOCACY. Their power is inadequate to stem the freshet current. (The MONOCACY lay at Ichang from 10 August to 6 September unable to stem the current and get up river). Consequently they are incapable of convoy duty. The Chinese know it, and that engenders a tendency to shoot up passing vessels. PALOS and MONOCACY must have a yearly overhaul in Hankow. The time for this overhaul must be a season when the river is navigable. This happens to be also the season for fighting. We are therefore confronted with the problem of giving the PALOS and MONOCACY the yearly overhaul in the very season when the disturbances are probable. For these boats must go above Ichang before the river falls in the autumn, in order to cover the up river station throughout the winter. There being then required four boats for up river duty, in order that this complement can be maintained, there must be two relief boats. A total of six new fast boats ~~must~~ is therefore urgently required to meet the demands of American interests, power and prestige on this river, and properly to protect American lives in this stretch of the river where there is every indication of recurring disturbances of increasing severity.

Commander Yangtze Patrol Force's report of Political and Military situation, week ending 19 September, 1922.

34. There has been no military activity in the past week. Firing on foreign merchant vessels between Ichang and Chungking has ceases, temporarily and possibly for the remainder of the year. It is reported that a Commanding General of one of Szechuanese armies, with an armed body guard, forcefully boarded a British steamer near Wanhsien a few days ago and demanded and secured passage to Chungking. When the details of this incident are learned a complete report will be submitted. Such actions are occuring with increasing frequency and until there is an adequate force to properly protect them, the steamer captains will be helpless in coping with such situations. On 15 September the S.S. LOONG MOW (British) arrived Ichang from up river. After anchoring the captain

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left the ship and shortly thereafter she was boarded by several armed soldiers. These were driven off by the crew, whereupon she was boarded by about 50 more armed soldiers who severely beat up several members of the crew including the Chinese engineer and the comprador. The latter was quickly taken ashore under arrest. The British Consul, Captain of the British gunboat GNAT and Captain of the LOONG MOW were sent for. They all repaired on board and succeeded in driving the soldiers off the ship without any fighting. They also demanded and received the release and return of the comprador. The instigator of and reason for this attack are still unknown. It is rumored that the crew had smuggled $1,500000 worth of coppers that the soldiers wanted to seize. This however seems improbable on account of the great difficulty in secretly handling and stowing such a bulky shipment. The British Consul and Captain of the GNAT believe that the Compradore and crew disposed of opium that was being smuggled in for one of the Generals at Ichang. This would seem to be the more logical cause. But whatever the cause might have been, the interesting features is the boldness of such an attack in the presence of American, British and Japanese gunboats.

Commander Yangtze Patrol Force's report of Political and Military situation, week ending 24 October, 1922.

35. The Central China Post (Hankow) states that General Yang Shen, recent Commander of Second Szechuanese Army, is in Hankow. He states that he will not proceed to Loyang to ask further help of Wu Pei Fu but that he still has 6,000 men await int his orders near the Hupeh border. The following is an extract from the Kiang Shen Daily News Hankow, of 19 October:

"On the 8th instant an agreement between the authorities of Hupeh and Szechuan was countersigned the terms are as follows:

1. The demarkation of the boundaries shall be made by representative of the two parties to the agreement.
2. Neither party shall station troops within 20 li of the boundary.
3. Should there by any brigandage, both parties shall cooperate in despatching troops for its suppression.
4. Both parties shall take steps looking toward the opening of the river traffic between Hupeh and Szechuan".

"It is reported that Hsiung Ke-Wu on returning to Chengtu from his native country fell from his horse and broke his back; as a result ofthis mishap he is said to have died in Chengtu. If this is true, the possibility of hostilities between Hupeh and Szechuan is greatly lessened". The predicted boycott against steamers at Wanhsien seems to have started but exact details are

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lacking. The boycott seems to be of two kinds:- a military boycott mainly directed against the LOONG HOW on her refusal to pay a larger and exorbitant military tax (possibly on account of junk sinkings) and another boycott caused by the junkmens desire to obtain the cotton carrying trade as well as the salt trade. It is not known whether coal can be obtained or not. It is understood that all good except cotton can be shipped to Wanhsien but nothing can be shipped out.

36. The Central China Post states, in the issue of 1 November that General Yang Shen has returned to Hankow from Loyang and will proceed to Western Hupeh (presumably Ichang). It is said that he has accepted an important appointment from Wu Pei Fu which means another big upheval in Szechuan in the near future. The same paper also states that "A group of delegates representing the Commander in Chief of Szechuan have arrived in Peking and have been received by the President, when the situation in Szechuan was discussed. It is said that there is good prospect of Szechuan remaining loyal to the Central Government.

HANKOW - HUPEH.

37. Indications are present in Hankow of continued and possibly serious labor troubles. Since the settlement of several minor strikes including that at the Yangtze Engineering Works, a strike has been called at the British Cigarette Company which was accompanied by some demonstration on the part of the workers. The leading officers of this company state that they believe their workers ready to return now but that the matter has gone beyond their own workers to the Central Labor Union. Up to the 1st of November, the strike at the works of the British Cigarette Company has not been settled. Minor strikes are reported from Ichang.

HONAN.

38. The following is an extract from Central China Post of 30 October concerning an attack by bandits on the Kin-Han Railway:

"The first reports of fighting in Honan reached Hankow on Saturday afternoon, although nothing definite as to the nature of the trouble was ascertainable. Rumor had it that a conflict had occured between General Feng Yu-hsiang's troops and those of General Wu-Pei-Fu. This, however, was subsequently denied, and it later became known that there had been a general uprising of the bandits who, ever since the overthrow of Tuchun Chao Ti last spring, have been overrunning the whole of the province.

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"It seems that on Saturday night the bandits made an sudden attack in great force along the railway between Suiping and Changko. The attack was successful to the extent that it completely disorganised all traffic along the line: and on Saturday no northward bound trains from Hankow were expected to proceed further than to Chumatien. According to a message received through communication circles, the bandits numbered more than 10,000. Divided into two armies, one portion attacked Linyung station from the direction of Hsiang-cheng while the other threw itself against Suiping station from Wuyang. It is also reported that many of the Honan soldiers stationed at Suiping who were formerly friends of the bandits when they belonged to the army of General Chao Chieh, joined in with the outlaws, thus making the situation still more difficult for the authorities. The 24th Division which is stationed at Chenchow and the 14th Division from Chumatien were immediately ordered to the scene of disturbance, and it is now reported that they have succeeded in driving the bandits away from the railway station. Trains from the north were arriving in Hankow through out the day yesterday but were all heavily delayed, most of them being trains that were due to arrive here on Saturday.
A foreigner who came down from Hsuchow and arrived in Hankow yesterday morning reports that the journey was a very exciting one. The train on which he had travelled was heavily guarded by soldiers with quick-firing guns, while in places along the line were to be noticed dead bodies and the heads of bandits who had been executed. Two villages were seen to have been totally burnt out.

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1924

In reply refer to
FE - 393.1111 TsaoYang/17.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and has the honor to enclose herewith for his information a copy of despatch No. 2085 of February 18, 1924, with enclosures, from the American Minister at Peking, transmitting a report by the Assistant Military Attaché regarding his recent mission to Honan Province.

M. & R. DIV. RECEIVED MAR 26 1924 OFF SEC. WAR

15 Received A. G. O. MAR 28 1924

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MISCELLANEOUS DIV. A.G.O.

Enclosure:

As stated.

(3-26-24)

Enc. 1

1924 2657-A-251

1-1

Peking, February 18, 1924.

No. 2085

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1. In transmitting herewith copy of a report which Major John Magruder, U.S.A., Assistant Military Attaché to the Legation, has made on his recent mission to Honan Province for the purpose of expediting the release from bandits of Mrs. Juline R. Kilen, an American missionary captured at the sack

Incl A.I. 350.05 China (3-26-24)

sack of Tsaoyang, Hupeh Province, on December 27, 1925.

2. I have the honor likewise to enclose copy of my letters of commendation of Major Magruder and Captain W. W. Woodbridge, U.S.A., a language officer attached to the Legation, who accompanied Major Magruder on this duty, addressed to Colonel Sherwood Cheney, U.S.A., Military Attaché to the Legation. I shall not comment upon Major Magruder's excellently prepared report other than to state my belief that the Department, as has been the case with the Legation, will read Major Magruder's statements not only with great interest, but with the feeling that they contribute materially to our knowledge of the character of General Wu Pei-fu. As concerns the efficient work of the two officers in question, my letters of commendation mentioned above adequately express my sentiments in that regard.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN

Enclosures:
1. Report of Major Magruder, U.S.A.
2. Copy of letters, as above.

Enc. 2

2657-A-251

1-1 7

February 15, 1924.

His Excellency,

The American Minister.

Sir:-

I have the honor to report the following details of a trip to Loyang, Honan, undertaken for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the local authorities in order to secure the early release from bandits of an American missionary, Mrs. Julian R. Kilen, and to obtain certain information regarding the general bandit situation in Honan:

Pursuant to instructions from the Legation contained in letter of January 8, 1924 signed by Mr. Edward Bell, a copy of which is attached to the covering dispatch, I left Peking on the evening of January 8, accompanied by Captain W. W. Woodbridge, U. S. Army. The bandits having siezed Mrs. Kilen at Tsaoyang, Hupeh, in the early morning of December 27, were at this time reported to be working generally northward through Honan. Our intention being to isolate that official responsible for the military operations and negotiations looking to Mrs. Kilen's rescue and to proceed at once to his headquarters, it was first necessary to obtain some specific information as to the location of the bandits, the troops opposing them, and to establish the question of command, always a difficult matter in China. Loyang, the headquarters of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, was the logical first objective, not only because it was believed that Wu himself dominates all military situations within his jurisdiction but also because the

bandits' course appeared to be bringing them daily nearer to Loyang. Accordingly we proceeded to that place.

Enroute it was necessary to spend the night of January 9 at Chengchow, the junction of the Peking-Hankow and the Lung-Hai Railways. We arrived there at ten p.m. and were met by one Mr. Sun, a Secretary from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Kaifeng, and an Adjutant from the yamen of General Chin Yun-ao, Commander of the 14th Division. We called at once on General Chin in order to get what information we could of the situation. Two of his regiments were operating against the bandits in the area of Yihsien where they had had running fights with them. He stated that the bandits were then near Chia Hsien; that nobody to his knowledge had seen Mrs. Kilen since her capture; he mentioned some plans being undertaken by him to get in touch with her, apart from the military operations which he emphatically stated were being pursued with vigor. We were not able to obtain from him any specific details of the military plans nor was it possible to ascertain which official had been delegated to direct either the military operations or the negotiations to effect the release of the captive. We were, however, convinced that it was useless to remain with General Chin or to go to Kaifeng to see General Chang Fu-lai, the Military Governor of Honan.

On the morning of January 10 we made the four hour trip to Loyang, arriving there about two p.m. We were taken to Marshal Wu's yamen in motor cars and given accommodations in a guest house which has been constructed nearby. Mr. Sun, the Secretary from Kaifeng, accompanied us in the dual capacity of aid-de-camp and spy. Due to

his extreme timidity he was of little service to us, but he endeavored to assist us upon all occasions. Mr. Li Sum-ling, a Cantonese ex-journalist who once travelled widely in America and is now an official in Wu's finance department, was, in the absence of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, delegated to look after us and act as interpreter. Mr. Li was the only official present at Wu's headquarters who speaks English. Due to Wu's peculiar and difficult Shantung dialect, Captain Woodbridge was not able to interpret for me but he was most helpful in checking up Mr. Li, who frequently confused the conversation.

Marshal Wu's yamen is an active place, usually alive with delegates and visitors from his numerous military and political fronts. Wu himself is, unlike most Chinese officials, a very businesslike, hard-working man who has imposed upon himself a strenuous daily routine. We were presented to him a few minutes after our arrival and, in keeping with his known desires, eliminated the customary lengthy Chinese pleasantries and stated our mission. In brief, I attempted to impress him with the gravity with which the Legation viewed the banditry situation and the captivity of the American woman, the importance of her early rescue, and the desire of the Legation for information as to what steps were being taken to effect her release. As was expected and as was desired Wu Pei-fu was irritated with our being there. Perhaps he resented the Legation's action in sending us and the Foreign Office's failure to forestall our coming. Instead of deploring the incident and complying with our request for information as to steps being taken to rescue the captive he began an acrimonious discourse upon missionary activities, upon the troubles caused by native converts, and ended by stating that

Mrs. Kilen's capture had resulted from collusion between her own converts and the bandits. He also said that she was now being held for ransom by these converts who were travelling with the bandits.

I then stated that we were not engaged in any defense of Christian efforts but that we were concerned with the rescue of an American citizen for whose safety the Chinese authorities were responsible, nor was the situation affected by the types of bandits which caused her life to be endangered. I repeated a request for information of Mrs. Kilen's whereabouts and as to the steps being taken for her rescue. He replied merely with a repetition of the same charge and a general statement to the effect that steps were being taken for the release of the captive. His manner was argumentative and perhaps heated. Not only was he evading my requests for information as to the real situation, but he appeared to be attempting to put me on the defensive. Here I feigned some anger and told him that we had been sent to Loyang to perform a certain mission in which we had hoped he would co-operate, but that if he would not we should proceed without his assistance. I added that I must assume he desired me to inform the Legation of his attitude.

Here Captain Woodbridge warned me that the interpreter was causing us both to form erroneous impressions. After a restatement of our mission, and a move on my part to end the interview, Wu showed a more reasonable attitude and told us that General Li Chi-chen, Civil Governor of Honan, stationed in the city of Loyang, was in charge of bandit suppression and negotiations for the freeing of Mrs. Kilen. He also expressed the desire to talk with us later about the matter.

We then went to see Mr. Pai Pao-shan, Wu's Executive Secretary

and principal adviser, whom I fortunately had met in Hankow several years before. I told Mr. Pai of our unsatisfactory interview with Wu and expressed the opinion that the latter had no appreciation of the seriousness with which the American Legation and other legations in Peking viewed the situation in Honan. I added that Marshal Wu did not seem properly to value Chinese or foreign opinion. Mr. Pai assured me that such was not the case, and further assured me that effective measures were being taken against the bandits and for the rescue of Mrs. Kilen. He arranged for an interview with General Li Chi-chen who, he said, could give us the information we desired.

Mr. Pai (Pao-shan) is one of the finest types of Chinese officials I have encountered. He is a man of about forty-two, energetic, scholarly, wholly Chinese in his view-point, yet appreciative of modern ideas, of excellent habits, dignified and impressive. He is said to exert a great influence over Wu Pei-fu. Whenever I wanted to impart anything to Wu thereafter I expressed it to Mr. Pai who later put it more concisely before his chief than it would have been possible to do through an interpreter.

On the same afternoon we called on General Li, whose yamen is in the city, some three miles from the garrison where Wu maintains his headquarters. The Civil Governor was formerly Wu's Chief of Staff. He impressed us most favorably by his personal appearance, his direct but courteous manner and by his apparent knowledge of what was going on. He told us the bandits were then in the area about Lushan, that they were short of arms and ammunition and showed signs of breaking up into smaller bands. Mrs. Kilen had been seen on January 7 and was well. He repeated that she was being held for ransom by Christian bandits and that the

native converts were responsible for her having been taken. He was optimistic about her early release. Even then, he said, his agents were in negotiations with the personnel immediately in charge of her with the object of removing her by stealth from the main bandit band. He gave us a general outline of the military operations sufficient to convince us that serious operations were being undertaken.

From the information obtained during the day we were convinced that we had come to the proper place to exert what pressure we could to expedite Mrs. Killen's early release. It became increasingly evident that should we continue into the zone of military operations we might embarrass the negotiations, without otherwise aiding in the rescue. It was clear that, unlike the situation following the Linsheng Outrage, one man, Wu Pei-fu, was in control of the situation and that his subordinates were subjecting themselves to his orders; that aside from the bandit demand to be re-incorperated in the army, there were no great political complications; and that our proper course was to bring all possible influence to bear on Wu Pei-fu to cause him to expedite the rescue. Having antagonised him by coming to Loyang, having recognised in him a man of strong will not easily driven, and having seen his resentment of any attempted pressure from Peking or elsewhere, it seemed advisable to appease him and enlist his personal interest in the accomplishment of our purpose.

General Wu is a crabbed individual when at work in his office. He is human on the drill ground and the expression in his eyes is mild and sympathetic as he goes about, as he does each morning, among his troops. He is at heart a soldier and it is evident that he has great affection for his men. He has tiffin and dinner each day with the guests

who come to his yamen. On these occasions he freely imbibes Chinese wine and relaxes from his exacting office work. He becomes quite voluble and when not discoursing on the superiorities of the Chinese philosophers, principally Confucious, he expresses contempt for Parliament, the Cabinet and all evils which may be grouped under the word "Peking". His years of sitting with subordinates who are in awe of him have settled upon him the curse of many military commanders the world over, namely, the habitude of being listened to. He is a monologist. But he is amiable under these conditions.

We dined with him during the three days we remained at his yamen. On the second day we accompanied him on his rounds and observed the work of the units of the 3rd Division as well as of the cadets in his military school. By being duly appreciative of the work of his soldiers and attentive to the wisdom dispensed with his hospitality we established very pleasant relations with him. We discovered not only the frailties by which he could be approached but the existence of a very indomitable will which, if crossed, would result in stubbornness. It became evident that he could be brought to serve our purpose through personal rather than through official appeal. The threadbare formulae such as "the existing friendship between China and America" or the veiled threat of American displeasure might be a slight stimulus to action to Wu's subordinates, but they would probably leave him cold. He showed a manner too self-sufficient to need America's friendship and was so enclosed in a sphere clouded with his own activities that he could never see a menace in America's disapproval.

With the foregoing estimates of his character in mind, upon the occasion of a dinner at his home on the evening of the eleventh, we

remained after the Chinese guests had left, as the time appeared favorable to approach him for a more sympathetic hearing than we had obtain before. The dinner was in honor of Kang Yu-wei, an old Chinese scholar and monarchist. Wu had drunk largely, the dinner had lasted until midnight, his discourse had been highly appreciated by his guests and he had become most mellow. When we were alone I told him my first impression of him had been most unfavorable, frankly, that I had disliked his manner and him, but that since having had the honor of observing him under varied conditions my feelings had undergone a complete change. Painfully but deliberately, I expressed fulsom flattery as to his military greatness. In the language of the military fraternity I took advantage of what was clearly his weakness. I explained that we, like him, were soldiers, we had a mission to perform and that as "small soldiers" dealing with a "big soldier" we were asking that he assist us in carrying out our mission. He responded magnificently to the appeal. For the first time he talked freely about his activities in connection with the affair. He assured us that he was not indifferent to the seriousness of the matter, that he assumed "full responsibility" for the safety of the captive, that his troops were in active operations against the bandits and that his agents were with the bandits negotiating for the purpose of getting her out of their hands. He said he could give us his word that she would be safely returned at an early date. He added that he would circularize the troops and militia offering $10,000 to any man who effected her rescue. I was later told that the same night he had had a telegram sent to that effect, and also another in the nature of a reprimand to his commanders urging greater expedition in their plans. It is common knowledge about the yamen that Wu does not

forget what he says when in his cups.

Having made what we considered the proper impression, it seemed advisable to leave the yamen and go into the city of Loyang. We were not invited guests but, on the contrary, rather unwelcome ones for a time. When we announced we were moving into the city it was, however, necessary to acquaint our hosts that we were not displeased with our accommodations. We moved on January 12 and the remainder of the time we spent in quarters kindly furnished us by the China Inland Mission. This was more comfortable as it freed us from much inconvenience at the hands of well-meaning but troublesome minor officials about the yamen, and also gave us time to visit the local missionaries to obtain their views regarding the general bandit situation and the security of missionaries throughout the province. We had previously learned that no foreigners were present in the bandit area. Until Mrs. Kilen was released we paid frequent visits both to the Civil Governor's yamen and Marshal Wu's headquarters, for the purpose of keeping the officials impressed with the necessity of hastening the rescue, and in order to receive the latest news of developments. The Legation was kept informed of the situation as it developed by letters and telegrams which are now on file.

On the 12th, word was received that Lao Yang-jen, the leader of the bandits had been killed. On the morning of the 14th, no news having come regarding Mrs. Kilen, we began laying plans to proceed to Juchow, two days south of Loyang. Such a step was highly undesirable to the officials, and fortunately we had not stated our plans when a telegram was received announcing the rescue of Mrs. Kilen. The message stated that she had been rescued on the 12th, was in Juchow, and would be escorted to Loyang in a few days. This message also verified the killing of the bandit chief. All the officials, including Wu himself, were visibly pleased with the news. The latter sent us an enthusiastic message which

was, in effect, "I told you so".

We decided to go out on the road a day or so to meet Mrs. Kilen but when we announced our plans, the Civil Governor urged us to desist. He spoke of the dangers on the road from local bandits. This having little effect on us, he said it was not possible to know the route the escort would follow. Since there was no great advantage in our going and since the officials were so averse to it, we did not insist upon the matter.

Juchow being only two days away, Mrs. Kilen should have arrived in Loyang on the 16th. Her brother, also a missionary, came to Loyang on that date to meet her. The next two days were very trying as we could get no definite information of Mrs. Kilen's exact whereabouts. On the afternoon of the 18th, she arrived by chair at the yamen accompanied by a large military escort and was then brought to the mission in a motor car. She had been joined after her rescue at Juchow by Mr. Andahl, a missionary stationed at Tungpeh in Southern Honan, who had followed on the trail of the bandits, carefully avoiding officials who would have tried to stop him. As it happened his efforts were useless, but he was very energetic and bold in his efforts to be of service. Mrs. Kilen had been exceedingly well treated by the Chinese troops and her delay in arriving from the scene of her release was due to rests given her en-route. Considering the hardships undergone during seventeen days of captivity, she arrived in very good condition.

I interviewed her the evening of her arrival and the next morning. Her statements will be given later. Captain Woodbridge and I paid calls on the officials on the 19th and left for Peking that afternoon. We arrived in Peking on the following evening, after absence of twelve days. The entire expenditure on the trip was gold $141.62.

I wish here to record my appreciation for the valuable assistance of Captain Woodbridge during the whole trip. His experience of travel in China, his pleasing personality, his intimate knowledge of Chinese psychology and his calm, courteous manner in dealing with the Chinese of all classes make him a most excellent negotiator, wholly aside from his ability to employ the language. Wherever Mandarin was spoken his interpreting was not only efficient but intelligent.

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When we paid our farewell call on Marshal Wu he was in his office and on such occasions he is always brief and businesslike in his remarks. He made no reply to my expression of appreciation for the release of Mrs. Kilen and showed no enthusiasm whatsoever over the affair. He several times repeated that the missionaries should be warned against permitting their native converts to intrigue with bandits. He had frequently before charged in rather cryptic language that the Christian converts were guilty of collusion with the bandits without, however, giving any specific evidence upon which to base his charge. Prior to Mrs. Kilen's release I had told him that bandits were bandits regardless of their religious professions and had nothing to do with our principal concern, namely, effecing the American woman's release. This time I said that we should be glad to hear of specific cases where converts were in relations with bandits and some statement of the evidence upon which he based his charge. He only replied, "You tell the missionaries to instruct their converts to keep out of their dealings with bandits".

I could gather nothing from Mrs. Kilen's very frank and lucid account of her experiences which would indicate that there was any collusion between converts and bandits in the case of her siezure. I have no doubt that there are instances of understandings between

bandits and Christian converts. Certainly sympathy of Chinese people for bandits is often more natural than sympathy for officials and soldiers. A good peasant may become classed as a bandit merely because the bandits seize all of his worldly wealth and burn his house, leaving the peasant the choice of joint the bandits or starving. The wretched officials are responsible for the continued existence of the real bandits as well as the economic condition which makes the peasant the victim of each bandit raid. If the Christian peasant sometimes find themselves such victims, the missionaries cannot in any way be considered responsible, nor is it conceivable that the simple, devout people among our missionaries could countenance any traffic among their converts with real outlaws. The guilt of the officials for the conditions which exist in Honan is so evident that any isolated case of a missionary unwittingly giving aid or comfort to a bandit is unworthy of notice. Wu's charge is a quibbling absurdity.

Mrs. Kilen's account of her experiences was told very simply, without recriminations and without emotion or dramatics. She is a plain woman with an abounding religious faith, without which she could never have borne the hardships to which she was subjected. She was several times roughly urged forward and, after the bandits found themselves being hemmed in by the troops, there were three indecisive starts at killing her. Otherwise she had only to bear the hardships of the bandits themselves as they were marching day and night over rough country. She had no long rests as the bandits were always on

the rund, she had only the clothes in which she was captured, she had no blankets and was forced to sleep onfloors or K'angs, without cover, alongside her crude guards. She was led on a pony and only dismounted where the trail of the bandits went over mountains too precipitous to permit riding. The roads were often forbidden by the soldiers in consequence of which it was necessary for the bandit column to go over mountain ranges where there were no trails.

The bandits with arms were estimated at 8,000 men. Including captives, impressed bearers and camp followers, the whole band passing through the country consisted of perhaps 15,000 people - some say 20,000. Their trail was a path several li wide, clearly marked by their ravages. Houses were burned, and all natives showing any resistance or hesitancy about joining were shot down. The original bandits were organized in military units. Mounted men formed a screen on all sides to reconnoiter for soldiers, and organized an efficient relay system for carrying messages. The companies in the column consisted of old-time bandits, recruits who had been forced to join and who gradually became sufficiently trusted to carry arms, and the latest captives or natives who were homeless and had to join the column or starve. It was like a scourge of locusts passing through fields and leaving them bare.

Mrs. Kilen was taken at Tsaoyang, Hupeh, in the early morning of December 27, 1923, having very gallantly offered herself

in the place of Mrs. Hoff, whose husband was wounded and has since died. The route of the bandits was roughly as follows: Tungpeh, Tanghsien, Nanyang, East of Lushan, Taying. Several times they appeared to be attempting to break out to the east toward the Peking-Hankow Railway but were turned back by encountering soldiers. Once they turned west and Mrs. Kilen overheard remarks that they were making for Szechwan. Here too soldiers turned them back. With much backing and filling and with some apparent indecision they were gradually forced northward to the area south of Juchow where Chang Fu-lai's and Chin Yun-ao's troops on the east and units sent by Wu Pei-fu from Loyang on the north gradually encircled them. In about thirteen days the unwieldly bandit column had covered a distance, often across country, which would have taken perhaps fifteen days for a traveller to cover under normal conditions. The military dispositions which resulted in surrounding the bandits was well conceived and was executed with a degree of coordination which was not apparent from the very unsatisfactory bits of information we could elicit from the officials at the time.

Mrs. Kilen's actual release is clouded in all the obscurity which usually exists in connection with a Chinese political-military situation. When the bandits became aware of being surrounded, they lost all cohesion and appeared to break up into groups, each group intent upon saving itself. The group holding Mrs. Kilen became detached and during the night preceding her release some Chinese "gentlemen in silk gowns" appeared at a house in which she was resting. Negotiations were in progress and bickering occurred at several stops during the night. Finally they arrived at a vil-

lage with her immediate captors still present where soldiers appeared an an officer announced that she was free. She passed gradually from the bandits to the rescuing soldiers by processes purely Chinese, the details of which will never be known by foreigners. The statement previously made to us by Wu Pei-fu that he would rescue Mrs. Kilen by means of his agents who were already in the bandit camp was verified.

Without the large-scale military operations which attended her release, she could never have been taken from the bandits, and without the secret negotiations by which her immediate captors were induced to extricate her from the fighting and general melee of the last few days, she would probably never have been rescued alive. The bandits were ravaging the countryside in order to force Wu to reinstate Lao Yang-gen and his immediate followers in the army. Mrs. Kilen was siezed as one more means of exerting pressure to that end. Wu was determined not to reinstate the bandits in the army and military operations would have been forced on Wu regardless of Mrs. Kilen. Her siezure and the importance which the Legation attached to that feature of the situation doubtless hastened and increased the military activity and occasioned the secret negotiations of agents within the bandit ranks to effect the release. While I feel confident that General Wu would have in time followed the course he did pursue, the time element would not have been considered of the same importance had the Legation not taken the step of sending officers to his headquarters for the purpose of impressing him with the importance of effecting the release of one

of our citizens - a feature in the case which to him was relatively of no great importance. The original irritation caused by the Legation's action and by our arrival, as well as the later appeasement of his irritation and the enlistment of his interest and increased efforts, are all believed to have resulted in a speedier rescue of the captive.

As a result of the information gleaned from the Chinese officials, missionaries and from Mrs. Kilen's statements, the following observations are believed to be correct:

(a) The military operations conducted against the bandits, while many of the organizations engaged would under less competent authority not be dependable, were well handled due to the ability and forceful authority of Wu Pei-fu.

(b) That an unusual degree of reliance may be placed in the direct statements and promises of Wu Pei-fu.

(c) That Wu Pei-fu cannot be driven to any action by any of the agencies of the Peking Government and that any effective pressure can be exerted upon him only by the advice and suggestion of his friends or advisors in whom he has confidence.

(d) That the bandits had only one object in mind, namely, to force Wu to reinstate them in the army. That the bandits had planned to seize other foreigners, were forestalled, and took Mrs. Kilen for the purpose of forcing Wu to agree to their demands.

(e) That the bandits generally expressed great fear and great hatred of Wu Pei-fu.

(f) That no political motives other than those stated were evident in this particular affair.

(g) That no immediate danger to our nationals exists from the bandit band which sieged Mrs. Miles, but with the present political-economic conditions unchanged, future similar menaces will arise.

(h) That little danger to foreigners exists from the small local groups of bandits which are widespread in Honan, and that all danger from that source could be eliminated by the appointment of the better type of Hsien Magistrate.

(i) That Wu Pei-fu gives assurance that banditry in the three provinces under his control will be stamped out, and it can be if he gives it his undivided attention. There is considerable doubt that he will be deflected from his larger plans of conquest to stamp out banditry completely.

(j) That the Chinese officials view banditry which causes foreign missionaries to flee to the comparative security of the railway towns with a certain degree of complacence. They have no interest in seeing the foreigners at their inland stations, and the freedom from responsibility in having them out is believed to give officials some satisfaction.

Respectfully,

JOHN MAGRUDER,
Major, Field Artillery, U.S.A.
Assistant Military Attache.

Enc 3

1924 2657-D-251

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(COPY)

Peking, February 7, 1924.

Colonel Sherwood Cheney, U.S.A.,
Military Attaché
American Legation,
Peking.

Sir:

As you are aware, in the last days of December, bandits attacked the town of Tsaoyang, Hupeh, shot and seriously wounded two American missionaries, Mr. and Mrs. Bernard M. Hoff, the former dying a few days later, and carried off into captivitiy an American missionary, Mrs. Juline R. Kilen. No progress having apparently been made toward her release, Mr. Bell, during my absence in South China, conceived the happy idea of telegraphing on January 5th to the Department of State for permission to send an American military officer to Southern Honan or wherever necessary to discover the whereabouts of Mrs. Kilen under instructions from this Legation and with authority to take all possible measures for her rescue, the officer to be selected by Mr. Bell in consultation with the American Military Attaché and his necessary expenses to be defrayed by the Department of State. This permission was obtained.

Major Magruder was designated by Mr. Bell to carry out this mission, accompanied by Captain Woodbridge as interpreter. The two officers set out for Honan on January 8th, having received instructions from Mr. Bell covering the course they were to pursue. They proceeded at once to General Wu Pei-fu's headquarters at Loyang (Honanfu ).

After several telegrams and letters from Loyang setting forth his efforts to expedite the release of Mrs. Kilen, Major Magruder telegraphed the Legation on January 14th, reporting Mrs. Kilen's rescue, and on January 18th telegraphed further announcing that he and Captain Woodbridge were returning to Peking on January 20th, Mrs. Kilen having reached Loyang on January 18th in good health.

I desire to commend Major Magruder in the highest terms for his admirably executed efforts to hasten the release of Mrs. Kilen from her bandit captors. From my experience during the last few years in China I am convinced that his presence and conduct at General Wu Pei-fu's headquarters greatly expedited Mrs. Kilen's rescue. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that he was an important factor in saving her life.

I wish especially to invite your attention to the manner in which Major Magruder overcame the difficulties of his task of ingratiating himself with General Wu Pei-fu. It appears from the written reports made to the Legation that the General's manner was distinctly hostile at Major Magruder's first meeting with him. In a short time, however, Major Magruder succeeded in awakening his sympathetic interest and enlisting his active cooperation in the rescue of Mrs. Kilen. In achieving this result Major Magruder seems to have exhibited much tact and good judgment as well as knowledge of Chinese human nature, with a proper assertion at all times of his position and pregogatives as an envoy of the American Legation and his status as an officer of the American army who had come to ask the assistance of the most famous general in China in liberating an American citizen from the hands of bandits in a province within his immediate juris-

diction.

In commending Major Magruder and requesting that you be good enough to bring the fact to the attention of the Secretary of War, I may add that Major Magruder's successful conduct of his mission has , in my opinion, inaugurated a liaison with General Wu Pei-fu which may prove of considerable value in the future.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN

Enc. 4

1924 2607-A-251

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WAR DEPARTMENT

(Copy)

Peking, February 7, 1924.

Colonel Sherwood Cheney, U.S.A.
Military Attaché,
American Legation,
Peking.

Sir:

In transmitting to you my expression of commendation for the excellent conduct by Major Magruder of his mission to expedite the release of Mrs. Kilen from captivity among the bandits, I desire likewise to convey to you my appreciation of the admirable manner in which Captain Woodrow Woodbridge, U.S.A., a language officer attached to this Legation, who accompanied Major Magruder on this duty, assisted the latter as interpreter. Captain Woodbridge's knowledge of the Chinese language and customs and his experience gained as a language officer proved to be of very valuable aid in the successfulaccomplishment of the effort to hasten Mrs. Kilen's rescue.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN

No. 447.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.

WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 20, 1926.

Subject: Disturbances in Honan Province; Various Forces Isolating Mission Stations Looted, and Missionaries Taken Captive by Brigands.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

With reference to my previous despatches regarding the brigandage prevailing in Honan Province, I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Legation, two excerpts from the Central China Post, Hankow, of today's date on the subject. The first contains an account by the Reverend H. H. N. Ledgard, a British member of the China Inland Mission at Shangtsai, Honan, of his capture by and escape from the brigands; the second describes further activities of the Hankow Committee in connection with the protest of the foreign residents of this port at the present bandit situation in Honan. The two newspaper clippings are self-explanatory.

It is reported in the local vernacular newspapers of today's date that on the 18th instant a few hundred brigands attempted an attack on the foreign property on Chikungshan. The commander of the 25th Division stationed at Wushengkwan sent a detachment of soldiers to Chikungshan for its protection. These troops, in conjunction with the military police thereat, succeeded

in

in driving the brigands back in the direction of Loshan. The soldiers of the 25th Division are continuing in pursuit of the outlaws.

On November 18, 1928, at 12 noon, a battalion of infantry were assembled in the courtyard of the Military Governor's yamen in Wuchang. Military Governor Heise Yao-wan mounted a platform and addressed the troops. He stated in general that they were being sent into south Honan for the sole purpose of suppressing the brigands, protecting the merchants and traders, and bringing order and security to law-abiding citizens there. General Heise admonished the soldiers to observe strictest discipline and not cause the least disturbance at the places where they would be stationed or in the region which they would traverse. A company of machine guns of the 25th Division and a battalion of cavalry accompany the infantry force. The whole detachment left Hankow for south Honan on the morning of the 19th instant. The Department of Military Supplies had been ordered to issue the necessary supplies and arrange for travel accommodations and expenses.

Chinese press reports are to the effect that the bandit hordes which overran Honan and attacked the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai railways are now retreating. They are retiring chiefly from Sihsien and Chengyang to Shangtsai whence they expect to return to their strongholds in northern Anhui where they are inaccessible to the government troops. Also, at Kioshan and Mingkang the bandits are yielding to the pressure being brought upon them through the arrival of strong forces ordered to those points by General Wu Pei-fu.

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The retiring bandits are expected to reorganise and assemble fresh forces at Nanyangfu and Shangtsai. General Chin Yun-o has sent his best troops from Chengchow to occupy the recaptured towns of Chumatien, Yencheng, Hsiping, and Suiping. They are awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Wu Pei-fu before starting expeditions to round up the bandits and, if possible, eliminate them from Honan once for all.

Some of the disbanded brigands are reported to be retreating into the Honan-Hupeh border region where ex-soldiers, now outlaws and robbers, of General Chen Shu-fan, former Tuchun of Shensi Province, are waiting to join hands with their accomplices from Honan. The Garrison Commissioner of Hupeh at Siangyang is making plans to check the entry into Hupeh of the Honan bandits.

The principal group of bandits responsible for the present trouble in Honan are former troops of Generals Chao Chieh and Pao Teh-chuan. General Chao Chieh's forces consisted for the most part of the subdued bandits who operated in Honan and Shantung some eight years since;at this time they are simply returning to their old profession of large-scale robbery. In addition, when General Feng Yu-hsiang took up his post as Military Governor of Honan, he committed the blunder of executing General Pao Teh-chuan, who was charged as being an accomplice of the former Tuchun, General Chao Ti, who had rebelled against the Central Government and thrown in his lot with General Chang Tso-lin. Upon the killing of their commander, Pao Teh-chuan's troops made good their escape with their arms, and immediately joined the bandits. Meanwhile General Feng Yu-hsiang, who was so bent on introducing reforms in Honan, disbanded at

different

different times many of the troops of the deposed Tuchuns, with the result that all of these men have only helped augment the number of brigands. The brigands attempt to outwit the government forces by hiding and dividing themselves into small marauding bands intent on pillaging villages and towns and laying waste the country side; they thus make it extremely difficult for the government troops to locate them.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Clipping (Mr. Ledgard's Account of His Experiences with Bandits) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 20, 1922;
2. Clipping (Hankow Committee's Activities) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 20, 1922.

Enclosures not available

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

SHO.

H:G

A true copy of the signed original.

No. 449.

OFFICE COPY TO WAR DEPT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 12

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 20, 1922.

Subject: Disorders in Honan Province; Towns and Mission Stations looted and Missionaries Taken Captive by Brigands.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

With reference to my Nos. 442 and 443 of November 15, and November 16, 1922, respectively, regarding the public meeting of foreign residents held in Hankow on November 15th to discuss existing conditions in Honan and consider measures looking toward their improvement, I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Legation, copies of three letters, two dated November 17th, and one dated November 18th, addressed to me as Senior Consul by Mr. A. E. Marker, Chairman of the Committee appointed by the meeting; in these communications the so-called Hankow Committee discusses the bandit situation in Honan and proposes certain steps that might be taken to remedy conditions.

The Legation will note that the first letter, dated November 17, 1922, contains the resolution passed by the meeting and requests that it be transmitted to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body. The second letter, also dated November 17, 1922, refers to the danger threatening foreign property on Chikungshan and asks that the matter be brought to the attention of the Chinese

authorities

authorities. In this connection, as American Consul General, I had already written to General Wu Pei-fu at Loyang and General Chang Fa-kwei at Kaifeng as well as to the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow, regretting the unprotected state of American property at Chikungshan after the missionaries and other foreigners had left there on the 12th and 13th instants. Copy of my despatch to the two Chinese officials first above named formed enclosure No. 5 to my No. 446 to the Legation of November 18, 1922; copy of my despatch to the local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was sent to the Legation as enclosure No. 7 in the same despatch. Reference is respectfully made thereto. In my No. 447 of November 20, 1922, to the Legation, I reported the attempted attack on foreign property at Chikungshan by a band of brigands and their repulse by a detachment of the 25th Division acting in conjunction with the military police on the mountain. In the third letter the Hankow Committee suggests that the Diplomatic Body send a delegation to Loyang to call on General Wu Pei-fu for the purpose of securing the immediate release of the captives; also, that a Hankow delegation for the same purpose be selected by the Consular Body at Hankow and the Committee, and that the two delegations meet at Chengchow whence they could together proceed to Loyang; in this connection the Committee further suggests that the joint delegation be authorized under certain contingencies to offer foreign military support to General Wu Pei-fu as possible assistance in attaining the object desired.

A letter of simple transmittal covering the three letters mentioned above has been sent by me today as

Senior

Senior Consul to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body. Copies of this letter as well as its enclosures are forwarded herewith.

In press reports emanating from Peking it is stated that the Legation has already joined the other Missions concerned in making representations to the Central Government looking toward the release of the foreign captives now in the hands of the bandits. It is, therefore, probably unnecessary for me to express the hope that the Legation will see fit to associate itself with the other Missions interested in taking the concerted action suggested in the Committee's third letter above referred to. Several features of the Committee's proposal, as set forth in the third letter - especially the one relating to the proffer of foreign military support to General Wu Pei-fu - are not to be commended.

Any further developments in the matter at this end will be promptly reported to the Legation.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Mr. A. E. Marker to Senior Consul, Hankow, November 17, 1922;
2. Mr. A. E. Marker to Senior Consul, Hankow, November 17, 1922;
3. Mr. A. E. Marker to Senior Consul, Hankow, November 18, 1922;
4. Senior Consul, Hankow, to Dean of the Diplomatic Body, Peking, November 20, 1922.

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

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H:C

A true copy of the signed original

No. 451.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 24, 1922.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 12
WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Disorders in Honan Province: Terror in Mission Stations Looted and Missionaries Taken Captive by Brigands.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that the Lutheran United Mission, Hankow, received word by mail on November 22, 1922, that the towns of Nanyangfu, Sinyeh, and Tanghsien in southwest Honan were captured and looted by brigands on the 16th instant. As these three towns are located north of Siangyang, Hupeh, across the Hupeh-Honan border, the American missionaries residing in Siangyang and Fancheng (the latter is an important trade mart located on the Han River opposite Siangyang), are apprehensive that the Honan bandits may continue their southward march, as the White Wolf did eight years since, and attack towns in northern Hupeh as well.

There are American mission stations at Sinyeh and Tanghsien with Americans and other foreigners in residence, but no reports from them have yet come to hand. There are no American missionaries at Nanyangfu. The missionaries stationed at Sinyeh and Tanghsien are believed to have made good their escape, but this is not known positively. The only information so far reaching Hankow is contained in a letter received by

the

the Lutheran United Mission; besides reporting the capture of the three towns above named, the letter states that when the local soldiers garrisoned in these towns for their protection heard of the approach of the bandits they themselves started to loot and later joined the robbers upon their arrival.

Bandit and soldier seem to mean much the same thing in Honan at present. Foreigners and Chinese alike state that the reports prepared by the officials and handed to the native press for publication, relative to the fighting that takes place between the government troops and the bandits are pure fabrications. The fighting is farcical. Numerous towns have been captured and looted in spite of the presence therein or nearby of large bodies of troops. At Chumatien on the railway General Chin Yun-o had between ten and twenty thousand soldiers. Notwithstanding the presence of this large force only a few miles distant, Suiping and Siping, also on the railway, were looted, and the government troops, instead of surrounding the brigands, permitted them to proceed westward and southward with the results noted above. As Nanyangfu is garrisoned by a large body of well-trained, fully equipped soldiers, for the Honan military commanders to have permitted this important strategic center in southwest Honan to fall into the hands of the brigands is a serious reflection on the high provincial authorities as well as General Wu Pei-fu.

Immediately upon receipt of the information concerning the capture of the three towns above-named I telephoned to the local Foreign Office to request General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, to

telegraph

telegraph to the Garrison Commander, General Chang Liem-sen, at Siangyang, making inquiry regarding the fate of the missionaries from Sinyeh and Tanghsien who were believed to be making their way southward to Siangyang.

The American missionaries stationed in the captured towns are as follows:

Lutheran United Mission, Sinyeh:
Reverend S. S. Klyve, wife and 2 children;

Independent Lutheran Mission, Tanghsien:
Reverend H. O. Boen, and his sister, Miss Inga Boen;

Lutheran United Mission, Tengchow (This town is located in the same region and, if not already captured, must be threatened by attack):
Miss Ida C. Greseth.

On the 23rd instant the Reverend H. A. Larsen, an American citizen and member of the Lutheran United Mission, called at this Consulate General. He informed me that some thirty Americans - men, women, and children - residents of Siangyang and neighboring towns were being assembled at the former place preparatory to starting at once for Hankow for safety. In view of the violent disturbances in that part of Honan adjoining the Siangyang district and the renewed activities of local robbers in the central Han River valley, I deemed it advisable to ask the Foreign Office to make the further request of the Military Governor of Hupeh that he telegraph instructions to the military authorities along the Han River to afford this party of missionaries full protection. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs replied that the Military Governor would be requested to telegraph urgent instructions to the river police along the Han River and the Garrison Commander at

Siangyang

Siangyang to accord all necessary protection to the American missionaries on their way down river to Hankow. In addition, General Hsiao Yao-nan was requested to issue orders to the Garrison Commander at Siangyang to afford adequate protection to the American missionaries and their families at Tsaoyang, a large city east of Siangyang near the Hupeh-Honnan border and to furnish them, in the event that they deemed it necessary to evacuate the mission station, a military escort to a place of safety. The Commissioner promised to transmit this request as well to the Military Governor. The names of the American missionaries at Tsaoyang are:

Lutheran Brethren Mission:
Miss Gunda Hoff,
Reverend Peter Valderhaug, wife and 4 children.

I have today received a despatch, dated November 23, 1922, by the local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, wherein he states that the Military Governor, acting on my request, has instructed the garrison commanders at Siangyang and Tsaoyang to accord the American missionaries in that region full protection. Copy of the Commissioner's communication, which is self-explanatory, is enclosed. There is also enclosed, for the information of the Legation, copy, in translation, of a telegram, dated November 21, 1922, received by me from General Wu Pei-fu; this message is in response to my despatch of November 13, 1922, on the subject of the capture of the Sihsien missionaries, the defense of Chikungshan, the protection of American missionaries and their property in Honan, etc. (See enclosure No. 3 to my despatch to the Legation No. 446 of November 18, 1922).

Any further information reaching me on the subject of the existing lawlessness in Honan and the steps

taken

taken by the authorities for the protection of the missionaries and their property will be transmitted promptly to the Legation.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. From Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow, November 23, 1922 (in translation);
2. From General Wu Pei-fu, Loyang, November 21, 1922, telegram (in translation).

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation in Peking and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

SHO.

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A true copy
of the signed
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Copied by YYY.
Compared with 11124.

Translation.

Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow,
to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 23, 1922.
Received November 24, 1922.

Sir:

Yesterday over the telephone you stated that about 30 American missionaries were coming down to Hankow from Siangyang and Fancheng for the purpose of safety. You requested that the Military Governor be asked to order the Garrison Commissioner at Siangyang by telegraph to afford the party proper protection.

Thereupon I reported the matter to the Military Governor with the request that prompt consideration be given to your request and that a reply be given. I am now in receipt of a reply to the following effect:

"I am in receipt of your letter stating that the American Consul General has notified you in substance, that American missionaries are coming from Siangyang, Fancheng, and Tsaoyang to Hankow for safety. He requests that instructions be issued to the proper authorities to accord the party protection.

"I have already telegraphed to General Chang, the Garrison Commissioner, and to the 1st Brigade stationed at Tsaoyang to afford proper protection. You are asked to communicate this information to the American Consul General."

I beg to transmit the foregoing for your information.

With renewed assurances of my high consideration,

Signature of Chen Chieh,

Per Signature and seal of of Peng Chung-wei,

Chief Secretary.

Translation of Telegram.

His Excellency General Wu Pei-fu, High Inspecting Commissioner, Loyang, to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 21, 1922.
Received November 22, 1922.

Sir:

The contents of your despatch of the 15th instant have received my consideration. I have already referred it by telegraph to the Military and Civil Governors at Kaifeng with the instruction that the points raised in your communication be considered and that measures be taken at once. This reply is for your information.

Seal of Wu Pei-fu.

Dated November 20, 1922.

L. No. 437.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 12, 1922.

Subject: Capture by Brigands of R. Borg-Breen and Son at Sihsien, Honan.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that I received on November 11, 1922, a telegram dated Sinyangchow, November 10, 9.15 p.m., from the Reverend Bert Nelson, a member of the Lutheran United Mission (Chinese name 路鄂信義會) at Loshan, Honan, reporting the burning by brigands of Sihsien, Honan, and the capture of the Reverend Einar Borg-Breen (潘懷憐) and his young son, Master Rolf Borg-Breen. Mr. Borg-Breen is an American member of the mission station at the latter place; the Lutheran United Mission is an American missionary society. I have also today received a letter from the Reverend N. Astrup Larsen, Vice Superintendent of the above-named mission, reporting generally on the disturbed conditions in southeast Honan wherein mention is made that Mr. Borg-Breen with his wife and young son and Miss Mina Hjeldness at Sihsien had not been heard from when Mr. Larsen left Sinyangchow on November 10th. The Reverend Larsen's letter is dated November 10th and was sent from Chikungshan, Honan. A further letter received by me today from Chikungshan, November 10, 1922, is by Mrs. C. W. Landahl, the wife of the Superintendent of the

Lutheran

Lutheran United Mission in Honan. This letter also described the prevailing unrest in the same part of Honan. I also enclose copy of a letter, dated Sihsien, November 9th, received by me from Miss Kjeldness. According to her letter, the father and the child, aged five, were carried away by two bands of robbers. [illegible]ting separately. All the members of the mission were robbed of clothes, food, and money. Mrs. Borg-Breen was with Miss Kjeldness in Sihsien awaiting an opportunity to get away to one of the towns located on the railway. Copies of these three communications are enclosed for the information of the Legation.

I am glad to learn from these letters that the American missionaries in the interior stations situated in the bandit-infested areas have left their stations and come to the railway towns of Sinyangchow and Chikungshan for safety to remain until conditions improve.

I may add that the Reverend George O. Holm of the Lutheran United Mission at Chengyang, Honan, called on me on November 9th. He stated that he had brought his family to Chikungshan. On the following day I received a call from Dr. Nathaniel Fedde of the same mission at Kwangchow. The latter has also brought his family to Shekow, a station along the Peking-Hankow Railway in Hupeh. The information given me by these two missionaries is to the same effect as that contained in the three letters enclosed.

Immediately upon the learning of the capture of Mr. Borg-Breen and young son I asked Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Hankow, to request General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, to telegraph General Chang Fu-lai (張福来), Military

Governor

Governor of Honan, conveying to him my desire that troops be despatched against the brigands to secure the release of Mr. Borg-Breen and his son. Mr. Chen assured me that he would give the matter immediate attention. He was confident that General Hsiao would readily comply with my request.

As in the case of Mr. Lundeen and Mr. Forsberg, the missionaries who were captured by bandits at Juchow on October 13th, I beg to request that the Legation make representations to the Central Government in this most recent outrage against American citizens.

On November 1, and November 9, 1922, I addressed despatches to the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs referring to the critical situation at Chikungshan and pointing out that American life and property in many sections of Honan, due to the widespread brigandage in the province, were threatened by grave danger. I stated that a number of American missionaries residing in the affected areas were expected to leave their stations for Chikungshan as a place of safety and to remain there until normal conditions were restored. Mr. Chen's attention was called to the fact that a large number of American school children and teachers in the American School at Chikungshan required protection; that according to a report, dated November 8, 1922, by the principal of the school a large band of brigands were about forty miles northeast of the mountain, and that the present guard at Chikungshan was inadequate to protect the residents thereon from any attack by a large band of brigands.

In my despatch of November 9, 1922, I informed the Commissioner that brigands in large numbers were

moving

moving toward the southeast of Honan and had already taken a number of towns and that it was possible that if they returned to west Honan by way of Sinyangshow, Chikungshan and its vicinity would be in danger of attack and American life and property on Chikungshan would be imperilled. I also pointed out that it was most important that railway communication between Hankow and Chikungshan be kept open so that, in the event that the mountain was threatened by an attack from Honan brigands, facilities might exist for bringing the residents thereon to Hankow.

I will keep the Legation promptly advised of any information I may receive from missionaries and Chinese officials regarding the four American captives as well as any further developments in the existing situation in south Honan.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. From Reverend N. A. Larsen, Chikungshan, November 10, 1922;
2. From Mrs. C. W. Lundahl, Chikungshan, November 10, 1922;
3. From Miss Hjeldness, Sihsien, November 9, 1922.

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(Sent to the Legation in quintuplicate and 1 copy sent to Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

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of the sig[illegible]
original

Copied by MYH
Compared with

LUTHERAN UNITED MISSION

Kikungshan, November 10, 1922.

American Consul General,
Hankow.

Dear Sir:

In the absence of our superintendent, the Rev. C. W. Landahl, who is at present at or near Fancheng, Hupeh, I feel it my duty to write you about the bandit situation in south-eastern Honan.

All members of our mission from Kwangchow, Kwangsham, and Loshan arrived in Sinyangchow yesterday.

The city of Sihsien was taken by brigand early in the morning (about 1 a.m. I have been informed) Wednesday the 8th. Our missionaries there, the Rev. Borg-Breen, wife and one child, and Miss Mina Hjeldness had not been heard from when I left Sinyangchow this morning. The attack was, it seems, sudden and unexpected, and the probability is that they were still in the city at the time of the attack. The recently retired "hsien" magistrate from Sihsien was a refugee the other day on his way to Sinyang. I myself talked with him Wednesday. He had made his escape from Sihsien just before the brigands came in and he was inclined, it seemed, to think that the missionaries were still there at the time. We have sent Chinese to make inquiries, but so far have no information. I am sure you will take such steps in the matter as the gravity of the situation demands. Sihsien has according to all reports been burned.

The last of our missionaries to leave Loshan reports the brigands only 15 li from the city. But hearing that 1,000 or more of General Chin's men were on the way from Sinyangchow they turned and headed for Chengyang. According to report last night received in Sinyangchow from our Chinese pastor there (Sinyangchow), who is in close contact with General Chin, the city of Chengyang was taken yesterday. Our missionaries, the Rev. Geo. Holm and family, and Miss Kulberg, are safe, having left a week or so ago.

It was feared last night in Sinyangchow that the brigands might make "a bee line" for Sinyangchow in the hopes of making use of the absence of General Chin's troops to secure guns and ammunition. It is also rumored that, keeping with their plan of carrying off as many foreigners as possible, they are planning an attack on Kikungshan. Counting the staff and children at the American school, and other missionaries here at present, there must be close to seventy-five (75) Americans on Kikungshan at present. One hundred of General Chin's men came back here yesterday, but under the circumstances it would seem that a larger force ought to be stationed here. Would it not be feasible to put it up to the Hupeh authorities that they share responsibility with General Chin for the protection of the

foreigners

foreigners here? Besides the Americans there are a large number of Swedish subjects here, most of them connected with the Swedish school.

Permit me to add that I received a wire from Kwangchow last night stating that Kwangchow and Kwangsham are in danger. While we have no foreigners there at present, our property in the two places must be worth at least $100,000 mexican. Most of this is in Kwangchow.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) N. Astrup Larsen

Vice Supt. L. U. M.

A true copy
of the signed
original

Copied by MYH
Compared with

Kikungshan, Honan, November 10, 1922.

P. S. Heintzleman, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Hankow.

Dear Sir:

In your letter to Mr. Landahl early in September you desired to be informed of any new developments in the conditions on our field.

After General Feng sent troops to Kwangchow and Kushih, things quieted down, and have remained so until quite recently.

Mr. Landahl left for our west field over a month ago, (Fancheng and surrounding districts). In his absence I thought perhaps I ought to send you a few words re the late sudden movements of the 'tufei' robber-armies, which threaten our east field.

Twice this week General Chin has sent an officer from Chengchow to see about his family up here - they leave today - and he has come over to our place with enquiries from the General and to keep us informed of the situation. Last night this officer arrived with greetings, saying that the General had sent up a squad of soldiers as a guard for Kikungshan. He said that Sihsien was taken - and burnt - by the tufei; Kwangchow and Kushihsien were in peril, and several thousand soldiers had just been despatched to relieve these cities and suppress the tufei.

Today I hear that Chengyang also was taken - yesterday noon - when only a short distance from Loshan, the brigands turned back on Chengyang - which was threatened last week - and took that place, presumably because of the arriving troops. Fortunately our Chengyang missionaries left for Sinyang last Saturday when the place was first threatened. Late last night a telegram came from Sinyang stating that the Loshan, Kwangchow, and Kwangshan missionaries had reached Sinyang safely. To our great anxiety, however, we learn that the Sihsien missionaries have not been heard from and their whereabouts are unknown. We do hope that they have escaped; as it is said that as the brigands entered one end of the city, people fled out of the gate at the other.

It is also stated that the Anhwei General sent troops to the relief of Kushihsien; so we may hope that between them they may be able to defeat the brigand hordes.

As long as the railway line is kept clear, I do not think Kikungshan will be endangered.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) (Mrs. C.W.) Alice Landahl.

P. S. I

P. S. I forgot to mention that the Tengchow and Sinyeh districts are again very much disturbed. The Sinyeh missionaries have for some time had to go into the city at nights, we hear. The station is in the (South Suburb) Nan Kwan.

In regard to the Sihsien missionaries, word has just come that Mr. Borg-Breen and Rolf (little son, about 5) were taken; the ladies (Mrs. Breen and Miss Hjeldness) were in Sihsien. Reverend Nelson, of Sinyang, had started for Sihsien to see about them. The situation is certainly growing serious. Sihsien is only 60 "li" from Losham, which is 120 "li" from Sinyangchow.

(Signed) Mrs. C. W. L.

A true copy of the signed original

Copied by MYH
Compared with

Sihsien, Honan, November 9th, 1922.

American Consul General,
Hankow.

Dear Sir:

On Nov. 8th about 2 a.m. a band of 5,000 robbers arrived in Sihsien and immediately began to loot and burn. We were told that they went to Chengyang.

Yesterday afternoon they insisted on Rev. E. Brog-Breen's going with them. They said, "We have protected you, now you must protect us." About an hour later other robbers who had not been in the house before came and demanded that we give up Rolf Breen, aged five, to them. They said that if we would give them silver money they would not take him. We did not have any silver money as we had by this time been stripped of nearly everything we had by those who had already looted. When they saw we could not give them any money they kidnapped the child and said they would let the child return when ransom was paid.

Mr. Breen learned of the fact that the child had been taken and asked the leader whom he was with that they should bring the child. This they promised to do but when they were leaving the city Mr. Breen came back and told us that they must have gone on ahead with the child and that they hoped to find him in Chengyang.

Now, of course, we know nothing of whether they found him or not.

Mr. Breen told us that he had seen and spoken to Mr. Lundeen of Juchow, Honan, who also is in the hands of these robbers.

This morning we saw Mr. Ledgard (Shangtsaihsien) for a few minutes as they were passing through. He said there were about 5,000 men in this band. Up to the time Mr. Breen and Rolf Breen were taken there were eight foreigners taken by this band. Those whose names he mentioned are: Messrs. Lundeen and Forsberg of Juchow; two ladies, Miss Sodenstrom and Mrs. Sodenstrom; Mr. Ledgard of Shangtsaihsien, Honan; two Frenchmen and a priest whose names he did not mention.

He told us that the object of these men was to do this destruction work in order that they may have a chance to re-enter the army. Many of these men are Chao Ti's ex-soldiers. The farther they go the larger the band grows because the riff-raff follows them in order to loot.

Mrs. Breen and I are here alone in Sihsien. We hope to go to Kikungshan as soon as we can get off when we think the way is clear. We expect to go to Loshan

and

and then to Sinyangchow. We also want to wait until we see if the child is returned. If they do send him back he should be here tomorrow evening. We can then try to get off the following day. If he is not returned, we must get off anyway. The distance from here to Chengyang is 110 li.

People seem to think that from Chengyang the robbers are going to Juning.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)(Miss) Mina Hjeldness.

L. No. 458.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 15, 1922.

Subject: Capture by Bandits of Einar Borg-Breen American Missionary, and His Son, Rolf Borg-Breen, at Sihsien, Honan.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

With reference to my No. 457 of November 12, 1922, with enclosures, regarding the capture by brigands at Sihsien, Honan, on November 8th, of the Reverend Einar Borg-Breen, and his son, Rolf Borg-Breen, American citizens and members of the Lutheran United Mission at that place, I have the honor to state that I received a call today from the Reverend George O. Holm of the Lutheran United Mission who is stationed at Chengyang-hsien, Honan. He informed me that he in company with the Reverend Edward Sevik, an American citizen, and the Reverend K. N. Tvedt, a Swedish subject, all members of the Lutheran United Mission, were planning to leave today at 11 o'clock a.m., by rail, for Sinyangchow or Mingchiang both in Honan in order to locate Mr. Borg-Breen and his son with a view to securing their release by means of negotiations with the bandit chiefs. He stated that in a conference held last night by the foreign mission body at Hankow it was decided that I should be asked to request the Legation to depute one or two members of its staff who, in company with

representatives

representatives of the Chinese Central Government were to proceed to Honan and in cooperation with the authorities of that province attempt to bring about the release of the captives. If this were done Mr. Helm and the other two missionaries would desire to be advised thereof in order that they could join the party feeling that they could be of assistance in interpreting, in serving as guides, etc. I trust the Legation will find it possible to act favorably on this suggestion as I believe this plan offers fair prospects of success in the attainment of the object desired. If the Legation is willing to attempt this plan I would be glad to be informed thereof by telegraph in order that I may in turn advise the three missionaries at what point on the railway they could join the party from Peking. In connection with the above procedure as suggested by the missionaries, I have to refer to my No. 422 of October 23, 1922, wherein practically the same suggestion is made regarding the best method by which the rescue of Mr. Lundeen and Mr. Forsberg could be effected.

Regarding the disturbed conditions in Honan generally, I beg to report that all the American and other foreign residents at Chikungshan, Honan, came to Hankow on November 12th reaching here during the evening of that day. The place is being evacuated as it was learned that an attack by a large brigand band was imminent. The foreigners were convinced that the local guard was totally inadequate to cope with the outlaws, particularly as it was persistently reported that the soldiers at Sinyangchow were likely to join the robbers. Among the number leaving Chikungshan were seventy

American

American school children, twenty-five of whom detrained at Shekow, a town on the railway in Hupeh, while the others are being furnished accommodation by missionaries in Hankow. The Swedish school in Chikungshan numbering fifty pupils arrived in Hankow this morning. I am informed that there are no Americans at present at Chikungshan. I am also informed that the only American missionaries who have not yet come to Hankow or any other place of safety are those in Juning, Suiying, and Kieshan, Honan. The members of these mission stations have not been heard from lately, and the three missionaries above-mentioned will attempt on their present journey into Honan to get in touch with them.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

350.

(Sent to the Legation in quintuplicate and 1 copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

H:C

A true copy
of the signed
original. J.M.C.

L. No. 440.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 14, 1922.

Subject: Disorders in Honan Province; looting of Mission Stations and Capture of Missionaries by Brigands.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

With reference to my despatches Nos. 437 and 438 of November 12, and November 13, 1922, respectively, on the above subject, I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Legation, two excerpts from the Central China Post, Hankow, of today's date. The first clipping, a news item, gives further details of the prevailing brigandage in south Honan - the looting of towns, including the mission stations located therein, and the capture of foreign missionaries. The second clipping, an editorial, discusses the situation from the point of view of the foreign residents of a treaty port and suggests measures that might be taken by the treaty Powers as well as foreign organs in China looking toward relief from the activities of the brigands. It is believed that these newspaper articles will be of interest, and the leader may be taken as indicating, though in a radical manner, perhaps, the local foreign attitude toward the subject.

A remedy proposed in the editorial for meeting

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the bandit situation in Honan - the organization of a mass meeting of protest by means of which it is hoped to bring pressure to bear on the high provincial authorities responsible for the protection of foreign life and property in their respective jurisdictions - is novel and somewhat aggressive. However, the views of the editor of the Central China Post on military and political conditions in central China are generally taken as the best measure of local foreign missionary and merchant opinion. As the editor, Mr. John Archibald, has had much to do with the extension of missionary enterprise in this part of China during the past 35 years, his views on this situation and suggestions as to remedial steps, on behalf of the mission and other foreign interests affected, are worthy of more than passing notice.

I was informed by the local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs by telephone this morning that General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, had at my request despatched telegrams to General Wu Pei-fu at Loyang and General Chang Fu-lai, Director General of Military Reorganisation in Honan, Kaifeng, conveying my request that adequate steps be taken to secure the release of the Reverend Borg-Breen and his son, Rolf Borg-Breen, from the hands of the brigands. Mr. Chen further stated that a telegram had been sent by General Hsiao to the military authorities concerned regarding the present welfare of the American members of the Lutheran United Mission at Kiochan, Suiping, and Juning, from whom no word has been heard by the mission at Hankow. This request was made by me at the instance of the Reverend N. A. Larsen, Vice Superintendent of

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the above-mentioned mission, who with his family has recently arrived at Hankow from Kwangshow, Honan, his regular station. Mr. Larsen was obliged to leave Kwangshow because of a threatened attack on that city by armed bandits.

Information reaching Hankow through the local office of the Peking-Hankow Railway is to the effect that Kiaohan, Chumatien, Sinantien, Kuochenchi and the villages near the railway in that part of Honan were looted, burned or otherwise destroyed. The brigands in their attack on the railway came from Kungchino and Shangtsai. When they began to destroy railway property and pull up the rails between Suiping and Chumatien, a regiment under the command of General Chin Yun-o arrived from Yencheng. A fight ensued north of Chumatien which lasted two hours. At a critical time in the fighting fresh troops under Brigadier General Yang came upon the scene, whereupon the robbers were repulsed. The regular troops, however, were unable to drive the bandits back from the railway; the latter merely retreated southward along the railway in the direction of Kiaohan and Mingchiang. Learning that there was a strong force of regular troops at Sinyangchow, they turned eastward in the direction of Ping-chang; a small body fled to Chengyang. General Chin is despatching troops in different directions for the suppression of the bandits; he has requested General Hsiao Yao-nan to send troops to assist in the task. It is reported that General Hsiao in response thereto has ordered General Liu Tso-lung, who is at present in Kwangshui, Hupeh, to despatch troops to

Kwangshan

Kwangsham, and he has also ordered two battalions of the troops under General Chang Lien-chen, Garrison Commander at Siangyang, to be sent to Tungpeh, Hunan, to assist General Chin.

Information received in local military circles is to the effect that General Chang Fa-kwei has decided to assemble a large force for the extermination of the brigands, and with this end in view has ordered General Hu Ching-yi to cooperate with General Chin.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Clipping (News Item) from Central China Post, Hankow, Issue of November 14, 1922;
2. Clipping (Editorial) from Central China Post, Hankow, Issue of November 14, 1922.

enclosures not available

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and 1 copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

SEO.

H:C

A true copy
of the signed
original.

L. No. 442.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 15, 1922.

Subject: Missionaries in Honan Provincial Troops Looted and Missionaries Taken Captive by Bandits.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my No. 440 of November 14, 1922, on the above subject, particularly the paragraph therein which relates to the resentment felt by all classes of the foreign community in Hankow at the failure of the Chinese officials in Honan to protect the missionary and other foreign interests in that province and the consequent proposal on the part of prominent business men and missionaries in this port to hold a public meeting to discuss what measures can be taken to remedy conditions.

I now beg to report that arrangements have been made for the holding of the meeting above-referred to. The meeting is to be convened at 6 p.m. today in Victoria Hall, the British Concession, Hankow. The announcement calling the meeting, which also gives the resolution to be proposed thereat, is contained in the enclosed clipping from this morning's issue of the Central China Post, Hankow.

The conveners of today's public meeting are named in the announcement. They comprise representative

business

business men and missionaries from all the large foreign communities in Hankow. The promoters of the plan for a meeting are Messrs. Hacker and Kirkhope, prominent British merchants in Hankow, and Mr. W. P. Mills, an American who is one of the foreign secretaries of the local Young Men's Christian Association. Both the British Consul General and myself were in the first instance approached by these three gentlemen as to whether we approved of such a meeting. We replied that we saw no objection thereto as favorable action by the foreign community on the resolution to be proposed, as published, would be in line with the position we had already taken with our respective Legations in regard to existing conditions in Honan and how they might be improved. Mr. Goffe and I decided, however, that we would not attend the meeting. Consul Lassetor of this office and Mr. Hoss, senior Vice Consul on the staff of the British Consulate General, will be in attendance, but not to participate in the discussions. The proceedings of the meeting will be reported to the Legation. While I can perceive no objection to Americans attending this meeting, it is difficult to see how any action taken or steps proposed by such a body of foreigners could have the slightest effect on the situation.

In connection with this public meeting, I have to enclose, for the information of the Legation, two further excerpts from the local morning British newspaper, of today's issue, on the subject; the first is a news item giving the most recent information reaching Hankow on the bandit situation in Honan; the second is an editorial invoking public support for today's

mass

mass meeting.

The local vernacular newspapers state, in effect, that the brigand band which has recently attacked the Peking-Hankow Railway came into Honan from Anhui. It is under the leadership of a brigadier general who owes allegiance to General Pao Teh-chuan. That these bandits are supported by an undisclosed party is shown by the fact that they bear flags inscribed with the characters "the Army for the Construction of the Country (建國軍)." They numbered only a few thousand when they first entered Honan, but their number was largely increased by numerous bands of brigands from west Honan. On the morning of November 12th in the face of strong government forces the brigands divided into two bodies: one moved in the direction of Loshan and Kushihsien, returning to the well known robber district; the other moved westward to Piyang and Wuyang.

General Chang Fu-lai, Director General of Military Reorganisation in Honan, has given General Chin Yun-o and his command $10,000 as a reward for the services so far rendered by them in checking the bandits.

It is reported that the brigands are still in the neighborhood of Kiashan with an intention of again attacking the towns along the railway. The bandit chief, called Old Foreigner, is Chao Chieh. The robbers are as well and fully equipped as the government troops. General Chin is of the opinion that his force is only sufficiently large to afford proper protection to the railway and asserts that he is not in a position to pursue the bandits. He has requested General Wu Pei-fu to despatch additional troops for the suppression of the outlaws. The Central Government has telegraphed

General

General Wu in the same manner. General Wu, in turn, asks for the cooperation of the provincial authorities of Hupeh and Anhwei. The Division under General Hu Ching-yi and the two brigades under the commands of Generals Wang Wen-wei and Tien Wei-yung have been ordered by General Chang Fu-lai to cooperate with General Chin's army. Anhwei has promised to despatch two brigades to assist General Chin, and, as reported in my No. 440 of yesterday's date, General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, has ordered General Liu Tso-lung, at present in Kwangshui, Hupeh, to despatch troops to Kwangshan, Honan, and he has also ordered General Chang Lien-shen, now at Siangyang, to send two battalions to Tungpeh, Honan.

On November 13, 1922, I addressed identical despatches to General Wu Pei-fu and General Chang Fu-lai on the subject of the existing chaotic conditions in Honan. They were requested therein to despatch troops to secure the release of Mr. Borg-Breen and his young son and to accord proper protection to Mrs. Borg-Breen and Miss Hjeldness so long as they remained in the mission station at Sihsien and to furnish a guard to escort them at the proper time from the mission station to a place of safety. Also, Generals Wu and Chang were notified that three missionaries of the Lutheran United Mission were proceeding into Honan in an attempt to get in touch with the missionaries at Juning, from whom no word had been heard, and especially to locate Mr. Borg-Breen and his son; if successful in locating the two captives, these three men would endeavor to open negotiations with the bandit chiefs for the formers' release.

Generals

Generals Wu and Chang were requested to instruct the local authorities in the districts which the party will traverse to accord the three missionaries all proper protection and assistance. Further, I requested that adequate measures be taken at once for the protection of all American mission property in Honan, special reference being made to the valuable property belonging to the Lutheran United Mission in Kwangchow and Kwangshan, and to various American mission societies and individuals at Chikungshan.

The three missionaries mentioned in the foregoing paragraph who went from Hankow into Honan on November 13th to get in touch with the bandits, as reported in my No. 458 of November 15, 1922, telegraphed from Sinyangchow yesterday to the effect that they could do nothing without the support of the Legation. Local missionaries and others interested in any measures that may be taken by the Chinese and American authorities for the rescue of the captured Americans are anxiously awaiting word from the Legation through the Consulate General as to whether the plan suggested in the above-mentioned despatch, for effecting the release of Mr. Borg-Breen and his son, has met with the approval of the Legation. If, before the receipt of this despatch, no telegram in answer to my communication above referred to has been sent me, I would thank the Legation to give me a telegraphic reply as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures

Enclosures:

1. Clipping (Announcement of Public Meeting) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 15, 1922;
2. Clipping (News Item) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 15, 1922;
3. Clipping (Editorial) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 15, 1922.

enclosures not available

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

SSO

K:G

A true copy of the signed original

No. 445.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 16, 1922.

Subject: Disorders in Honan Province; Towns Looted and Missionaries Taken Captive by Bandits.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

In continuation of my No. 442 of November 15, 1922, wherein reference is made to the public meeting which was to be held yesterday in Hankow to discuss existing conditions in Honan and consider what measures might be taken to improve the situation, I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Legation, a clipping from this morning's issue of the Central China Post, Hankow, containing the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting was held, as planned, at 6 p.m., on November 15, 1922, in Victoria Hall, the British Concession, Hankow. The newspaper article gives a full account of the proceedings which indicate clearly the feeling of the foreign community of Hankow toward the prevailing brigandage in Honan which is held to be harmful to all foreign interests in the province, commercial and missionary alike. The Legation's attention is particularly invited to the comprehensive review of the brigand situation in Honan given in the address made before the meeting by the Reverend N. Astrup Larsen, an American citizen and member of the Lutheran United Mission

Mission at Kwangchow, Honan. This review is the most concise and accurate statement on present conditions in southeast Honan that has got come to my knowledge.

The resolution passed at the meeting is to be presented to the Consular Body at Hankow for consideration and transmission to the Diplomatic Body in Peking; in forwarding the resolution to the Legation I hope to be able to make some observations thereon.

I have to enclose, for the information of the Legation, a further excerpt from the local morning British newspaper, of today's date, giving the newest developments in the situation, so far as they have become known in Hankow.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. Clipping (Proceedings of Public Meeting) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 14, 1922;
2. Clipping (News Item) from Central China Post, Hankow, November 14, 1922.

enclosures not available

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).

No copy sent to the Department.

320.

H:G

A true copy of the signed original.

L. No. 446.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 18, 1922.

Subject: Disorders in Honan Province; Towns Looted and Missionaries Taken Captive by Brigands.

The Honorable J. G. Schurman,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

With reference to my despatches Nos. 437, 438, 440, 442, and 443 of November 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 1922, respectively, regarding the brigandage prevailing in Honan Province, I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Legation, copies of all the correspondence, as listed below, exchanged between me and various Chinese officials in Honan and Hupeh on the subject. This correspondence is self-explanatory.

The attention of the Legation is respectfully invited to enclosure No. 10, which is translation of an article appearing in the Kiang Shen Daily News, Hankow, issue of November 18, 1922, quoting two telegrams dated November 16, 1922, addressed by the Chinese Associated Chambers of Commerce, now in session at Hankow, to the Central Government and the provincial authorities concerned on the subject of the lawlessness prevailing in Honan. In these telegrams the conference of Associated Chambers requests that a time limit be fixed for the suppression of brigandage in Honan first and in the neighboring provinces later.

▲

A news item from Peking is to the effect that the Central Government has under consideration the appointment of General Wu Pei-fu as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces for the Suppression of Brigandage in the four provinces of Honan, Shantung, Anhui, and Kiangsu. Such an appointment should prove a long step forward toward the re-establishment of law and order in the bandit-infested areas of Honan.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
Consul General.

Enclosures:

1. To Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Protection of Chikungshan), November 1, 1922;
2. To Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Protection of Chikungshan), November 9, 1922;
3. To General Chang Fu-lai, Director General of Military Reorganization in Honan (Capture of Sihsien Missionaries and Protection of Chikungshan, etc.), November 13, 1922;
4. From Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Capture of Juchow Missionaries), November 15, 1922 (in translation);
5. From Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Protection of Chikungshan), November 15, 1922 (in translation);
6. To Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Reply to No. 4), November 16, 1922;
7. To Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Reply to No. 5), November 16, 1922;
8. From Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Capture of Sihsien Missionaries), November 17, 1922 (in translation);
9. From Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow (Protection of American Missionaries at Juning, Suiping and Kioshan), November 17, 1922 (in translation);
10. Translation from Kiang Shen Daily News, Hankow (Telegrams Sent by the Conference of Chinese Associated Chambers of Commerce to the Central Government and Certain Provincial Authorities), November 16, 1922.

320.

(Sent in quintuplicate to the Legation and one copy sent to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Force).
No copy sent to the Department.

A true copy of the signed original

H:C

Copied by MYH
Compared with

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 1, 1923.

The Honorable Chen Chieh,
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,
Hankow.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of a letter, dated October 29, 1923, from Mr. Roy F. Thelander, principal of the American School at Chikungshan, Honan, stating that the prevailing brigandage in Honan is such that the bandits are in a position to attack strongly protected cities along the Peking-Hankow Railway and requesting that the Chinese authorities be asked to take measures for the protection of American life and property at Chikungshan. Mr. Thelander's communication, which is self-explanatory, reads as follows:

> "I deem it desirable to write you regarding conditions in this section of the country.
>
> "It may be that we are in no particular danger, for all is quiet up here, but of course one never knows what can happen in a few hours as conditions are in Honan today. There are rumors afloat up here that there may be an outbreak of some kind. I have been told that soldiers have been withdrawn from the mountain and that the present police force is inadequate for the proper protection of the mountain. If there should be robber bands in the vicinity of the mountain they might take advantage of a situation that they might regard as favorable. I shall appreciate it very much if you will kindly inquire of the authorities what measures have been taken to meet any emergency that may arise. In view of being responsible for a large number of American children and teachers I consider it my duty to always be on the alert for emergencies."

I beg to request that you give this matter prompt consideration. In view of the absence of a military

guard

guard in the vicinity of Chikungshan, it is impreative that measures be taken looking toward the adequate protection of American citizens and their property on the mountain. As the brigands attack cities and towns without the slightest warning in advance, it is wise to take precautionary steps; otherwise, American life and property may be imperilled. Prevention is better than cure, and present conditions in Honan plainly call for stringent measures for the safeguarding of the Americans at Chikungshan.

I beg to request that you take up this matter with the Military Governor of Hupeh to the end that the Military Governor of Honan may be requested to station adequate troops in the vicinity of Chikungshan for the protection of the American residents and their property thereon from the possible attacks of outlaws.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated by me.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
American Consul General.

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K:C

A true copy
of the signed
original

Copied by MYH
Compared with

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 9, 1922.

The Honorable Chen Chieh,
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,
Hankow.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of November 1, 1922, wherein I point out the grave dangers surrounding American life and property in many sections of Honan due to the widespread brigandage in that province and explain that a number of American missionaries residing in the affected areas are expected to leave their stations in the near future and go to Chikungshan for safety to remain there until normal conditions are restored; mention is also made therein of the large number of American school children and teachers already on Chikungshan. As all soldiers have been withdrawn from the mountain and the present police force is not deemed adequate for the proper protection of the place, I ask therein that you take up the matter with the Military Governor of Hupeh to the end that the Military Governor of Honan may be requested to station adequate troops in the vicinity of Chikungshan for the protection of the American residents and their property thereon from the possible attacks of outlaws.

I now beg to state that I have today received a call from the Reverend George O. Holm of the Lutheran United Mission at Chengyang, Honan. Mr. Holm states that recently conditions in the vicinity of Chengyang

city

city have become serious; brigands in large numbers threaten to attack and capture the city. As a result the Magistrate had three of the four city gates closed and barricaded, and only one gate is left open for traffic. Mr. Holm adds that he along with the other foreigners there was asked by the Magistrate to leave Chengyang for a place of safety, and that he and his family have gone to Chikungshan. He further states that brigands in large numbers are moving toward the southeast part of Honan and have already taken a number of towns; it is possible that if they return to west Honan by way of Sinyangchow, Chikungshan and its vicinity will be in danger of attack and American life and property on Chikungshan will be imperilled. At present there are over sixty American school children and teachers on Chikungshan and, in addition to the considerable number of American missionaries already arrived there, many others from the various disturbed districts are expected to reach there in the near future. Since the Americans in the bandit-infested areas of Honan are making Chikungshan their place of safety, it is imperatively urgent that the mountain be adequately protected and guarded from possible attack.

In view of the foregoing I beg to renew my request that you take up the matter with the Military Governor of Hupeh to the end that an adequate force may be stationed in the vicinity of Chikungshan for the protection of American life and property there.

In this connection, I venture to point out that it is most important that railway communication between Hankow and Chikungshan be kept open so that, in the event

that

that the mountain is threatened by an attack from Honan brigands, facilities may exist for the transport of the residents thereon to Hankow.

I cannot too strongly impress on you the seriousness of this matter, and I need hardly assure you that your effective cooperation in this connection will be greatly appreciated by me as well as by the American Minister at Peking and the Government at Washington.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
American Consul General.

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

Copied by TMC.
Compared with

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, November 13, 1922.

His Excellency General Chang Fu-lai,

Director General of Military Reorganization in Honan,

Kaifeng, Honan.

Excellency:

I have the honor to state that I am in receipt of urgent telegrams and letters from a number of American missionaries of the Lutheran United Mission stationed at various places in Honan, reporting the capture by brigands at Sihsien on November 8th of the Reverend Minar Borg-Breen, and his five-year-old son, Rolf Borg-Breen; both are American citizens, and the former is a member of the above-mentioned mission stationed at Sihsien. The father and son were carried away by two different parties of the same robber band acting separately. All the members of the mission at Sihsien were at the time robbed of their clothes, food, and money. Mrs. Borg-Breen and Miss Mina Hjeldness, American women of the mission, are still at Sihsien awaiting an opportunity to come away for safety to Hankow or one of the towns located on the railway.

I beg earnestly to request Your Excellency to despatch adequate troops immediately to secure the release of Mr. Borg-Breen and his young son, and at the same time accord proper protection to the two American women so long as they remain in the mission station at Sihsien and also furnish a guard to escort them at the proper time from the mission station to a place of safety.

Reggrding

Regarding the disturbed conditions in south and central Honan generally, I learn that all the American missionaries in stations in southeast Honan have come to Hankow and other places of safety along the railway or else have been heard from lately, with the exception of those located in the town of Juning. No word has been heard lately from the missionaries at this station. Three members of the Lutheran United Mission, namely, the Reverends George O. Holm, Edward Sevik, both American citizens, and the Reverend K. N. Tvedt, a Swedish subject, left Hankow today by rail for Sinyangchow or Mingchiang in an attempt to get in touch with the missionaries at Juning. The three gentlemen above-mentioned will also endeavor on their journey into Honan to locate Mr. Borg-Breen and his son and then try to open negotiations with the bandit chiefs with a view to bringing about the release of the two captives. In connection with the trip of this rescue party into Honan, I would thank Your Excellency to instruct the local authorities in the districts which the party will traverse to accord these missionary gentlemen all proper protection and assistance.

I learn further that Kwangchow and Kwangshan are in grave danger of attacks by brigands. The American missionaries in those cities have already come to Hankow for safety. While no Americans are there at present, the Lutheran United Mission has much valuable property in the two places, especially in Kwangchow. Adequate measures should be taken at once for the protection of this as well as other mission property in Honan.

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What is stated in the preceding paragraph regarding the protection that should be accorded the mission property in Kwangchow and Kwangshan applies equally to the property on Chikungshan belonging to American missionaries and merchants. The present situation on Chikungshan is as follows: On November 12th and 13th all the American and other foreign residents came by rail to Hankow for safety. This step was deemed necessary in view of the persistent report that an attack on the place was being planned by a large brigand band. The foreign residents were convinced that the local guard was totally inadequate to cope with the outlaws in the event of an attack. With reference to the detachment of soldiers stationed early in November at Chikungshan on my request, the original number consisted of only 100 men. On November 10th half of them suddenly left to escort General Chin's wife to Sinyangchow. As no reinforcement arrived the whole number of soldiers left to protect the foreigners and their property consisted of only 50 men. Finally when on Sunday and Monday last the foreigners departed from Chikungshan the remaining 50 soldiers also left. There is thus at present no Chinese force whatever on Chikungshan to protect the valuable American property at that place. It is hoped that this important matter as well will be given the prompt and serious attention of Your Excellency.

I cannot too strongly impress on Your Excellency the seriousness of these matters, and I need hardly assure you that your effective cooperation in this connection will be deeply appreciated by me as well as the American Minister at Peking and the Government at Washington.

The

The favor of a telegraphic reply is requested.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,

American Consul General.

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(Similar despatch of the same date sent to General Wu Pei-fu, High Inspecting Commissioner of Hupeh and Hunan, Loyang).

Translation.

Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow,
to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 13, 1922.
Received November 14, 1922.

Sir:

With reference to the capture by brigands of two members of the Augustana Synod Mission at Juchow, Honan, recently I received a telephone message from the Military Governor of Hupeh stating that a telegraphic reply had been received from the Military Governor of Honan. I was instructed to transmit the information to you. In compliance with the instruction a copy of the telegram was sent to you in due course. Thereafter a despatch was received from the Swedish Vice Consul on the same subject. It was referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military and Civil Governors of Hupeh, as is on record.

I am now in receipt of a special instruction from the Office of the Military Governor stating as follows:

> "Your report has received my careful consideration. Since the matter has been referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General Chang of Honan will be instructed by the Ministry to take prompt measures to release the captives from danger, etc."

Besides communicating the foregoing to the Swedish Vice Consul, I beg to transmit it for your information.

In this connection I have to call Your attention to a newspaper report that all the foreigners captured by the brigands have been released and that they have returned to their homes in safety, etc. I shall appreciate a confirmation from you of this report.

With renewed assurance of my high consideration,

Signature and seal of Chen Chieh.

Translation.

Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow,
to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 15, 1922.
Received November 15, 1922.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two recent despatches regarding the brigandage in Honan; you request that the Military Governor of Hupeh ask the Military Governor of Honan to despatch troops for the protection of American life and property on Chikungshan; you further request that rail communication between Sintien and Hankow be kept open in order to meet emergencies.

Your communication under acknowledgment were in due course referred to the Military Governor of Hupeh for consideration. I am now in receipt of following reply:

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters stating that the American Consul General, Hankow, has reported that brigandage in Honan is growing from bad to worse and that he requests that soldiers be despatched to protect the foreigners on Chikungshan and to keep open the rail communication between Chikungshan and Hankow in order to meet emergencies, etc.

"I immediately despatched an urgent telegram to the 1st Mixed Brigade of Hupeh instructing Captain Chow at Teh-an to send a company of soldiers to Wushengkwan at once to cooperate with the troops of the 14th Division stationed at Sintien and Chikungshan in protecting the foreigners on the mountain and in guarding the railway south of Wushengkwan.

"With reference to the capture of the Reverend Borg-Breen and his son, American missionaries at Sihsien, I have already telegraphed General Wu, High Inspecting Commissioner, and General Chang, Director General of Military Reorganization in Honan, requesting them to take measures for the release of the captives. When a reply is received, it will be transmitted to you.

"It is hoped that you will transmit the foregoing information to the American Consul General."

I

I beg to communicate the foregoing for your information.

Regarding your inquiry as to the welfare of the American missionaries at Juning, Suiping, and Kioshan, Honan, I have personally requested the Military Governor to send a telegram of inquiry concerning them

With renewed assurances of my high consideration,

Signature of Chen Chieh,

Per Signature and seal of Peng Chung-wei,

Chief Secretary.

Copied by MYH
Compared with

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, November 16, 1922.

The Honorable Chen Chieh,
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,
Hankow.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your despatch of November 13, 1922, regarding the capture by brigands of the two missionaries at Juchow, Honan, and quoting for my information a communication from General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military and Civil Governor of Hupeh, on the subject. In this connection you inquire whether I am able to confirm a newspaper report to the effect that the foreigners in Honan captured by bandits have been released, and that they have returned to their homes in safety.

The newspaper report that the foreigners in Honan captured by robbers have been released is unfounded. It is true that Mr. Ledgard and Mrs. and Miss Soderstrom, all British subjects, who were recently captured by brigands in Central Honan managed to escape from their captors; they were not released. The American, French, and Swedish captives, however, have neither escaped from nor been released by their captors. As the subject of the despatch under acknowledgment relates specifically to the two missionaries of the Augustana Synod Mission who were captured at Juchow on October 13, 1922, namely, Mr. Lundeen, an American citizen, and Mr. Forsberg, a Swedish subject,

you

you are informed that both these gentlemen are still in the hands of the robbers and have not returned to their station at Juchow. The same is true of Mr. Borg-Breen and his five-year-old son, Rolf Borg-Breen, both American citizens, who were captured by brigands at Sihsien on November 8th. The father and son are still being held captive. Mr. Borg-Breen is a member of the Lutheran United Mission stationed at Sihsien.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN

P. S. Heintzleman,
American Consul General.

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H:YU

A true copy
of the signed
original.

Copied by XXX.
Compared with

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

Hankow, China, November 16, 1922.

The Honorable Chen Chieh,
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,
Hankow.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of November 15, 1922, quoting, for my information, copy of an instruction addressed to you by the Military Governor of Hupeh wherein it is stated that His Excellency had despatched a company of soldiers of the 1st Hupeh Mixed Brigade at Teh-an to Wushengkwan to cooperate with the troops of the 14th Division stationed at Sintien and Chikungshan in protecting the foreigners at the latter place and in guarding the railway south of Wushengkwan.

In reply I beg to state that I am reliably informed that there are no troops whatever stationed at present at Sintien and Chikungshan. In this connection I venture to apprise you of the present unprotected position of Chikungshan. On November 12th and 13th all the American and other foreign residents on Chikungshan came by rail to Shekow and Hankow for safety. This step was deemed necessary in view of the persistent report that an attack on the place was being planned by a large brigand band. The foreign residents were convinced that the local guard was totally inadequate to cope with the outlaws in the event of an attack. It is true that a detachment of soldiers was, in response to my request, stationed

early

early in November at Chikungshan, but the number was very small, consisting of only 100 men. On November 10th half of these soldiers suddenly left to escort General Chin's wife to Sinyangchow. As no reinforcements arrived the whole number of troops left to protect the foreigners and their property consisted of only 50 men. Finally, when on Sunday and Monday last the foreigners left Chikungshan the remaining 50 soldiers deserted the place. There is thus at present, with the exception of about 20 regular police, no Chinese force whatever on Chikungshan to protect the valuable American property there.

The proper protection of Chikungshan is a most important matter and one which deserves to receive prompt and serious consideration on the part of the provincial authorities of Hupeh and Honan; while I appreciate greatly the kind and accommodating spirit prompting the action of the Military Governor in sending on my request a company of soldiers to Washengkwen to cooperate with the troops alleged to be already stationed at Sintien and Chikungshan, I cannot resist the conviction that this body of men, apart from the fact that it is very small, is too far away to be of actual assistance in protecting foreigners and their property on Chikungshan in the event of an attack by any of the large brigand bands that are at present operating in southern Honan. I beg to request, therefore, that you will kindly convey the above to the Military Governors of the two provinces concerned to the end that joint measures may be taken by them for the adequate protection of the American mission property on Chikungshan.

Your active cooperation in this matter will be deeply

deeply appreciated by me.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration,

P. S. HEINTZLEMAN
P. S. Heintzleman,
American Consul General.

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H:G

A true copy
of the sign
original.

Translation.

Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow, to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 17, 1922.
Received November 18, 1922.

Sir:

In a recent conversation you stated that an American missionary and his son at Sihsien in the neighborhood of Sinyangchow had been captured by brigands. You requested that the Military Governor be asked to telegraph the authorities in Honan to the end that prompt measures might be taken looking to their release, etc.

I reported the matter to the Military Governor of Hupeh and requested that a telegram be sent to the Honan authorities. I am now in receipt of a reply stating:

"With reference to the capture by bandits of American missionaries at Sihsien, Honan, upon the receipt of your letter a telegraphic inquiry was despatched to the Military Governor of Honan with the request that he take steps for the rescue of the captives. I am now in receipt of a telegram, dated the 14th instant, from Director General Chang, stating as follows:

'Your telegram of the 12th instant has been respectfully noted. I have already telegraphed to General Chin, the Commander-in-Chief, to take steps looking toward the rescue and release of the American missionary and his son who were captured by bandits at Sihsien.'

"I have to communicate the foregoing to you for transmission to the American Consul General."

I beg to transmit the foregoing for your information.

With renewed assurances of my high consideration,

Signature of Chen Chieh

Per Signature and seal of Peng Chung-wei, Chief Secretary.

Translation.

Mr. Chen Chieh, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Hankow,
to Mr. Heintzleman, American Consul General, Hankow.

Dated November 17, 1922.
Received November 18, 1922.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your recent request by telephone that inquiries be instituted as to the welfare of the American missionaries stationed at Juning, Suiping, and Kioshan, Henan. Thereupon I personally requested the Military Governor of Hupeh to send a telegram to that effect. I am now in receipt of the following reply from the Military Governor:

"Recently you asked that a telegram be sent to the Military Governor of Honan requesting that protection be accorded the American missionaries at Juning, etc. Your request was complied with. I am now in receipt of a telegram from General Chang, Director General of Military Reorganization in Honan, dated the 15th instant, reading as follows:

'The contents of your telegram of the 13th instant have received my consideration. I have already ordered the troops at the front by telegraph to take measures for the protection of the American missionaries residing at Juning, Suiping and Kioshan. They were instructed to locate them and render a report thereon.'

"The foregoing is transmitted for your information and transmission to the American Consul General."

I beg to communicate the above message for your information.

With renewed assurances of my high consideration,

Signature of Chen Chieh,

Per Signature and seal of Peng Chung-wei,

Chief Secretary.

Translation from the Kiang Shan Daily News, Hankow, November 18, 1932.

Recently brigandage has again broken out in Honan in its most violent form. The brigands have attacked the Peking-Hankow Railway and have attacked and captured over ten hsien cities including Kioshan and Chengyang. Most of the mission stations of foreign nationalities have been either looted or burned, and some of the missionaries have been taken captive. Foreign residents in Honan, in order to escape from the bandits, have come to Hankow in large numbers. The foreign merchants of Hankow are indignant at this state of affairs; Mr. Hanker, Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce, proposed the holding of a public meeting of the foreign residents of Hankow to consider what measures might be taken to improve the situation. On the 15th instant a mass meeting was convened in Victoria Hall, British Concession. It was resolved that a protest be lodged with the Chinese Central Government. An account of the meeting appeared in yesterday's issue of this paper.

It is reported that the Associated Chambers of Commerce, on account of the mass meeting mentioned above, considered that the brigandage in Honan greatly concerns the administration of China; therefore, on the 16th instant after the program for the day, Mr. Lu Chao-peh, Chairman of the conference, called a special meeting. After earnest discussion it was resolved that an urgent telegram be despatched to the Central Government requesting that immediate steps be taken for the protection of foreigners so that no opportunity would be afforded them to interfere in China's civil administration. Three

persons

persons were chosen to draft the necessary telegrams. Mr. Hsu Yung-ting, delegate for the Wuchang General Chamber of Commerce, subscribed $1000 to meet the telegraphic charges. The telegrams were sent to the Telegraph Administration for despatch at 12 midnight.

The following is a translation of the telegram: To the President and the Cabinet, Peking.

The press reports that recently the brigands in Honan have become most active and have disturbed several provinces. When the conference had the subject under consideration, the Hankow newspapers reported that on the 14th instant British, American, Japanese, French, Dutch, Danish, Belgian, Swiss, Norwegian, Italian, and Portuguese residents at Hankow issued a public notice to the effect that on the 15th a public meeting would be held in Victoria Hall, Hankow. The principal point is to the effect that inasmuch as the Chinese Government is inefficient, the military cliques maintain troops for their own protection; as a result thereof, brigands become bold and cruel, and the life and property of foreigners of all nationalities are imperilled. The brigandage has existed for a number of months, yet it has not been suppressed, and no effective methods have been found to secure the release of the foreigners captured by the bandits. In order to improve the situation the foreign residents are compelled to telegraph to their respective governments to the end that the latter may address notes to the Chinese Government inquiring why soldiers are permitted to terrorize the inhabitants, requesting from the Chinese Government an appropriate apology, and asking to be informed whether the Chinese Government is able to maintain order and

peace

peace in China and protect foreign life and property, etc. The report gave us great alarm. The Chinese militarists have under their commands myriads of soldiers employed for their own selfish strife and they pay no attention to the operations of the bandits; hence the rampant brigandage in Honan endangering foreign life and property. If they do not come to their senses promptly in suppressing the bandits, the Boxer trouble is likely to recur at once. Should this happen, what will be the future of the country? Therefore, this conference begs to request that the military authorities responsible be strictly ordered to suppress the brigandage within their jurisdiction within a time limit. Should any delay bring disaster to the country, they should be indicted according to the law with a view to upholding the national law and to strengthening the foundation of the country.

The following telegram has been sent to General Tsao Kun, High Inspecting Commissioner of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan, Paoting; General Wu Pei-fu, High Inspecting Commissioner for Hupeh and Hunan, Loyang; General Chang Fu-lai, Director General of Military Reorganisation in Honan, Kaifeng; and General Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, Wuchang:

(The first part is similar to the foregoing telegram)

When the people are poor and the treasury is depleted and the country is in danger of collapse, the rampant brigandage imperils the life and property of foreign residents. The Boxer trouble may recur at any time. We beg to request that you give this serious consideration. In view of the warning of the foreign community in holding a mass meeting, it is requested that you despatch adequate troops immediately first for the joint suppression of the brigands in Honan, and then the bandits in the other provinces, so that foreigners will have no occasion to complain. Thus the foundation of the country will be strengthened and the merchants and people of the entire country will receive benefits at your hands.

Written by Miss Roy Anderson Dec-1922

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.
JAN 25 1923
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CHINA - INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION.

Americans welcomed the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a republican form of government in 1911. For nearly fifty years previous to the abdication of the Emperor Hsuan Tung the work of American educators had done much to awaken the people of China to a realization of their backwardness when compared with the peoples of other powerful nations. The Sino-Japanese War, Boxer Trouble and Russo-Japanese War were evidences of the weakness of China when confronted with modern fighting machines. The more modern among the intellectuals - the scholastic aristocracy - felt that fundamental reforms in the social, political and economic life of China were essential to the maintenance of China as an independent state. The Throne and the thousands of reactionary, or conservative, Chinese officials, as well as the leaders of the classical school, were of the opinion that there was nothing lacking in Chinese civilization, there was nothing to be gained by foreign contacts, and they considered that the barbarians of the West had only one thing which could be of material use to China - the art of modern warfare. The knowledge of this art must be acquired - not to assist in the modernizing of China, but merely to protect China's ancient civilization from the invasion of Western civilization.

Japan was cited as an example of the necessity of militarizing a nation to protect it from alien aggression. The defeat of China in 1895, and the subsequent defeat of Russia in 1905, proved that the Japanese had acquired a skill in modern warfare which would not only defend Japan against Western invaders, but would also allow her to invade the territory of others. The Chinese had from time immemorial held the Nipponese in contempt, all that the subjects of the Mikado had in the way of learning had been borrowed from China. Now that the Japanese had exchanged their ancient learning for the modern, the Chinese officials feared that she would attempt to impose her new ideas and thought upon the Chinese by force of arms. The Throne and the reactionary Chinese officials were determined to protect China from the contamination of modernism.

Yuan Shih-kai, Resident General of Korea, was accused by the Throne of being a traitor when he allowed the last vestige of Chinese authority to be removed from Korea under threat of Japan. He returned to China disgraced. The sentence of death was passed upon him, and had it not been for the intercession of Viceroy Li Hung-chang, he would have been summarily decapitated. The old Metropolitan Viceroy knew that Yuan Shih-kai was one of the cleverest of Chinese officialdom, and he decided that his life should be spared. In a memorial to the Throne Li Hung-chang begged that Yuan Shih-kai should be spared his life, stripped of all his honors, and ordered to drill a modern army in order that he might redeem his reputation. This was done,.

Yuan Shih-kai at once set about his new task - the training of a modern fighting machine. He employed German officers as well as several from other nationalities. The military school which he es-

tablished was a sort of Plattsburg. He organized a camp at Machang just south of Tientsin, and gathered together as good material as he could find from which a modern army was to be trained. From the most ancient times the military profession was not considered decent. The Chinese have a proverb: "No gentlemen would become a soldier." This feeling upon the part of the better educated Chinese made the task of Yuan Shih-kai doubly difficult. It was impossible for him to secure the more intelligent young men as officer material. He had not only to choose men from the lower walks of life who were above the average intelligence, but he had to teach them their "a,b,c's".

Yuan Shih-kai was a man of iron will, and after some years of downright struggle he succeeded in building up a respectable fighting force. These troops were the beginnings of China's modern army. Many of the senior officers were men from the lowest social stratum, but they were for the most part men of unusual intelligence, and it should be recorded that quite a few of these men became excellent scholars as well as military leaders.

While Yuan Shih-kai was drilling his troops, the aged Viceroy of Hupeh, Chang Chih-tung, one of China's greatest scholars, also opened a military school in Wuchang. He sent many students to Japan, and brought many Japanese instructors to Hupeh. Unlike Yuan Shih-kai, Chang Chih-tung made his military school a school wherein gentlemen studied to be officers. The school was in every sense a school of mollycoddles. The cadets did not do any actual drilling, and in no way were they forced to soil their hands and clothes - a school of young aristocrats who were nothing more than parlor militarists.

During the training of the armies under Yuan Shih-kai and Chang Chih-tung, several modern leaders among the intellectuals, known as "reformers", came into personal contact with the Emperor Kwang Hsu and influenced him to issue a "reform edict". Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao were the two prominent "reformers" who had succeeded in modernizing the weak Emperor. The Dowager Empress at once ordered that these "reformers" be beheaded, and forced the Emperor into confinement in the palace. He became in every respect a prisoner.

The Dowager Empress viewed with increasing alarm the rise of the reform movement, and became suspicious of the two Viceroys who were training modern armies in Hupeh and Chihli. There was a great demand for a constitutional monarchy, and hundreds of able scholars joined the group which had initiated the constitutional cause. The Empress Dowager was one of the cleverest politicians of her day, and she felt that the time had arrived when she should break down the reform movement. The Boxer Trouble was undoubtedly a foolish stroke, but in her eyes it was the only means of getting rid of the "foreign devils" who had dared to initiate reforms. The wholesale massacre of foreigners would, in her opinion, act as a deterrent when foreigners who would in the future seek the hospitality of the Flowery Kingdom attempt to teach modern thought.

Yuan Shih-kai and Chang Chih-tung as well as Liu Kwun-yi, the Viceroy of Kiangsu, knew that the massacre of foreigners would bring ruin to China, and headed

ruin to China, and headed by Viceroy Li Hung-chang, they [illegible] to do to all that they could to check the Boxers, and did [illegible] save the lives of thousands of foreigners. Had these great Viceroys joined in the Boxer movement few foreign lives would have been spared in the interior and many of the treaty ports would also have suffered.

The occupation of Peking by the forces of America, Great Britain, Japan, France and Russia - an occupation which still exists - proved conclusively to the Manchu Throne and Chinese reactionaries that any attempt to massacre foreigners would not be tolerated, and the superior forces of the West would easily quell any Chinese uprising. Again the Chinese were taught the value of force. Their previous experience having been the Sino-Japanese War which was soon to be followed by the Russo-Japanese war.

Beginning with 1905 there was a very strong constitutional movement. The hundreds who had been sent into exile in foreign countries and the great Northwest of China were actively engaged in raising funds and carrying on propaganda. The many schools established by the government and private individuals became the headquarters of revolutionary instruction. The students gathered together from all parts of the country were awakening to the necessity of the overthrow of the Manchus. They had no republican ideas beyond the securing of a constitution. The whole aim was to restore the son of Han to the Throne, and make him a constitutional monarch.

China was full of anti-dynastic secret societies - anti-Manchu. The last great effort to overthrow the Manchus was during the Taiping Rebellion. While the rebellion proved unsuccessful it did not kill the secret societies. Alongside these anti-dynastic secret societies there sprang into existence another secret society of the moderns. In fact there were several of these, the stronger being the Tungmenghui. The schools were hotbeds of sedition, and the hundreds of young students from good families were coming under the direct influence of the Tungmenghui. Many of the zealots were resorting to the method of assassination, and some of the more prominent Manchu officials were murdered prior to the Revolution of 1911.

In 1911 the revolutionary societies had not succeeded in securing sufficient strength to overthrow the Manchus, and at the same time establish any sort of stable government. The attempt of the Government to nationalize railways thereby interfering with state's rights, especially in Szechuan, gave the revolutionaries at Hankow and Wuchang an opportunity to initiate a rebellion against the Manchus. A little group of revolutionists, headed by Hwang Hsing, a follower of Sun Yat-sen, who was at the time abroad, forcibly persuaded Colonel Li Yuan-hung to declare his independence of his Manchu superior, and take command of the Chinese troops at Ichang, initiating a rebellion against the Throne. The troops were for the most part members of the old anti-dynastic societies, and welcomed any movement calculated to get rid of the Manchus. Colonel Li Yuan-hung and his associates had no republican

principles. They had no modern views for that matter. To them the whole thing was merely an anti-Manchu rebellion.

In 1908, three years before the outbreak of the First Revolution at Wuchang, the Empress Dowager had died and also the Emperor Kwang Hsu. Yuan Shih-kai was at the time in Peking where he had been called by the Empress several years before. The Empress Dowager fearing the rise of two great Chinese military leaders, Yuan Shih-kai and Chang Chih-tung, had brought them to Peking, making them Grand Councillors of State, substituting for them Manchu officials at the head of the armies in Chihli and Hupeh. It was generally believed that Yuan Shih-kai had poisoned the Emperor Kwang Hsu upon the death of the Empress Dowager, and when the baby Emperor Hsuan Tung succeeded to the Throne, the Prince Regent forced Yuan Shih-kai into exile. His rival Chang Chih-tung had passed from this world about three years before Yuan Shih-kai's exile. Fearing the power of Yuan Shih-kai the Prince Regent allowed him to resign, so technically speaking his face was saved, and officially he was not in exile.

The revolution at Wuchang rapidly spread throughout the Yangtze Valley and the Southern and Southwestern provinces. The Chinese troops in these areas were for the most part commanded by young men, men of revolutionary tendencies and the soldiers themselves were ax adherents of the anti-Manchu cause. It was therefore not difficult to raise the standard of rebellion. The old Manchu garrisons in the Yangtze Valley and in these provinces south of the River were of no value, having degenerated through years of ease and dissipation. They were disposed of in a very few days.

The provinces north of the Yangtze were in the hands of the so-called Northern Army, the army which had been created by Yuan Shih-kai and Chang Chih-tung. This army could have easily defeated the rebels. The troops were well disciplined and equipped, officered by capable men. The Throne at once ordered the Northern Army to proceed to Hankow and Nanking, the two strongholds of the rebels, with instructions to annihilate the enemy, giving no mercy to revolutionists.

The Prince Regent and other members of the Imperial Family felt that this Northern Army could not be depended upon since it was the creation of Yuan Shih-kai. The Throne at once recalled Yuan Shih-kai to power, appointing him Prime Minister and also as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. Yuan Shih-kai was given supreme command of the government. He took up his new post, but in doing so remembered his treatment at the hands of the Manchus. He returned to Peking with the one object in mind - getting rid of the Manchus.

Yuan Shih-kai ordered the Northern Army to defeat the rebels at Hankow, but under no circumstances let it out that they had been defeated. All that he desired was to check their advance. He also sent forces to the Kiangsu-Shantung border to keep the rebels from entering strictly Northern provinces. Then finding that he had the rebels at his mercy he daily informed the Throne of the rebel movement which was daily

growing in strength. He advised that it would be most difficult for him to check the advance of the Southerners, and in every way frightened the Manchu family into subservience to his will.

In the mean time Sun Yat-sen had returned from abroad, and was escorted to Nanking, the newly established seat of the rebel government. It was decided to form a republican government, and a national assembly was brought into being, the members having been chosen by the rebel chieftains, and not duly elected. The membership of this assembly contained the names of men from every province in China. The assembly elected Sun Yat-sen to be Provisional President of the Republic of China, and a Cabinet was appointed by him. The members of this Cabinet were men of the old and new schools of thought. The Ministers were of the old school, and the vice-ministers of the new school - with only one exception, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Wang Chung-hui, a young man and a graduate of Yale University.

Yuan Shih-kai found himself confronted with a republican government at Nanking under the presidency of Sun Yat-sen, and a rebel army which he easily held in check. He decided that he would secure the abdication of the Manchus and bargain with the republican government at Nanking to elect him president. Yuan Shih-kai asked his brilliant and trusted secretary, Liang Shih-yi, to draft an edict of abdication for the Throne, and simultaneously instructed his chief subordinate, General Tuan Chi-jui, who commanded the troops in the vicinity of Peking, to issue an appeal to the Throne, begging the Throne to abdicate in deference to the will of the people.

Tuan Chi-jui did as instructed, and the Throne finding that the army in control of Peking had become disloyal, sent for Yuan Shih-kai announcing the willingness of the Throne to abdicate, and urged him to draft the edict of abdication. The edict was already prepared, and within a very few hours it was presented to the Throne, the vermillion pen signed it and it was proclaimed. The edict stated that the Throne had attempted to govern well, but had failed, and since the people desired a republican form of government, the Throne had decided in deference to the will of the people to abdicate, and hereby appointed Yuan Shih-kai to form a republic.

Yuan Shih-kai had accomplished his first object, the abdication of the Manchus. He at once started his bargaining with the republican government at Nanking. This was not a difficult task for the National Assembly as well as the rebel military leaders knew that their forces were no match for the troops under Yuan Shih-kai. Sun Yat-sen was persuaded to retire in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, and he presented his resignation to the National Assembly, urging the Assembly to elect Yuan Shih-kai Provisional President. This was forthwith done.

It was the wish of the National Assembly that Yuan Shih-kai should journey to Nanking to be inaugurated. This Yuan refused to do. He informed the Assembly that he would like to go to Nanking, but that he feared there would be trouble in Peking if he were to leave. The

Assembly insisted, so Yuan Shih-kai, to prove his point, caused a mutiny of troops in Peking. The mutiny was supposedly a protest to the troops against his going to Nanking. The Assembly then delegated certain individuals to go to Peking to inaugurate the new President.

Yuan Shih-kai organized a Cabinet in which the following posts were given to his own men: Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of War, Ministry of Navy, Ministry of Interior. The other positions were given to revolutionists, for he knew there was no way for them to utilize their positions to secure financial or military control, and the control of transportation. The revolutionists at once detected Yuan Shih-kai's plan. He intended to run the government without interference from the revolutionary party, or parties. This made the revolutionists bitter at the very outset against Yuan Shih-kai - a bitterness that led to a rebellion against him in 1913.

According to the provisions of the Provisional Constitution adopted by the National Assembly at Nanking, a parliament was to be elected which would elect a substantive president. Yuan Shih-kai knowing that his position was provisional set to work to secure control of the majority of the to-be-elected parliament, believing that after his election as substantive president he could do just as he pleased. By bribery and intimidation he secured the majority vote, and was duly elected substantive president for a period of six years. Colonel Li Yuan-hung, now General Li Yuan-hung, was elected Vice-President.

Parliament contained so many revolutionists who had become members of a new political party, the Kuomingtang, that Yuan Shih-kai was unable to transact any business which needed the ratification of Parliament. The national legislators placed every obstacle in his way. They set about making a permanent constitution - a constitution that would serve as a check upon Yuan Shih-kai rather than a national instrument Yuan Shih-kai knew that he could obtain nothing so long as this parliament existed. The head of the anti-Yuan Shih-kai movement was one of his Cabinet Ministers, Sung Chiao-jen. Yuan Shih-kai secured the assistance of his Minister of Interior and Premier, Chai Ping-chun, who hired an assassin to do away with Sung Chiao-jen. Sung Chiao-jen was brutally murdered when boarding a train one evening at Shanghai. His death was a shock to the Kuomingtang members of Parliament.

Yuan Shih-kai finding no other way out of his difficulties, dissolved Parliament. A lot of the members were ordered arrested and for several weeks the streets of Peking were filled with detectives on the trail of parliamentarians. Hundreds of so-called revolutionists were tried by the Martial Court, and summarily decapitated, many disappearing without the knowledge of their families. I had the experience of saving several from death. Yuan Shih-kai was bent upon putting the "fear of God" into all who dared to go counter to his wishes.

Hwang Hsing and Sun Yat-sen organized what is known as the Second Revolution in 1913. This rebellion started in one of the Yangtze Provinces - Kiangsi. The trained troops of Yuan Shih-kai soon quelled this rebellion and its initiators sought asylum in foreign countries, or

in the foreign settlements of the treaty ports.

Yuan Shih-kai then organised his own national assembly - a body appointed by him to do his will. This assembly was made up of many men of ability and experience, but they were Yuan Shih-kai men, not national representatives.

Yuan Shih-kai, like most tyrants, had a most suspicious nature. The dissolution of Parliament had not by any means dissolved all of his difficulties. He was surrounded by several strong military leaders, men in whom he had every confidence in the days that he was training his modern fighting machine - they were men whom he had raised to their present commanding positions. During his exile for three years he had not been in direct touch with his old military subordinates, and he felt that they were ambitious persons, so he set about creating jealousies between the three leading militarists, in the hope that by so doing he would be able to prevent any union which would be directed to his overthrow. These three leaders were: Tuan Chi-jui, Feng Kuo-chang and Wang Shih-tsen. Tuan Chi-jui was a fine military commander who had only one ambition - the training of any army that would be of sufficient strength to cope with foreign invaders. Feng Kuo-chang was a very clever and unscrupulous individualw who did have aspirations. Wang Shih-tsen was an old scholar, who had no mind of his own, and was therefore not to be feared as Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang.

To understand China's military system, or lack of system at this time, it is necessary to know that there were many thousands of mercenary troops scattered about the country. In the great famine and flood areas in Chihli, Kiangsu, Honan, Shangtung and Anhui, bandits were numerous. These bandits were not men who lived the life of plunderers for the love of it. In the South, that is in parts of Kwangtung, Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kweichow robbers were also to be found in large numbers for the same reasons that we find them in the Northern provinces just mentioned. These bandits smuggled salt for the most part. We also found regular Robin Hood bands who plundered the rich to feed the poor. These bandits were largely the remnants of the old anti-dynastic secret societies, and members of the local militia. The Chinese officials rarely attempted as a method of bandit elimination ~~xx~~ a serious campaign against them. In some of the fights the bandits were the victors. Up to 1905 there were no trained troops to speak of, and after that time they were largely concentrated about Peking and some of the larger Northern and Southern cities - provincial capitals and large trade marts. These regulars were but rarely employed in bandit chasing.

In 1911 there were many ex-bandits who had accepted official military commands on the promise that they and their followers would keep the peace. In the South we found Lu Yung-ting, ~~My~~ Mu Yung-hsin, Lung Chi-kwang. In central China the most famous bandit leader was "Tiger" Hsu, yet the most powerful in this area was Chang Hsun. In the North we found Chang Tso-lin. These six ex-bandit leaders who have become generals in the Chinese army had a total of some two hundred thousand troops. I call them mercenaries for as long as the Government paid them, or gave them legitimate means to secure pay from the collection of

taxes, they kept the peace.

As I have mentioned, Yuan Shih-kai began to feel that possibly his old subordinate commanders had ambitions of their own so he determined to create a purely Yuan Shih-kai army - a model army. While he was training this force, he decided it would be wise to offset any power held by his old subordinates in the Chihli army by employing the aid of the ex-bandit generals. He lavishly spent money upon them, allowing them to increase their forces and equipment. This, of course, angered Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang, especially the former who was really and genuinely desirous of creating an efficient national fighting force.

Yuan Shih-kai appointed Tuan Chi-jui Minister of War in his first Cabinet, and made Feng Kuo-chang Governor-General of the Metropolitan Province. He placed more reliance in Tuan Chi-jui than he did in Feng Kuo-chang. These appointments caused immediate friction between Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang. Feng had done the fighting about Hankow holding the rebels in check, while Tuan had merely sat quite peacefully with his forces outside Peking. Feng thought that he should have had the Cabinet position instead of Tuan.

In the Second Revolution Yuan Shih-kai, upon the personal request of Feng Kuo-chang, appointed Feng to a command to suppress the rebels at Nanking. Feng Kuo-chang moved south along the Tinetsin-Pukow Railway with his forces, and later became Governor-General at Nanking. During his campaign he was most generous with the rebel enemies. He incorporated several of the conquered divisions in his own army, and thereby won the sympathy of the stronger rebel military leaders. Feng Kuo-chang at once set to work to completely hold the Yangtze Valley in his name. While doing this he cultivated the more rebellious provinces south of the Yangtze - for one purpose only - the eventual elimination of Yuan Shih-kai.

Tuan Chi-jui had no thought of overthrowing his old superior, but he felt bitterly towards him because he attempted to organize a new army, and, against the wishes of Tuan Chi-jui, kept the mercenaries intact, refusing to disband any portion of these bandit forces. Tuan Chi-jui came to be extremely sullen, and did little to assist the Government. Yuan Shih-kai interpreted this sullenness to indicate that Tuan Chi-jui was preparing to bring about a coup so he watched him very closely.

By 1915 Yuan Shih-kai felt that he had two powerful rivals - Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Chi-jui. He believed that they were both ambitious to become president, therefore, it would be wise to change the form of government, making it a monarchy, merely to destroy any ambition upon the part of leaders to become president. He honestly felt that the people would welcome a return to a monarchy, and in this he was correct. They wanted a very limited monarchy, a genuinely constitutional monarchy, but they had no particular faith in a republic where rival military forces could at will fight each other in competing for the presidency. The people believed that there would be less fighting and more general security in

having an emperor - one to be respected and honored, and whose son would inherit the Throne without the dispute and wrangling which was necessary to elect a president.

Yuan Shi-kai fully determining to become emperor secured the services of many brilliant intriguers, and in a short time secured the nominal organization in each province of pro-monarchical bodies who sent delegates to Peking, and in turn urged Yuan Shih-kai to be emperor. After a good deal of camouflaging Yuan Shih-kai "most unwillingly" submitted to the will of the people, and became Emperor Hung Hsien.

By this stroke Yuan Shih-kai forfeited the last semblance of his power. In central China he found the powerful Feng Kuo-chang a neutral when the imperial ambitions of his superior were announced and put into effect. In North China he found Tuan Chi-jui retiring to the Western Hills in a sulking mood, and his troops neutral. To his great surprise he secured no support from the ex-bandit generals, who failed to assist him for two reasons, (1) they had no desire to fight the well drilled troops of Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Chi-jui, (2) they had been pardoned as bandits and elevated to high rank in the Chinese army by the former Manchu Dynasty, and felt that if anyone was to be Emperor it was only right that Hsuan Tung should return to power.

The Kuomingtang and Chinputang parties which had been at daggers' point with each other for three years, and which had been thrown out of power by Yuan Shih-kai, now united to overthrow the new emperor. A counter-revolution against the Hung Hsien regime was initiated in Yunnan, and an expeditionary force was sent by this province against the Szechuan army. Yuan Shih-kai dispatched forces to Szechuan, but these were easily routed. The anti-monarchy movement began to spread, and when Yuan found that his old subordinates as well as the mercenaries would not fight he cancelled the monarchy and restored the Republic by a "Presidential Mandate". He had hardening of the arteries, and the shock of his political collapse caused his death within a week or two after he had restored the Republic by "mandate ".

Now the people of China had nothing whatsoever to do with the making of the republic, the making of Yuan Shih-kai emperor, the defeat of Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambition, the restoration of the republican form of government - the whole of all the movements were initiated and engineered by conflicting military groups supported by their civil henchmen. The feeling amongst the people was undoubtedly in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The feeling of the people played no part in the matter. It was the feeling of Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Chi-jui against Yuan Shih-kai - purely personal hatred - which caused the end of Yuan Shih-kai's dreams. There was no organic union between the Southern rebels and the Feng Kuo-chang - Tuan Chi-jui groupings - it was merely a tactical cohesion - all wanted the end of Yuan Shih-kai. It was not his imperial ambitions, but his strong and reckless personality that they desired to be destroyed.

Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President succeeded to the presidency. He was just a big good-natured, lovable soul - a man without any particular intelligence, yet willing to do as

much as he could for his country. He became a genuine believer in a republican form of government, and would under no circumstances do anything to hurt the growth of such a government in China. Immediately upon his assumption of power he issued a mandate restoring the Parliament which had been dissolved by Yuan Shih-kai.

Seniority in China counts for much, much more than in this country. The great military leaders, Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang, rather looked down upon Li Yuan-hung who was by many years their junior in the point of service and prestige. They considered him a usurper - one who had come into office by chance and not because of any distinguished service he had rendered his nation. Both of these old generals knew that the Republic would not have been possible had they not refrained from crushing the rebel forces which were at their mercy in 1911. It must however be recorded to the credit of Tuan Chi-jui that he did try to work with and for Li Yuan-hung. It was his earnest desire to see that peace be restored to China, and he felt it h his duty to support Li Yuan-hung.

When Parliament assembled it elected Feng Kuo-chang to be Vice-President. This election was the direct reward for his liniency with the rebels in the Second Revolution, and because of his neutrality during the monarchical campaign of Yuan Shih-kai. This added greatly to the prestige and power of Feng Kuo-chang. He was now the logical successor to the presidency, and furthermore had control of the Yangtze provinces since his henchmen occupied the important posts as governor-generals of the several Yangtze provinces.

By this time the Northern Army as it was called in the days of Yuan Shih-kai's training camp at Machang, and even so named for three years after Yuan became President, was split into two main divisions. These divisions were known as the Chihli and Anhui Military Parties. Feng Kuo-chang was a native of Chihli, and Tuan Chi-jui of Anhui. The adherents of Feng became members of the Chihli Party, nominating him unofficially as their leader, while the adherents of Tuan Chi-jui formed what was known as the Anhui Party. There were Anhui generals in the Chihli Party and natives of Chihli in the Anhui party. The provinces of Anhui and Chihli had nothing to do with the names of the two parties beyond the simple fact that the two leaders hailed from these two provinces.

Each of the provinces (22) had a military governor. The Yangtze and Northern provinces were headed by adherents of Tuan Chi-jui or Feng Kuo-chang. The Southern provinces had their own leaders - men largely affiliated with the remnants of the old revolutionary parties. These military governors were not less than feudal lords. They controlled the revenues of the provinces so far as the mere matter of collection and disbursement were concerned. Few of the provinces had civil governors, and when they did the civil governor was merely a servant of the military governor, otherwise he would be deprived of his post. All appointments of governors and governor-generals were made by the Central Government. Naturally there was much wire pulling. The Chihli and Anhui military parties attempted at all times to keep about evenly matched. The governor-generals had thousands of troops who were not on the records of the Ministry

of War, and when the Central Government refused, or could not, pay these extra troops, the governor-generals would apply the provincial revenues for their upkeep. In other words it was not long before each province had troops which were the troops of the governor-general - not those of the province or of the Central Government.

Li Yuan-hung was unable to restore peace. The old military commanders refused to take his orders, and in every way possible made his lot a hard one. Tuan Chi-jui through the intrigues of his chief subordinate, General Hsu Hsu-cheng, was made to believe that the President was plotting his downfall. Tuan Chi-jui, who was Premier at the time had done all that he honestly could to assist Li Yuan-hung, but the continued rumors which were created by his subordinates, and the fact that Parliament kept bringing all manner of unreasonable demands daily to the Government, caused Tuan Chi-jui to become sulky and reckless.

When the United States advised China to break off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, President Li Yuan-hung and many members of the Parliament were opposed to such a break, believing that nothing but harm would result. Tuan Chi-jui's subordinates seized upon this to storm parliament demanding a declaration of war, whereupon Parliament felt that it had the right to do as it pleased, and even those in favor of war were unwilling to subject themselves to coercion. A lot of the military governors from the provinces came to Peking, and in conference with Tuan Chi-jui decided that Parliament was useless and should be dissolved, also that President Li Yuan-hung deserved severe censure and punishment for the manner in which he had done counter to the wishes of the governor-generals.

Tuan Chi-jui was dismissed by President Li Yuan-hung. This dismissal started trouble all along the line. The followers of Tuan Chi-jui - the Anhui Party - and the Chihli leaders had one thing in common, the elimination of Li Yuan-hung, though for different reasons. The Anhui Party wanted to have one of their leaders elected President, possibly Tuan Chi-jui, while the Chihli Party desired that Feng Kuo-chang should succeed to the presidency.

Behind the scene was a very astute and extremely unscrupulous ex-Grand Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, who was bent upon the destruction of Li Yuan-hung's already fading power, being desirous of the job of being President himself. Hsu Shih-chang was not a military man, but according to seniority he would have ranked only second to Yuan Shih-kai. He had held high positions in the provinces and Peking during the Manchu regime, at one time being Junior Guardian to the Heir Apparent, and just before Yuan Shih-kai's monarchical coup he was Grand Secretary of State. Hsu Shih-chang worked hard to egg both the Chihli and Anhui factions to oust President Li Yuan-hung. He felt that the elimination of President Li would mean that the Anhui and Chihli parties would be forced to compromise their differences by electing some one outside of these parties as President - he, Hsu Shih-chang to be the President.

The conference of the militarists just referred to was in fear of the action which Parliament might take against the "feudal lords". Parliamentary government was not conducive to the building up of a strong

militaristic nation. The attack upon Parliament made by a gang of thugs under the orders of Tuan Chi-jui's chief lieutenant, frightened many of the law makers, who unceremoniously left Peking, seeking refuge in the foreign concessions. Appeals were daily made to President Li Yuan-hung to dissolve Parliament.- this he refused point blank to do.

President Li became isolated. Since practically a majority of the Parliament had left, the Ex-Grand Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, the various military governors, Tuan Chi-jui and his following all refusing support to the President, left him "high and dry". Feng Kuo-chang, the Vice President, was anxiously awaiting the day when President Li could be eliminated, and he could succeed to the presidency. President Li would not budge. No one seemed to be willing to openly ask him to get out of office, and no one was willing to force him out. The whole situation became serious. No business could be transacted.

Chang Hsun, a strong ex-bandit general, having his headquarters at Hsuchowfu in Northern Kiangsu, took advantage of the disturbed state of the country to propose a restoration of the Manchu Emperor, Hsun Tung. At first he had secretly sought the assistance of Feng Kuo-chang, Tuan Chi-jui, Hsu Shih-chang and many of the old militarists. Many of these men gave him their support, Tuan Chi-jui alone refusing to have anything whatsoever to do with a monarchical restoration. Chang Hsun feeling that he could restore the Emperor, accepted an invitation from President Li to come to Peking to assist him. President Li had felt that this old general was not working with the opponents of the President.

Chang Hsun arrived in Peking, and at once sought the dissolution of Parliament. This was brought about when several generals went to the Palace and secured the signature of the President to a mandate dismissing Parliament. Wu Ting-fang, the Acting Premier, had refused to countersign the mandate, so he was dismissed, and the chief of the local gendarmerie was appointed in his place, in order that some one could countersign the mandate. Chang Hsun brought to Peking some six thousand troops who took up positions in the Palace ~~xxxx~~ and near the Palace. One One morning, bright and early, the people of Peking were surprised to find the Dragon flag floating over the ~~Hsun~~ Palace instead of the five-colored flag of the republic. Chang Hsun had restored the Emperor with a bloodless revolution. President Li Yuan-hung, deserted by his friends, had fled to the Legation Quarter for asylum.

Tuan Chi-jui, then at Tientsin, began to raise a force to attach Peking, and restore the Republic. In less than two weeks Chang Hsun was driven into hiding in the Dutch Legation, and the Emperor was isolated again in his portion of the old Winter Palace. This was a triumph for Tuan Chi-jui. He was considered the savior of the Republic. He entered Peking, took up the position of Premier, a position to which he had been restored by a forged mandate, purporting to have been issued by President Li Yuan-hung before his flight.

Tuan Chi-jui now ruled Peking. Li Yuan-hung was at Tientsin, had resigned the presidency, and had refused to return to power. This left the nation without a head. Feng Kuo-chang, the bitter rival of

Tuan Chi-jui, was Vice-President, and stationed at Nanking. There was no Parliament. The Premier was then forced to ask Feng Kue-chang to come to Peking to take over the duties as President. Feng Kue-chang knowing the strength of his rival in the North, refused to leave Nanking until all of his men were placed in power throughout the Yangtze. Tuan Chi-jui did not want to appoint Feng Kue-chang men to these posts. The argument became most bitter, and in the end Feng Kue-chang got what he wanted - Feng men in Yangtze. This having been accomplished, he went to Peking to take over his duties as President.

The South noticing the wide division between Feng Kue-chang and Tuan Chi-jui, believed the time had now arrived for the Southern militarists to occupy some of the posts along the Yangtze. A rebellion was raised, and Hunan became the seat of war. Tuan Chi-jui the Premier, insisted upon a fight to the finish with the South. President Feng Kue-chang and his followers pleaded for peace. Tuan Chi-jui at last secured a mandate from the President, ordering an expedition against the South. The troops selected were of the VIIIth and XXth Divisions. These divisions were made up of officers who were adherents to the Chihli Party - the party of Feng Kye-chang.

When the expeditionary force came within sight of the enemy in Hunan, the troops bolted, ran away withought fighting, leaving much in the way of arms and ammunition to the rebels. This flight had been ordered by President Feng Kue-chang. It embarrassed Tuan Chi-jui to such an extent that he was forced to retire from office. The bitterness of the Anhui against the Chihli party became intense. Both Feng Kue-chang and Tuan Chi-jui intrigued to secure generals of the opposing side. Money was used freely. Each governer-general, division commander, and anyone who had a fighting force became subject to the most attractive proposals. Loyalty ceased to exist, and there was an open exchange of fealty, which was determined by the highest price offered. This state of affairs led to the breakup of the Chihli and Anhui parties into many smaller sub-divisions. It was impossible to consider two, or three military parties. There were nearly as many parties as there were divisions and brigades.

The day was approaching when Feng Kue-chang's term of office would expire. There was a great deal of bustling upon the part of the militarists to secure the election of a new President. The Chihli and Anhui parties were still the two major parties though they were in very bad shape owing to troubles and dissensions within their own ranks, disturbances which had cost them the desertion of many generals and their troops. The one thing that was necessary to elect a president was a Parliament. The militarists then set to work to have the Central Government promulgate election laws, and in a short time a parliament was elected, the military-governers in the provinces holding these elections. The Chinese people had little or nothing to do with the lections, and on every side you would hear the supervisers of the elections to parliament bemoaning the fact that there was so little interest - in fact in many places money in small sums was distributed simply to get a crowd to the election booths. The people knew that the whole thing was a ng game of the militarists, and that it was none of their concern, and

would not be their concern until the militarists had become so exhausted that the people would have the opportunity and freedom to bring about genuine popular elections.

The manner in which these elections were carried on required a great deal of money. Tuan Chi-jui and his followers sought foreign financial aid - this was furnished by the Japanese through a newly organized bank, the Sino-Japanese Exhange Bank. After the election of members to Parliament, it was necessary to spend a yet greater sum in buying up the majority vote for the presidency. This money also came from Japan, the Japanese Government being solidly behind Tuan Chi-jui.

In the election of the President the majority vote was cast for Hsu Shih-chang, the ex-Grand Secretary of State. A more contemptible figure could not possibly have been chosen. He was elected by the Anhui militarists and Japanese money.

The Japanese Government had come to take a great interest in China. The Japanese wanted to consolidate their position in Shantung, Fukien, Mongolia and Manchuria, therefore, a pro-Japanese Government in Peking was most essential. Tuan Chi-jui's chief lieutenant, Hsu Hsu-chang, desired a modern fighting force capable of defeating every other force in China, and since money was necessary, he was willing to make concessions to Japan to secure this urgently needed financial support. Under the guise of preparing for war against Germany the Japanese and the Peking Government made secret treaties which were of a politico-military nature, and approximately three hundred million yen and some two hundred Japanese officers were employed by Tuan Chi-jui in creating a new army, known to be under the orders of the War Participation Bureau which was directly under Tuan Chi-jui. (This bureau was formed for the prosecution of the war against Germany.)

Tuan Chi-jui through the aid of Japan intended building up a force which would conquer all China. Japan in assisting him expected to have a thoroughly pro-Japanese Government which would help in making concessions to Japan. The power of Tuan Chi-jui became so great that other militarists began to be alarmed. No one it it seemed dared to overcome Tuan Chi-jui. It was left to a General, then stationed in southern Hunan to undertake an expedition against Tuan Chi-jui's new army. This was General Wu Pei-fu, an excellent soldier and scholar - a man with very high ideals, and in every way honest. General Wu Pei-fu marched his two divisions well trained troops across Hunan-Hupeh and Honan, coming within some eighty miles of Peking without any opposition.

Tuan Chi-jui then secured a Presidential Mandate ordering Wu Pei-fu to return to Hunan. This Wu Pei-fu refused to do. Another mandate was issued depriving Wu Pei-fu of his titles and decorations, dismissing him as a traitor. This also had no effect. Still another mandate was issued ordering a punitive expedition to march against Wu Pei-fu to destroy him.

The newly organized Japanese trained army of Tuan Chi-jui took the field. In the very first battle some seventy thousand of these troops were pitted against about twenty thousand under Wu Pei-fu. In this battle Wu Pei-fu was victorious. His men fought well under heavy odds, but they were fighting against Japanese domination of China. The troops under Tuan Chi-jui, learning that they had been paid and equipped by the Japanese, refused to fight, and in less than two weeks the Tuan Chi-jui forces had all surrendered. This is an example of what will happen when it is known that alien money is financing internal affairs - military or otherwise.

During this fighting, Chang Tso-lin, the ex-bandit who had become governor-general of Manchuria, arrived with his forces near Tientsin. He did not take part in the fighting though he was supposedly on the side of Wu Pei-fu. As soon as Wu Pei-fu had completed his military victory, the President, Hsu Shih-chang and the governor-general of Manchuria decided that Wu Pei-fu's sudden rise to power would be to their detriment, so they schemed to have him retire from the vicinity of Peking, and at last appointed him as Deputy Inspector of Chihli, Honan and Shantung with headquarters in Honan.

Chang Tso-lin did not remove his troops from the proximity of Peking and Tientsin. He forced the retirement of Wu Pei-fu and occupied positions about the Capitol with his own forces. Wu Pei-fu was in no position at the time to give battle to Chang Tso-lin so he gracefully, though reluctantly, retired.

With the elimination of the Anhui Party, and the entrance of Chang Tso-lin, there came about another military party - the Manchurian Party. President Hsu Shih-chang did all that was within his power to weaken Wu Pei-fu, and Wu Pei-fu's nominal senior, General Tsao Kun, an ignorant and useless vagabond.

The victory of Wu Pei-fu was not welcomed by the Southerners. Sun Yat-sen had returned to Canton, and formed a Military Government. He was elected Extraordinary President by the rumpy of the twice dissolved Parliament, and planned an expedition against the North. The Southern militarists had little sympathy with this expedition, knowing that the forces of Wu Pei-fu were far superior to their own. The first move by the South was to support an expeditionary force to take over the Province of Hupeh, making it a self-governing province - this at any rate was the excuse. General Wu Pei-fu advised the Southern forces not to venture into Hupeh, but taking no heed of his advice they attacked this province, and were put to rout by Wu Pei-fu's troops. Propaganda was then sent broadcast that Wu Pei-fu was opposed to the autonomy of the provinces, and was the arch-enemy of to self-government.

Chang Tso-lin, the ex-bandit governor-general of Manchuria, seized upon this anti-Wu Pei-fu propaganda to seek the end of his rival in arms. Chang Tso-lin made an alliance with

Sun Yat-sen and also came to peace with Tuan Chi-jui and the remnants of the Anhui Party. After completing these understandings, Chang Tso-lin sent some ten divisions, or approximately one hundred thousand troops, to reinforce his sixty thousand troops about Peking and Tientsin. He completely took over the authority of the Central Government, and ordered President Hsu Shih-chang about as if he were his servant. Chang Tso-lin intended defeating Wu Pei-fu, throwing out President Hsu Shih-chang, and having Tuan Chi-jui elected to the presidency.

Tsao Kun, Inspector-General of Chihli, became frightened and was about to surrender to the will of Chang Tso-lin when Wu Pei-fu arrived upon the scene with one division and one mixed brigade - about sixteen thousand men. Wu Pei-fu took command of the Chihli forces which were in the vicinity of Paotingfu and Tientsin - forces which would not fight. Seeing that he would have to strike quickly, he took his own sixteen thousand men to Peking, engaged some fifty thousand of Chang-Tso-lin's troops, routed them, and bringing up reinforcements, drove Chang Tso-lin helter-skelter into Manchuria. It took him just six weeks to do this.

Wu Pei-fu found it unwise to pursue Chang Tso-lin into Manchuria. He knew that the reactionary militarists to his rear would plan his downfall unless he could remain in China. He also felt that complications with Japanese by his invasion of Manchuria would be such as to please his enemies and give strength to Japanese demands and designs. He therefore, returned to his headquarters in Honan, where he has been ever since, training and equipping his forces as best he can, preparing for the next conflict.

Wu Pei-fu did not retire before he forced Hsu Shih-chang into retirement. He demanded that Hsu Shih-chang should abdicate and that former President Li Yuan-hung should take up the presidency. There was no Vice-President elected when Hsu Shih-chang was elected President, therefore, the field was clear fro the restoration of Li Yuan-hung.

Chou Tsze-chi, one of the finest characters in Chinese official life, was Premier when Hsu Shih-chang abdicated. He became Acting President, pending the arrival of Li Yuan-hung in Peking, and it was through his efforts that peace was maintained in the Capitol during this critical period. Chou Tsze-chi refused every appointment offered by Li Yuan-hung, and retired into private life - not to be idle, but to organize the intelligenzia. Chou Tsze-chi is a rare man in every way. He is honest and fearless in his official life, and has never cringed before the military satraps, refusing to furnish them with funds, or to render them any assistance, striving at all times to end their careers in China.

Upon the return of Li Yuan-hung to power, the twice-dissolved Parliament was restored. In the South, Chen Chiung-ming, the able governor of Kwangtung, had ousted Sun Yat-sen, dissolved the Canton Military Government, and set to work to restore order and

and peace in Kwangtung. The Anhui Party adherents kept very quiet indeed. Wu Pei-fu had succeeded in driving Chang Tso-lin back into Manchuria, assisted Chen Chiung-ming in ousting Sun Yat-sen, forced the neutrality of the Anhui Party and drove Hsu Shih-chang from the Presidency.

Wu Pei-fu interfered quite considerably with the appointment of the first Cabinet under Li Yuan-hung. He stated openly that he wanted no Cabinet Minister who would make foreign loans, or any cabinet that would give assistance to Japan. He declared that each Cabinet Minister should be selected so that the people would be assured of his opposition to foreign loans and Japanese aggression, then it made no difference to him as to who was appointed to Cabinet position. Wu does not believe that any cabinet can function until rival military parties have been destroyed, and this is his object.

Wu Pei-fu is not a political genius - in fact he knows little or nothing about politics. He is a soldier in every sense. His great object is to destroy all of the provincial armies, create a national army of some two hundred thousand men, form this into an efficient constabulary force, and states that until this is accomplished the people will not be allowed freedom in participating in the affairs of the government.

The third Cabinet in five months has just come into being under Li Yuan-hung, and the composition of his Cabinet is evidence of present conditions in China. It shows that General Wu Pei-fu is surrounded by enemies, and that Chang-Tso-lin's power is again in the ascendency. It is also proof of an understanding between Tsao Kun and Chang Tso-lin, the adherence of the Anhui faction to Chang Tso-lin, and, what is to be very much regretted, the return of Japanese influence in Chinese internal politics.

Let us consider for a moment the military situation in China today. We will take the provinces, one by one.

1. The Southern Bloc:

(a) KWANGTUNG: For nearly four years the province of Kwangtung has been in the hands of Sun Yat-sen and his military subordinates. The idea of Sun Yat-sen(s expedition (1) against Kwangsi (2) against the North, has cost Kwangtung millions of dollars, bleeding the provincial treasury absolutely dry, causing the issuance of worthless paper money, and in every way destroying sound finance. Though the expedition against Kwangsi proved successful, it did not bring Kwangtung any money, for Kwangsi is one of the very poorest provinces in all China.

In Kwangtung there were the following senior military subordinates to Sun Yat-sen before his recent downfall at the hands of one of them:

Hsu Chung-chi, Chen Chiung-ming, Chen Chien, Li Lieh-chun, and Tang Chi-yao.

Hsu Chung-chi's objective was to return to Fukien as governor-general. Li Lieh-chun desired to be restored to his former post as military governor of Kiangsi. Chen Chien desired to become the governor-general of Hunan. Chen Chiung-ming wanted to maintain his control as governor of Kwangtung. Tang Chi-yao was fighting to restore himself to power in Yunnan.

These five individuals were employing the money and resources, human and material, of the lone Province of Kwangtung, to enable them to maintain themselves at the head of the provinces of which they were natives. It is only natural that Chen Chiung-ming resented the large expenditure of money from his province to assist the other four to regain power in their provinces. He was, therefore, steutly opposed to the Northern Expedition proposed by Sun Yat-sen, and supported by Hsu Chung-chi, Chen Chien, Li Lieh-chun and Tang Chi-yao. I believe that Chen Chiung-ming sincerely desired to put Kwangtung in order, making it a model province. He has always contended consistently that if each province would set its own house in order, then, and only then, would there be stable government in China.

The insistence of Sun Yat-sen upon a Northern expedition made Chen Chiung-ming a bitter enemy, and in June last Sun Yat-sen was driven from Canton, and now resides in the foreign concession at Shanghai. Tang Chi-yao by a bit of clever strategy succeeded in slipping back into Yunnan where he is now Governor-General. Hsu Chung-chi, Chen Chien and Li Lieh-chun were all caught napping, for when they left for the front, Chen Chiung-ming overthrew Sun Yat-sen, cut them off from their supplies, financial and material. The Northern expedition fell through, and now we find Chen Chiung-ming at the head of an impoverished Kwangtung, Tang chi-yao governor-general of a bankrupt Yunnan, Li Lieh-chun, Chen Chien and Hsu Chung-chi hanging in mid-air.

(b) YUNNAN: Yunnan has a total revenue of some four million dollars (Mex.) per annum, and until last year maintained anywhere from one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand troops. The Yunnanese soldiery were scattered over Szechuan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien. These troops have melted away until there are now in Yunnan about thirty thousand troops. The province has no money at all, and of late the growth of opium is being encouraged to replenish the provincial treasury. The troops now in Yunnan are disorganized, and there is no hope of their being whipped into shape to attempt an expedition outside of their province. About two-thirds of the military equipment has disappeared in other provinces, and having no money with which to buy new equipment this province can be taken off the list of military provinces which must be feared because of the ability to impose its will upon a sister province.

(c) KWANGSI: Before the invasion of Kwangsi by the Kwangtung

troops last year this province had already been bled dry by Li Yung-ting. It is, like Yunnan, a very poor province, filled with bandits and all manner of lawless bodies. When the Kwangtung troops entered the province matters were made worse. The Kwangtung troops were maintained in several large centers, and the remainder of the province was left open to the depredations of bandits who did their work well. The collapse of Sun Yat-sen's Northern Expedition caused the evacuation of Kwangsi by the Kwangtung troops. The few remaining Kwangsi leaders are now trying to set the province in order, but it is a hopeless job. At any rate this province can also be stricken from the list as a strong military province.

(d) KWEICHOW: Kweichow is even poorer than Kwangsi and Kwangtung, and the revolutions and counter-revolutions of the past three years have reduced the province to an appalling condition. Not only have the officials, the army, and other allied officials institutions and individuals suffered, but the people are in absolute distress. There is no military organization worth speaking of today in Kweichow. About four years ago there were three excellent divisions in Kweichow where today there is hardly one division left.

(g) SZECHUAN: Szechuan has five strong leaders, who shift their sympathies from day to day - one day we find two or three of them siding with the North, the next with the South. This, the richest of all Chinese provinces contains some one hundred and fifty thousand troops who are nothing more or nor less than outlaws, plundering the country. There is no cohesion between the various military units, and no likelihood of unity. Szechuan is occupied with its own troubles, and at present gives little attention to what is going on outside. It would be impossible for this province to send a force to attack another province. There is no organization, and no possibility of organized effort until one of the five leaders first succeeds in eliminating his four rivals - this is hardly likely under one year. General Liu Hsiang may be able to win out by joining forces with Wu Pei-fu in the Hunan Upper Yangtze, but Chinese opinion inclines to the belief that such a union of forces would combine all other leaders in Szechuan against Liu Hsiang.

(e) HUNAN: For seven years this Province of Hunan has been overrun by Northern and Southern soldiers. It was one of the richest provinces in China, but today not only is the provincial treasury bankrupt, but business in the large centers has been paralysed. Wu Pei-fu has a garrison at Yochow, and with the encroachments made from time to time by Southerners on the Kwangting-Hunan border no breathing space has been allowed this province. There are today about fifteen thousand poorly trained native Hunanese troops, and with the pressure from within and without there is no possibility of Hunan raising an army within the next year or two, which would be able to advance against another province.

(f) FUKIEN: The province of Fukien has changed hands several times during the past five years. The South has practically occupied the south of Fukien all the time, while the Northern part of the province has been under the control of an appointee of Peking. There is no money left in the provincial treasury, and there are practically no native

Fukien troops in the province. In the South of the province we find Cantonese troops, and in the north we discover Northern soldiers, sent from Shantung, Kiangsu and Honan. I t would be foolish to expect Fukien to raise a force which could do damage either to the occupationary forces in the province, or to attempt an invasion of another province.

Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichow, Szechuan, Hunan a d Yunnan compose what is popularly known as the South. These provinces are completely disorganized. There is no money left, and no military unit which can go into the field. The whole state of the SOUTH is most pitiable. Little, or no attention, is now given to the strength of the SOUTH by Wu Pei-fu and other Northern leaders. There is now nothing which they need fear from the South in a military way.

With the exception of Fukien and Hunan there are no Northern troops to be found in the SOUTH. Each of the other provinces contains only its own provincial troops and it is well that this is the case. The various governors know the uselessness of attempting to rebuild their forces, and are now trying to cut down the troops they have, doing all that is possible to maintain peace within their own borders. Free play is given to self-government movements, and we now find prominent merchants and scholars attempting to assist in the work of reconstruction. It is this phase of the situation which gives one encouragement. The militarists have proved themselves incompetent, they have drained the provinces dry, paralyzed business, accomplished nothing more than to bring misery to the people. They have in many instances instigated lootings simply to allow the soldiers to gain by robbery from the people wjat the officials are unwilling to reach down into their pockets and to pay.

(g) YANGTZE BLOC: The Yangtze Valley contains the very richest of the Chinese Provinces, and these provinces have always been coveted by the various war-lords. The Northern armies having been the stronger, we find that since 1911 the Yangtze Provinces have been occupied nearly the whole time with Northern generals and their armies. The center of wealth and intellect has been the Yangtze, but there has been a very perceptible lack of the martial spirit. Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Hunan in the South: Chihli, Shantung and Honan in the North furnish the fighting material. Chekiang, Kaingsu, Anhui, Kiangsi and Hupeh do not seem to have been able to raise efficient fighting forces. As a result these provinces have had war-lords imposed upon them from the North.

(h) CHEKIANG: Chekiang is today without a governor-general in name, yet with one in fact. General Lu Yung-hsiang, the former governor-general, having taken sides with the Tuan Chi-jui party in the last war against Wu Pei-fu, felt that it would be wise for him to resign his position as military governor, yet he has kept his troops intact, and still controls the province. Chekiang is a rich province, and has been spared the many battles which other provinces have suffered. This province has also been fortunate in having at its head men who have not robbed and plundered the provincial treasury. The people are striving for provincial self-government, but have not as yet em-

ployed violence in their struggle. Just so long as General Li Yung-hsiang remains peacefully inclined there will be no change in the affairs of Chekiang. There are two native divisions, and two Northern ones in the province. None of these divisions are of any particular value, and do nothing more than draw their pay which the revenues of Chekiang can furnish without any extraordinary effort. Of late there has been a bit of grumbling about the unnecessary expense of the troops, but the people have been so afraid of internal disturbances that they have been unwilling to kick openly, believing that it would cost the province more to have rebellion than to pay the four divisions. Chekiang has also had the good fortune to be blessed with its own officials in office instead of having a lot of Northerners occupying civil posts - this has also acted as a deterent when revolution has been mooted ----- The total debt of the provinces is only about six million dollars (Mex.) and I believe that thes provincial finances are in a better shape than any other single province unless it be Fengtien, the seat of Chang Tso-lin's authority. Chekiang has kept out of nearly every trouble which has arisen, and it is unlikely that an expedition will be sent against another province. If the native troops raise a disturbance, then the Northern soldiers will be employed to quell them, and vice versa. There is no possibility of the Northern and native forces uniting in any sort of expeditionary campaign.

(i) KIANGSU: Kiangsu has suffered greatly. This province is the key to the lower Yangtze, and for this reason has been subjected to a great deal of fighting. There has never been any fighting between native Kiangsu troops and the Northern occupationary forces, for there are no Kiangsu troops. The Anhui and Chihli parties, the North and South, as well as bandit organizations in the North of the Province, have repeatedly contested their strength in an attempt to secure control of the province, and the result has naturally been a serious drain to the provincial finances. Kiangsu has always been a great revenue bearing province, but the malpracticesof the many military overlords have resulted in absolutely bankrupting the provincial treasury. There are today some sixty thousand troops in the province under the nominal command of Governor-General Chi Hsieh-yuan, one of the cleverest yet one of the most unscrupulous of Chinese generals. He is now working to overthrow General Wu Pei-fu, and believes this can be done by supporting Tsao Kun for the presidency. He is certain that Wu Pei-fu is opposed to his old chief becoming president, and has used this against him in causing dissension between Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, placing the latter in the position of a traitor to his chief. The troops in this province are about the best trained in the Yangtze, and present practically the only formidable enemy to Wu Pei-fu south of the Great Wall. By allying himself with Tsao Kun, Chi Hsieh-yuan will be able to attack Wu Pei-fu in the rear. My own opinion is that he will not attack, but his mere neutrality will give encouragement to other military units along the Yangtze to take advantage of Wu Pei-fu's difficulties when in he is engaged with Chang Tso-lin, to cause him a great deal of worry. With Chi Hsieh-yuan out of the way there is little doubt but that Wu Pei-fu would have no one to fear, that is, in the Yangtze. The people of Kiangsu are opposed to any participation in the battles-to-be, and would welcome Chi Hsieh-yuan's neutrality merely to keep quiet in the province.

(j) KIANGSI: Kiangsi is occupied in the North by Northern soldiers, but the south of the province is still more or less in the hands of Southern sympathisers. The Northern troops are supposedly under the authority of Wu Pei-fu, but knowing the commander and also knowing the quality of the troops, I would venture to say that they would side with Chi Hsieh-yuan of Kiangsu rather than undertake participation in a campaign against Chang Tso-lin, or against Chi Hsieh-yuan. There are some thirty thousand Northern troops, but they are absolutely worthless. These soldiers would be of no value in any serious fighting - even Chinese warfare.

(k) ANHUI: Anhui like Kiangsu has suffered terribly from invasion after invasion. It is a strategical province from a military viewpoint, and has suffered accordingly at the hands of various militarists who have attempted to control it. While there are some forty thousand troops within the province they are as useless, if not more so, than the soldiers in Kiangsi. The Governor-General is one of the ex-bandit school, and he would more than likely side with Chang Tso-lin. He could do little good either for Chang Tso-lin or himself, but it is most likely that any war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu would find Chang Wen-sheng, Governor General of Anhui, on the side of the Mukden chieftain. This province has been systematically bled by its many governors, and has been reduced to absolute poverty so far as provincial revenues are concerned. Business has also been paralysed, and the interior is infested with large bands of robbers. The people have suffered nearly as badly as those of Kwangsi.

(l) HUPEH: As Kiangsu is the key to the Lower Yangtze so Hupeh Province is the key to the Upper Yangtze. This province contains some fifty thousand troops, and hardly more than fifteen thousand could be expected to fight. The province is governed by Hsiao Yao-nan, who was placed in his position by Wu Pei-fu. This man is a weakling, and opium smoker, and, as the Chinese say - "he has very soft ears", meaning that he listens to anyone and everyone. It is impossible to know what will happen in case Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin go to war with each other. There ar are those who believe that Hsiao Yao-nan will turn traitor, and even attack Wu Pei-fu in the rear. There are others who believe that he will attempt to defend Hupeh from an invasion by Szechuan, and will be defeated in the attempt. There are yet others who believe that he will make peace with Szechuan, and remain neutral. One thing is certain, and that is that the popular feeling in Hupeh is opposed to Wu Pei-fu, and it may be that this feeling will greatly influence their weak governor-general when the test comes as to his loyalty. There are no native troops to speak of in the province, the bulk of the soldiers coming from farther north. There is no money left in the treasury of the province, and it is known that the indebtedness of the province is upwards of forty millions. Wu Pei-fu

has been forced to bleed Hupeh to secure pay for his troops, and previous to his bleeding of the province, the most successful bleeder of all reigned for six years - Governor-General Wang Chan-yuan, who retired with a personal fortune of some sixty millions.

So far as the Yangtze is concerned, I do not believe that these provinces will be able to show as many as a total of twenty-five thousand native troops. These provinces are occupied by Northern soldiers under the command of Northerners. With the exception of about thirty-five thousand Northern troops in Kiangsu and Hupeh the remainder of the Northern forces are a little more than worthless. Financially and militarily the Yangtze is in a very bad way, and Wu Pei-fu need have little trouble if he would only start cleaning out the Yangtze immediately. This is naturally what he should do, though it may postpone his fighting Chang Tso-lin.

(m) THE NORTHERN BLOC: The Northern Bloc is known to comprise the provinces of Honan, Shantung, Chihli, Shansi and Shensi. Honan, Shantung and Chihli are wealthy provinces, but nothing like as wealthy as the Yangtze provinces. There is not as much material and intellectual progress to be found in these Northern provinces, but they have a population of exceedingly strong men physically. The Northerner is not stupid, but he is very slow in his thoughts and in his movements.

(n) SHANTUNG: Shantung has as its governor-general a very weak personality, and he is in command of a very conglomerate force. There are some fifty thousand troops but only about ten thousand who could put up any sort of a fight. The province is overrun with bandits, thousands having been imported to the province by Chang Tso-lin in his last fight against Wu Pei-fu, imported through Tsingtau which was in the hands of the Japanese. In case of war between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin the Shantung soldiers are more than likely to side with Chang Tso-lin, since they are to all intents and purposes adherents of Tuan Chi-jui. The provincial treasury is empty, and the province owes some fifty millions of dollars. There is no chance of Shantung attempting to take the lead in any fighting, but the troops could do damage to Wu Pei-fu as they are on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, also in command of the port of Tsingtau where Japanese arms could be easily shipped in, as well as Manchurian soldiers.

(o) CHIHLI: Chihli is the seat of Tsao Kun's government, the prospective president. He is an illiterate coolie who has risen to his position through the cleverness of his two brothers. Tsao Kun was a non-commissioned officer in the days of Yuan Shih-kai's training camp at Machang. He has some thirty thousand troops, though he is the nominal leader of the Chihli Party. These troops are worthless, and in the recent campaign between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin they either ran or remained neutral. The worst that they can do next time is to allow Chang Tso-lin's soldiers to invade Peking and Tientsin with no attempt to hinder them. This is about what they will do. Chihli is financially bankrupt and owes over forty millions of dollars. The Inspector-General, Tsao Kun, and his two brothers are together worth some seventy millions of dollars which they have systematically squeezed out of the province.

(p) SHANSI: Shansi is known as the "model province". It is ruled over by a weak personality, yet a man who has consistently refused to side with any of the other contending military factions. He has some twenty thousand troops - troops that could not be employed in real fighting, yet are of sufficient strength to keep down bandits in Shansi. This province can show a fairly clean financial balance sheet. The Governor-General, Yen Shih-shan, is quite wealthy, but he has not bled the people unmercifully, and being a native of the province over which he rules he has invested his ill-gotten wealth in the province, building up industries. On the whole Shansi is one of the best governed, and about the most peaceful of provinces. It is the only province which has had the same governor since 1911 - the year of the overthrow of the Manchus. In case of war between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin it is not likely that Shansi will take part. If it did, little or no service could be rendered.

(q) SHENSI: Shensi has suffered about as much as Kwangsi in the South. It is a poor province, and has been the scene of contending Northern and Southern armies. Half of the province is in the hands of the North, the other at the mercy of the South. It has been impoverished to such an extent that the people are in dire need. No governor-general desires the province since there is no money to be made out of it. There are some twenty thousand Northern troops, but these could not be, and would not be, used in any fighting; first because they are poorly equipped, and second because of the distance they would have to travel.

(r) HONAN: Honan is the headquarters of Wu Pei-fu and his crack troops. He has some forty thousand good fighting men, and besides these troops there are some fifteen thousand useless ones, stationed in the province under the governor-general. Until recently Feng Yu-hsiang, better known as the Christian General, had some twenty thousand of his well drilled troops in the province, but these have been withdrawn to Peking. Honan is in a bad financial state, having had to contribute to the upkeep of Wu Pei-fu's, Feng Yu-hsiang's and the local military governor's armies. Wu Pei-fu has even seized the railway revenue for his troops. In case of war with Chang Tso-lin, the main fighting force which will be sent against him will be the troops of Wu Pei-fu now in Honan.

(s) MANCHUKIAN BLOC: Manchuria is composed of the provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang and Fengtien, the latter being the seat of Wu Pei-fu's arch-enemy, Chang Tso-lin, whom he defeated last July. In the Manchurian army there are some one hundred and fifty thousand men, and about one third of this number are good soldiers, well equipped. Chang Tso-lin since his defeat last July has been relying upon Japanese and Russian reactionary support. He has received many millions of dollars worth of arms from Japan, via Korea, and in the reorganization of his forces there are about one hundred Russian and Japanese officers. He was dismissed by mandate from his post, but in spite of this still maintains his position. He is preparing with the aid of Japan to invade Peking next spring. He is the only General who has a force which could compete with Wu Pei-fu, and he has the sympathy and assistance of nearly every reactionary in China. His latest move has been to advocate the election of Tsao Kun as president, hoping thereby to weaken seriously his enemy, Wu Pei-fu. Manchuria is also well off financially so far as the provincial treasuries are concerned.

With the added financial assistance from Japan, Chang Tso-lin is in a very comfortable position financially.

The brief review of the situation, financially and militarily, in the provinces, all being mentioned but Kansu, Sinkiang and Mongolia, since these three provinces do not enter into China's internal political and military affairs, shows that the provinces are bankrupt, and that with the exception of Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, there are no outstanding generals or military forces left. Since the Second Revolution in 1913, nearly every general has been looking after his own pocket book regardless of others. The provinces have been bled white, and as a result the military overlords find it difficult to maintain substantial military forces. The time has come when they must dig down into their own pockets for money, and this being distasteful to them, since money is all they want, they have allowed their forces to degenerate and disintegrate to such an extent that they are unable to fight.

With the glaring exception of Wu Pei-fu, and the possible exception of Feng Yu-hsiang, we find all of the other generals and governor-generals North of the Yangtze, and including the Yangtze, reactionary. The Southern military leaders have practically nothing left them to fight with. The South being eliminated as a military factor at present, we find all of the reactionaries in the Yangtze and in the North, opposed to Wu Pei-fu. Wu Pei-fu's success means their extinction. Therefore, we find them sympathizing with, and even supporting, Chang Tso-lin. Wu Pei-fu is now surrounded by enemies, but he has been in the same position before, and won the day. Of course, he is now bitterly hated by his brother militarists, and it will be harder for him in his next fight against reactionaries, headed by Chang Tso-lin.

President Li Yuan-hung is a weakling. Parliament is under the leadership of an unscrupulous man, Wu Ching-lien. Parliament naturally counts for a good deal now since it has the duty of electing a President, and the man chosen for this position by Wu Ching-lien, Speaker of the House of Representatives, is Tsao-Kun - present Inspector General of Chihli, Honan and Shantung. The individual already referred to is incompetent and thoroughly untrustworthy. The ambition of Tsao Kun to become president works in well with the plans of Chang Tso-lin to defeat Wu Pei-fu. It works well with the plans of all the reactionary militarists in the provinces, and especially does it conform to the liking of Japan.

Chang Tso-lin believes by supporting Tsao Kun for the presidency he will be able to combine all reactionaries within the Great Wall against Wu Pei-fu, leaving him in sole control of the leadership of reactionary forces. The only possible ally that Wu Pei-fu may have is General Feng Yu-hsiang at Peking, but he is very uncertain.

According to the reports which are now received from China, it is likely that Chang Tso-lin's invasion of Chihli will coincide with the time set for the election of Tsao Kun to the presidency, or immediately after the election to maintain Tsao Kun in power.

I have not mentioned the people and their wishes so far. They have not figured in the politics and military movements mentioned. The people are absolutely opposed to militarism, and they have done in their quiet way all that they could to wear down the power of the many feudal lords. When the next fight occurs we are likely to witness an open expression of support for Wu Pei-fu.

The reactionaries have at last awakened to a sense of their weakness. They have begun to feel the pressure of popular opinion, and the pressure of man like Wu Pei-fu. They feel that if they can unite to crush any power that is against them, they will be able to unite in forming a reactionary government which will last for some years more, giving them the opportunity of gaining wealth at the expense of the people, and by uniting it will not be necessary for them to expend such enormous sums upon the upkeep of large military forces.

The time has come when the Power should cease to recognize the Peking Government. It is not a government representing the people, but representing whatever militarist is in power. By withdrawing diplomatic support immediately from Peking a blow would be given to the reactionary movement, a blow which would mean much to weaken the reactionaries. The withdrawal of diplomatic recognition will show the people that the Powers are in sympathy with the people, and will do nothing to support the corrupt government which serves only the purpose of the reactionaries. This proposed withdrawal of diplomatic support, if carried out, will do more than anything else to break down the reactionary movement. For ten years we have supported reactionaries, financially and otherwise. We have done this in the face of earnest requests from Chinese patriots that we should not recognize the government at Peking.

In the following paragraphs I shall try to picture the progress of popular government.

The militarists are now in a very bad way, for they have not the money to keep up efficient armies, and unless the reactionary union can be accomplished then it is the end of the military overlordship of the provinces. The people of China have suffered at the hands of the militarists, but they have also learned some lessons which were necessary. They have learned that it is not sufficient merely to make laws by which the people are to be governed, but that those who administer these laws shall be chosen by the people.

The Chinese are fundamentally a democratic race. From time immemorial they have been governed by the customs and traditions, the laws of China, customs and traditions of the people. In every province you will find a difference between the customs of that province and those of another. In each town in the province it will be discovered that the local customs differ in a greater or lesser degree from those of sister towns. These customs are the uncodified laws of China, and until the advent of a republican form of government the officials appointed by the Throne ruled according to provincial, or local customs. During the dynasties a man was never appointed to be an official in his own province, and when he went to another

province he became subject to the customs, or laws, of the province to which he had gone. He tried cases and gave sentences according to the customs of the locality to which he had been appointed as an official. An official from Chihli, appointed to Position in Kiangsu, administered the laws of Kiangsu, forgetting that he was a native of Chihli.

The Throne but rarely attempted to interfere with the will of the people as expressed in their customs. Until the Republic there was little or no military coercion. The military man and his soldiers were not as a rule considered a part of good society, and were merely a class higher than the bandits whom they were supposed to suppress. I can remember many instances in which the peopled refused to pay taxes to which they had not in advance agreed to pay. They made their refusal in the face of an imperial edict. The local magistrate meeting with the opposition of the people would petition his superior under one pretext, or another, begging that the tax levied be cancelled in deference to the will of the people. In Soochow, one of the richest cities of all China, a tax was levied upon silk. The weavers got together and refused to pay it. The local magistrate, upon the plea that the Soochow weavers were poor, urged the Governor and Viceroy to petition the Throne to cancel the order for the extra tax. The Throne issued an edict stating that on account of the poverty of the people of Soochow it gave the Throne great pleasure in cancelling the order. Now the people of Soochow were more than able to pay this tax, but they had nothing to do with its levy, and therefore, refused to pay it. The Throne simply yielded to popular wishes.

The last one hundred years of Manchu rule was allowed simply because the Throne exercised no immediate power over the people. The people cared nothing about the pomp and glory of imperial splendor just so long as this splendor did not interfere with the liberties of the people. There was no aversion to alien rule, but alien rule was purely nominal, for it was the Chinese official who really ruled the country, and he did so in deference to popular will. The people of China were actually self-governing.

The Revolution of 1911 was not directed against the system of government, but against the Manchus. The popular feeling, or desire, that a son of Han should reign caused popular support of a revolution. As already pointed out the anti-dynastic secret societies did more than anything else to end the Manchu regime. Yuan Shih-kai was not severely criticised for the manner in which he betrayed the Throne, for after all aliens composed the imperial family. The success of the revolution can be attributed to the popular anti-Manchu feeling. The failure of the revolution can be ascribed to the fact that it was a revolution against a weak group of Manchus, possessing no actual power, instead of a revolution against the system of government. The people felt that the overthrow of the Manchus would mean that the Chinese successors would do more than the Manchus to recognize the will of the people, and they were satisfied so long as they were allowed to continue to do as they pleased.

There was no sentiment in favor of the establishment of a republican form of government in 1911. In the documents recently disclosed of the plans of the Tungmenghui, the modern revolutionary organization which officially engineered the revolution of 1911, there was contained no hint of a

republicans form of government. A constitutional monarchy under a Chinese ruler was the central and all-pervading idea of the revolutionists. The republican idea was an after-thought, not thought of until the revolutionists saw that it would be to their advantage to have one of their number at the head of the government, and since none could prove imperial lineage, it was necessary to change the form of government. This accounts for the election of Sun Yat-sen to be Provisional President. Sun Yat-sen, Hwang Hsing and other revolutionary leaders could not by any stretch of imagination qualify as successors to the Han emperors. Yuan Shih-kai would have chosen from the very first to be emperor, but he felt that he had no claim, and would have to sacrifice his leadership if he attempted to restore a Chinese descendent of one of the Han line. It is certain that Yuan Shih-kai could have restored the monarchy in 1915 had he been willing to have proposed as emperor some one descended from a Han emperor, or even from Confucius.

Had the revolution of 1911 carried out the constitutional monarchy scheme I feel confident that it would have been the least expensive step towards stabilization and good government throughout China. However, this did not take place, and we have to face facts as they exist.

The military autocracy that came into power with the exit of the Manchus showed the people that they had lost to a great extent the right to govern themselves. All kinds of new and unsuitable laws were imposed by these military autocrats under the guise of a republican form of government, and the will of the people was ignored. For the first time in their history the Chinese understood that they would be unable to have their laws recognized unless they had the right and power to elect the administrators.

The jealousies which sprang up between the various military leaders after 1913, occupied the attention of the militarists, and they soon left the people pretty well alone, being satisfied with the collection of taxes which were used to keep up military establishments, and also to line their own individual pockets. On the other hand the people felt their weakness in the face of military authority, and instead of attempting revolution against an authority which had the recognition and financial support of the foreign powers, they set to work to improve their local governments, and owing to a lack of government support for their school they raised private funds for educational purposes. Since 1913 the people have steadily progressed along the lines of self-government. They have found their military superiors occupied with wars and intrigues of all kinds against their fellow militarists, therefore, the people as a whole have had the time to work out their own problems with a minimum of interference from their superiors in official positions.

Public sentiment has shown a very decided inclination towards provincial autonomy, and a central government resenting a federation of autonomous provinces, in other words a federal government representing states' rights states. The social, racial, geographical and economic differences between the various provinces are sufficient reasons for the soundness of the federation idea. The Chinese are provincial in the sense that they are first citizens of their province and secondly citizens of China. The national feeling which is growing very rapidly in China is centered entirely upon the confederacy idea. The people want a united states of China, and this is what they are going to have before they are done.

Many of the military autocrats are today currying favor, or attempting to curry favor, with the people on the grounds that they support the idea of provincial autonomy. Their idea of provincial autonomy differs widely from the popular idea. The militarists want to reign supreme in a province with a minimum of interference from the central and other provincial governments. The people want no military head, and feel that when the militarist is ousted that each province will be able to live in peace with her sister provinces, the present inter-provincial jealousy not being the result of the feeling of one province toward another, but due entirely to disagreements between the military head of one province and that of another.

There is no feeling between the people of the South against the people of the North. Both the North and South, so far as the people are concerned, want to be left alone to establish peace and order in their own provinces, and have every desire to work in the closest harmony and union with other provinces. All of the North and South talk has been created by a bitterness between the military leaders of the North and the South, who as individuals have attempted to conquer each other in the hope of securing more territory to bleed of its revenues. There is absolutely no feeling between a man from Chihli and a man from Kwangtung.

The provincial self-governing idea has grown to such an extent that it is likely that the people will refuse to pay taxes so long as military forces occupy their provinces. The weakening of the military organizations throughout China is gradually making the people bolder, and the time will soon come when taxes will not be paid, and the militarist will retire from office rather than attempt to enforce payment.

In the villages, towns and cities we find a healthy growth of municipal governments. In former days the elders of the leading families merely had social intercourse with each other, but now we find that these elders have gotten together in an effort to create organized local self-government. They have gone one step further - they have begun to have economic relations. From the mere social contact between leading citizens there has now grown to be political and economic affiliation. The elders of the towns choose from among themselves an aldermanic board which acts in an advisory capacity to the local official, who is appointed by the central or provincial authorities. This board has no name, but is in fact an aldermanic board. It advises, but the local official

sees that it is to his advantage to take the advice proffered. These elders represent the merchants, landed proprietors and various trade guilds, and are in every sense representative of the people.

In other words the people have found it impossible to overthrow the militarists by force of arms, and have allowed them to fight among themselves, believing that some day they will become exhausted, and automatically cease to exist. The people on the other hand have learned to govern themselves and have developed men of ability in the self-governing movement. There is nothing to prevent the villages, towns and cities getting together and electing the superior provincial officers that is, when the militarist power has disappeared.

I am afraid that before the people are able to form civil government in higher circles than purely local, they will have to undergo suffering at the hands of the two million odd men that are now under arms. This suffering will not be of a terribly serious nature, with rare exceptions only, for the soldiers under arms are not soldiers because they want to be, but merely because they have been recruited from areas where they couldn't make a living, no matter how hard they may have tried to do so. These hundreds of thousands of soldiers from famine and flood areas in the North are now scattered in the richer provinces in the Yangtze, and they would rather make a living as laborers than have to eke out an existance as bandits. Suffering there will be, but not to the extent that most people think.

The real trouble which faces Chinese and foreigners alike is the low living governor-general and other high military officials who may order looting on a large scale as a final farewell. This is the greatest danger. In the North and in the Yangtze there will be a lot of looseness upon the part of the military leaders. Foreign lives and property will not be immune from the attacks of these bandit chieftans, who knowing their end is near, will attempt to recoup by murder and pillage. The laxity of our State Department and the Foreign Offices in other countries in treating with the present Peking Government is only creating trouble for their nationals in the very near future. The recent murder of Charles Coltman at Kalgan, and the murder of an American in Hunan several years ago will be repeated over and over again unless we take a very positive stand at once. Our forces at Tientsin and Peking should be increased, and we should be prepared to protect American lives wherever they may be in danger.

Any addition to our forces in China, and any declaration against the Chinese military autocrats would be welcome to the Chinese people. They are more than anxious that we should do all that is within our power to defeat the militarists whom they believe would have been defeated long ago had not the foreign powers, including the United States, supported the militarists.

Americans and Europeans have always believed that China needed a strong arm government. Well, this is the very kind of government that the Chinese will under no circumstances tolerate. The people

are democratic and peace loving, and they need only to have the right to freedom of speech and action to create a very strong and efficient government. They have gradually worn their own militarists to the point of surrender, and if foreign powers will only refuse any and all support to these militarists, or to a government which is controlled by them, the people will secure that right to freedom of speech and action which they so desire. No dictator will be acceptable to the Chinese, nor is a dictator necessary.

The Japanese know full well that the Chinese are moving along rapidly in the right direction, and they are bringing every pressure to bear to prevent the people coming into their own. They are attempting now to cause the unity of the reactionaries in the hope of postponing the day when China can get a stable government. It is the intention, in fact, the foreign policy of Japan, to keep the Chinese in hot water so that the Japanese can show to the world the inability of Chinese to rule themselves.

I am firmly convinced that the Chinese will be able to establish a strong republican government, based on a system not entirely unlike our own, if foreign aggressors are only kept in check. Just so long as alien aggressers utilize Chinese bandit chieftans and other unscrupulous officials, then so long will there be disturbances in China. If foreign powers would only recognize the right of the Chinese to work out their own destiny without outside interference, we would soon find a stable government in China.

Rockhill, Reinsch, Crane and Schurman all seemed to think that we must recognize the Peking Government. They have all suggested from time to time that financial assistance should be given to this government to keep it in power in spite of the fact that the Chinese people don't want the government, and have repeatedly begged the powers not to give it any money. The Consortium, under Thomas W. Lamont's guidance, has seen fit to refuse money to any Chinese Government which the Chinese are unwilling to support. The Consortium has done much to assist the people of China by refusing assistance to the Peking Government.

It is as a rule a very safe rule to follow when we determine that a government which does not warrant the support of its own people does not warrant our support. The one way in which we can support the people of China is to keep our hands off, and let them work out their own problems. We should also exercise our influence and power in keeping the other nations from taking advantage of China's present weakness. We have told the Russians that they must do thus and so before we recognize them, yet we are contended to recognize a group of bandit chieftans as the government of China, going so far as to give them diplomatic and financial recognition and support. There is a strong government in Soviet Russia, yet there is no government whatsoever in China. We have told Japan to keep her hands off of Russia, yet we have by our policies encouraged her to interfere with China.

M. I. D.
from FE

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

No. 94. Tsingtau, China. December 23, 1922.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Statement of Chairman of Tsingtau Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Concerning Bandits.

Honorable Jacob Gould Schurman,

American Minister,

Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose with this despatch a memorandum of a statement made by Mr. Sui Chi Ching, Chairman of the Tsingtau Chinese Chamber of Commerce, during his call at this Consulate on December 22, 1922, concerning bandits in the Kiaochow territory and their connivance with the Japanese authorities in Tsingtau. The memorandum is self-explanatory and calls for but little comment.

Mr. Sui is preeminently a leader amongst the Tsingtau Chinese and is highly respected by the foreign community as a reliable and conservative man. His statement, because of the active part he has played in recent happenings in Tsingtau, is the best evidence that can be obtained from Chinese sources. While it may not be entirely accurate (as, for example, it is quite possible that Mr. Sui has slurred over the part played by the Chamber of Commerce in the negotiations with the bandits), I believe that, in the main, it is correct.

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I regret that a lack of time has compelled me to type the rough notes just as they were made during the progress of Mr. Sui's narration.

Copies of this despatch are being transmitted to the Department of State, the American Consul, Tsinan, and the U.S.S. ASHEVILLE.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul.

Enclosure:
Memorandum, as stated.

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A true copy of the signed original. aa

Memorandum of Statements made by Mr. Sui Shi Ching, Chairman of the Executive Chinese Chamber of Commerce, On December 30, 1922, to H.B.M. Vice Consul, Mr. C.A.A. Turner, Mr. A.C. Hoe, manager of the Standard Oil Company's office at Weihsien, and American Consul, C.A. Adams, in the American Consulate. Rev. Mr. Davies of the American Presbyterian Mission, Tsinan, acted as interpreter.

Mr. Sui said that first he desired to express his appreciation of all that the American and British Consuls had done for him after his capture by the bandits on November 30, 1922; that he felt that their interest in his case had probably caused the Japanese to refrain from killing him after his escape from the bandits, or rather after he was released by the bandits.

(Note: All that the American and British consular representatives had done was to visit the scene of the abduction on December 1, 1922, and call upon General Yui in the interests of their own nationals as reported in Tsingtau Consulate's despatch No. 87, dated December 4, 1922, entitled "Incidents Connected With the Approaching Transfer of the Kiaochow Bay Territory.)

Mr. Sui said that he thought it would perhaps be to the advantage of everyone for him to make a full statement regarding the Kiaochow Bay bandit question.

Mr. Sui said that several years ago during President Yuan Shi Kai's attempt to become the Emperor of China, a Japanese military officer, General Otani, trained and armed 600 Chinese recruits who came up from the south and were supposed to be Dr. Sun Yat Sen's men. Three hundred of these men attacked and captured Weihsien and the other three hundred almost simultaneously attacked Sho-tsun. Mr. Sui said that they were sent to Weihsien and Chotsun for the attack from Tsingtau by rail. Mr. Sui said that the present Shantung bandits are the remnants and outgrowth of that force.

Mr. Sui said that last spring during the fighting between General Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Pei-fu,

Chang Tso-lin sent General Chang Tsung Ch'ang with 200 men from Mukden to Tsingtau to attempt to organize the bandits at Lao Shan and Shea Kia-tao into a force that would create a diversion in eastern Shantung and keep Military Governor Tien's troops from the main fighting line; that Chang Tso-lin's unexpectedly quick defeat had upset these plans and that General Chang Tsung Ch'ang and his 200 men returned to Mukden and that they were in no way connected with recent happenings in and around the Kiaochow Bay Territory.

Mr. Sui said that from the beginning of last summer up until the beginning of December the number of captives taken by the Shea Kia Tao and Laoshan bandits ~~numbered~~ was between 1,000 and 1,500 persons, the object being to collect money for the release of these persons. Mr. Sui said that the bandits had been operating along a coast-line of approximately 300 miles, about 150 miles each way from Tsingtau, and back into the country as far as Kaomi. He said that since the bandits depended upon junks mainly for the transportation of their captives their operations had been principally along the coast.

Mr. Sui said that from the middle of last summer until the first of December there were about five to six hundred bandits in Tsingtau and its suburbs, and that about fifty of these bandits had their families with them. Mr. Sui, speaking of the period from the beginning of the summer until the first of December, said that the Military Governor of Shantung at first made no effort to suppress the operations of the bandits in the territory near Tsingtau because of jealousy between Dr. C.T. Wang and himself; that although Governor Tien had the military strength in Shantung and Dr. C.T. Wang had none, Dr. Wang was placed first in Shantung

affairs

affairs and Governor Tien second. In order to have some men of his own, Dr. C.T. Wang sent 120 men of General Feng Yu'i Hsiang's army in Honan to Chefoo to be trained as water police and that about 120 more men were recruited from around Chefoo. Dr. Wang also recruited about 600 Shantung men, without consulting General Tien, and placed them in training at Pangtse under the instruction of officers from Peking.

In September, General Wu Pei-fu, learning of the state of affairs in eastern Shantung, instructed Governor Tien that he would have to clean out the bandits within three months since the Kiaochow Bay territory was to be taken over by China in December. As the result of this Governor Tien sent some soldiers to Kiaochow and also wrote to General Yui, Commander of the Tsingtau Garrison, requesting him to clean up the former German leased territory of Kiaochow.

NOTE: Mr. Sui was careful to say that the following statements concerning the statements attributed to General Yui could not be gauranteed to be actually the words of General Yui, but that they were his words or the words of members of his staff.

Upon receiving the letter from Governor Tien, General Yui called the bandit leaders together (most of them were residing in Tsingtau), showed them the letter and asked them what they were going to do about it. The bandits said that they had enjoyed General Yui's assistance for these several years and asked for his advice. General Yui said "I will furnish you with arms and ammunition, you attack General Tien's men, capture Kiaochow and Tsimo and then you will be in a position to talk peace terms with Governor Tien. You Chinese are bandits today and officials tomorrow, so it ought not to be difficult to arrange." The Japanese authorities also requested

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the bandits to break the Shantung Railway line at some point in Chinese territory. The bandits failed in their attacks upon Kiaochow and Tsimo and refrained from cutting the railway because they did not know what complications this might lead to. The Japanese were displeased with the failure of the bandits to break the railway line. When the fighting went against the bandits about sixty junks were towed from the Tsingtau small harbor (junk harbor) to the point on the coast of Kiaochow bay nearest to Kiaochow City (the towing was done by Japanese steam launches) and the defeated bandits were then placed on board the junks and transported to Shea Kia-tao and Laoshan Bay. During the time of preparation for attack on Tsimo the bandits took nearly all the public hire service cars from the various Tsingtau garages for convenience in going to and from Laoshan and the edge of the former leased territory.

(Note: This last statement is supported by the fact that during the period mentioned there was a great scarsity of public hire service cars in Tsingtau)

Upon learning that Dr. C.T. Wang was coming to Tsingtau on October 8th or 9th, the Japanese military authorities sent junks to Laoshan Harbor and towed the bandits from Sha Tze Kou across the bay to a point in the Shea Kia-tao region and brought them back to Laoshan after Dr. Wang's departure.

Mr. Sui said that after this incident the Bandits in Tsingtau became more numerous and the merchants became apprehensive and Mr. Sui went to Tsinan, to see Governor Tien. Governor Tien then appointed one of the men in his intelligence service, Mr. Mao Shao-fu to make investigations. Mr. Mao came to Tsingtau, made investigations and returned to Tsinan. Since no understanding was arrived at with the

bandits as the result of Mr. Mao's visit the Tsingtau merchants became more apprehensive, especially as the police in training at Pangtse were unarmed. Mr. Sui said that he then sent a representative to Loyang to talk to General Wu Pei-fu who, being a Shantung man, could be counted upon to display a real interest in the affairs of this province. A little later (November 16th) Mr. Sui again went to Tsinan and this time he saw both Military Governor Tien and Civil Governor Hsiung (who had arrived a short time before). Mr. Sui said that as the result of his second trip both Tien and Hsiung sent representatives to Tsingtau, Mao Shao-fu representing Tien and a man named Tien Y'u-ting representing Hsiung. These representatives arrived in Tsingtau on November 21st and opened negotiations with the bandits, through an intermediary. These negotiations continued until November 25th, in the mean time reports and instructions being sent to and from from Tsinan. Mr. Sui said that he kept in touch with the representatives and on November 26th was informed that the negotiations were successful and that there would be no fighting in Tsingtau.

At this time the bandits had demanded a contribution from 24 villages in the Japanese controlled territory, each village being called upon to pay from three to eight thousand dollars, according to its size. The bandits agreed (1) to withdraw their demand for contributions from the villages, (2) to release several hundred captives whom they were holding for ransom and (3) to refrain from causing fighting when the Tsingtau territory had been restored to China. On its part, the Shantung Government agreed to enlist a part of the 2,000 bandits (the number to be decided later) in its forces, to give all the bandits enough money to enable them to return home, to allow those bandits who

were to be enlisted to retain their arms, the arms of the remainder of the bandits to be purchased by the Government at a price to be determined later. Mr. Sui said that the bandits had 600 rifles, 1,000 large calibre automatic pistols and 700 smaller calibre automatic pistols.

Mr. Sui said that the Tsingtau Chinese Chamber of Commerce promised Dr. C.T. Wang $150,000 to defray police expenses and had actually paid over $60,000 of this amount to General Liang Shang Tung.

Mr. Sui said that on November 27th or 28th the water police from Chefoo came to Tsingtau and on November 30th the Fangtze police arrived.

Mr. Sui said that at two o'clock on November 30th the Chinese Chamber of Commerce had a meeting to discuss and arrange a reception for the police officers and also to discuss and arrange silver souvenirs for General Yui and his staff. It was decided to give General Yui and his staff silver souvenirs to the value of about $1,500 (Note: These souvenirs were purchased but never presented). At the meeting at two o'clock the Chinese Chamber arranged a dinner for the Chinese military and naval officers then in Tsingtau for that evening (November 30th) at the Tung Wha Hotel and the hosts and guests gathered there - thirty in all- at six o'clock. Mr. Sui emphatically denied that any bandits were invited to be present at that dinner and stated that none were present when the party sat down to dinner. Mr. Sui said that about 30 Japanese - Tsingtau business men and others whom he did not know - were also having a dinner party in another room on the same floor of the Tung Wha Hotel.

Mr. Sui said that the Chamber of Commerce dinner party

had

had been seated about an hour when some thirty armed bandits came up from below, held up the party and after searching form arms began an altercation, saying that the arrangements for a settlement were all very well but that they had no guarantee that such arrangements would be carried out. Mr. Sui said that one of the bandit leaders had not been consulted in the settlement. This leader, known by the name of "Sun Pai Wen" refused to consent to the settlement and later told Mr. Sui that the Japanese authorities had told him (Sun Pai Wen) that the bandits were simply putting their heads into a noose, that they had no guarantee and that the Chinese authorities would later cut their heads off at leisure.

Mr. Sui said that the bandits recognized him as the head of the Chamber of Commerce and poked their pistols at him in an attempt to frighten him; that the Japanese dinner party had heard the noise of the altercation and had come to the door of the room in which the bandits and Chinese officials were and laughed at the threats which the bandits made against Mr. Sui; that although the dispute with the bandits lasted about an hour, nohe of the Japanese made any attempt to call the police and no police appeared on the scene. Mr. Sui said that the bandits finally took him, Mao and another Chinese named Sun Hsiao Po (who had been connected with the Japanese Administration and who had made himself very much disliked by the bandits because he had "squeezed" them for the Japanese authorities), compelled them to go down stairs and get into automobiles that were waiting, and carried them to the bandit stronghold at Laoshan, where they arrived at about 10 o'clock p.m.

Mr. Sui said that at first the bandits abused him, accusing him of going to the Chinese authorities and making trouble for them, but that after he had explained that Chinese merchants could not cause the bandits trouble and that all such matters must naturallyk be looked after by officials there was a marked change in the attitude of the bandits toward him, and they talked quite freely to him.

Mr. Sui said that on the morning following his capture the Chinese, Sun Hsiao Po, was gradually stabbed to death by means of "slicing" with knives.

The bandits told Mr. Sui that he and Mao had been taken as hostages. The bandits also told Mr. Sui that there were a number of Japanese in the clothes of Chinese soldiers in the hills around Laoshan who had that day fired guns, presumably in an effort to start the bandits on the war path but that the banditm leaders had given strict instructions that no matter what happened the bandits were not to return the fire while the negotiations were going on.

Mr. Sui said that the bandits told him that if the negotiations failed for any reason, they would get their revenge by abducting the American and British Consuls and a number of other prominent foreigners and thus causing such an outcry that the Japanese would not withdraw from Tsingtau; that the Japanese authorities had marked out for them the location of the foreigners they were to carry off.

Mr. Sui said that the bandits also told him that during the past year, Japanese merchants in Tsingtau, with the consent of the Japanese authorities had sold to the bandits approximately 80,000 automatic pistols with ammunition, and that the bandits had disposed of these arms throughout

the country, at a profit.

(NOTE: If this last statement is accurate it is very probable that the arms came to Tsingtau from Japan as "military stores," such shipments being exempt from customs examination)

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

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May 21, 1923.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, FAR EASTERN DIVISION, STATE DEPARTMENT.

Subject: Possible Occupation of the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad.

1. General Conditions:

In accordance with your request of the 19th inst., it is proposed to discuss in this memorandum a possible foreign occupation of the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad. The question will be discussed in two phases:

1st Phase. The size of the allied expedition is based upon the supposition that the Chinese government and independent leaders will offer no opposition to the occupation of the railroad. In other words we would have a condition similar to that under which allied troops now garrison points on the Peking-Mukden Railway.

2nd Phase. The size of the expedition is determined by some unfriendliness on the part of the Chinese. Bridges and important points must be guarded as a precaution against sabotage with a possibility of attempts to call a general railway strike. Military operations on a large scale and guerrilla warfare are not considered as a possibility. Unfriendliness and possible sniping at individual soldiers would be the extent of armed opposition.

2. Bases:

The following ports of entry would be available for the foreign troops occupying the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad:

Chinwangtao, just south of the Great Wall, is connected with the Peking-Mukden railroad and has docks available for six good-sized transports. This is an open port at all times.

Tientsin. Transports could not go up the river to Tientsin but would have to unload on lighters outside of Taku bar. During the winter months Tientsin could not be used as the river is frozen. One advantage at Tientsin is that it is the present base of the American troops.

Chinwangtao and Tientsin are both on the railroad and it is within the treaty rights of the United States to maintain troops at these points under the provision of the Protocol of September 7, 1901.

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Tsingtao is a finely developed harbor with necessary docks and railroad facilities.

Nanking-Pukow. Nanking and Pukow are separated by the Yangtze river with railroads leading from Nanking to Shanghai and from Pukow to Tientsin. Pukow has floating pontoon docks for ten transports with railroad yards sufficient for making up eight trains.

The British would probably desire to use Chinwangtao and Nanking-Pukow as bases. The Japanese would probably wish to base their troops on Tsingtao while Tientsin and Chinwangtao would be the most convenient for the American forces if their headquarters should be kept at Tientsin. On the whole, for political reasons, it would seem advantageous not to assign definite ports to the different forces but to use all of the ports in common, allotting the facilities in accordance with the size of the forces furnished.

3. Size and composition of the Occupying Forces under first phase.

The distance from Tientsin to Pukow is 628 miles. To make even a show at occupation of the railroad would compel the occupation of the most important cities. It would probably be best to occupy the divisional points in order to secure some supervision over the working of the lines. It may then be said that no fewer than the following cities should be occupied under the suppositions of the first phase:

Tientsin
Tsangchow
Tsinanfu Tehchow
Yenchowfu
Hsuchowfu
Pengpu
Pukow.

Sectors allotted to the various nations might be as follows:

(a) Tientsin inclusive - Tsinanfu exclusive.
(b) Tsinanfu inclusive - Lincheng exclusive.
(c) Lincheng inclusive - Hsuchowfu inclusive.
(d) Hsuchowfu exclusive - Pukow inclusive.

Should the expeditionary force consist of French, Japanese, British and American troops, it is believed that each nation should send one regiment of infantry or its equivalent numbering approximately 1500 men each. There would not be, however, any objection to the use of slightly larger numbers should any of the nations desire to send them.

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4. Size and Composition of the Occupying Forces under Second Phase.
In addition to the cities to be garrisoned under the first phase, it would be necessary, under the second phase, to guard important bridges, arsenals and other vulnerable points. The allied expedition should then consist of a reenforced brigade from each of the four countries concerned. The possible composition of a reenforced brigade would be as follows:

| | Officers | Men | Animals |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Infantry division including division air service at present authorized peace strength less the following: | 305 | 4,798 | 1,746 |
| 1 infantry brigade | | | |
| 1 artillery brigade headquarters | | | |
| 1 artillery regiment | | | |
| 1 ammunition train | | | |
| 1 battalion of engineers | | | |
| 1 tank company | | | |
| 1 motor ambulance company | | | |
| 1 motor truck company | | | |
| 1 wagon company | | | |
| 1 cavalry regiment (less 1 squadron) at present authorized peace strength | 19 | 413 | 538 |
| 1 pack train | - | 14 | 65 |
| Total | 324 | 5,225 | 2,349 |

The total number of allied troops required under this phase would be approximately 20,000.

5. This force would be in addition to the allied force in China, which is, at present, maintaining railway communication from Peking to Shanhaikwan.

W. K. NAYLOR,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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OCT 16 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-I-258
WAR DEPARTMENT

May 21, 1923.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR PLANS DIVISION.

Subject: Possible Expedition to China.

1. Present Conditions:

In any consideration of the despatch of an Allied expedition to China, one is struck with the contrast between the power of the Central Peking Government at this time and the power wielded by the Empress Dowager at the time of the Boxer Uprising. In 1900 an emperor was still regarded as a "Son of Heaven" and although the government was weak, it was far more powerful than that puppet of the Chihli militarists with which the foreign powers, at present, conduct diplomatic relations. Hatred of the foreigner was wide-spread throughout China and the Chinese leaders had not yet received that lesson which has made the lives of foreigners, through the intervening years, comparatively safe throughout the provinces of China. A consideration of the 1900 expedition, therefore, had to be based upon a possible major operation against a united country controlled by a fairly strong Central Government. Had not the viceroys and governors of Central and South China, following the wise counsel of men of the type of Yuan Shih-kai, refused at the last minute to enter the struggle, the Allied expedition might have developed into a serious war.

At present the Central Government has little or no authority outside the walls of the city of Peking. A plaything of the Chihli party, its only power grows out of the fact that the Great Powers extend recognition to the Peking Government, negotiating through their accredited Ministers, questions of international importance.

The Treasury is bankrupt since provincial revenues are no longer transmitted to Peking and since the only revenues reaching the central treasury are those which are under foreign supervision, such as the customs' receipts and salt revenues(a government monopoly).

The armed forces of China have been estimated at from 900,000 to 1,250,000 men. In addition there are several hundreds of thousands of bandits throughout China, most of them belong to units that have some semblance to military organization. Of the

regularly constituted forces, not over 10% are supported by the Central Peking Government, the remainder depend, for their support, upon the various military leaders or Tuchuns. The military leaders grade from men like Wu Pei Fu, the dominant figure of the Chihli party, which controls Peking and Central China, or Chang Tso Lin, the Manchurian dictator with his well equipped and organized army of 100,000 down to the semi-independent leader dominating a part of one province who is only one degree removed from banditry.

Individual military leaders, devising their own means of raising and supporting their armies, appropriate provincial revenues, and practice extortion of all kinds.

The military groups or cliques are organizations of individuals bent on aggrandizement of personal wealth or power who have joined together for the purpose of maintaining themselves against rival organization. The individual within the group is selfishly attempting to benefit from his fellows as well as from the rival groups. There is some party loyalty and more personal loyalty which will stand a small degree of strain, but each man has a price which is easily attained. As has been noted, the War Office has no control whatever over the armed forces of these individuals or cliques while the President is a puppet in the hands of certain powerful leaders. The Parliament also neither represents the people nor legislates for them.

With political and military conditions so chaotic one can readily understand how small a distinction there is between a minor military official and a bandit. Banditry has always been a profession in China and budding young bandits grow up to emulate that famous exbandit, Chang Tso Lin., the richest and most successful of the military leaders of China.

The bandits may be grouped in two categories. First: bandits proper, that is, those groups of armed men operating usually in remote and inaccessible parts of the country who have for generations practiced robbery on the highways of commerce both on land and sea. Second: those groups of armed men who, having started on a military career as legitimate soldiers, find themselves, through the death or political eclipse of their original leaders, forced into banditry as a means of livelihood since it is easier to rob than work.

In addition to soldiers proper and bandits there are in China vast numbers of armed men doing guard duty of all sorts, such as the railway guards that are seen at each station on the railway lines and the yamen and body guards of the countless provincial, district and county officials of all sorts, civil and military. The Customs and Salt Service also have guards of their own.

In general, it may be stated that every official who collects money or enforces regulations is backed by a group of men with rifles, and when it is realized that practically every official has to collect not only his own salary, but money to support his guards, plus a tribute to some one higher up for the privilege of holding his job, it is easy to understand what a burden these hords of armed men are to the long suffering people of the country.

One may wonder why Wu Pei Fu would permit banditry to flourish within a few miles of his stronghold at Loyang in Honan but the suppression of organized banditry within the area of China nominally dominated by General Wu Pei Fu would strain the resources of that officer to the utmost, leaving him an easy prey for Chang Tso Lin or other rival leaders. It is far easier for him to negotiate with the bandit leaders and, when necessary, to legalize their position by incorporating their groups into the constituted forces than to dissipate his strength in (to him) useless warfare.

The attack on the Tientsin-Pukow Express on May 6, 1923, is the most serious aggression against foreigners which China has seen since the Boxer troubles in 1900. The motives which actuated the bandit leader are problematical. There is, of course, the simple explanation that robbery and probable ransom offered sufficient reward but when one remembers the use with which foreigners have been regarded in the past in China, there seems a possible more serious cause underlying the outrage. The attack was so well planned and so quickly executed without hesitation of any kind that one suspects a master mind playing for high stakes. Possible explanations are that the outrage was instigated by Chang Tso Lin in order to undermine the Central Government and the Chihli Military Party or that certain foreign influences have been at work.

Should an allied expedition be despatched to China to insure a restoration of stable conditions, there seems little likelihood of united action against that expedition by the powerful military leaders and it is even possible that men of the type of Wu Pei Fu and Feng Yu Hsiang might, under certain conditions, co-operate in restoring order. Anti-foreign sentiment has, however, at times in China reached great heights, the most striking instance, in recent years, being the Japanese boycott following the Versailles conference. We have recently also seen the power of the labor unions in South China. It is therefore hard to predict what attitude the Chinese would bear towards an allied expedition dispatched to China. Such an expedition might be forced to undertake operations against the regular constituted forces of the powerful military leaders; might be confronted with guerrilla warfare; with railroad strikes or with passive acquiescence. One should note that throughout the vast areas of China there are no roads worthy of the name except in the vicinity of the large cities. Some of the difficulties attending transportation of supplies may be appreciated when one remembers the famine of 1920-21 when many thousands were starving within a few miles of the great stores of food in Tientsin and Tsinanfu.

2. Mission.

The mission of the expedition would be to overcome hostility towards foreigners and to suppress banditry wherever such activity was or had been directed towards foreigners. An expedition probably would be sent only in the case that the Central Government and Military Tuchuns did not show the proper desire to suppress banditry. The expedition would not attempt to suppress banditry by operating directly against the bandits but probably would occupy the railroad or important cities or ports in order to force the Chinese authorities to comply with the wishes of the allied forces.

To attempt to establish a stable government in China would be such a serious undertaking and would require such a great number of troops that such a mission more likely would be the out-growth of an expedition sent for punitive purposes rather than the avowed intention in the beginning. An expedition of that kind would require forces in excess of those available in the United States Army.

3. Limitation of Expedition.

The extent of China is so great as to make it impracticable to attempt operations in the whole of China with a small expedition. It therefore would be necessary to determine what areas are of vital importance. Manchuria, at present, is sufficiently orderly that it can be excluded from the theatre of operations. American and other foreign interests are greatest in the areas bounded by the Great Wall on the north, the Peking-Hankow Railway on the west and the Yangtse River on the South. Operations should be limited to this territory. Attempts to cover greater territory would render a small expedition thoroughly inefficient. There are considerable foreign interests in Kwantung and operations might be necessary in that Province. In that case, a separate expedition should be used since Canton is so far removed from the other territory above described. The practicability of operations depends to a very great extent upon the railroads and navigable rivers available. Practically all of the railroads and navigable rivers of Central China lie within the area described above. This renders operations much less difficult than in other sections of China.

4. Strength and Value of Chinese Troops.

Within the limits of the area described above as of special importance to Americans and other foreigners, the following armed forces are maintained:-

| | |
|---|---|
| Anhwei | 20,500 |
| Chihli | 96,000 |
| Honan | 42,200 |
| Hupeh | 70,400 |
| Kiangsu | 54,600 |
| Shantung | 70,900 |
| | 354,600 |

These forces are in no sense at the command of the Central Government of China. All of them maintain nominal allegiance to the Chihli party which dominates the Central Government. Wu Pei Fu and Feng Yu Hsiang are the dominant military leaders of the Chihli party, with

Tsung Hsu as its military head. Wu and Feng each have one division of reliable and efficient troops of ten or twelve thousand each,- probably 20,000 troops in this district could be counted upon to be loyal to Wu; the rest of the troops would be of doubtful loyalty and of very little efficiency. 20,000 probably would be the maximum that could be counted upon to oppose foreign troops.

5. Bases:

The following bases would be available for operation in this district:-

Chinwangtao, just south of the Great Wall is connected with the Peking-Mukden railroad and has docks available for six good-sized transports. This is an open port at all times.

Tientsin. Transports could not go up the river to Tientsin but would have to unload on lighters outside of Taku bar. During the winter months Tientsin could not be used as the river is frozen. The advantage at Tientsin is that it is the present base of the American troops.

Chinwangtao and Tientsin are both on the railroad and it is within the treaty rights of the United States to maintain troops at these points under the provision of the Protocol of September 7, 1901.

Taingtao is a finely developed harbor with necessary docks and railroad facilities.

Nanking-Pukow. Nanking and Pukow are separated by the Yangtze river with railroads leading from Nanking to Shanghai and from Pukow to Tientsin. Pukow has floating pontoon docks for ten transports with railroad yards sufficient for making up eight trains.

The British interests are greatest in South China and at Weihaiwei in North China. They would probably desire to use Chinwangtao and Nanking-Pukow as bases. The Japanese control the mines of Shantung jointly with the Chinese. For this reason they probably would want to base their troops on Taingtao. For political reasons it would not be desirable to permit the Japanese to use Taingtao alone so that the American forces should use that port to some extent. Tientsin and Chinwangtao would be the most convenient ports for the American forces if their headquarters should be kept at Tientsin. On the whole, for political reasons, it would seem advantageous not to assign definite ports to the different forces but to use all of the ports in common, allotting the facilities in accordance with the sizes of the forces furnished.

6. Size and Composition of the Expeditionary Force.

In the Boxer Revolution of 1900, 20,000 allied troops were able to relieve Peking. The amount of resistance at present would probably be less than that encountered in 1900. An allied force of 20,000 would be sufficient as a purely punitive expedition. This expedition probably would be furnished by the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France. A reenforced brigade consisting of the following troops should be furnished by the United States;

2 regiments of infantry
1 battalion of artillery (preferably mounted)
2 Companies of Engineers
1 Signal Company
1 Reinforcement group, less one squadron
1 Observation squadron
2 Pack trains
1 Hospital and 1 Ambulance Company.
1 Bakery Company and a clothing and bath unit.

Owing to political considerations involved, Filipino troops should not be employed. This would practically eliminate the employment of troops from the Philippine Department since the number of white troops in that Department is so limited that it could not be safely reduced. Troops with the expedition should be drawn from the West Coast, or from Hawaii, dependent upon the time in which transportation would be available.

The Commander of the expedition should have the rank of Major-General. The British and Japanese Commanders probably would be either Major-Generals or Lieutenant-Generals, and a commander of less rank than Major-General would be seriously handicapped in his dealings with them.

W. K. NAYLOR,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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CHINA
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CHINA

Estimate of the Military Situation

1. MILITARY

1. Strength:

| | Present Strength | Trained Reserves | Military Man Power |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulars and others under arms | 1,082,000 | | 1,082,000 |
| Untrained | | | 13,918,000(Est.) |

Service is voluntary with temporary compulsory service of local people when considered expedient by leaders. There is no fixed enlistment period, most enlistments, however, are for three years. Military manpower is low owing to low standards of living and poor sanitation. The greater part of those under arms are merely coolies in uniform, and many of the leaders are little more than independent bandits.

2. Organization: By Official Decree of August 31, 1912, the Supreme Control of the Army is invested in the General Staff and in the Ministry of War. A joint board representing the General Staff and Ministry of War convenes from time to time or when emergency requires to work out problems involving use of troops.

In February 1916 it was announced that a Special Council had been established at the President's Palace. This Council acts merely in an advisory capacity to the President and exercises no control over troop organization.

The practical administration of military affairs is supposed to be largely in the hands of the Ministry of War. In practice, control is decentralized to such an extent that the movement and even the mission of troops is almost entirely in the control of Provincial or local commanders.

Units higher than a division exist only in theory. The Luchum or regular army theoretically consists of 24 divisions and 22 mixed brigades. The irregular organizations consist of Provincial troops, mounted, stationary, moving and water police; frontier defense troops, eetc., a total of nearly one million irregular forces.

A normal division consists of about 12,500 men organized into two infantry brigades each of two regiments; a regiment each of cavalry and artillery, a battalion each of engineers, machine-guns and transport, a sanitary detachment and a band. A mixed brigade consists of about 5,000 men organized into two infantry regiments, one battalion of artillery, one squadron of cavalry and one company of engineers, machine-

guns and transport. In practice divisions may be reduced to two or three thousand men depending upon the funds made available to the division commander for maintaining his division. He is responsible for the purchase of equipment and the payment of his troops. He frequently diverts to his personal use, funds intended for the maintenance of his division and often stoops to levies on cities and even banditry in order to pay his troops.

There is an Air Service entirely independent of the Ministry of War organized for "commercial" Service but which has been used in an emergency for military purposes. At present the planes are not equipped with machine guns or bomb dropping devices.

There is no tank nor chemical warfare service and practically no coast defense organization.

It must be understood that any statements on Organization are more theoretical than actual.

3. Equipment: There is a total of about one million rifles of every age and type, 1,300 machine guns and 3,000 field guns of different models. The great variety of models of guns and rifles renders all ammunition service difficult. Accoutrements are antiquated and insufficient. Uniforms are made in China and of poor quality. There are no reserve supplies in guns, ammunition or equipment. Each provincial Tuchun or independent commander organizes his own arsenal, from which he attempts to secure replacement of guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. The material produced in these arsenals is insufficient and of poor quality.

4. Mobilization: There are no mobilization plans. Given a patriotic cause and assuming that funds were available the following is suggested as the probable procedure for mobilization.

The mobilization would probably consist of three phases:

(a) Recruit by conscription or otherwise to war strength of the existing Luchun (National) and Provincial organizations.

(b) The mobilization of these or parts of these existing organizations at critical points to be determined by the needs of the situation.

(c) Organization of replacement units to meet the needs of the active army and possible organization and mobilization of additional divisions to augment the active army. There is no reserve for this purpose.

Telegraphic orders for recruiting to war strength would reach all organizations by the 7th day(delay would be due to inefficiency of organization and delay in reaching districts remote from telegraph station). The organizations could be filled to war strength on the 14th

day. Practically all organizations should be ready to move on the 15th day.

Organizations near railway lines of North China could be mobilized at any given point or points on or near those lines by the 45th day - (estimated). (Delay would be due to lack of rolling stock available). Guns, rifles and equipment for such a mobilization would be lacking.

5. Theory of Combat: The Chinese have little conception of fighting tactics and their lack of organization would make the application of modern theories of combat difficult. Troops rarely conduct combat exercises or solve problems involving use of troops in battle. A few divisions at Peking work out simple problems at manoeuvers but the problems are generally poorly conceived, and badly executed.

Against foreign troops Chinese would act almost entirely on the defensive. At times they have shown determined holding ability but in general (unless superior in numbers) would avoid closing with their opponent.

In the usual action between two Chinese forces the casualties are few and bribery, loot, conspiracy and treachery are liable to play a larger part in the victory than strategy or tactics.

General Wu Pei Fu in August, 1920, with unusually well trained Chinese troops, many of whom had volunteered and were serving from patriotic inspiration, displayed real offensive tactics and quickly overwhelmed much larger Chinese forces, many of whom were Japanese trained. Early in May of 1922, General Wu Pei Fu, backed by popular sentiment in Central China, overwhelmingly defeated the Manchurian troops of Chang Tso Lin who had taken up a covering position south of Peking and Tientsin.

With able leadership, proper equipment, an efficient staff and patriotic cause, effective Chinese forces could be developed. The Chinese troops have stamina and at times have shown great courage. China has, in the past, developed only a handful of aggressive officers.

6. Distribution of Forces:

(a) Normal distribution: There is no distribution to resist or initiate invasion. The distribution of troops depends upon theneeds of the political group conspiring for power and on the troops available to the interested parties in carrying out their schemes.

For the most part troops are stationed along or near the main arteries of communication. The object of the leader is to control areas with the idea of increasing returns in taxes, requisitions, etc., and incidentally as a protection against the efforts of their political enemies.

(b) Present Distribution: Chinese armed forces by provinces are estimated as follows:

[redacted]

There are constant movements of military forces from oneprovince to another, hence these figures are continually changing.

7. Efficiency and Morale: The Tuchun system accounts to a large extent for the following outstanding features; decentralization of military authority, the lack in most organizations of discipline, training, or efficiency.

The authority of the Central Government has gradually broken down and the strength of the Tuchun has grown until now their control over their provinces and the troops therein is practically complete.

Each Tuchun regards the units of the army stationed in his province as his personal following and in the struggle for ascendency each spends a large proportion of the provincial funds for the recruiting and equipment of larger armies.

The Chinese are very poor organizers and this racial characteristic is shown to a remarkable degree in lack of effective control of troops and a total lack of centralized staff which could or would perform proper staff functions in the emergency of war.

A few organizations such as Wu Pei Fu's "Own Division" have proved to be efficient and have shown high morale and patriotic motives. These isolated examples indicate that future generations may see an efficient Chinese Army.

8. Strength:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | light training cruisers | (1913) |
| 4 | old light cruisers | (1898) |
| 3 | destroyers | (1913) |
| 8 | torpedo boats | (1895 - 1908) |
| 19 | gunboats | (1908 - 1915) |
| 15 | light gunboats & tugs | |
| 2 | transports | |
| 1 | dispatch boat | |
| 1 | old training ship | |

No ships are under construction and no new ships have been authorised.

The Navy is inadequate and unable to attempt proper defense. There are no submarines, mines, etc.

9. Organization and Armament: The fleet organization is not known. There are no fighting ships of value. The largest modern gun carried is 6 inch calibre.

The total personnel of the Navy is about 5,000 officers and men.

10. Distribution:

(a) Normal Distribution: Not known. Naval stations are located at Foochow, Tsingtao, Kiang Nan and Whan Poa.

(b) Present Distribution: The fighting ships are about equally divided between the North and South.

11. Efficiency and Morale: Efficiency and morale are very poor. The navy is entirely unprepared for the emergency of war. Men are several months in arrears in pay and there are no funds for purchase of coal for the ships.

The ships are old and cannot be considered as efficient fighting units

There is a tendency in the Navy as in the Army to acknowledge allegiance to individual leaders rather than to the Central Government.

## III. GEOGRAPHIC

12. Geographic Information Affecting the Strategy of the Country:

The outstanding features of China's geographic location in relation to her connection with world affairs is her isolation. Except for the Chinese-Eastern Railway her only direct means of communication with foreign countries is by the Pacific Ocean to which she presents a two thousand mile coast line with excellent harbors. This coast line, however, is flanked by the islands of Japan.

The great extent of territory and limited rail transportation make general mobilization difficult. Owing to difficulty of transportation South China would form a theatre of operations practically separate from the rest of China.

Lack of communication other than by sea makes the coast line a source of weakness. Each section would be isolated from others. An enemy could maintain himself at any point along the coast without much difficulty.

## IV. SITUATION

13. Present Situation: Both China's army and navy are incapable of

offering successful defense against a properly equipped modern army or navy, and incapable of undertaking an offensive over sea. The Peking Gendarmerie and the Peking Metropolitan District Guards are the only portions of the armed forces of China which may be said to be under the control of the President of China and most of these troops even are loyal to General Feng Yu Hsiang of the Chihli Military Party rather than to the Central Government. In May 1922, following the defeat of Chang Tso Lin, the Manchurian Dictator, on the Chihli plains by the forces of General Wu Pei Fu, there was a general feeling of optimism throughout China. This was intensified by the expulsion of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the South China Government from Canton by General Chen Chiung Ming, the Military Tuchun of Kwangtung, and the establishment of an entente between General Chen and General Wu. General Wu, following his victory, demanded the abolition of the Tuchun system and the inauguration of vital reforms. It was on this platform, with the promised support of powerful leaders, that Li Yuan Hung, on June 11, 1922, assumed the office of President of China pending the election of a President by the National Parliament.

Optimism has proved however to be premature. Chang Tso Lin, in withdrawing his retreating forces from Chihli gained possession of 90% of the rolling stock of the Peking-Mukden Railway and crippled that strategic road by the retention of this equipment north of Shanhaikuan. Chang Tso-Lin is busily engaged in reorganising and strengthening his army. Russian officers have been employed as advisors and instructors and foreign ordnance experts are reported working in the Mukden arsenal. The Japanese have been implicated in the sale of large quantities of munitions which are reliably reported to have been received in Mukden from Vladivostok during the early fall of 1922. All Manchurian revenues have been diverted from Peking to Mukden while proclamations issued by Chang Tso-Lin virtually amount to a declaration of the independence of the Manchurian Provinces from the present Central Government.

The Peking Government is powerless in the hands of the Chihli militarists, the Treasury is empty, the foreign banking groups refuse crediting and officials assume office with a watchful eye towards a safe line of retreat to the nearest foreign concession.

The outstanding feature of the military situation is the attempt being made by Wu Pei Fu to bring about the unification of China by force. At present the Chihli party has nominal control over practically all that portion of China between the Yangtze and the Great Wall but in the south the situation is more complicated. The Military Governor of Chekiang is supposed to be a Sun Yat Sen sympathizer with some leaning towards the Anfu party, while in Kwang tung, a peculiar situation has arisen. Canton was captured in January 1923 by Yunnan and Kwangsi troops apparently loyal to Sun Yat Sen. Dr. Sun returned to Canton in February only to find that the Kwangsi leader, General Shen Hung Ying, was of

doubtful loyalty. On March 30th the Peking cabinet, yielding to pressure from the Peking militarists, appointed General Shen as Military Governor of Kwangtung. This direct slap at Dr. Sun culminated during the latter part of April in hostilities between the troops of General Shen and those troops loyal to Dr. Sun with the early fighting favorable to the latter who retains possession of Canton. At present then only Chekiang and parts of Kwangtung and Yunnan hold out against the Chihli unification scheme.

Recent movements of Chihli troops to a line extending from Jehol to the Gulf of Chihli at Peitaho have been taken to indicate a coming offensive against Chang Tso Lin. That movement may, however, be purely offensive.

Throughout China there are several hundred thousand armed bandits, most of whom maintain some semblance of military organization. In fact there is little difference between the bands maintained by leading bandits and the troops serving under the banner of many of the minor semi-independent military leaders, since both types of "soldiers" are maintained by the same forcible dishonest methods. Until recently aggressions by these bandits against foreigners have been very rare but during the past year there have been a number of instances in which foreigners, as such, have been singled out for robbery and ransom. These outrages culminated on May 6th in the derailing of the Tientsin-Pukow express and the capture of about twenty foreigners, including two American Army officers, who were taken into the hills of Shantung and held for ransom. Whether the motive of these bandits in this instance were simple robbery and desire for ransom or whether this may not have been a deliberate attempt by some faction or foreign element to discredit the Central Government, is problematical.

One Japanese division occupies the Zone of the South Manchurian Railway and small detachments of the troops of the Great Powers are stationed along the Peking-Mukden railway in accordance with the Protocol of 1901.

14. Future Situation: With the Chihli party controlling every province north of the Yangtze except Manchuria and either in control of or fighting for control of every province south of the Yangtze except Chekiang and Yunnan, it will be interesting to watch how far Wu Pei Fu's unification scheme will progress. This scheme will eventually fail as any agreement between the ordinary types of Chinese militarists must fail. China needs forceful, honest leaders who will put love of country above personal gain and who will compel the subordination of individual military leaders. There are few of this type of leader now in public life. Men of the type of General Shen Hung Ying, now fighting with Sun Yat Sen for control of Canton, will give nominal allegiance to Wu Pei Fu until firmly entrenched in power, after which treachery may be expected.

The union of the Far Eastern Republic with Soviet Russia brings a rather large, well disciplined and fairly efficient force of Soviet troops to the Manchurian borders. It is very doubtful if Chang Tso Lin's troops could, without the aid of Japan, successfully oppose or even seriously delay a Soviet advance into the Zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It is also problematical whether the Japanese would give Chang armed support. One is therefore compelled to question numerous rumors and reports that Chang is preparing to renew hostilities with the Chihli militarists since a potential enemy of great relative strength would be in his rear. In any consideration of a possible advance by the Chihli militarists into Manchuria for the purpose of forcing unification, one must question whether the Japanese will not maintain the status quo by prohibiting fighting between Chinese factions in the Zone of the South Manchuria Railway. This is particularly true since Chang Tso Lin, willingly or otherwise, has shown a disposition to play the political game with the Japanese while Wu Pei Fu has been a leading opponent of Japanese aggression on the mainland of Asia.

NOTE: For further detailed information on this subject see Information Digest on file in the Military Intelligence Division.

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3-1 1923 2657-J-260 E

WAR DEPARTMENT

*SUBJECT* A DISCUSSION OF THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

*From* JAPAN

*No.* 5126 *Date* June 11, 1923.

*Replying to No.* *Date*

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 5 1923

4860 - Penetration of National Interests into Foreign Countries.

The attached "Discussion of the Manchurian Situation" is based upon the recent investigations of the Military Attache in North and South Manchuria. It is believed that the Manchurian question is of very great importance in any consideration of the Far East, and the conclusions arrived at herein are the result of a rather extensive investigation of the subject. (Source: M.A.Japan-5126-June 11, 1923.)

Binding Margin.

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MIL. INTELLIGENCE
1922 2657-J-260
WAR DEPARTMENT

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A

# DISCUSSION OF

# THE

# MANCHURIAN

# SITUATION.

June 9, 1923.

# A DISCUSSION OF THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

Manchuria is the meeting ground of the three great Asiatic civilisations - Chinese, Japanese, and Russian. Naturally enough, their interests are often conflicting, especially in the question of the ownership and control of the two great railway systems, the South Manchurian and the Chinese Eastern. In addition, China and Soviet Russia are struggling for the political control of Mongolia, closely watched by Japan who is not without aspirations in that region, herself. These "Three Eastern Provinces" of China furnish the real problem of the Far East, even though the present internal confusion of China, with its accompanying internal complications, now monopolizes public attention. The mutual jealousies of the Powers, in all probability, will prevent any one Power from obtaining any great degree of political or economic control of China proper. This is not true of Manchuria, however - even after two wars, the question of control still remains undecided, and the moves of the three contestants in the game will furnish much of future Far Eastern history.

It is believed worth while to mention briefly some of the physical characteristics and the economical possibilities of Manchuria, so as to be able to appreciate the prize for which three great peoples are struggling.

It has been customary to consider Manchuria as divided into North and South Manchuria, the dividing line being drawn from Changchun to Kirin. North of that line is supposed to represent the Russian sphere of influence, the South falling to Japan. Although such a division has decreased in importance since the Russian Revolution, the almost certain recrudescence of Russian power will again make it a matter of interest. In any case it is necessary to note the three provinces that make up Manchuria - Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. Fengtien, as it contains the great fertile Liao valley, and has the benefit of Japanese law and order, Japanese transportation, and Japanese markets, is the richest and most thickly settled (129 per sq. mi.). It has the advantage, also, of lying close to China proper where there are hordes of coolies to draw on for settlers. Kirin extends from central Manchuria far to the northeast where it borders the Maritime Province of Siberia. Its richest section is the Sungari river valley, which offers great possibil-

ities for future development. Heilungkiang, bordered by the Amur on the north, and the Sungari on the east, is larger than the other two provinces combined, but has a population of only 12 per square mile. Like Kirin, it has great tracts of forests, while its western section differs but little from Mongolia upon which it borders. Any political discussion of this region should include a section of some 60,000 square miles of Eastern Inner Mongolia, as it represents the so-called Japanese sphere of special interest.

No accurate population statistics of this region are available, but an average of estimates places it at between 20 and 25 million, including 600,000 Koreans, less than 200,000 Japanese and 175,000 Russians. Every Spring witnesses a migration of 350,000 to 450,000 Shantung coolies for work on Manchurian farms and railroads, some 70% of whom return to their homes after the harvest. These coolies are shipped through like cattle to North Manchuria; those who remain there secure more or less permanent employment on the farms or in the forests. In slack times, many take up the congenial occupation of banditry; soldier, bandit, laborer - the line of demarkation is often so faint as to be hardly discernible. It is only a question of time, however, until this ant-like army of Chinese farmers will raise the present average of 53 per square mile to a figure more comparable to that of regions further southward - and then there is nothing to stop their onward progress but the Arctic Circle.

As coal and iron, the principal minerals, are found chiefly in South Manchuria in the Japanese sphere of influence, their further consideration will be deferred until the subject of Japanese interests is discussed. After all, it is as an agricultural country, that Manchuria is important in the world's economy.

It is estimated that over 33 million acres of land are under cultivation, and that some 42 million acres of arable land (about equal to the improved farm lands of Indiana and Illinois) are awaiting cultivation. Great crops of beans, wheat, kaoling (a kind of sorghum), millet, corn, rice, and buckwheat are raised. Leaving aside for a moment the subject of beans, which deserves a special discussion for itself, it will be of interest to consider the exportable surplus of foodstuffs, such as would be available, for example, to a civilized army operating in Manchuria.

The statistics of 1920 give the following exports of cereals from Manchuria:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Barley..... | pounds | 14,263,984 |
| Buckwheat..... | " | 5,670,854 |
| Kaoling..... | " | 232,360,842 |
| Corn (Maize).... | " | 85,886,612 |
| Millet..... | " | 301,282,373 |
| Rice..... | " | 11,822,769 |
| Wheat..... | tons | 546,293 |
| Flour (wheat)... | pounds | 92,355,466 |
| Salt..... | " | 181,107,829 |

The above is quite a respectable total in itself, and it would not be at all strange if the frugal Chinaman, under the stimulus of high prices, might raise a little larger crop, and at the same time, feed himself more on kaoling and millet, and less on barley, corn, rice, and wheat. It is of interest, also, in this connection, that Japanese-owned flour mills have a daily capacity of 25,000 bags.

The mountain ranges of the north, and the upper reaches of the Sungare and Yalu have great tracts of forests, but the present reckless deforestation seriously threatens the future of this industry.

The Chinaman has been raising soya beans for generations. The plant helped fertilize his fields and furnished pasture for his drove of unkempt, razor-backed hogs. The bean itself was an excellent food, and before Standard Oil penetration, he pressed out an oil which served as a light, the residue being fed to his porkers. The coming of the Japanese, however, opened up a source of income never before contemplated - for the introduction of the bean, bean oil, and bean cake to the outside world has created a demand that guarantees prosperity to the farmer and has advanced the development of the country by decades.

The beans are harvested late in September. Late in January, when roads are good, i.e., frozen, the creaking Chinese cart of a pre-Confucius era, pulled by a team of horses, mules, donkeys, or bullocks, or any combination thereof, transports them to the nearest railroad station or river port. All along the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railroads may be seen huge piles of sacks of beans awaiting transportation to Dairen or Harbin. Those along the Liao and Sungari rivers are loaded on junks in April or May and floated down to Yinkou or Harbin. At the modern mills at Dairen, and to a lesser extent at Yinkou and Harbin, the bean oil is extracted, the residue or bean cake being even more valuable than the oil. One hundred and thirty-three pounds of beans will give approximately 12 lbs of bean oil and two pieces of bean cake weighing 62 lbs each.

In 1921, 133,000 tons of oil and 1,672,000 tons of bean cake were exported from Manchuria. Production in 1920 was slightly less, but the total value of beans, bean oil, and bean cake exported during that year was $117,465,000 (U.S.Currency), exceeding by $30,000,000 the total of all other exports.

It is of interest, in this connection, to note briefly, the manifold uses of the soya bean. The Chinese and Japanese use the bean in various forms for food and it is an important article of diet for both peoples. The Occidental eats it in oleomargarine, olive oil or as a substitute for cottonseed oil, peanut oil, etc. It is a basis of many soaps, paints, and enamels, and is valuable in the manufacture of explosives. In the laboratory, gasoline, kerosene, and benzol have been made, although the Standard Oil is in no immediate danger of competition in that line. From the meal, may be made various breakfast foods, milk and flour. Without the bean cake, the Japanese farmer would be in a bad way for a cheap and efficient fertilizer, while the Chinese farmer uses it as food for his animals. A new use of the bean cake and one that may prove of great value in Far Eastern economics, is not being developed in the chemical laboratory of the South Manchurian Railway - the manufacture of a flour for bread making. Should this prove as successful as hoped, it will provide a cheap food for the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese peasant which will be of incalculable value to those peoples. So much for the romance of the bean - and it should not be forgotten that credit is due to the Japanese and the S. M. R. R.R. especially, for developing this source of wealth for the Manchurian peasant.

This resume of Manchurian agricultural resources would be incomplete without some mention of domestic animals. No accurate statistics are available in such a country, but the numbers have been estimated as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Horses.....2,570,000 | Sheep and Goats..2,560,000 |
| Mules..... 620,000 | (80% East. Inner Mong.) |
| Cattle.....2,000,000 | Hogs.....6,290,000 |

The horses, while small, have great endurance. Mules are of good quality, and worth more than the horses. The cattle are of Chinese and Mongolian breeds, the Chinese keeping them for working purposes and the Mongolian for milk - beef is a secondary consideration. Sheep and goats are also of

poor quality, while the hog is a dirty, frowzy razor-back. The South Manchurian Railway is attempting to improve the various breeds of domestic animals by the importation of foreign stock, but it will be some years before any substantial improvement may be expected. Some day, however, Manchuria and Mongolia will be an important factor in the world's supply of beef, mutton, and pork.

## CHINA'S INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA.

The use of the word China to denominate a nation being something of a misnomer at present, it would perhaps be more accurate to say that the interests of the Chinese people in the Three Eastern Provinces are, of necessity, entrusted to Tuchun Chang-tso-Lin. Since 1911, this enterprising ex-bandit has resisted all efforts of the Peking government to oust him. During that time he has gradually consolidated his position until he now has a kingdom of his own, independent in reality, if not yet so in name.

However, it must not be imagined for a moment that he has a sinecure. On the contrary, he has several live problems on his hands and his ability to keep several balls in the air at the same time shows that he possesses political talents of a high order. First and foremost, he has the problem of the Japanese - a real condition and not a theory by any means. He is often called pro-Japanese, but it is far more accurate to call him pro-Chang-tso-Lin. He must get along with the Japanese, deriving as much profit from them as possible and, at the same time, giving up as little as can be avoided. It must be admitted that he has succeeded very well in that endeavor. The Japanese are running an excellent transportation system from Dairen to Changchun and from Mukden to Antung, efficient to a degree not possible for Chang-tso-Lin or any other Chinese combination. Under the aegis of Japanese law and order and by virtue of the markets afforded thereby, Chinese farmers in increasing thousands are becoming more and more prosperous, to the greater profit and prosperity of Chang-tso-Lin. Through Japanese enterprise, new country is being opened up to settlement and hordes of new settlers from China proper are pouring into Manchuria - of course the South Manchurian Railway profits thereby, but so does Chang and at no effort or expense on his part. There is another very distinct advantage afforded by the presence of the Japanese, and that is the security afforded Chang from invasion by any

rival from inside the Great Wall. It may be taken for granted that the Japanese will allow no civil war in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railway - and Mukden could not be taken by the combined forces of all the Tuchuns in China. It will be noted that, in all the clamor for the return to China of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the railroad zone, the voice of Chang-tso-Lin was noticeable by its absence.

The Japanese are only one of the several problems confronting the uncrowned King of Manchuria. In the north he has the Russians, both white and red, on his hands as well as the troublesome question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In Mongolia, he has as actual Red Russian occupation, while his relations with the Soviet government in Siberia must give him considerable food for thought. The much talked-of Sino-Russian Conference may settle the different points at issue between the two countries for it must be remembered that the Chinaman and the Russian understand each other fairly well after all these years of rather intimate intercourse. At present Chang has about 50 ex-white Russian officers in his army while some 600 Russian officers and men are included in the 2600 men comprising the Chinese Eastern Railway Guard. It is true that considerable apprehension existed and perhaps still exists to some extent, that the Reds might seize the Chinese Eastern by force - but Chang's fine hand may be detected in the threat that the Japanese would not sit idly by and see this done. If there is any grabbing to be done, the Changchun-Harbin section is a rather tempting prize to Japan and Japan would welcome a good opportunity to take it. During Chang-tso-Lin's invasion of Chihli last year, the Japanese kindly offered to guard not only that stretch but the Harbin-Pogranichnaya section as well, so that Chang might devote all his energies to the South. Chang, however, did not avail himself of this kind offer.

In addition to his Japanese and Russian complications, Chang must keep a weather eye, as well, southward where there are any number of ambitious candidates for his position. His invasion of Chihli last year failed, more through treachery in his own camp than through any special merit of his enemies. He is not likely to attempt it again unless chances are overwhelmingly in his favor. In the meantime he is busily engaged in improving his personnel and materiel in case the future should render necessary another trial of strength. A number of foreign officers have been employed, an arsenal has been constructed, large quantities of war supplies have been purchased, and a very determined effort is being made to develop an efficient army. If these efforts are for defense only, well and good - he has plenty of money and can always raise more.

However, Manchuria itself is about as big a problem as one man can handle. Should he attempt to include Peking and North China as well, he is sure to meet with the united opposition of the other hungry war-lords, with dubious chances of success. Just not he manages three provinces well - much better than any of his enemies within the Wall - but too much ambition for further fields to conquer may well work his downfall.

Of course there are bandits in Manchuria, just as there are in every other province in China. However, they seem to be less prominent than in China proper. Perhaps Chang's early training has taught him how to handle that gentry - it is hardly conceivable that his old comrades would embarrass him by capturing foreigners, at any rate.

## RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA.

The European War, and more especially the Russian Revolution, has played sad havoc with Russia's once dominating position in North Manchuria. The Russians now in Manchuria are paying dear for their countrymen's pre-war high-handed arrogance. It is not a pleasant sight for any white man to see any portion of his race kicked about by Chinamen, such as is now going on in Manchuria as a consequence of the Russian's loss of extra-territoriality. Just what the Soviet Government will do to regain their country's lost prestige and influence remains to be seen. In any case the question hinges on the fate of the Chinese Eastern Railway which has been, and will be for many years, the center of all Russian effort in Manchuria.

The Chinese Eastern Railway has been very much in the limelight since the World War, especially at the time of the Washington Conference. While the circumstances of its construction are perhaps well known, it is essential to remember that it is a Russian concern, constituted by a Russian bank (Russo-Chinese, later Russo-Asiatic), under statutes promulgated at St. Petersburg. The matter is somewhat complicated by the fact that the bank's capital is predominantly French, (about 60%), and further by the Chinese Government's interest of 5,000,000 Kuping taels. While the Russo-Asiatic Bank is the only shareholder of the railway, the Russian Government has very strong interests therein, due to its outlay in connection with the bonds issued by the railway estimated at from 350,000,000 to 425,000,000 gold roubles. This amount would be doubled, perhaps, if all the money spent by the railway and borrowed from the Russian Government for guard, police, schools,

hospitals, municipal buildings, etc., be considered.

The Soviet Government's attitude toward the railway has some amusing features. For example, Karakhan, the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, filled with enthusiasm and generosity on account of Kolchak's fall at the end of 1919, declared:- "The Soviet Government returns the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Chinese people without any compensation whatever." The Chinese took possession in 1920, saying that it was a temporary control over the administration of the railway pending an agreement with some future Russian Government and "acting in trust for the Russian Government's interest in the railway zone." There are strong indications, however, that Mr. Karakhan's generous sentiments do not meet with the full approval of the present Soviet authorities. Mr. Joffe, the Soviet Government's representative in the Far East made the following communication to the Chinese Government in 1922: "The statements of 1919 and 1920 do not infer that Russia renounces all her interests in China..... Until all these questions are settled Russia's rights in China will not have lost their strength and the 1919 and 1920 declarations do not at all cancel Russia's local and just rights in China.....unless the Chinese Government discontinues its ignoring of Russian interests, Russia will perhaps, after all, be obliged to consider herself free from the promises which she has voluntarily given." This statement of Mr. Joffe indicates that the Soviet, like the Imperial Government, is disposed to guard Russia's interests in North Manchuria, and her rights in regard to the railway are undeniable. There is every indication of a Sino-Russian Conference in the near future to discuss the various questions at issue between the two countries. Just what form any agreement will take is rather difficult to foresee. However, it seems certain that the Reds will insist upon the expulsion of the present White element on the Board of Directors and in the railway personnel as well, such men to be replaced by their own people. The White Russians in the railway guard will have to go too. The present commander of the railway Guard is Maj. Gen. Wen, a graduate of West Point and while it seems agreed that he is very efficient for a Chinaman, the fact remains that the railway guard as a whole, is not all equal to its responsibilities. On the other hand, the introduction of Red troops into Manchuria would entail so many complications that it is doubtful if it will be attempted. Oustromoff, the present General Manager, is conceded to be a very able man and it is doubtful if the Reds have any suitable man to replace him. Some time ago the Vladivostok authorities declared Oustromoff an outlaw, but that declaration has since been withdrawn and there are some indications of a growing rapprochement between him and the Soviet authorities.

During the past winter and spring, considerable apprehension was felt in Chinese circles, that the Soviet troops would seize the railway zone by force. As a purely military proposition they could have done so without any great amount of trouble. However, such a proceeding might well have brought Japanese interference with consequent danger of the loss of the Changchun-Harbin section of the railroad. At present there is every indication that the two countrys' conflicting claims regarding this railway will be settled at the conferance table and not on the battlefield.

A glance at the map will show the helpless situation of the railroad unless some working arrangement is arrived at with the Soviet authorities, and in view of the wretched condition of the Amur line, such an arrangement is almost equally imperative for the latter. The railroad has no outlet except through Soviet territory or via the South Manchurian Railroad to Dairen and cannot prosper unless it has through traffic from Chita to Vladivostok. From Manchuria Station to Pogranichnaya is over 900 miles. From Manchuria Station to Tsitsinhar, or about 40% of the line, practically no freight originates - and that originating in the vicinity of Harbin or brought down the Sungari river, will go either to Vladivostok or Dairen, depending on several conditions, one of the most important of course being the comparative cost. Just now, on account of the disturbed conditions at Vladivostok, a considerable portion (about 45%) goes south to Dairen, which of course is a great loss to the Russian railways. Unfortunately there is but little return freight from either port, as Harbin's prosperity is directly dependent upon the railway which in turn is largely dependent upon Russia and Siberia. Harbin is now doing only 10% of its former trade with those countries.

In the above consideration of Russia's interests in Manchuria, practically exclusive attention has been paid to the Chinese Eastern railway, as Russia's interests are largely centered therein. In constructing this railroad, Russia hoped to colonize along it with her own people, but the ubiquitous Chinaman has crowded in instead. It will be recalled that at the time of the Manchu conquest of Peking, the semi-nomad Manchus flocked south into Shantung and Chihli. Before many generations, overpopulation drove them back, and the long and arduous trek had started long before there were any railroads in Manchuria. Naturally, it was a very slow process along the present Chinese Eastern railway zone, but the building of the railways immensely facilitated the influx which is now going on rapidly. There is but little chance for the Russian farmer in the Manchuria of the future, for where the Chinaman comes there is no room for anyone else. Before the recent war, Russian capital had, to a great extent, kept other capital out of North Manchuria. Just now Russia is not in a position to finance any-

thing in Manchuria or anywhere else, and the development of that must depend on other capital. China cannot do it; Japan has some ¥ 25,000,000 already invested there - whether or not she will appreciably increase her interests depends to a considerable degree upon the outcome of future negotiations with Soviet Russia. In any case, if Japan invests heavily in mining and timber concessions in Siberia and continues the development of South Manchuria, it is doubtful if she will be able to spare the capital needed for the proper development of the country. Without American or European capital progress will be slow.

With regard to the question of what Russia can do in the immediate future in North Manchuria, it is clear that no considerable progress can be made until conditions in Siberia more nearly approach a pre-war normal. The outstanding questions between China and Russia concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway must be settled amicably so that there may be a free movement of produce along the railroad to Vladivostok, its natural outlet. It must be remembered that Siberia is not an agricultural country in the sense that North Manchuria is - Siberia has great forests and extensive mines and some day it will be the industrial country which Nature evidently intended. It needs the agricultural products of North Manchuria, and a fair degree of Russo-Chinese co-operation would see that these products together with the beans and flour for export, go over the Chinese Eastern, or down the Sungari and Amur to Habarovsk then by rail to Vladivostok. Such co-operation would make it very difficult for the Japanese and the South Manchurian Railroad to divert any great portion of such traffic to Dairen. Even under the present difficulties the railway more than pays operating expenses, but of course cannot pay any of its immense debt to the Russian Government or even the interest thereon. Russia's interests in North Manchuria therefore, demand Sino-Russian co-operation in the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the return of normal conditions in Siberia, and the rehabilitation of Russian business in Harbin.

## JAPAN'S INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA.

Japan has vital interests in Manchuria, which may be summarized as sentimental, strategic, and economic.

Japan has fought two wars in Manchuria, in one of which she staked her national existence. Thousands of her

soldiers died there, and an immense treasure was expended for which the whole population is still paying. The names of Port Arthur, Liao Yang, and Mukden are far more than geographical expressions to the Japanese people, and it is not strange that any idea of the retrocession of the Kwantung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway, the only tangible rewards for their expenditure of blood and treasure, should be indignantly rejected by all classes of people.

The strategical questions involved are equally obvious. The possession of South Manchuria by any enemy of importance is a direct menace to the safety of Korea and ultimately Japan itself. Any enemy army must attack through Manchuria. In addition, Japan could not maintain a long drawn out struggle with any powerful nation, under the conditions of modern warfare, without the raw materials of the Asiatic continent.

Important as the sentimental and strategic considerations undoubtedly are, they fade into insignificance when compared with economic interests. It is a well-known fact that, while Japan is blessed with a pleasant climate and magnificient scenery, there is a great deficiency in certain raw materials which are absolutely indispensable for the prosecution of a modern war. Japan is fatally weak in iron (and steel), cotton, wool, and petroleum, to mention only a few of the more important items. The supply of coal, also, is far from adequate, especially in the coking coal necessary for the iron industry. In food stuffs, the rapidly increasing population is making the supply of rice a matter of grave anxiety to the Japanese people, and even now a certain amount must be imported. To raise the necessary crops on land that has been tilled for centuries, an immense quantity of cheap fertilizer is imperative; it is imperative too that the supply of such fertilizer should not be interrupted even in war time, or rather especially in war time, when domestic food production must be kept at its highest proficienty.

It will be interesting to note to what extent Manchuria can supply these deficiencies, either now or in the future, and this will be to a considerable degree an index of the value of Manchuria to Japan.

With respect to the badly needed iron, Manchuria at present is not producing any great quantity for Japanese industry. However, in the Anshan mine, the S.M.R.R. possesses one of the greatest iron ore fields in the world. The iron is not of high grade quality and pig iron made therefrom cannot compete commercially with the imported product. However, in time of emergency when import from

other countries is difficult or impossible, this mine would go far toward rendering Japan self supporting. One may expect to see a large amount of money spent for new equipment and new development of this mine in the immediate future. Large deposits of iron ore are also found at Penchihu, owned by a Sino-Japanese company, which also operates an iron foundry. Both of these mines are valuable assets to the Japanese, especially if other supplies, for any reason, become unavailable.

While Japan possesses a considerable amount of coal in her own islands, the S.M.R.R. possesses in the Fushun mines, one of the greatest coal deposits in the world. An annual production of 3½ to 5 million tons would not be especially difficult, and the reserves are apparently inexhaustible. Excellent coal, suitable for coking, is found at Penchihu, owned by a Sino-Japanese company. This coal fills a very great deficiency in the iron industry.

Unfortunately for Japan, Manchuria cannot assist in supplying the aching void in petroleum.

With regard to food stuffs. Manchuria supplies the cheap but efficient bean-cake fertilizer. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this article to Japanese agriculture. The bean and the bean-oil also are important articles of Japanese diet.

Much attention is now being paid to the possibility of securing a considerable addition to the area devoted to rice culture in Manchuria and Mongolia. There are immense tracts of land in those countries suitable for rice growing, but in most cases large capital would be required for development, water supply, etc., before any large production is possible. Even now, however, many Koreans and some Japanese are engaged in this congenial occupation. Okura & Co., has secured a large tract of land in Eastern Inner Mongolia for this purpose. The S.M.R.R. is supplying improved seed, and in the course of a few years, a yearly production of 15 million koku is hoped for, this being about ¼ of the present yield of Japan proper.

The gradually increasing use of bread in Japan as a substitute for rice makes the question of a wheat supply one of some importance in the future. Manchuria is well able to supply any desired amount of this grain. Foreseeing a future demand, the Japanese have already invested considerable capital in flour mills in both North and South Manchuria.

Sheep growing has been attempted in Japan, but without success, and a constantly increasing amount of wool must be imported. There are between 2 and 2½ million sheep now in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, but the wool produced is very poor both in quality and quantity. The S.M.R.R. is spending considerable money in an endeavor to improve the breed, and it should be only a question of time when much of Japan's wants can be supplied from these countries.

When it is remembered that almost ⅓ of Japan's exports are cotton manufactures of some kind, an idea may be obtained of the importance of raw cotton in her industrial world. Yet all of this cotton must be imported, and the immense industry is therefore absolutely dependent upon supplies purchased abroad. Naturally, great effort is being expended to remedy this state of affairs. As no cotton can be grown in Japan, its culture is being encouraged in Korea, and in Manchuria as well. At present in South Manchuria there are some 30,000 acres in cotton, producing about 4½ million pounds. The culture is being encouraged by the authorities, who hope to attain a production of 10 times the present amount within the next few years.

The above summary of Japan's present and future economic prospects in Manchuria will be sufficient to show the vital importance of that country as a source of raw materials and food stuffs. Niggardly supplied by Nature, in her own country, her standing as a nation, and indeed her very self-preservation makes it imperative that she seek these vital necessities elsewhere - and especially in a neighboring country with which her sentimental and strategical interests are so closely bound.

The naive way in which the average Japanese looks upon Manchuria is well illustrated in the opening sentence of a petition addressed to the home government by the Dairen Chamber of Commerce:- "Manchuria, notwithstanding the fact that it stands in the relation of an extension of the mother country.....if matters are allowed to go on in this way, our commercial supremacy will be threatened by the competition of the Powers, which prospect makes us shudder for the sake of the nation." It will be worth while to consider, briefly, Japan's political career in Manchuria since the Portsmouth Treaty gave her Russia's interest in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the S.M.R.R. zone, and see how much justification there is for the remark quoted above.

From the first, there has been a divided control, by more or less friction, the amount depending upon the personalities of the men acting as Governor General of the

Kwantung Leased Territory, the President of the S.M.R.R. and their relations with the Foreign Office and with each other. To this three-cornered jurisdiction must be added the Army influence, which has always been annoying to the civilian organs.

To Viscount Goto, the first President of the S.M.R.R. is due the greatest amount of credit for constructive work in the development and consolidation of Japanese interests in South Manchuria. Of an energetic, forceful and at the same time tactful personality, he was able to harmonize the various conflicting interests into some semblance of team work. Japan's position in Manchuria today is largely due to Goto. The Army had its golden opportunity during the Teranchi regime, when the World War permitted it to try out its policy of assimilation and absorption in Manchuria and Korea. Needless to say the "assimilation" of several million independently inclined Chinamen was too big an undertaking and another Army dream of Empire ended in failure. Since that time, the administration of Manchuria has been more or less a question of domestic party politics, and the Kwantung Government and the railway have both been made the victims of a spoils system, full of abuses and scandals, only a portion of which have ever been made public. The Kwantung Government itself is a top heavy institution and its maintenance is a heavy drain upon the home government. The Leased Territory has an area of only 1300 square miles and could be cheaper and more efficiently administered by the S.M.R.R. than under the present system. Perhaps, however, it may be considered as a cadre which could readily be expanded, or filled in with additional units, so as to provide a complete system for administering all Manchuria; should circumstances ever invite such an attempt on the part of the Japanese.

## THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILROAD.

Japan's interests in South Manchuria center chiefly in the S.M.R.R. and it being "the organ of the Japanese Government for the economic development of Manchuria and Mongolia." The activities of this company far transcend the usual functions of a railroad, embracing every phase of economic life in Manchuria. They include harbor administration, shipping, hotel establishments, coal mining, steel works, electricity and gas supply, city planning, building, administration, the organization of education and sanitation within the entire railway zone, and other subsidiary enterprises of varying descriptions - all in all a bewildering array of activities not usually included in

the ordinary sphere of a railway's functions. It is capitalised at ¥ 440,000,000, one-half of which is held by the Government. In view of the social service activities outlined above and to the fact that it is the Government's agent for the economic development of Manchuria, the dividend on Government shares is waived, non-Government stockholders receiving from 8 to 10%. The assets of this company are now estimated at more than a billion and a half yen. It is believed, however, that, on account of the persistent Chinese demand for the return of the Leased Territory and the railway zone, little, if any, depreciation in assets is marked off. It would seem that China's ability to pay for this road, in case of restitution, would be a matter of the dim and distant future. In addition to the railway lines owned by the Company, the S.M.R.R. has been entrusted with the management of the Korean railways, which have an aggregate length of about 1100 miles.

The railroad itself is a money maker as in the F.Y. 1921-22, its total profits were over 25% of its P.U. Capital. There is every reason why this railroad should make money, as it has no competition, is the agent of the Government, and has an abundance of cheap Chinese labor in the shops and along the right of way. However, the company is interested in so many unprofitable enterprises, such as hospitals, schools, experimental laboratories and stations, etc., that the net earnings are considerably reduced, much of the net earnings even being put back into the railway properties. For this reason, the railway company has had recourse to foreign loans and there are indications that another such loan is now in prospect. While money may be obtained in the United States at 6% and 7%, it is doubtful if any could be secured at less than 9% in Japan. The railway possesses two very valuable properties in the Fushun Coal and the Anshan Iron Mines - the latter is not a money maker and for some years to come will absorb a great deal of money. However, it is an asset of incalculable potential value to the nation. The railway hopes to tap virgin territory in Manchuria by means of the so-called "Five Railways", the concessions for which were obtained as part of the famous "Nishihara Loans" of the Terauchi Ministry. These railways are to be under joint Sino-Japanese management, the money being advanced by Japan. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in getting them started, on account of disagreement between the two countries over the official personnel. The Tsuping hai-Taonan line is now under construction and has been completed to a point about 40 miles beyond Chengchiatun. This road has good prospects of success, especially if it succeeds in attracting any considerable amount of Mongolian exports which now go to Tientsin. The Changchun-Taonan project shows no signs of life. The Kaiyuan-Hailung-Kirin line is being discussed but has not yet been started. There are conflicting reports

about the Kirin-Kainei line. The Commander of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guard stated that the contract for construction of the railway had been signed in Peking. On the other hand, a director of the S.M.R.R. line stated that a railway was now being constructed from a mine in Manchuria some 50 miles from Kainei to Kainei. This Kirin-Kainei line is of considerable strategic importance to Japan, and perhaps for that reason, its construction has been vigorously opposed by the various Peking Governments. These lines are chiefly matters of the future, but when built will be of considerable importance to the S.M.R.R. and great factors in the development of the country through which they pass. The Changchun-Harbin branch of the C.E.R.R. would be a very rich prize for the S.M.R.R. and for Japan itself as well. If a standard gauge S.M.R.R. train could run on its own tracks from the wharves of the Sungari river at Harbin to the ocean wharves of Dairen, it would be of immense value to Japan and conversely, a very severe blow to Russian and Siberian interests. There have been sufficient indications that Japan is not unaware of that fact, and would not be slow in taking advantage of any opportunity that might present itself for the acquisition of that section. Just now, taking advantage of Russian conditions and the need of money by the C.E.R.R., a traffic agreement has been made between the two railways highly favorable to Dairen, as opposed to Vladivostok.

If closely examined, Japan's profits in Manchuria will be seen to consist of the money paid by the S.M.R.R. as a dividend of 8-10% on its non-government stock, much of its profits going back into improvements. Its annual expenditures are around ¥ 150,000,000, but ultimately the Chinese get most of that. Private investment is small, being mostly held by big companies like Mitsui and Suzuki. It provides a living for some 185,000 Japanese outside of Japan proper, who, incidentally, have little if any influence on the life of the great mass of Chinese around them. Only for strategical reasons, and for its present and potential supply of raw materials is Manchuria profitable to Japan; as a business proposition it hardly pays. For these reasons there has not been much development during the last ten years, and the local merchants are beseaching the home government for money at low rates of interest. Now they pay 11-12% from the banks or the Oriental Colonization Company. This latter company, incidentally, has close to ¥ 50,000,000 outstanding in loans, about 70% of which is on immovable property. Its late venture in borrowing ¥40,000,000 in the United States at about 6% to be loaned out at from 10 to 12% would appear to be a good stroke of business. As a general proposition, it may be said that Japan has about reached her limit of development in Manchuria and needs foreign money. The late President Hayakawa of the S.M.R.R.

invited Chinese cooperation but with very indifferent success. The Chinaman does not seem disposed to cooperate with the Japanese or to initiate new enterprises himself. Foreign business firms in South Manchuria consist chiefly of import and export firms, whose chief business is with the S.M.R.R. and none are prospering to any great extent. Such firms as the Standard Oil and the British-America Tobacco Company have no Japanese competition and are prospering.

It is quite a general idea that Japan has already absorbed and now dominates South Manchuria, but such a statement is far from being accurate. The dream of political and military domination expired with the end of the World War, with no present prospects of revival. Japan controls the little Kwantung peninsula and the narrow S.M.R.R. zone, but scarcely affects the life of the millions of hard-working Chinamen, who, by virtue of the protection and good markets afforded by the Japanese, are better able to pay the taxes demanded by their liege lord, Chang-tso-Lin. It is to the interests of both Chang-tso-Lin and the Japanese to work in harmony; peace and order, the increase of population, and the development of the country are equally advantageous to both parties - and this policy, being dictated by sound judgment and cold estimate of the actual situation, may be expected to be continued.

The visitor to Port Arthur will see an imposing monument erected in memory of the thousands of Japanese soldiers who were killed during the long siege. On another hill is a shaft to the Russian dead, sacrifieed to an Imperial dream of a mighty Eastern Empire. Blind to these glorious memorials and indifferent to all other considerations, the Chinese peasant tills the valleys between - and at harvest time reaps the grain.

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## CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
(1)

**Name:** Tsao Kun.

**Title:** Marshal. Inspector-General of Chihli, Shatung and Honan.

**Birthplace:** Tientsin, Chihli Province.

**Date of Birth:** About 1865.

**Languages and dialects:** Mandarin only.

**Political Party or Group:** Leader of Chihli Party.

**Historical Sketch:** Born a coolie; was street hawker selling piece goods; became a soldier and graduated from Peiyang Military Academy; in the Sino-Japanese War; rose through various grades to Commander of 3rd Division; Tuchun of Chihli 1917; joined the forces of Tuan Chi-jui against Chang Hsun in the monarchial movement; in 1918 appointed Inspector-General of Szechwan, Kwangtung, Kiangse and Honan for operations against South; with his subordinate Wu Pei-fu, joined Chang Tso-lin in defeating the Anfu party in 1920.

**Attitude towards America:** Friendly. No known prejudice against any foreigners.

**Estimate of Character:**

Tsao Kun is now the most likely candidate for the Presidency. No one except his own henchmen can state any notable qualification he may have for the office. He is not a scholar. He reads with difficulty and cannot be considered a writer of his own language. His knowledge of world affairs would be, like most of the officials of his own type, childlike. However, he impresses one with having good substantial common sense qualities and of being able to arrive at practical solutions of problems. He is a mediocre military man, and is considered a politician with little shrewdness. His outstanding quality is an abounding good nature. He is affable, easy-going and of pleasing personality. Men of greatly varying qualifications and dispositions work in harmony with Tsao Kun and hold a great affection for him. He enlists the assistance of the soldierly qualities of Wu Pei-fu, the political shrewdness of Chi Shih-yuan and is the recognized leader of all those unscrupulous men of the Tientsin Clique who wish to exploit his position. With all the leaders and cliques of the Chihli Party pulling in different directions, Tsao Kun is a post, unsecured by greatness or genius, about whom they tug. He harmonizes the conflicting elements in his party due to his agreeable personality. He is not popular with the people, having nothing picturesque in his makeup to appeal to the people. The general opinion of those foreigners who visit him is that he is " a good-hearted, simple and likeable old fellow". He is perhaps easily influenced by the last man who has his ear.

(M. A. China, Report No. 5157. July 17, 1923.)

His mildness and amiability however have not prevented his accumulating a considerable personal fortune at the expense of the people of his province. If he becomes President, it is not to be expected that the usual methods of graft and squeeze will disappear from the Central Government, nor will any constructive administration be instituted. An excellent Boss of his Party, he will probably make a mediocre President who will be the tool in the hands of his followers.

Tsao Kun's rise to his present position has been attributed to a fortunate turn of circumstances. His conservative plodding tendencies coupled with his geniality, however, are not merely fortuitous. His lack of ambition and lack of aggresiveness have spared his being the target for bitter enmity. He created little jealousy among his contemporaries and thus slipped into a leading position where more positive men would have been opposed.

( M. A. China, Report No. 5157. July 17, 1923).

Copies to:
(5) M. I.D.
(1) File.

## CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
(2)

**Name:** Chang Tso-lin.

**Title:** Marshal. Inspector-General of the three Eastern Provinces. (Deprived of title in 1922, but maintains position in spite of Central Government).

**Birthplace:** Haicheng, Fengtien Province.

**Date of birth:** About 1874.

**Languages and dialects:** Chinese only.

**Political Party or Group:** Leader of the so-called Fengtien Party.

**Attitude toward America:** Friendly. No known prejudice against any foreigners, except perhaps British whom he thought assisted Wu Pei-fu in the 1922 campaign.

**Historical Sketch:** First known as leader of band of Hunghutze; fought with Japanese in Russo-Japanese War; after war at request of Japanese, he and his band were taken into Chinese Army; received rapid promotion and was appointed Tuchun of Fengtien in 1911; first division command was 27th; served Yuan Shi-kai faithfully until collapse of latter's monarchial movement in 1916; assisted Tuan Chi-jui against Chang Hsun in 1917; appointed Inspector General of Three Eastern Provinces 1918; joined Tsao Kun against Anfus in 1920; relieved of all titles after defeat by Chihli Party in 1922, but is now virtually ruler of an independent Manchuria.

**Estimate of Character:**

Chang Tso-lin received no education in his youth and, although he has applied himself since, is now practically illiterate. He was a resourceful and daring leader of his Hunghutze. He was more than a robber. Rather he was a robber baron, exacting tribute over a large area, and a man of some distinction in his calling. The Chinese people have never overlooked the fact that Chang was once a Hunghutze and, what is more serious, that he is not a scholar. Since his rise to power he has striven to overcome his educational and cultural deficiencies. Superficially he has succeeded, but one does not become a Chinese scholar late in life and his efforts in this direction have been somewhat pathetic. With his past he could never attain a sentimental following in China.

There is great difference of opinion as to the ability of Chang Tso-lin.

## CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
(2)

There is nothing of strength or rare ability suggested by his personal appearance. He has the gift of choosing his subordinates wisely and of accepting their advice. If they fail him he is merciless. He has been absolutely arbitrary in exacting discipline, and his executions have been summary in putting down disorder or disloyalty. Although he has shown considerable ability in the organization and equipment of his troops he has never demonstrated ability in fighting them as has Wu Pei-fu. He appreciates the need of modern weapons and equipment and of modern training but his tactical ideas, even from a Chinese standpoint, are amateurish and unoriginal.

Chang Tso-lin's great success lies in his appreciation of the necessity of organizing the economic resources of his provinces and increasing his revenues. He is not lustful for personal gain and applies his wealth to improving his military forces and to consolidating his control. The financial situation in his provinces is maintained on sound principles. In this matter, as in others, Chang is ably advised. In observing his success one inevitably questions what is due to Chang himself and what is due to the Japanese. When Chang attempted to seize the power South of the Wall, he was hopelessly insufficient both in a political and a military way. The economic development of Manchuria is not due to Chang but to the Japanese. The Japanese Railway Zone makes for order and security, without which Manchuria would probably be as disorderly as the rest of China. In fact that part of Manchuria not rendered secure by the Japanese is bandit ridden.

If Chang did not have the secret support of the Japanese, it is very dubious if he would have the ability to maintain his position against his local enemies. He is credited by the people ~~for~~ with orderly conditions in South Manchuria, perhaps undeservedly, but he is not liked by them. Since his defeat by Wu Pei-fu he has become embittered and has considerably lost his grip on affairs. At the present time he is not in good health and is an opium smoker. Events of the past few years have thrown him more into the hands of the Japanese, and there is little doubt that, while he could not be called pro-Japanese, mutual interest and mutual understanding make him defer to the Japanese as his most powerful enemy and his staunchest supporter. He maintains his position only so long as he does reasonably the bidding of Japan.

Due to his state of health , there is much conjecture as to his successor in the event of his death. He looks upon his son Chang Hsueh-liang as heir-apparent to the constructive throne. There would probably be a political breakup in such event but every effort would be made by the Japanese to prevent disorders, and their choice would probably succeed to the power.

( M. A. China. Report No. 5169, July 30, 1923.)

(Prepared by J. M.)

## CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
( 3 )

**Name:** Wu Pei-fu.

**Title:** Marshal. Inspector General of Hunan and Hupei.

**Birthplace:** Penglai, Shantung Province.

**Date of Birth:** 1873.

**Languages and dialects:** Chinese Mandarin only.

**Political Party or Group:** Most prominent military commander of the Chihli Party. Very close to Tsao Kun; strongly antagonistic to Chi Hsieh-yuan and the Tientsin Clique.

**Attitude toward America:** Very friendly. No strong feeling against any foreigners except the Japanese, against whom he is openly bitter.

**Historical Sketch:** Obtained classical degree at age of 21; honor graduate Pai Ping Military Academy, near Tientsin, 1898; after brief service entered Tuan Chi-jui's Beiyang Military Academy; after graduation joined 3rd Division, then commanded by Tsao Kun; served in all the campaigns of this Division and rose through successive grades; in 1916 was in command of 6th Brigade; in 1917 he was acting commander of the 3rd Division; was sent to retake Hunan from the South in 1918, was successful and held line South of Changsha until 1920; in summer of 1920 he forcibly returned to Chihli and precipitated the Anfu-Chihli war; appointed Vice Inspector General of Chihli, Shantung and Hunan in 1920; Inspector General of Hupei and Hunan in 1921; defeated Fengtien invasion of Chihli in Spring of 1922; refused appointment as Minister of War; in 1923 conducted campaigns thru subordinates in Kwangtung, Fukien and Szechwan as program of "Unification by Force".

**Estimate of Character:**

Wu Pei-fu is one of the most prominent personalities in China today. He is certainly the best military leader, having seen more actual service with troops and having conducted more campaigns of no mean importance, with considerable success, than any living Chinese. He exercises leadership of troops with great personal bravery, with a considerable degree of tactical skill, and inspires confidence in his men. He has organized campaigns on

CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
(3)

several fronts involving large numbers of troops and carried them through successfully in spite of the inferior staff assistants at his disposal. While his troops are poorly equipped and poorly trained from a Western point of view and while his tactical ideas are not modern, Wu Pei-fu has a proper appreciation of basic tactics, of the necessity of intensive training, of esprit de corps and of the inculcation of the will to win in his troops.

Wu Pei-fu is a soldier and in no sense a statesman or politician. According to Chinese standards, he is devoid of political sense. It is China's misfortune that a soldier of considerable genius and with less than usual appetite for self aggrandizement cannot be used in his proper sphere, that is, as the instrument for enforcing the decrees of a central authority, properly constituted, rather than as the authority itself, as he now is. Wu Pei-fu was emminently fitted to be a subordinate, and a very capable one, until circumstances forced him to so high that he found himself in a rare atmosphere with no authority visible to which he could offer his services. From that time on, although he dislikes politics and knows little about it, he has been forced into becoming a politician, a "Militarist" instead of a plain "soldier man", and in many ways he has become much like all the rest of the militarists. Once he had a large sentimental following among the Chinese; he always seemed to be on the right side. His slogans had a good anti-Japanese ring when he was driving out the Anfus and later Chang Tsoplin. But now that he is engaged in futile internal affairs, now that he is saving China after his own fashion and in a manner that looks suspiciously advantageous to Wu Pei-fu, now that he has degenerated into a mere battering ram for the Chihli Party, he is no longer the "Hope of China".

Wu is a strong rugged personality. He clings stubbronly to an idea once formed. While he is a scholar, he is more aggressive and has a more positive character than the usual type of Chinese gentlemen. He is active physically, he is frank and even brusque in his conversation, and is always appreciated by foreigners with whom he converses freely - if he likes them. His evenings are usually given over to convivial parties at which he drinks heavily with a great degree of abandon. At such times he speaks his mind freely. It is feared by some that he drinks too often and too largely for his future welfare.

The Chinese believe that Wu has secret ambitions, ultimately to be President, but that he is proceeding cautiously. Foreigners criticize him for failure to grasp his opportunities and many feel that he should have siezed the power in Peking both after the Anfu debacle and after the driving out of Chang Tso-lin. Wu pretends to be a mere soldier without political ambitions and likes to be considered the guardian of China against the enroachments of Japan. He appears to be violently anti-Japanese.

CHINESE PERSONALITIES.
(3)

His recent campaigns against the South and Szechwan cause one to doubt the sincerity of his disinterestedness in furthering his personal prestige.

Future events will have to be awaited before the true character of Wu Pei-fu is known.

(Prepared by J. M.)

( M. A. China, Report No. 5172, July 31, 1923.)

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

OF OCTOBER 4

SUBJECT POWERS REPLY TO CHINA'S NOTE (LINCHENG AFFAIR)(G-2 Report.)

From CHINA.

No. 5196. Date October 16, 1923. 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

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( The following is copied from The North China Standard under date of October 5, 1923.)

See previous reports Nos. 5182 and 5190.

" The Diplomatic Body have examined with great care your Excellency's note of September 24th regarding the Lincheng incident and were glad to find it, along with a fresh expression of the regret felt in China for that deplorable outrage, a positive declaration that the Chinese Government and people were not actuated by any anti-foreign feeling.

The Diplomatic Body, however, feel bound to recall that in their note of August 10th they did not declare the existence of an anti-foreign movement in China, they declared the existence of a situation resulting from the development of brigandage in China threatening with danger the life, liberty, rights and property of foreigners residing in this country. In this regard, the special character of the Lincheng outrage does not appear to have been understood by the Chinese Government, and the Diplomatic Body are obliged on this important point to rectify the statements contained in Your Excellency's note.

Contrary to these statements, it is irrefutably established by the facts themselves, that the Lincheng outrage was directed against foreigners.

The instigators of the Lincheng attack declared on many occasions that their purpose was to capture foreigners and to make use of their foreign nationality in order to bring pressure to bear upon the Legations charged with the protection of the hostages and through these Legations upon the Chinese Government. This purpose the Lincheng bandits succeeded in accomplishing in all its details; and they negotiated with the Chinese Government under the cover of their foreign hostages whom they did not release until they had gained their object. Their method was copied from that of the Honan brigands in 1922; it has been imitated since by the Hupeh brigands who murdered their hostage Father Melotto, and very recently by the Honan brigands who carried off two foreign women to a fate still unknown. Every foreigner may well fear and does fear the same fate. That is the essential character of the Lincheng outrage.

The Diplomatic Body had hoped that following this incident, the Chinese Government would inaugurate vigorous action against the brigands who infest the country. However, the measures indicated in Your Excellency's note of September 24th last, remain ineffective as it is not enough to give an order to pursue the brigands but above all it is necessary that the brigands be actually pursued. The local authorities do not manifest at this time any zeal in the repression of brigandage which is still rife in most of the provinces of China, while at the same time their best military forces continue to be employed in those civil wars which bring so much suffering and misery to the Chinese people.

Under these conditions, the Diplomatic Body, mindful of the necessity of assuring respect for the life, liberty, rights and property of foreigners in China and desirous of contributing to the restoration of the rule of law and order in this great country, find themselves compelled to maintain in their entirety the considerations and conclu-

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sions of their collective note of August 10th last. They therefore call upon the Chinese Government to execute the measures indicated in their above mentioned note. "

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WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT GOVERNMENT'S SECOND REPLY TO LINCHENG NOTE - OCTOBER 15.
(C-2 Report).

From CHINA.

No. 5197 Date October 16, 1923., 19

Replying to No. Date RECEIVED C/2 W.D. NOV 21 1923, 19

"The reply of the Chinese Government of October 15th is tatamount to a withdrawal from the stand taken when the Lincheng Note was first presented."

(Copied from the Peking & Tientsin Times under date of October 16).

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Chinese Government have taken under careful study the Note of the Diplomatic Body of October 4th in further reference to the Lincheng incident; and while they regret that the observations and assurances of their Note of September 24th last failed to persuade the Diplomatic Body to modify its position, they are nevertheless disposed, in deference to its wishes, to give further consideration to its Note of August 10th last.

As regards the matter of "Damages", Your Excellency will recall that in their Note of September 24th the Chinese Government have declared their intention to do in the fullest measure possible what would be equitable in the way of reparation for the foreign victims of the Lincheng incident, and announced their readiness to accept as the basis of classification and assessment the three categories of damages enumerated in the Note of August 10th from the Diplomatic Body. There remains the questions of the "supplementary indemnities" for individual cases. In the furtherance of that intention I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government are prepared to agree in principle to the inclusion of the damages specified in the said category as an additional basis of appraisement, reserving for later discussion the nature of these damages and the reasonableness of the amounts.

Of the four Chinese officials named under the heanding of "Sanction" in the Diplomatic Body's Note of August 10th last, I stated in my reply of September 24th that three had been dismissed from their duties and the fourth was already under consideration for punishment in conformity with Chinese law. I now have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Ministry of War, which had been entrusted with the duty of considering the punishment of the Military Governor of Shantung, Tien Chung-yu, has submitted his report and acting thereupon the Chinese Government have by a Presidential Mandate of October 14, relieved the said Military Governor of his post.

The Chinese Government have been fully concious of the necessity of repressing brigandage in certain inland parts of the country, which is the more deplorable because its depredations extend to the peaceful nationals of the foreign Powers. It brought about the Lincheng incident and has given rise to the two recent cases in Hupeh and Honan to which reference was made in the Diplomatic Body's note of October 4th. With a view to its elimination, the Chinese Government had, as was stated in my Note of September 24th, adopted measures to pursue the bandits, and since the receipt of the Diplomatic Body's Note under reply they have despatched renewed orders to the Provincial authorities to redouble their efforts in the prosecution of this essential duty on their part. As regards the reforms to be effected in the system of policing and protection on the principal railway I stated in my last Note that "the Chinese Government look upon it

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the whole matter of railway policing and protection as an urgent problem of China's internal administration, of which they are fully concious of their responsibility for a practical solution." I wish again to assure Your Excellency, however, that while the Chinese Government cannot commit themselves to the scheme or schemes which the Diplomatic Body intends to present, they fully appreciate the interest which it takes in this problem and its readiness to collaborate.

The Chinese Government sincerely believe that a vigorous and sustained campaign against brigandage, together with the new measures for the protection of the principal railways, will result in a decided improvement in the situation as regards the safety of travel and residence in the interior of China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) V. K. Wellington Koo. "

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(1) The damages which the Diplomatic Body proposes to claim from the Chinese Government for the victims of the outrages;

(2) The guarantees which the Diplomatic Body considers to be necessary for the future insistence on the responsibility of the military governors and other authorities; and measures for the protection of the railways;

(3) Sanctions Punishment of the officials or employees of the railway who were guilty in this matter of neglect of duty or of complicity with the brigands.

## I DAMAGES.

The Diplomatic Body claims damages from the Chinese Government for the foreigners who were the victims of the Lincheng incident.

These damages will be classified into the following categories:

(A) Compensation for loss of baggage and objects which were either stolen or lost at the time of the attack on the train and for individual medical attention rendered to the prisoners during the period of their detention; these will be based on the sworn statements of the persons concerned in the presence of their respective Consuls.

(B) Compensation for the loss of life and of liberty and for sufferings undergone by all the foreign travellers while in the hands of the brigands; $20,000 Mex. for the foreign traveller who was killed on May 6th at the time of the attack on the train by the brigands; $500 Mex. per prisoner per day for the first three days of detention, May 6th, 7th and 8th;

$100 Mex. per prisoner and per day during the week commencing May 9th;

$150 Mex. per prisoner and per day during week commencing May 15th;

$200 Mex. per prisoner and per day during the week commencing May 20th;

$250 Mex. per prisoner and per day during the week commencing May 30th;

$300 Mex. per prisoner and per day during the week commencing June 6th;

(C) Compensation to cover reimbursement of the amounts expended in supplying relief to the Prisoners.

In formulating the above mentioned demands for definite indemnities (A. B. and C.) the Diplomatic Corps declares that the foreign victims of the Lincheng incident are entitled to receive from the Chinese Government supplementary indemnities varying according to individual cases as compensation for bodily injuries, medical attention, loss of earnings and temporary or permanent decrease of earning capacity caused by their captivity or in consequence thereof. Individual demands will be examined and formulated in each case by the Legation of the person interested.

The Diplomatic Corps endorses the demands presented or to be presented separately by several Legations for damages suffered by foreign prisoners of brigands in Honan from June to December, 1922, thereby indicating clearly that the Diplomatic Body has been notified of these demands and approves them in principle.

## II GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE.

The Diplomatic Body notes with great regret that the brigands infest not only the province of Shantung but all or a part of the provinces of Chihli, Kiangsu, Honan, Anhui and other provinces and that the means employed at present to suppress them are notoriously inadequate. The first duty of the Chinese Government being to maintain order and protect foreigners and Chinese against violent acts and outrages on the part of the brigands, the Diplomatic Body invites the Chinese Government to take, through the agency of the inspecting generals, military governors, etc., immediate steps to cooperate in organizing with the help of their best troops vigorous operations against the bandits. The Diplomatic Body will eventually instruct the Military Attaches of the foreign legations to follow these operations and report to them.

### A—RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY GOVERNORS AND OTHER PROVINCIAL OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

The final protocol for the settlement of the disturbances of 190... (Article X and Annex 16) declares that all the Governors General, Governors, and provincial or local officials are bound to insure in the most efficacious way the protection of foreigners and are responsible for the maintenance of order in the event of new anti-foreign disturbances, within the limits of their districts.

It expressly prescribes the following penalties for those who should fail in this duty;

"If owing to indifference, or rather of voluntary tolerance, great calamities take place, or if treaties should be violated and no immediate steps taken to make reparation or inflict punishment, the Governors-general, Governors, and the provincial or local Officials responsible will be removed and shall not be reappointed to other office in other provinces, or hope to be reinstated or receive any further honours."

Brigandage having become a grave menace to the lives, property and rights of foreigners in China, the Diplomatic Body will keep itself accurately informed with regard to this state of unrest and for that purpose it has decided on the despatch in case of need of its own representatives into the provinces infested by the brigands in order to examine and report upon the local situation. When it appears to the Diplomatic Body that a Military Governor or officer commanding troops or that a provincial or local official has failed or is failing in his duty of providing protection for foreigners in conformity with the clauses of the Protocol of 1901 above mentioned, the Diplomatic Body will demand the immediate imposition on the offender of the penalties prescribed therein without prejudice to such additional punishments, fines, etc., as the circumstances may call for.

The Diplomatic Body moreover reserves the right to order the exclusion of these officers or officials from the protection of the foreign concessions or settlements in the treaty ports.

### B—MEASURES FOR PROTECTING THE RAILWAYS.

The Lincheng incident has clearly shown the danger which foreign travellers at present run on the Tientsin-Pukow Line, which is one of the principal means of communication in China and on the Chinese railways generally.

From the inquiries which the Diplomatic Body undertook and from the information which it has collected, particularly from the International Military Commission which it despatched to Lincheng, it transpires that the present system of protection of the Chinese railways is insufficient to insure in an efficient manner the protection of the lines.

The Diplomatic Body considers that reforms are necessary and that it is its duty to aid the Chinese Government to carry these out, by collaborating with them in the task.

...SANCTIONS.

...Diplomatic Body requires ... Chinese Government the ... of those civil or mili... and employees of the ... Railway whose ... with the bandits may be ... established or whose conduct may ... to have facilitated the ... either by negligence or lack of foresight before, or by inactivity during, the incident or whose attitude may have been found to have contributed to the prolongation of the detention of the foreign prisoners.

Without entering into the details of all the prosecutions to be undertaken in connection with the Lincheng incident, the Diplomatic Body, after having made a careful study of the matter by means of international commissions both civil and military and by other methods, finds it necessary to request the Chinese Government to inflict upon a certain number of persons the punishments which it has determined. The demands of the Diplomatic Body are as follow:—

1. That General T'ien Chung-yu, military Governor of Shantung, who, as military Governor of Shantung, was directly and wholly responsible for the maintenance of order and the protection of foreigners in his province, and, as Commander-in-chief of all the troops in his province, was responsible for the payment, discipline and conduct of his troops, should be summarily dismissed from his present duties, that he shall never henceforth be entrusted with any official duty or mission on Chinese territory and that he should henceforth receive no new honour.

2. That General Ho Feng-yu, Defence Commissioner at Yenchowfu and Commander of the 6th Mixed Brigade of Shantung, who, as Defence Commissioner at Yenchowfu, had responsibilities in Southern Shantung similar to those of General Tien for the entire province and who, after General Tien, was responsible for the continuation of brigandage in southern Shantung, shall be dismissed from his duties and shall never again be appointed to any military command whatsoever.

3. That General Chang Wan-ching, Commissioner of the Tientsin-Pukow railway police, responsible for the discipline and conduct of the police along the permanent way and on the trains of the said railway, shall be dismissed from his duties and shall never again be entrusted with any police duty on railways.

4. That Chao Te-chao, the officer in command of the guard on the train which was attacked on May 6th, responsible for the defence of the train, who was not in uniform at the time of the attack and who took no action and allowed himself to be captured by the bandits, should be dismissed from his present duties and shall never again be employed in a police capacity.

In conformity with the provisions of the last paragraph of Article II-A above, the Diplomatic Body reserves the right to themselves to order the exclusion of these four officers from the protection of the foreign concessions and settlements in the Treaty Ports. The punishment of certain officers, however, does not adequately satisfy the just claims of the Diplomatic Body.

The attack by brigands on the train from Pukow to Peking, the capture of foreign travellers, the length of their captivity, the measures which had to be resorted to to obtain their release, have proved to the world that foreigners do not enjoy in China the guarantees of safety to which they are entitled. The actual sanction of the Lincheng incident should be found in a strict respect by the Chinese Government and all authorities in China for the rights of foreigners and for the treaties in force.

The Diplomatic Body has firmly determined to guard closely and to maintain by all measures in its power the defence of these rights and the application of those treaties which were solemnly confirmed at the time of the final establishment of the Republic of China, by the declaration communicated to the Legation on October 6, 1913, prior to the publication on the 10th of the same month.

Before terminating this note, the Diplomatic Corps draws the attention of the Chinese Government to brigandage in China which in its present state constitutes a grave danger for the whole country as well as for the rights and interests of foreigners.

The Diplomatic Body has received admissions that the Chinese Government were aware of the existence and recent development of brigandage in China in the official notifications addressed by the latter to the members of the Diplomatic Body respecting the insecurity of certain districts from which the Watchtowers desired on that account to exclude foreigners from those districts.

The Chinese Government has now recently been warned that these notifications will be only considered as valid for a limited period and the Diplomatic Body hereby declares that henceforth they will consider these notifications as being official recognitions on the part of the Chinese Government of the existence of brigandage in the districts mentioned and all renewals of the said notifications after the fixed time limit as being official admissions on the part of the Chinese Government of their failure to suppress the brigandage in these same districts where they had denied its existence.

The Diplomatic Body aims at suppression of brigandage in China because brigandage threatens the rights and interests of the foreigners under their care. But the Chinese no less than the foreigners suffer from the evils of brigandage, and when the Diplomatic Body asks that by the suppression of brigandage foreigners should be guaranteed security in China it is in fact asking that the Chinese should also be guaranteed security in their own country.

The recent development of brigandage with its evil consequences is not always caused by reason of the lack of military forces; there are at the present time in China more soldiers under arms than in any other country in the world. But these soldiers do not suppress the brigandage either because, not being paid, they refuse to make any efforts and even fraternize with the bandits or, as is generally the case, because the best of them are otherwise employed. As long as the Chinese Government allows the best disciplined troops in China to devote themselves to those civil wars which perpetually afflict one part or another of this great country the national or provincial armies will be diverted from their true task. They will more than any one else minister to the misery and sufferings of the Chinese people instead of acting as their defenders against the outrages and depredations of the bandits.

If the Government of China continues to authorize or to tolerate these abuses, if they do not set themselves resolutely to repress the brigandage which threatens the rights and interests of foreigners in China, the Diplomatic Body will be obliged to consider what further steps should be taken to

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and interests of foreigners
in Country which although it
the rights and privileges ac-
to members of the great
of nations has shown itself
of fulfilling even the
fundamental of the duties
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the rights and privileges of

Diplomatic Body desires the
Government to understand
intention to obtain the repara-
for the Lincheng incident the
guarantees and sanc-
mentioned above.

Accept, Your Excellency, etc., etc.

(Signed)

Batalha de Freitas.
W. J. Oudendijk.
Jose A. Barnet.
Johan Michelet.
Robert Everts.
Marquis de Dosfuentes.
Jacob Gould Schurman.
Adolf Boye.
de Fleuriau.
Vittorio Cerruti.
Francisco Castillo Najera
Ronald Macleay
Yoshizawa.
C. Bonde.
H. H. Schroeder.
G. de Buthoes.

OFFICE CHIEF
Militia Affairs
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1923

2657-J-268

WAR DEPARTMENT

201-Pinger, R. W.

2nd Ind.

RKC/f

Hq.Phil.Dept., Aug. 15, 1923 - To The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Major Pinger, the author of this report, was one of the officers captured by Chinese bandits near Lincheng, Shantung, on May 6th 1923 and was held by the bandits for 38 days.

RECEIVED

For the Department Commander:

J P WADE 1923
Adjutant.

Received A. G. O. SEP 29 1923

OFFICERS' DIVISION,
A. G. O.

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2 maps

All communications should be addressed to the COMMANDING OFFICER, Philippine Ordnance Depot, Manila, P. I.

P. O. D. Form No. 6

# PHILIPPINE ORDNANCE DEPOT.

WAR DEPARTMENT

In reply refer to No. 201/1091 Pinger, R.W.

RWP-pr

Manila, P. I. July 24, 1923

Subject: Report on detached service in Asia.

To: Commanding Officer, Philippine Department, Manila, P. I. (Thru Channels)

1. Complying with Bulletin No. 12, Headquarters Philippine Department, February 7, 1923, I submit herewith a report covering my detached service in Asia, granted me by paragraph 7, S.O. 34, as amended by paragraph 7, S.O. 85, and paragraph 12, S.O. 143, Headquarters Philippine Department, 1923.

2. Accompanied by my wife and two boys, I departed from Manila, April 28, 1923, on the "Taiyo Maru" for Shanghai, via Keelung, Formosa. At latter port I unwittingly violated the Japanese law by taking a number of interesting photographs of the harbor (a fortified area). Unfortunately both negatives and prints fell into the hands of the Shantung bandits, later in my journey.

3. After a few days in Shanghai, I started for Pekin, but at about 2:30 A.M. May 6th, the train was derailed near Lincheng, Shantung, and together with my older boy I was carried off as captive by bandits. My wife and younger child were similarly captured but released after marching about five miles.

4. The personal circumstances of my thirty-eight day captivity in the mountains of Shantung are probably so well known from newspaper sources that I shall omit mention of them. I am inclosing, however, a map which I constructed by pasting successive rude road sketches together and tracing. A large part of these sketches were necessarily made from memory as it was three days before I could secure pencil and paper. The route of march does not of course include every turn or detour; I estimate that we covered about eighty miles in travelling what by air line would be but thirty-four. The distance from "Temple in the Clouds" to the mines at Tsao Chuang by the direct valley route is only about twenty miles. I am also inclosing a proposed magazine "story" which I wrote while imprisoned on the summit of Pautzeku. This may contain certain data of interest to the Intelligence Division - ~~if not~~ its return is requested. While adhering strictly to fact, it is not of course

All communications should be addressed to the COMMANDING OFFICER, Philippine Ordnance Depot, Manila, P. I.

P. O. D. Form No. 6

# PHILIPPINE ORDNANCE DEPOT.

WAR DEPARTMENT

In reply refer to No. 201/109 Pinger, R.W.

RWP-pr

Manila, P. I. July 24, 1923

Subject: Report on detached service in Asia.

To: Commanding Officer, Philippine Department, Manila, P. I. (Thru Channels)

1. Complying with Bulletin No. 12, Headquarters Philippine Department, February 7, 1923, I submit herewith a report covering my detached service in Asia, granted me by paragraph 7, S.O. 34, as amended by paragraph 7, S.O. 85, and paragraph 12, S.O. 143, Headquarters Philippine Department, 1923.

2. Accompanied by my wife and two boys, I departed from Manila, April 28, 1923, on the "Taiyo Maru" for Shanghai, via Keelung, Formosa. At latter port I unwittingly violated the Japanese law by taking a number of interesting photographs of the harbor (a fortified area). Unfortunately both negatives and prints fell into the hands of the Shantung bandits, later in my journey.

3. After a few days in Shanghai, I started for Pekin, but at about 2:30 A.M. May 6th, the train was derailed near Lincheng, Shantung, and together with my older boy I was carried off as captive by bandits. My wife and younger child were similarly captured but released after marching about five miles.

4. The personal circumstances of my thirty-eight day captivity in the mountains of Shantung are probably so well known from newspaper sources that I shall omit mention of them. I am inclosing, however, a map which I constructed by pasting successive rude road sketches together and tracing. A large part of these sketches were necessarily made from memory as it was three days before I could secure pencil and paper. The route of march does not of course include every turn or detour; I estimate that we covered about eighty miles in travelling what by air line would be but thirty-four. The distance from "Temple in the Clouds" to the mines at Tsao Chuang by the direct valley route is only about twenty miles. I am also inclosing a proposed magazine "story" which I wrote while imprisoned on the summit of Pautzeku. This may contain certain data of interest to the Intelligence Division - ~~if not~~ its return is requested. While adhering strictly to fact, it is not of course

written from a military point of view.

5. It is believed, however, that my opinions on several aspects of the "Lincheng Incident" may be of certain military value, especially if compared with others already obtained. Among these aspects is that of <u>cause</u>.

6. I believe that there were three separate sets of individuals concerned in the matter; first, Chang Tso Lin who hoped by arousing foreign public opinion, to embarrass the present Chinese government and above all keep Wu Pei Fu from descending upon him from Mukden, this year at least. Chang Tso Lin is understood to have certain connections with the Japanese government, but I doubt whether the latter had any real responsibility for the affair. I believe, however, that the excellent Japanese intelligence service maintained in Shantung was fully aware of what was to happen and after examination of the train's passenger list, advised all Japanese subjects to take another train. This theory would easily account of the fact that there were no Japanese among the victims although there would ordinarily have been quite a number. In view of Japan's present boycott troubles in China, I believe the Lincheng incident was rather welcomed as indicating to the world the irresponsibility of the present Chinese Government.

7. The Lincheng incident having produced exactly the effect calculated by Chang Tso Lin, I think he cared very little for the outcome so far as his tools were concerned, namely the bandits and the inhabitants of the district concerned. Several of the captives agree that in the first few days (while in danger from the Chinese troops) the bandits seemed to be controlled by silk-clad individuals bearing the earmarks of military men who disappeared as soon as the bandits were safe in their mountains. My observation of the excellent advance-guard, rear guard, and flanking arrangements would apparently corroborate this. Later, however, the bandits were completely lacking in unity of command which made negotiations extremely difficult.

8. The second set of responsible individuals consisted of professional bandits, men with criminal records, etc., whose total number probably did not exceed 300. These are the men who for years have held places like Pautzeku upon the summit of which I personally counted eighteen Chinese child prisoners and four or five adults who have been held for years awaiting ransom. These numbers do not include a larger number which were on the summit when Solomon, Allen and myself arrived but who were probably taken further north the following day to make room for the rest of our party had necessity arisen. These



P.O.D. 201/1091, Peiping, P.W.

bandits were for the most part pig-tailed (indicating that they had never served in the Army) and did most of the looting and terrorizing the night the train was wrecked. We learned to recognize these men and stay out of their way. In the final settlement I believe that very few of this group enlisted in the Army, except perhaps temporarily with the idea of getting new arms, more ammunition and a little "back-pay". Service in the Army would entail living in the villages where any blood-feud in which involved, would mean constant danger to the ex-bandit. We learned on credible authority that in one of the conferences, a leader of this element declared that "these foreigners (we prisoners) all have crooked hearts and should be killed". Fortunately for us these men were greatly outnumbered by the more conservative "bandits-pro-tem". Their main object in the incident, apart from the excitement, loot, etc., was to obtain the withdrawal of the Chinese troops who had been besieging Pautze-ku since February. Actual assault was never feared by the bandits, but the presence of the troops made it difficult for them to obtain ammunition, food, and water, to negotiate the sale of their prisoners or to carry on the general profession of banditry. It is believed that they would never have attempted executing the Lincheng affair by themselves, for the risk of retreat would have been too great. Villagers would undoubtedly have cooperated with the troops at least to the extent of catching a few individuals, with the inevitable loss of the latter's heads.

9. In order to dilute the responsibility, to safeguard retreat, and to facilitate the acquisition of the necessary food, water and ammunition, temporary alliance with the male population of the district was necessary. Already related by blood and by a common hatred for the troops of the district (recruited from other provinces), this was not difficult. This group was composed largely of unemployed discharged soldiers who felt that if there had to be an army of non-producers in the valley, they wanted to be that army. Then in the event of being unpaid, they could fall back on their "home-folks" for food, without the latter having to supply "outside" soldiers as well. The other element in this group were all the employed men of the district (except the very old and the very young), including the landed gentry whose villages and lands have been laid waste by the "outside" troops during the last year. This element did not care to be enlisted in the army but above all things desired the removal of "Black-hearted" General Ho and his thieving division.

10. As is well known all three of these groups secured exactly what they wanted -

(a) Chang Tso Lin - embarrassment of government, resignation of the President, and "status quo" on part of Wu Pei Fu.
(b) Professional bandits - relief from pressure by troops; money, clothes, food and a complete



U.S. 201 Tong, T.W.

pardon and enlistment in the army if desired.
(c) Inhabitants of valley - relief from annoyance of troops and necessity for feeding them when chronically unpaid; money, clothes, food, pardon, and a job in a home-stationed army for the unemployed men.

It remains to be seen what the foreign powers will do to prevent such an unheard-of adjustment from acting as a precedent for other discontented elements in China.

11. Since my return, I have been asked why we prisoners constantly protested against the apparently aggressive movements of the Chinese troops, and discouraged intervention by foreign ones. The following will I hope explain this; as may be inferred none of us had or have any great respect for Chinese troops.

12. At the time of the derailing, all the troops "riding the train" promptly decamped westward. Asked for explanation by the American Consul at Nanking(Mr. Davis) they replied that they were afraid the bandits would take their rifles away from them!

13. The Commander of the garrison nearest the wreck admitted having heard the firing which preceded the looting. Asked to explain why he delayed two hours in getting contact with the bandits, he said that he knew that there were too many bandits for him to engage with his small force!

14. On Sunday afternoon, reinforced in number and encouraged by the nice weather, the troops took up perfectly safe positions to the south and west of us and assisted by two machine guns sprayed our two hill-top forts (patollas) with lead. Knowing that the troops would not think of finishing the job by an assault with the bayonet, such action merely endangered our lives and kept a certain element (probably the non-professional bandits) in a highly nervous state. The professionals coolly curled up in the lee of the wall and knowing that we would march all night, got some much needed sleep. From both hills, the prisoners sent down messages under white flags telling the troops to stop firing. For a time the firing apparently stopped but later it began again only to be terminated by darkness.

15. Under cover of latter and of a severe rain and hail storm, we plunged down the northeast slope and by a forced march of perhaps twenty to twenty five miles completely eluded the troops for several days. Why no attempt had been made during the day to take up a position between the bandits and their obvious destination is of course beyond Occidental understanding.



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16. We next heard of the troops on Wednesday, when I negotiated with the No. 2 Chief (a conservative) for the release of my eight year old son. We proposed that we could help his cause by sending a message for him to the outside world accompanied by my boy. He seized this opportunity and while fondling my youngster, serving us tea, etc., informed me that the troops had again moved up and were constantly firing on his outposts, which served no useful purpose. He then told me that if this was not stopped and the troops withdrawn in three days he would be forced to shoot us. He further informed us that he was not a professional bandit and was not interested in ransom. Later on I had other dealings with this old man and I believe he was perfectly sincere in what he said. However, when the time came for shooting, he "saved face" by having us awakened at 2:00 A.M. and marched two days farther into the mountains. The next time the troops moved up (again a two day delay), he ordered Solomon, Major Allen and myself to the summit of Pautzeku where we remained for eleven days until the negotiations progressed more satisfactorily and Allen was actually released.

17. While on Pautzeku we found the base of a field artillery shell (about 3") indicating that the troops had apparently meant business when they began their siege in February. An assault of the place which could have succeeded at the price of a few casualties, is not however of record.

18. Later in Pekin, I had the opportunity of conversing with a missionary who had been through the Boxer siege in 1900. He stated that the Boxers were much better disciplined and trained than the present Chinese soldiers. At any time they could have rushed the British Legation, where all foreigners had sought refuge, and at the cost of perhaps a dozen lives, annihilated the foreigners. But having no appetite for cold steel, they contented themselves with shooting bullets, arrows, and incendiary devices into the inclosure and upon the arrival of foreign troops, cut off their queues and became friends immediately.

19. Among the thousands of bandits I observed but one bayonet. Many had short knives, however, but these did not appear to be intended primarily as weapons.

20. As to foreign armed interference, I wrote down to the relief mission at Tsao Chuang that I believed it impracticable except with the use of Infantry corresponding to a division together with at least a battalion of mountain artillery. Even then I doubted its efficacy except perhaps as a threat behind negotiations. The chances are that long before a division could have been brought within a hundred miles of us, we would have withdrawn many miles farther into the mountains,



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where difficulties of transportation would have greatly prejudiced the chances for prompt success. Upon talking with General Connor at Tien Tsin after my release, I was pleased to hear that he and the other members of the allied military mission had come to practically an identical conclusion.

21. In a numerical sense the bandits were well-armed, practically all having a military rifle and perhaps half having automatic pistols as well. The rifles consisted largely of the present Chinese military issue with ammunition to correspond in bandoleers. Both were evidently manufactured in the Chinese government arsenals. There were however a large number of Japanese, German, and Belgian rifles with an occasional Russian. The pistols were mostly Parabellums and Lugers with a few small Colts. I saw no United States service arms or ammunition of any kind.

22. I had frequent opportunity to observe the details of arms when the bandits were cleaning them. This they did by the use of kerosene and a brick of emery. As a result many of the bores were practically smooth, and the breech mechanisms so loose that I would have disliked shooting any of them. I frequently inserted the bullet end of a cartridge in the muzzle of its rifle and usually found a clearance of almost 1/32 of an inch! I also found as many as three different kinds of cartridges in one single clip. Apparently any cartridge which can be fired is considered entirely suitable. Despite the scarcity of ammunition, the younger bandits were constantly "popping" at birds, rabbits, etc., but I never saw any successful marksmanship.

23. After my release from the hands of the bandits June 12th, I proceeded to Tien Tsin, Pekin, Tien Tsin, Peitaiho, and Chingwantao respectively. From latter port I sailed July 7th on the Kailan Mining Administration Collier "Hwahting", arriving at Manila July 16th. During this period I had the opportunity to talk to many foreigners representing different governments and professional viewpoints. All seem to agree that under present conditions, the method employed for our release was the only practicable one, but that similar and perhaps more serious episodes must be expected in the future. Of all groups I think the missionaries feel most pessimistically on the matter. In their outlying stations they are subject to attack without being able to pay local tuchuns for protection as is customary in the case of business concerns. Few of the Chinese except those who have received direct benefit from the missions in the shape of medical treatment, etc., have any particular inclination to favor the missionaries in any way; frequently they display actual hostility.



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24. Among the business men, there is the feeling that our foreign policy is exceedingly weak; that our country insists on treating China as a sovereign power when that country is in no position to shoulder sovereign responsibilities. They claim that again and again they have tried to get certain small laws passed which would cost the people of the United States nothing but which would facilitate business in China very greatly - but without avail. The men from Shanghai are in great fear of the withdrawal of their extra-territoriality, which is now being urged on the foreign powers by the Chinese government; they say that sunh action would simply ruin them.

R. W. PINGER
Major, Ord. Dept., U.S.A.

2 Inclosures:

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1st Ind.

Commanding Officer, Philippine Ordnance Depot, Manila, P. I., July 26, 1923 - To the Commanding Officer, Philippine Department, Manila, P. I.

1. Forwarded.

REC'D. HDQS., P. D. JUL 28 1923.

C. T. RICHARDSON,
Major, Ord. Dept., U. S. A.

2 Incls.

P.D.S. 201 Pinger, R.W.

3-1 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTELL. 12
1924 2657-J-272
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT FULL OFFICIAL TEXT OF SINO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.
Signed on May 31, 1924.

2657-J

From China.

No. 5284. Date June 16, 1924., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., JUL 12 1924

5890.

The following report is the full text of the Sino-Russian Agreement, signed at Peking, China, on May 31, 1924, which gave recognition to Soviet Russia by China and established full diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries.

Binding Margin.

# Full Official Text of the Sino-Russian Agreement Signed on May 31, 1924

*The full official text of the agreements which were signed on May 31, 1924, between China and Russia, together with the supplementary declarations, notes, etc., as given out by the Chinese Foreign Office is as follows:*

## Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to re-establish normal relations with each other, have agreed to conclude an agreement on general principles for the settlement of the questions between the two countries, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

**Article I.** Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two Contracting Parties shall be re-established.

The Government of the Republic of China agrees to take the necessary steps to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Legation and Consular buildings formerly belonging to the Tsarist Government.

**Article II.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold, within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, a Conference which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided in the following Articles.

Such detailed arrangements shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference as provided in the pre-

**Article III.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to accept at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etcetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etcetera, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920.

**Article IV.** The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, etcetera, concluded between the former Tsarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

**Article V.** The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia—namely, as to the time-limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers—are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

**Article VI.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories the existence and/or activities of any organisations or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to permit in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

**Article VII.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.

**Article VIII.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree as regards, at the aforementioned Conference, the questions relating to the navigation of rivers, lakes and other bodies of water which are common to their respective frontiers, on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

**Article IX.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereinafter provided:

(1) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China—such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation, and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said Railway)—shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities.

(2) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the

transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said Railway.

(3) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

(4) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9th 1917.

(5) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

(6) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending the settlement of the questions as provided under Section (3) of the present Article.

(7) Until the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27th (September 8th) 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the said Railway and which do not prejudice China's rights of sovereignty, shall be maintained.

**Article X.** The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the special rights and privileges relating to all Concessions in any part of China acquired by the Tsarist Government under various Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, etcetera.

**Article XI.** The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity.

**Article XII.** The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

**Article XIII.** The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to discuss simultaneously with the settlement of a Commercial Treaty at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

**Article XIV.** The Governments of the Contracting Parties agree to discuss at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the claims for the compensation of losses.

**Article XV.** The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Agreement For The Provisional Management of The Chinese Eastern Railway

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mutually recognising that, inasmuch as the Chinese Eastern Railway was built with capital furnished by the Russian Government and constructed entirely within Chinese territory, the said Railway is a purely commercial enterprise and that, excepting for matters appertaining to its own business operations, all other matters which affect the rights of the Chinese National and Local Governments shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities, have agreed to conclude an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Railway with a view to carrying on jointly the management of the said Rail-

way until its final settlement at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement [illegible] between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31st 1924, have for their respective purposes, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: V. Kyuin Wellington Koo;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I. The Railway shall establish, for discussion and decision of all matters relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway, a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and five by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Republic of China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Director-General.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Assistant Director-General.

Seven persons shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director-General and Assistant Director-General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors and they shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General, their respective Governments may appoint another Director to officiate as the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General (in the case of the Director-General, by one of the Chinese Directors, and in that of the Assistant Director-General, by

Russian Directors).

Article II. The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors to be composed of five persons, namely two Chinese Auditors who shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and 3 Russian Auditors who shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.

Article III. The Railway shall have a Manager, who shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a national of the Republic of China and the other to be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and the Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

Article IV. The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

If the Chief of Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and if the Chief of Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Republic of China.

Article V. The employment of persons in the various departments of the Railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article VI. With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in article VII of the present Agreement, all other matters on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be referred for settlement to the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

Article VII. The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors for consideration and approval.

Article VIII. All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement of the question of the present Railway.

Article IX. The Board of Directors shall revise as soon as possible the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, approved on December 4, 1896, by the Tsarist Government, in accordance with the present Agreement and the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, and in any case, not later than six months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors.

Pending their revision, the aforesaid statutes, insofar as they do not conflict with the present Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

Article X. The present Agreement shall cease to have effect as soon as the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway is finally settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924.

Article XI. The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (II)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby declare that it is understood that with regard to the buildings and landed property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the question of the transfer or other suitable disposal of the same will be jointly determined at the Conference provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, in accordance with the internal laws and regulations existing in China regarding property holding in the inland. As regards the buildings and property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Peking and Pataohu,

the Chinese Government will take steps to immediately transfer same as soon as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will designate a Chinese person or organization, in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the island.

Meanwhile the Government of the Republic of China will at once take measures with a view to guarding all the said buildings and property and clearing them from all the persons now living there.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (III)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31 1924, the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, etcetera, concluded between Russia since the Tsarist regime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (IV)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that the Government of the Republic of China will not transfer either in part or in whole to any third Power or any foreign organization the special rights and privileges renounced by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article X of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (V)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article XI of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [illegible] will after the [illegible] of all prior [illegible] secured thereunder be appropriated to create a fund for the promotion of education among the Chinese people.

2. A special Commission will be established to administer and allocate the said fund. This Commission will consist of three persons, two of whom will be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and one by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Decisions of the said Commission will be taken by unanimous vote.

3. The said fund will be deposited as it accrues from time to time in a Bank to be designated by the said Commission.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (VI)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that they will establish equitable provisions at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles

between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, for the regulation of the situation created for the citizens of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the abolishment of the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction under Article XII of the aforementioned Agreement, it being understood however that the nationals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entirely amenable to Chinese jurisdiction.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the fifth month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Declaration (VII)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having signed the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, hereby agree, in explanation of Article V of the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway of the same date, which provides for the principle of equal representation in the filling of posts by citizens of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the application of this principle is not to be understood to mean that the present employees of Russian nationality shall be dismissed for the sole purpose of enforcing the said principle. It is further understood that access to all posts is equally open to citizens of both Contracting Parties, that no special preference shall be shown to

[illegible] Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo
(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

## Notes Exchanged

By Dr. Koo

Peking May 31, 1924.

Mr. L. M. Karakhan,
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic of China,
Peking.

Dear Mr. Karakhan:

On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to declare that, on an Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having been signed between us to-day, the Government of the Republic of China will, in the interests of friendship between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discontinue the services of all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed in the Chinese army and police force, as they constitute by their presence or activities a menace to the safety of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If you will furnish my Government with a list of such persons, the authorities concerned will be instructed to adopt the necessary action.

I have the honour to remain,
Yours faithfully,
V. K. Wellington Koo
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

By Mr. Karakhan

May 31, 1924,
Peking.

Dear Dr. Koo,

I have the honour to acknow-

[illegible]

L. M. Karakhan
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic of China.

## Ratification Mandate

*The following is the unofficial translation of the Presidential mandate, dated June 16, ratifying the Sino-Russian agreements:*

"A memorial from the Minister of Foreign Affairs petitioning the President to ratify the Sino-Russian Agreement and to give instructions for State seals to be affixed to the document: The principles contained in the agreement provide for the settlement of pending Sino-Russian questions. It contains a provisional agreement relating to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and certain supplements. When the State seals are affixed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will counter-sign the agreement. The President hereby orders the necessary seal to be placed on the agreement and authorizes the said Ministry to sign the documents and arrange a date for the exchange of the agreement with the Soviet Representative."

AFC 4/19/24.

1 2 7

NOTES ON POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL CONDITIONS IN URGA.

1924 26 57.9 Jun 23

WAR DEPARTMENT 314

1. POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

The preliminary agreement concluded between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic has created a great deal of discussion at Urga in regard to the ultimate disposition of Outer Mongolia.

The Consulate is informed from reliable sources that the present Soviet Government, nominally acting in an advisory capacity to the Mongolian Government but actually dictating its policies and its administration, does not intend to relinquish either political of economic control of Outer Mongolia. It is stated, however that there is little doubt that the Soviet troops, numbering about 500 men and now stationed at Urga, will be removed from the immediate vicinity of that city in the near future. It is felt that this merely a technical compliance with Article V. of the agreement between the two Republics, which provides for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia and does not indicate any intention on the part of the Soviet Government to actually abandon all control of this territory.

Under the existing regime obtaining in Urga and Outer Mongolia, the so-called Soviet "advisers" excerise a complete and very effective dictatorship, and have in a great many instances even disposed of the services of the Mongolian Chiefs of Government Departments who formerly, nominally functioned in their respective capacities.

The Mongols are represented to be still inspired with the hope of obtaining complete autonomy, with the exception of a minority element known as the "Young Socialist Party" which is closely cooperating with the Soviet officials. There is good reason to believe that the Mongols have been and are evolving plans looking towards the independence of Outer Mongolia. This is substantiated to some extent by the reports of foreigners who have recently arrived from Urga, to the effect that the Mongols are known to be purchasing arms and ammunition and is in turn corroborated by information furnished this Consulate by the Consul General at Tientsin of the activities of a certain Mr. T.S. Kamichan, who is understood to be seeking to purchase considerable supplies

of military equipment, tents, arms and ammunition, etc., for use in Mongolia. While no information has been secured in regard to the activities of the above mentioned party, from statements made by several arrivals from Urga, there is undoubtedly more than usual activity in the purchase of such equipment.

In view of the fact that the Mongols are completely under the domination of the Soviet officials and are systematically oppressed and coerced, it is felt that they will be unable to effect anything in the nature of a coup d'etat.

It is an often expressed opinion that between the oppressive and despotic tactics of the Russians and Chinese and the slow advance of civilization in its commercial aspects the Mongols are a "doomed race". The Mongols, who are essentially a nomadic people, are unable to adapt themselves to either of the commercial or agricultural phases of civilization which are now manifesting themselves in Outer Mongolia.

It is impossible to state with any degree of accuracy what effect the death of the living Buddha, which occurred on May 20th 1924, will have upon the political situation. While his authority was at one time an important factor in the political imbroglio existing at Urga, it had been reduced to almost negligible proportions at the time of his death. The Mongolian Government contemplates electing a successor, but whether they will be successful in appointing one or not is problematical. From another source the Consulate was informed that the Japanese proposed to retrieve their position in Outer Mongolia by working for the appointment of a Tibetan lama whose sympathies are decidedly pro-Japanese. This informant was insistent that such an attempt was actually being made but it is difficult to say whether such is the case or not.

A most rigorous and systematic censoring of all printed matter and mail exists, which is excercised with particular attention in the case addressed to foreigners engaged in business in Urga. Anything that is regarded as of political significance, if found in correspondence addressed to a Russian, means summary arrest and imprisonment and in the case of a foreign national, the detention of mail for three or four weeks and the enforcement of further restrictions of business activities.

Reports indicate that there are about fourteen foreigners now in Urga, of which number four or five are

American citizens. The number of Japanese is stated to be fourteen of fifteen.

## II. TRAVEL AND PASSPORT REGULATIONS.

A new regulation has been recently enforced with respect to automobiles carrying passengers for hire, which provides that such automobiles may only leave Urga in turn. This regulation which provides for the consecutive departure of cars, means, in many instances, a delay of from ten days to two weeks and is but another indication of the obstructionist attitude of the Soviet authorities towards those endeavoring to carry on business at Urga.

In regard to passport regulations, the Consulate is reliably informed that a passport issued by the Mongolian authorities is absolutely indespensable to entry into Urga. A Chinese passport or a passport issued by a foreign Government and duly vised by the Chinese authorities is sufficient to carry one to Udde, about 360 miles north of Kalgan. At this point Chinese jurisdiction ceases and in the event of inability to show a passport issued by the Mongolian Government it is impossible to proceed further. It is stated that the Mongolian authorities strictly adhere to this policy and that the only exceptions made are in the case of a few foreigners well known to the authorities, but in most cases these individuals are guaranteed by others who are in possession of the necessary papers.

## III. COMMERCIAL CONDITIONS.

The general attitude of the Soviet officials towards foreign nationals engaged in business at Urga is one of consistent hostility. Nationals of countries which have accorded recognition to the Soviet Government, such as Great Britain, are treated with as much hostility and suspicion as those nations who have not done so. In this connection it is pointed out that particular animosity has been exhibited towards Japanese subjects and that as a consequence the formerly very considerable Japanese colony has now been reduced to fourteen or fifteen individuals.

Business in general shows a somewhat upward trend in spite of the increasing difficulty, experienced by foreigners

in particular, in carrying on trade. At the same time the commercial situation is in a constant state of flux due to the political aspect which the whole question assumes. This applies more specifically to Russian or Russian-Mongolian business enterprises. The very probable dissolution of a company known as the Mongolian Central Cooperative Society is a case in point. This company is a semi-official Mongolian enterprise and is capitalized ar Mex. $500,000 and has been doing a very considerable business since it was organized. It is now understood that the Soviet officials are dissatisfied with the conduct of its affairs and threaten to dissolve it at any time. This company was perhaps the largest enterprise organized to do business in Mongolia and had made an excellent beginning, but if as the Consulate has been informed, it has already run counter to the wishes of the Soviet officials, it is in all probability simply a question of time before it ceases to exist in its present form.

The only medium of exchange now current in Urga is the Chinese silver dollar, considerable shipments of which continue to be made from Kalgan to Urga due to the exorbitant transfer charges demanded by the banks.

A.F., in C
(4/19/24)

RECEIVED IN G-2 with 42-I-5 fr. Amer. Exped. Forces in China
Dated June 25-24.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S.Army FORCES IN CHINA
TIENTSIN, CHINA.

January 17, 1925.

Subject: Allied Trains during Chihli-Fengtien 1924 War.

The chief mission of the Allied Forces in Tientsin under the Protocol of 1901 is to keep the Peking-Mukden railway line open from Peking to Shanhaikuan. Early during this period it became apparent that, due to the unusual number of troop trains and the lack of cooperation between the various military leaders and the regular operating staff, the whole system would soon be so congested that ordinary traffic would be impossible. On September 22nd, the Allied Commandants in Tientsin met in conference to discuss the traffic situation. It was the concensus of opinion at this time that, although ordinary traffic was being interfered with, so long as there was no complete block, a military train should not be run. On October 13th another Conference was held, one Conference intervening on September 29th, at which time it was decided to start an Allied train to Shanhaikuan on the 14th.

The arrangement at this time was that each foreign contingent, American, British, French, and Japanese, should furnish a detail of 12 soldiers and 1 Officer for each train. The trains were to be under the command of an additional Officer supplied successively by the contingents in alphabetical order, i.e., the American contingent furnished the commanding Officer for the first train, the British for the second, and so on. This arrangement was later changed, as necessity demanded that trains be run between Peking and Tientsin as well as between Shanhaikuan and Tientsin. A division of the detachments was made by the commandants and the American and Japanese contingents were given the Tientsin-Shanhaikuan end of the line, as their sectors were along that section, and the British and French were given the Tientsin-Peking sector for like reasons.

Twelve trains were run in all and although there was usually some delay, little opposition in force was encountered and in most instances the Chinese military commanders assisted whenever possible.

The G-2 Office, U.S.Army Forces in China, detailed two observers aboard each train and the attached file is a complete report of their observations during these trips.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORTS, CHIHLI-FENGTIEN 1924 WAR.

| Date of Trip. | | To & return. | Mil. observer. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 14-16 | Tientsin | | Capt. Steele |
| Oct 20-24 | " | Shanhaikuan | Cpl. Peyton |
| Oct 27-28 | " | Peking | Lt. Brannan |
| Oct.27-28 | " | " | Cpl. Peyton |
| Oct 29 Nov 4th | " | Shanhaikuan | Lt. Johnson |
| Oct 29-30 | " | Peking | Cpl. Peyton |
| Oct 30 Nov 3rd | " | Shanhaikuan | Peyton. Cpl. |
| Nov 1-2 | " | Peking | W.O., Johnson |
| Nov 5-8 | " | Shanhaikuan | Peyton & Olmstead |
| Nov 8- 9 | " | " | Capt. Miley |
| Nov 12-13 | " | Peking | Sgt. Metz |
| Nov 12-14 | " | Shanhaikuan | Cpl. Peyton |
| Nov 18-19 | " | " | Lt. Crist |
| Nov.18-19 | " | " | Cpl. Peyton |
| Nov 20-21-22-23 | " | " | Capt. Newton |
| Nov 20-23 | " | " | Cpl. Miller |
| Nov 23-25 | " | " | Capt. Macon |
| Nov 25-26 | " | " | Lt. Snodgrass |

Tientsin, China.
November 27, 1924.

Subject: Report of trip with Inter-Allied Train made on November 25, 26, 1924.

To: Commanding General, United States Army forces in China, Tientsin, China. (Through channels.)

1.- Pursuant to instructions from Headquarters, United States Army forces in China, contained in letter, Headquarters American Barracks, Office of the Commanding Officer, Tientsin, China, November 24, 1924, Subject, Instructions and " approved instructions to officer in charge of Inter-Allied Train ", the following report is submitted.

2.- While not essentially an Allied Train in the sense contemplated in the "approved instructions to officer in charge of Inter-Allied Train", this train bore that designation,being represented, however, by one flag, U.S., and performed related duties limited by the scope of its mission. The mission in this instance was to "bring back to Tientsin the several cars of freight and supplies left at Peitaiho ------.

3.- This train composed of an engine and one passanger coach, left Tientsin East station at 3:30 P.M., November 25th, 1924, one and one half hours later than schedule time, caused by taking on coal and water. The trip to Tongshan was very slow due, first, to a poor ill-conditional engine and, secondly, to the passage of six trains enroute. The delays varied in periods of time from 20 and 40 minutes.Arriving at Tongshan 9:00 A.M., the progress of the train was delayed for one hour for refueling purposes and change of crew. The train then proceeded without interruption to Chinwangtao, arriving there at 2:30 P.M., November 25th, 1924, refueled and returned to Peitaiho where nine freight and supply cars, above referred to, were attached. The return to Tongshan was very slow due to weight of cars and character of the engine but otherwise uninterrupted. At Tongshan the train remained for two hours for refueling purposes, change of crew, and minor repairs of the engine. At Chun-liong-cheng where the train arrived at 6:10 A.M.,November 26th, 1924, the progress of the train was interrupted for two hours and 40 minutes on account of a block in Tientsin. A chinese troop train enroute to Tientsin arriving ahead of me was also detained at this point. Debate ensued with the Transportation Master as to which train would depart first. It was apparent that being intimidated by the chinese soldiery and

fearful of their resultent action, the Transportation Master intended to give the other train priority. I explained fully to him the character of my train and the consideration it must be given. He was fully aware of the fact that the Allied Train was to be given priority but was fairly afraid to do so. He asked me to combine the two trains which I consented to do. The chinese troop train composed of two engines and seven cars was thereupon attached in rear of my train and together we proceeded to Tientsin arriving there at 9:40 A.M., November 25th, 1924.

a. The physical condition of the railway and all auxiliary installations appeared to be good in all respects between Tientsin and Chinwangtao. A possible exception to this statement may be taken with reference to engines if the one I used is a fair example.

b. The railway is fairly free from traffic congestion. The yards at Tongshan and Chinwangtao are fairly full of cars of various description but not crowded.

c. No foreign nationals were evacuated.

d. Reports by telegram were made to the Commandant, Allied Forces in Tientsin as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Chinwangtao | 1 |
| Lan-hsieu | 1 |
| Tongshan | 2 |
| Chen Lieng Cheng | 1 |

To the Commanding General, United States Army forces in China as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Chen Lieng Cheng | 1 |

4.- Military information:

a. The six trains mentioned above passed while enroute to Tongshan were freight trains, one containing coal, the other largely horses, carts, a few pieces of artillery, possibly 3 inch, supplies of various description and the necessary personnel as caretakers. One passanger train going west loaded with all nationals considerably beyond its normal capacity was passed a short distance beyond Tongshan.

b. Observed various detachments of Chang Tso Lin's Army at practically all stations enroute, the larger portion of them being at Chen Lieng Cheng, Tongshan and Chinwangtao. All of them appeared to be quiet, peaceful, contented, well clothed and fed. In fact they appeared entirely uneffected by the cold weather.

c. At Tongshan there were about 2000 Fengtien soldiers. A large portion of them were performing drill of various kinds. In my interview with Captain Dabney, Company K, 15th Infantry, I learned that these soldiers were largely composed of recruits which came to Tongshan on the 21st inst., now undergoing intensive military training. Captain Dabney told me according to reports, 10,000 chinese soldiers were being congregated at Tongshan and further that he had no confidence in the report.

He further told me that he was making every effort to prevent the assembly of soldiers at that point and to send away those already there.

d. A number of Fengtien soldiers, 1st and 3rd Army, were observed at Chinwangtao. They stated that a part of them were returning to Mukden and were there awaiting trains to convey them.

e. A long train of empty cars arrived at Chen Lieng Cheng from Tientsin a short while before my departure. Loading of chinese soldiers and supplies began immediately. I was informed that those soldiers were returning to Mukden.

f. My train conductor told me that the stores and shops at Chinwangtao were closed. At all other town along the way they appeared to be open and doing business.

E.H. SNODGRASS,
1st Lt., 15th Infantry,
Commanding Inter-Allied Train.

" Incl - 1
Approved instructions
for officer in charge
of Allied Train."

American Barracks,
Tientsin, China,
November 25, 1924.

Subject: Report of Allied Train from Tientsin, to Chinwangtao, China and return (Nov.23d to Nov.25th, 1924).

To: Major General K. Yoshioka, Allied Commander of Troops in Tientsin, Japanese Barracks, Tientsin (Thru Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, Tientsin, China.)

1. Pursuant to instructions dated November 23, 1924 an Allied train consisting of one locomotive and three passenger cars left Tientsin East station at 11:45 A.M., November 23, 1924 for Chinwangtao under my command.

2. There were no Allied troops on the train except the United States detachment, and no flag available for the locomotive except the United States flag. These facts caused some stations to wire ahead that an American Special was coming instead of an Allied train which caused some slight misunderstandings until our train arrived, and probably some delays. The principal occasion being when the Station Master at Lanchow allowed a train to leave his station going toward Chinwangtao instead of holding it until the Allied train reached Lanchow and passed. According to his statement he did this because he did not know that ours was an Allied train.

3. This Allied train arrived Chinwangtao at 11:45 P.M., November 23, 1924. Eighteen cars of freight of American supplies was picked up there. Due to repairs on the locomotive the train did not leave Chinwangtao for Tientsin until 4:30 A.M., November 24th. The locomotive was a passenger engine and unable to bring all of cars to Tientsin. Eight freight cars and one 3d class passenger car were left at Pei Tei Ho. The Allied train with the remaining ten freight cars and two passenger cars left Pei Tei Ho at 8:10 A.M., and arrived Tientsin at 12:15 A.M., November 25, 1924.

4 a Railway communication was open from Tientsin to Chinwangtao.

b The condition of the railway and its auxiliary installations was very good. It appears, however, that the locomotives are overworked and time not allowed for their proper maintenance.

If the present situation continues along these lines it is likely that the locomotives will soon be in very poor condition. There is a clamor for locomotives and none available along the line. When one becomes available the Chinese soldiery demand it and leave none in reserve.

c The condition of traffic along the railway is fair. There were several troop and supply trains moving toward Tientsin which would have made it difficult for a train other than an Allied train to get through without long delays. The Station Masters along the route appear to handle the situations very well under the circumstances.

d One foreign national and his family were picked up from a coal train and evacuated to Tientsin.

e This Allied train on the return trip was delayed one hour and ten minutes at Chang Gui Chuang (six miles from Tientsin) due to the Station Master at that place having permitted a Chinese troop train to leave in front of our train while the Allied train was stopped at the siding switch by a signal. This was done before I saw the Station Master. He stated that he explained to the Chinese soldiers that ours was an Allied train but that they threatened to assault him if he did not let them leave, that they had already been stopped for two hours due to a block in traffic at Tientsin.

f The railway line was in good condition and no repairs were necessary.

8 Incls. (Copies of telegrams)

F. A. Macon,
Captain, 15th Infantry.

REPORT OF OBSERVERS ON ALLIED TRAIN
NOV. 20 to NOV. 23- 1924.

To : Intelligence Officer, U.S.A.F.in C.

1. Captain J. Newton, U.S.Army, Train Commander.
Lieut. Pierce, Guard Detachment Commander.
14 enlisted men in detachment and attached to train as observers.
1 French Officer, 23 enlisted men.
2 Japanese enlisted men.
1 British Captain. 1enlisted man.

2. Train departed Tien Tsin East at 10:27 AM. Nov. 20.

3. Train consisted of:
Engine No. 190
3 first class coaches
2 second class coaches
1 third class coach
2 box cars, French supplies.
2 gondolas coal for Peking.
1 Guard and baggage car for passengers.
1 empty box car for Marine casuals.
1 Private car for the return of the British C.O.

4. There were 14 first cl. passengers all with Legation permits for the ALLIED TRAIN.

5. Between Tien Tsin East and the Central station there were 500 horses and 800 native soldiers, the majority of which wore the arm band of the 2nd. Feng Tien army.

6. Delayed thousand yards east of Central Station account of congested condition of the yards due to troop movements, at Central station there were 2 artillery trains of 12 cars each. 6 infantry trains average length 30 cars. 2000 native soldiers, 2nd. army, 150 of the 1st. army.

7. Arrived Tien Tsin Central station 11:58 AM.
Departed Tien Tsin Central yards at 1:17 PM.

8. Pei Tsang, arrived 1:33 PM. Departed 2:24 PM.
18 cars of material for R.R. and 150 labor troops.
10 cars wood and 4 cars supplies, 200 soldiers 2nd. army.

9. Yang Tsun, arrived 2:46PM. Deptd, 2:54 PM.
Passed east bound train here with 50, 2nd army and 500 civilian passengers, many of the latter were evidently being inducted into the Feng Tien forces.

10. 3:06 PM. passed 350 dismounted troops marching west, 2-3-4 in english numerals on small red guidons. 2 stokes mortars, 5 machine guns on mules.

11. Chang Chuang passed thru at 3:09 PM.
50 , 2nd. Army on platform, all mounted.

12. Lao Fa, arrived 3:23 departed 3:33 PM.
British Guard on platform. 35 , 7th. B. Feng Yu Hsiang.

13. Small patrols of Feng Tien forces in evidence along the R R .

14. Lang Fang arrived 3:56 dptd. 4: PM.
British Guard on the platform.
Noted the masts of a field wireless station south east of the station 1 mile. S tation master said that Feng Yu Hsiangs 7th. Mixed was garrisoning the small villages near here, and that there were about 7000 in the brigade, this was also told me at Lao Fa by a native officer of the 7th. Brigade.

15. Wan Chuang, passed thru 4:15.
No Troops in evidence at thispoint.

16. Wei Shan Chuang, arr. 4:38 dptd. 4:44.

17. Hang Tsun, passed thru, 4:56 PM.

18. Huang Te Pao, passed thru, 5:08 PM.

19. Feng Tai, arrived 5:16 dptd. 5:22 P.M.
200 of Fengs 2nd at this station, on platform.

20. Yung Tien Men, arr. 5:34 dptd. 5:42 PM.

21. Delayed at 5:49 at Chien Men City walls by Fengs soldiers who were on guard at the breach in the wall where the RR passes thru. About 50 native soldiers in evidence here.

22. Ping Ting Men, passed thru 5:11 PM.
Between this station and Chien Men station there were about 2000 native soldiers in box cars. No engines on any train so presumed that the men had been using these cars as quarters.

23. Peking, arr. Chien Men Station 5:2_ PM.
11th. Div. Feng Yu Hsiang at this point.

PEKING TO TIEN TSIN RETURN TRIP NOV, 21- 1924.
Train Completement
1 Private coach.
6 1st cl. coaches.
2 2nd cl, coaches.
1 3rd. cl. coach.
1 Box car ( Am. Marines)
1 " " ( French troops)
1 " " empty
1 " " Mail.

Capt. Newton, U.S.Army Train commander.
Lieut. Pierce U.S.Army Guard detachment Commander.
1 British Colonel.
1 Japanese Captain. 26 enlisted men.
1 M.S.M.C. Lieut. 59 enlisted men.
2 Captains Br. Forces with Br. Col.
4 1st. Cl. Passengers with Legation Permits.
2 Japanese civilians with permits rode with troops.
14 Guard U.S.A. ( 1 observer )
Train deptd. Chien Men Station 8:27 AM. Nov.21st.

24. Passed Chien Men walls at 8:35.
150 11th. Div. Feng.

25. From Feng Tai at 8:59 AM no delays occured untill 11:55 at bridge west of Tien Tsin Central station. No additional troops were noticed or unusual activities untill Pei Tsang where a new siding was being laid south of main line and paralell about 1000yds. long.

26. Tien Tsin Central, 12:23 PM. dptd, 12:50 PM.
The delay at the bridge was caused by troop trains getting ready for the Tsin Pu line.

27. Tien Tsin East station, arr. 1:21 dptd. 3:19 PM.
The train passenger list at this point was augmented by 250 enlisted men U.S.A.
3 1st cl passengers ( 2 for Tang Shan)
3 Japanese Lts. 12 enlisted men.
1 enlisted man U.S.A. attached as observer in addition to the personnel.
The Br. Col, departed at this station and also 2 Br. Captains.

28. Tang Ku , arr. 4:18 PM. dptd. 4:41.
Delay due to station master claiming right of way for west bound troop train, no such train arrived and Allied Train commander demanded right of way which, after considerable phoning was granted.

29. Hang Ku arr. 5:22 dptd. 6:30 PM.
Delay caused by Native soldiers holding staff at Lu Tai.
At 6:24 train of 24 box cars west bound pulled in, about 400 2nd. army Tchang.

30. Tang Shan, arr. 8:05 dptd. 8:50 PM.

31. From Hang Ku to Tang Shan there were no delays, at the latter station there were few native soldiers on the platform, but in the city many could be seen mostly of the second army Tchangs. These men of the 1st and 3rd army seemed to be mounted men. Probably cavalry as most of the men were armed with both saber and rifle and pistol.

32. Ku Yeh arr. 9:49 dptd. 10:00 PM.
There were no delays between Tang Shan and Ku Yeh.
At Ku Yeh there were about 500 men from the 1st. and 3rd.

33. Pei Ta Tien, arr. 10:40 dptd. 10:47.
The short delay occassioned here was caused by having to back down on East track so as to clear the trains at Lei Chuang which were occupying station tracks.

34. Tso To Tun: arr 11:21 dptd. 11:34 PM.
Delay caused account of the station master being in bed, he claimed that the native soldiers had the staff and that it would be unsafe for us to proceed without it. The traffic inspector forund this to untrue and we proceeded shortly.

35. There were no further delays encountered.

36. Chin Wang Tao arrived 2:39 AM. Nov. 22nd.1924. dpt.3:18PM.
At the station this point were about 500 Tchang 2nd. army, considerable forage in the yards and about 2000 1st and 3rd army in box cars. In the city th[illegible] were 5000 1st and 3rd army ( estimated )
At 6:10 AM. the train was pulled down to the Transport to facilitate the passenger and freight handling.

37. During the time that the train remained at Chin Wang Tao; Capt. Newton the ALLIED TRAIN commander, took the engine and visited Shan Hai Kuan, on his return he gave the following information. Capt. Newton called on the Chinese Charge at S H K. That the conditions of the yards and city were congested, that he saw 500 men of the 1st. Div. 1st and 3rd Army Tchang. That there were detachments of the following brigades which composed the 1st and 3rd. 21st. 26th. 16th. and 3rd. that there were 11, 75's and 2 , 37mm pieces and 1 anti aircraft piece mounted on auto truck which in turn was mounted on flat car.

38. Leaving Chin Wang Tao the train completment consisted of;

5 1st class coaches.
2 2nd " "
4 3rd " "
1 Guard and Baggage car.
1 Box car for baggage.

16 1st class passengers, U.S.
320 enlisted men U.S.Army & Marine Corps.
1 Japanese Officer, 13 enlisted men.

39. Chang Li arrived 4:35 dptd. 4:51.
There were no delays between Chin Wang Tao and this station.
At this point there were 114 cars troops 4300 men 1st and 3rd army Tchang. West bound.

40. Lan Hsien, arr. 5:55 dptd. 6:38P.M.
Delay occassioned by the Japanese Officer who requested a few minutes in which to conduct some official business in regards to the Telegraph Administration.

41. Tang Shan, arr. 8:25 deptd. 8:57 PM.
There were no delays of any kind from Lan Hsien to this station. At Tang Shan the train was supplied with water and the men of the Army and Marine Corps were served hot coffee on the platform.
2 additional passengers 1st class for Tien Tsin.

42. Tien Tsin East Station arr.12:43 AM. dptd. 7:02 AM Nov. 23- 1924.
Train Completment Tien Tsin to Peking.
3 1st class coaches.
1 2nd " coach
1 3rd. " "
1 Guard and Baggage car.
1 Box car on rear of train.

Captain Newton Train Commander.
Lt. Pierce Guard commander, 15 enlisted men U.S.
14 1st. class passengers.
1 U.S.M.C. Officer ( 37 enlisted men)

43. Tien Tsin Central arr. 9:AM dptd. 9:37 AM.
9:05 Gen. Yoshokos auto arrived in it were the 2 aides on his staffa dn the Jap. Consul General.
The private train of Marshal Tchang Tso Lin was in the yards ready to move to Peking. After arrangements had been made by the Allied Train Commander, the Allied Train took the running time of Marshal Tchang's train and proceeded west.

44. 9:45 AM. passed 250 Cav. 400 Inf. 2nd. Army Tchang. Marching west, about 3 miles from Pei Tsang.

45. 10: AM. Passed 250 Inf. 2nd. Army Tchang, these men were on the road east of Yang Tsun about 1½miles. 85 Cav. about ½ mile east Yang Tsun.

46. Chien Yang Men, Peking: arr 1:05PM. dptd. 2:45PM. There were no delays of any great duration during this portion of the trip, and to the return to Tien Tsin, the changes in troops along the R.R. we negligable. The British have taken the out posts along the R.R. away and returned them to thir stations.

47. Tien Tsin Central 10:30 PM. dpt. 10:42 PM.

48. Tien Tsin East station arrived 11:19 PM.

Edward D. Miller
Cpl. Hqrs. Co.
15 The Infantry.

Tientsin, China.
November 26, 1924.

Subject: Report of trip with Inter-National Train made on November 20, 21, 22, 23, 1924.

To: Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China. Tientsin, China. (Through channels.)

1.- In compliance with instructions report the following trip from Tientsin East to Peking and return, Tientsin East to Chinwangtao, Chinwangtao to Shanhaikuan and return, Chinwangtao to Tientsin, East; Tientsin East to Peking and return.

a. Schedule of trip:

| Date | Leaving Place | Time | | Date | Arriving Place | Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11/20/24 | Tientsin East | 10:27 | AM | 11/20/24 | Tientsin Central | 11:58 | AM |
| 11/20/24 | Tientsin Central | 1:17 | PM | 11/20/24 | Peking | 6 :25 | PM |
| 11/21/24 | Peking | 8:15 | AM | 11/21/24 | Tientsin Central | 11:50 | AM |
| 11/21/24 | Tientsin Central | 12:50 | PM | 11/21/24 | Tientsin East | 1:21 | PM |
| 11/21/24 | Tientsin East | 3:19 | PM | 11/21/24 | Tangku | 4:18 | PM |
| 11/21/24 | Tangku | 4:41 | PM | 11/21/24 | Hanku | 5:35 | PM |
| 11/21/24 | Hanku | 6:40 | PM | 11/21/24 | Tongshan | 8:05 | PM |
| 11/21/24 | Tongshan | 8:50 | PM | 11/21/24 | Lanchow | 11:57 | PM |
| 11/22/24 | Lanchow | 12:05 | AM | 11/22/24 | Chinwangtao | 2:45 | AM |
| 11/22/24 | Chinwangtao | 3:50 | AM | 11/22/24 | Shanhaikuan | 4:20 | AM |
| 11/22/24 | Shanhaikuan | 10:30 | AM | 11/22/24 | Chinwangtao | 10:50 | AM |
| 11/22/24 | Chinwangtao | 3:20 | PM | 11/22/24 | Lanchow | 6:00 | PM |
| 11/22/24 | Lanchow | 6:40 | PM | 11/22/24 | Tongshan | 8:30 | PM |
| 11/22/24 | Tongshan | 9:00 | PM | 11/22/24 | Tangku | 11:10 | PM |
| 11/22/24 | Tangku | 11:15 | PM | 11/23/24 | Tientsin East | 12:45 | AM |
| 11/23/24 | Tientsin East | 7:30 | AM | 11/23/24 | Tientsin Central | 9:05 | AM |
| 11/23/24 | Tientsin Central | 9:40 | AM | 11/23/24 | Peking | 1:05 | PM |
| 11/23/24 | Peking | 3:30 | PM | 11/23/24 | Tientsin East | 11:15 | PM |

b. The railroad:
The railroad and all structures and auxiliaries are in good condition between Peking and Shanhaikuan, with the exception of a small portion of the track where the wreck occured. A double track detour has been built around this place. The train passed over the detour with ease. Work is progressing on clearing up the main line.

c. Traffic congestion:
Outside of Tientsin East and Tientsin Central the road is fairly free of traffic congestion. The railway yards at Peking, Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan are quite full of cars, but this condition could easily be remedied. The yards of Tangku seemed quite clear.

2.- Military information:

a. Tientsin Central and Tientsin East are very congested, being full of cars loaded with troops and supplies of the Fengtien Army.

b. Observed various detachments of Chang Tso Lin's Army as far north as Chang Chuang. From Loa Fa to Peking, all troops observed belonged to Feng Yu Hsiang. At Loa Fa the 7th Brigade is stationed. Was informed that Feng had about 7000 troops in that vicinity.

c. Between Chien Men station and Peking station there were about 2000 soldiers in box cars. Observed no engines, so presume same were being used as quarters.

d. Enroute from Peking to Tientsin, upon arriving at Loa Fa, observed that the British were withdrawing their troops. They had an engine and a third class car. This proceeded the Allied train to Tientsin.

e. At Pei Tsang a new siding about 1000 yards long, parallel to the main line, is being laid.

f. The Allied train was delayed at Hanku to allow the passage of a South bound troop train, which consisted of about 24 cars.

g. The railway yards at Chinwangtao were fairly congested. Observed quite a large number of soldiers and supplies. Was informed that about 5000 men belonging to the 1st and 3rd Army were in the vicinity. The following day(November 22,1924), at Chang Li, passed a troop train containing about 4,300 troops headed South.

h. The yards at Shanhaikuan were in about the same condition as those at Chinwangtao. Observed about 500 troops in the town. There were detachments from the following organizations: 1st Division, 1st Army; 1st and 3rd Army; the 21st, 26th; 14th and 3rd Brigades. Observed on cars in the yards the following arms; 11 - 75's, 2 - 37 mm, and 1 anti-aircraft gun mounted on a motor truck. The town was quiet. Saw no evidence of shell fire. The shops were open and doing business. The Station Hotel and the North Hotel were open. The Railway Hotel was closed. Observed patrols and guards posted on the streets, evidently to maintain order.

Endeavored to call on the Chinese Major in command, but was unable to do so. However left my card with instructions to inform him that I had called to pay my respects.

Interviewed a Russian, whom I believe had charge of intelligence. He was a capable looking man and had an efficient looking office.

Three Japanese officers and three French enlisted

men accompanied me to Shanhaikuan and return. The latter went to pay the French troops at that place.

i. While at Lanchow interviewed Chang Tso Lin's traffic inspector at that place. His card is enclosed herewith. He was very courteous and friendly.

i. Enroute from Tientsin East to Peking on the 23rd of November, the Allied train was held up at Tientsin Central by the traffic congestion at that place. I met a traffic inspector of Chang Tso Lin's, named Elders. He was very friendly and promptly cleared the line for me. Among other switching he moved the train of Marshall Tuan Chi-Jui to a siding and gave me the right of way to Peking. He stated that five troop specials, Marshall Tuan, and Chang Tso Lin's train would follow me to Peking.

It was reported to me that General Yosoko's auto arrived and in it were two aides of his staff and the Japanese Consul General. Elders stated this party was to accompany Marshal Tuan to Peking.

3.- Impressions.

a. The railway is in a very disorganized condition. The English operating staff and the Chinese station masters yield to whom ever exercises the most pressure. The Chinese military do not pay a great deal of attemtion to the railway officials. They work thru them when such suits their conveniences, and disregard their orders when same are not in accord with their desires. The military are using the Chinese engineers and brakemen, but have installed their own traffic inspectors and train dispatchers in many stations.

The railway people were trying to run a few passanger trains, but these are not making much headway.

b. Most all of Chang Tso Lin's men and the railway officials were very friendly. The men of Feng Yu Hsian were inclined to be insolent and impertinent.

c. All Chinese soldiers were well fed,supplied with money and ammunition, comfortable clothed, and seemed contented. At Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao, I noticed them buying various articles. They had quite a lot of coppers in their hands. At Tientsin East and Tientsin Central observed them giving coppers to the small children.

JOHN C. NEWTON,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Commanding Inter-Allied Train.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVERS ON ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO SHANHAIKWAN AND RETURN FROM NOVEMBER 18,1924 to NOVEMBER 19,1924.

TO:- Intelligence Officer, G-2, Headquarters, U.S.A.F. in China.

1- Departed Tientsin East at:- 10:00 a.m. November 18th, 1924.

Allied detachments consisted of:-

U.S.Army Forces:- 1 Officer and 14 enlisted men.

Japanese:- 2 Officers and 22 enlisted men.

Remarks

Train consisted of:-

Engine No. 190.

Five Coaches.

Five Box-cars with supplies.

One Baggage with mail

One gondola with ties.

One flatcar with rails and handcar.

WB engine No. 159 with 30 gondolas, 3 box-cars and 1 coach loaded with approx 200 head of horses, 75 longcarts, 250 soldiers. WB engine No. 103 with 16 gondolas, 14 box-cars and 1 coach loaded with 50 head of horses, 30 longcarts and approx 150 soldiers, supplies was also in both trains. The soldiers on both trains are of the transportation corp with the I-I on thier collars, there was two other trains of box-cars on the north siding loaded with supplies there was no engine attached to these cars, on the south platform here there are approx 3275 rounds of Trench Mortar Amm. 300 cases of 3 inch amm. and 700 cases of rifle amm, the rifle amm is of german make, all this ammunition is being loaded on longcarts and taken toward Chinese city. 4 French Soldiers joined train here with supplies

2- CHANG KUEI CHUANG:-

Arrived 10:50 a.m.
Departed 11:24 a.m.

The cause of our delay here was due to troop train blocking the main line, Engines No. 162-102 WB with 53 cars, there was approx 900 mixed troops, approx 300 head of horses and 100 long carts and two cars of forage. WB engine No. 101 with 35 cars approx 800 head of horses and mules, 100 longcarts and approx 200 coolies and 150 soldiers as guards. WB engine No. 100 with 21 cars with approx 150 troops and 100 head of horses and four cars of foage all these troops are of the I-III and II-II. WB engine No. 109m with four coaches and 21 cars of supplies approx 100 soldiers as guards, there was approx 25 longcarts and 100 head of horses.

3- CHUN LIANG CHENG:-

Arrived 11:44 a.m.
Departed 12:21 p.m.

There was a dismantled aeroplane on the south platform, the

3- Cont'd.

plane lying in the south field is still untouched. WB engine No. 65 with 19 cars is lying on the south siding here with sixteen 75s seven 37mm, approx 150 troops and 3 box cars of ammunition, there was 1s longcarts and 50 head of horses on this train also. WB engine No. 203 with 29 cars carrying 50 longcarts, 200 head of horses and approx 100 soldiers as guards, some of the horses were all saddled up. WB engine No. 143 and 34 cars with approx 100 head of horses, 75 long carts, 25 steers and approx 75 soldiers as guards.

4- HSINHO:-

arrived 12:45 p.m.
No stop. WB engine with 19 cars of wood. WB engine No. 29 with 10 cars of supplies and approx 50 soldiers, these trains were on the siding here.

5- TANG KU:-

arrived 12:54 p.m.
departed 1:08 p.m.

The four French soldiers left train here with their supplies, there was a WB Allied coal train lying here, there are no troop trains here. There was 9 cars on the siding with approx 75 horses, 25 longcarts and approx 50 soldiers as guards. Our engine took water here.

6- PEI TANG:-

arrived 1:29 p.m.
departed 1:30 p.m.
No troops here.

7- CHA TING:-

arrived 1:53 p.m.
Departed 2:01 p.m.

WB engine No. 174 with 17 cars with approx 150 soldiers, 100 coolies 25 long carts and approx 100 head of horses. The cause of our delay was due to awaiting the arrival of this train.

8- HAN KU:-

arrived 2:16 p.m.
No stop. there was no troops here.

9- LU TAI:-

arrived 2:38 p.m.
No stop. in a village just west of here there was approx 200 troops at drill. WB Engine No. 217 with 6 boxcars and 24 gondolas with approx 200 troops, 100 head of horses and 40 long carts. There was approx 150 troops with their rifles stacked just south of the R&R. station, these troops were being assembled for some sort of a ceremony

10- TIEN CHUANG:-

arrived 2:55 p.m.
No stop, there was no troops here.

11) TANG FANG:-

arrived 3:11 p.m.
No stop there was no troop here.

12- HSU KO CHUANG:-

arrived 3:28 p.m.
Departed 3:29 p.m.
No troops here.

13- TANG SHAN:-

arrived 3:45 p.m.
departed 4:25 p.m.

Major Martin left train here. We unloaded supplies for "K" company There are no troop or supplies train in the yards here, there was about 10 soldiers on the platforms here, our engine took coal and water here.

14- KAI PING:-

arrived 4:44 p.m.
No stop there was 18 gondolas on the south siding with approx 100 head of horses and 75 long carts, there was no engine attached.

15- WALI:-

arrived 4:55 p.m.
No stop, there was no troops here.

16- KUYEH:-

arrived 5:09 p.m.
departed 5:14 p.m.

There was no troop or supplie train here.

17- PEI CHA TIEN:-

arrived 5:27 p.m.
No stop there was no troops here.

18- LEI CHUANG:-

arrived 5:47 p.m.
departed 5:48 p.m.
No troops here.

19- TOU TZU TO:-

arrived 6:01 p.m.
No stop, there was no troops here.

20- At 6:10 p.m. we stopped ½ mile west of Lan hsien the cause of our delay was due to an eastbound train ahead of us, at 6:49 p.m. engine No. 92 with 18 cars, approx 200 soldiers and 100 head of horses were on this train, at 7:01 p.m. we moved ahead.

21- LAN HSIEN:-

arrived 7:05 p.m.
departed 7:13 p.m.
There are 23 cars on the siding here loaded with approx 150 soldiers 100 head of horses and [redacted] 75 long carts, there was also a few supplies scatered all over the train. Five Japanese left train here.

22- CHU KO CHUANG:-

Arrived 7:25 p.m.
No stop, there was no troops here.

23- SHIHSHEN:-

arrived 7:33 p.m.
departed 7:49 p.m.

There was no troops here, cause of delay was due to awaiting train orders.

24- AN SHAN:-

arrived 8:09 p.m.
departed 8:15 p.m.

There was no troops here, our engine took water.

25- HOU FENG TAI:-

arrived 8:26 p.m.
departed 9:16 p.m.

There was no troops here. Our delay here was due to an engine at the next station being broken down on the main line.

26- [redacted] CHANG LI:-

arrived 9:54 p.m.
departed 9:58 p.m.

There was one train of 34 cars on the siding here loaded with supplies and wood. Our engine took water here.

27- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:-

arrived 10:13 p.m.
departed 10:21 p.m.

No troops here.

28- LIU SHOU YING:-

arrived 10:37 p.m.
departed 10:45 p.m.

No troop here.

29- PEI TA HO:-

arrived 11:03 p.m.
departed 11:08 p.m.

There was no troops in view here.

30- HAN TA SSU:-

Arrived 11:23 p.m.
departed 11:28 p.m.

No troops here.

31- At 11:45 p.m. we stopped approx 1 mile west of C.W.T. the casue of delay was due to an eastbound train ahead of us. At 12:01 a.m. we moved ahead.

32- CHINWANGTAO:-

arrived 12/19 a.m.
departed 12/45 a.m.

The armored train is still at this station, there was approx 50 cars of supplies on the south siding here guard by approx 100 soldier

32-Cont'd.

there was 3 box-cars ~~xxxxxxx~~ detached from our train here. There was a WB train of 19 cars on the main line with approx 100 head of horses, 75 long carts and approx 50 soldiers.

33- At 12:57 a.m. we passed a WB supplie train of 14 cars, the cars were all covered with straw matting.

34- SHANHAIKUNAN:-

arrived 1:30 a.m.
departed 9:13 a.m.

Engien with 10 empty box-cars and 20 gondolas loaded with approx 150 head of horses and 75 long carts pulled out of here eastbound at 7:57 a.m. the horses in the gondolas were covered with snow and ice and they had no protection from the weather whatsoever, there is one anti aircraft gun mounted on a ~~xxxxx~~ truck on the north platform here, there was no covering on the gun to protect it from the weather. There was very few troops in sight here.

35- CHINWANGTAO:- return.

Arrived 9:43 a.m.
departed 9:57 a.m.

Everything appear to be very quiet here, there was no troops in view except the guards on the platforms. 16 Japanese joined train here with equipment.

36- HAN TA SSU:-

arrived 10:13 a.m.
departed 10:14 a.m.

There was no troops here.

37- PEI TA HO:-

arrived 10:29 a.m.
departed 10:34 a.m.

There was no troops in view here. our engine took water.

38 LIU SHOU YING:- return.

arrived 10:50 a.m.
departed 10:51 a.m.

There was a few troops quartered in the village here.

39 CHANG CHIA CHUANG:- return

arrived 11:06 a.m.

No stop, there was no troops here.

40- We stopped west of Chang Li at 11:19 a.m. moved ahead at 11:23 a.m. the delay was due to train of empties on the main line ahead.

41- CHANG LI:- return.

arrived 11:25 a.m.
departed 11:27 a.m.

~~Xxxx~~ Soldiers are quartered in the village here, there was about 10 armed soldiers on the platform.

42- HOU FENG TAI:-

arrived 11:41 a.m.

No stop, there was no troops here.

43- ANSHAN:- return.

arrived 11:53 a.m.
departed 12804 p.m.

There was no troops in view here, our engine took water.

44- SHIHKEN:- return.

Arrived 12:22 p.m.
departed 12:23 p.m.

There was no troops in view here.

45- CHU KO CHUANG:-

arrived 12:31 p.m.

No stop, there was no troops in view here. There was 11 cars of wood and supplies on the north siding no engine attached to these cars.

46- LAN HSIEN:- return.

arrived 12:41 p.m.
departed 12:57 p.m.

There was very few troops in view here, there are 3 trains loaded with long carts and horses on the south sidings.

47- TOU TZU TO)- return.

arrived 1:12p.m.
Departed 1:13p.m.

No troops in view here. There are several hundred dismantled long carts on both sides of the R.R, here.

48- LEICHUANG:- return.

arrived 1:25 p.m.
departed 1:26 p.m.

No troops here.

49--PEICHATIEN:- return.

arrived 1:36 p.m.
Departed 1:37 p.m.

No troops here.

50- KUYEH:- return

arrived 1:46bp.m.
departed 1:53 p.m.

No troops here.

51 WALI:- return.

arrived 2:05 p.m.
departed 2:06 p.m.

No troop here.

52- KAIPING:- return

arrived 2:16 p.m.
departed 2:20 p.m.

No troops here.

53- TANGSHAN:- return

arrived 2:33 p.m.
departed 3:08 p.m.

There are no troops or supply trains here, there was a few armed soldiers on the platforms here.

[redacted] sheet no 6

54- HSU KO CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 2:23 p.m.
departed 2:38 p.m.

No troops here. The cause of delay was due to a coal train a head of us.

55- TANG PANG:- return.

arrived 3:55 p.m.
departed 4:04 p.m.

No troops here, the cause of our delay was due to awaiting arrival of Engine No. 202 EB with train on empties.

56- TIEN CHUANG:- return.

arrived 5:17 p.m.
departed 6:15 p.m.

No troops here. The cause of delay here was due to awaiting arrival of EB train of empties.

57- LU TAI:- return

arrived 6:38 p.m.
departed 6:39 p.m.

There was no troops in view here. There was one EB passenger train on the North main siding here, there was a few troops on this train.

58- HANKU:- return.

arrived 7:05 p.m.
No stop

No troops here.

59- CHA TING:-

arrived 7:15 p.m.
departed 7:43 p.m.

Delay due to awaiting arrival of EB train of empties, there was no troops in view here.

60 PEI TANG:- return.

arrived 8:07 p.m.
departed 8:08 p.m.

No troops here.

61- TANG KU:- return.

arrived 8:25 p.m.
departed 8:28 p.m.

There was approx 50 armed soldiers in view around the station here, there was 10 saddled horses picketed on the south platform, the coal train which was ahead of us is here on the north main line awaiting us to pass, this train was guard by chinese soldiers.

62- HSINHO:- return.

Arrived 8:36 p.m.
departed 8:39 p.m.

Engines No. 105-247 with empty cars was here when we arrived, there was no troops in view here.

63- CHUN LIANG CHENG:- return

Arrived 9:01 p.m.
departed 9:02 p.m.

There was 3 armed soldiers ob the platform here.

64- CHANG KUEI CHUANG:- return.

arrived 9:22 p.m.
departed 11:11 p.m.

Cause of delay due to awaiting orders of clear line in Tientsin, there was no troops here.

65- TIENTSIN EAST:-

arrived 11:30 p.m. November 19th, 1924.

American Barracks,
Tientsin, China,
November 20, 1924.

Subject: Report of Inter-Allied Train.

To: The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, Tientsin, China.

1. The Allied Train left Tientsin East Station at 9:50 a.m., Tuesday, November 18, 1924. The train was in command of the Japanese whose escort consisted of two (2) officers and twenty two (22) enlisted men; the Americans, one (1) officer and fourteen (14) enlisted men, the French, four (4) enlisted men (to detrain at Tangku).

2. About twenty (20) Li from Tientsin at Chang Cuei Chuang five (5) troop and supply trains (Chang Tso Lin) were blocking the line waiting for a clear track to Tientsin which necessitated a delay of one (1) hour. At Chun Liang Cheng we were delayed twenty five (25) minutes during the switching and passing of three (3) troop trains, one (1) supply train, one (1) artillery (3"inch pieces). At Hsin Ho, 12:50 p.m., one (1) troop and one (1) supply train was going toward Tientsin. At Cha Fing one (1) troop and one (1) supply train was observed proceeding toward Tientsin. At Lu Fui two (2) supply trains men awaiting orders to proceed to Tientsin. One (1) troop and supply train was in the Tongshan yards. Three (3) troop and one (1) supply train were observed at Lan Hsien.

3. The train arrived in Shan-Hai-Kuan at 1:45 a.m., Wednesday, November 19, 1924. Left Shan-Hai-Kuan 9:10 a.m., and arrived Tientsin East Station 11:37 p.m., Wednesday November 19, 1924.

4. What is estimated to be one (1) battalion of Chang Tso Lin's soldiers was seen drilling at a point 700 yards north of the station at Chun Liang Cheng.

Two miles Northwest of Lu Tai men seen what was estimated to be eight hundred (800) Chang Tso Lin's soldiers quartered in a village.

Ching-Wang-Tao and Shan-Hai-Kuan are occupied almost entirely by Chinese soldiers, especially in the Chinese outskirts. Very few of the native Chinese were seen conducting there usual chores in Shan-Hai-Kuan.

Very few soldiers were seen straggling about at any place. They were all well organized and under the command of an officer.

5. One of the railroad double tracks just beyond Ching-Wang-Tao is blocked by a wreck of one (1) locomotive and three (3) cars which are turned over on their side. The railroad communication (wires etc.) are destroyed from Lau Hsien to Ku Yeh due to storm. It is estimated that one week will be required to repair these lines. There is a double track here and with proper precautionary measures trains can be operated with safety.

6. The railroad authorities were exceptionally willing to help the train to its destination and exercised all in their power to give the Allied Train the preference of a clear block.

W. E. Crist,
2d Lieut. 15th Infantry.



TIENTSIN, CHINA,
November 15,1924.

Subject : Report of Commanding Officer, American Detachment, Allied Train trip to Shanhaikuan and return, November 12th to 14th inclusive.

To : The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China.
(Through military channels).

1. The Allied train under command of Captain Suzuki of the Japanese Army, with a Japanese detachment of one (1) officer and seventeen (17) men, and an American detachment of one (1) officer and fourteen (14) men left Tientsin East Station at 10:27 a.m., November 12th and returned at 9:30 a.m., November 14th. A British detachment of one (1) officer and nine (9) men was taken to Tongshan, and on the return trip eleven (11) Japanese officers, forty (40) Machine Gun troops with transportation and equipment, and forty (40) Infantry troops, enroute to Peking, were taken aboard at Chinwangtao.

2. No movements of factional troops were observed, but numerous supply trains carrying animals and transportation, forage and flour, enroute to Tientsin, and a number of empty trains from Tientsin, were passed on the way. These trains were all commanded by junior officers, each with a detachment of about fifty (50) men, and their movements did not seem to be co-ordinate.

3. Detachments of Fengtien troops were observed at stations enroute, the largest being at Tangku, Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan, estimated at not over eight thousand (8000) all together. These troops were all well equipped, clothed and fed, and were apparently well disciplined. As nearly as could be determined, there were about four thousand (4000) troops at Shanhaikuan, but they seemed to be detachments left behind, with no responsible head. The railroad yards there were badly congested with supply and empty trains, and no responsible Military Commander could be located.

4. The information was given by Mr. Oliver, traffic inspector at Shanhaikuan, that orders from Marshal Chang Tso-Lin to hold all trains there, had been received the morning of November 13th. Although there were several Mukden-bound trains

in the yards the morning of November 13th, one carrying supplies and captured guns, none had left by noon that day.

Helmer W. Lystad,
2nd Lieut., 15th Infantry.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVERS ON ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO SHANHAIKWAN AND RETURN NOVEMBER 13TH, 1924 to NOVEMBER 14TH, 1924.

To: Intelligence Officer, G-2, Headquarters, U.S.A.F. in China.

1- Departed Tientsin East 10:27a.m.

Detachments Consist of:-

U.S.Forces:- 1 Officer and 14 enlisted men.

Japanese: 2 officers and 17 enlisted men.

British: 1 officer and 9 enlisted men.

Train consisted of:-

Engine No. 190.

7 Coaches.

2 Box-cars. (1 empty and 1 R.R. Coolie equipment)

1 Gondola loaded with ties.

1 Baggage loaded with mail.

Major Martin M.C. joined train here enroute to Tangshan.
Our train was scheduled to leave here at 9:30 a.m. but was held up thru assembling of the train. Company "F" detail joined train here. 6 men of Company "K" also joined train. Everything was very quiet in the yards here, there was 3 trains in the yards with troops and equip. The Japanese brought aboard 2 crates of pigeons.

2- CHANG KUEI CHUANG:-

Arrived 10:45 p.m.
Departed 12:34 p.m.

No troop activity here. Delay here due to awaiting arrival of allied coal train which arrived here at 12:30 p.m. While we were here a Chinese officer made an attempt to board our train, he said that he was instructed by his Commander to join our train as go to Shanhaikuan on it as an escort, he was refused permission by Lieut. Lystad and Capt. Suzuki.

3- CHUN LIANG CHENG:-

Arrived 12:50 p.m.
Departed 1:02 p.m.

Westbound engine No. 76 with 39 cars of supplies and long carts, 3 cars contained 70 head of mules, cond good, there was 30 soldiers as guards. ~~2~~ 50 cars lying on the siding here with supplies, no engine attached to these cars. There was approx 200 troops in this town, mainly cav. about 75 head of horses picketed on south side of R.R. There was no field pieces here.

4- HSINHO:-

Arrived 1:19 p.m.
Departed 1:37 p.m.

Westbound engine no. 120-123 with 30 gondolas loaded with approx 150 head of mules, cond good. there was long carts and forage on this train also, approx 100 soldiers as guards. Westbound engine no. 200 with 5 coaches 26 gondolas of supplies, 50 soldiers as guards. Cause of our delay here was due to awaiting arrival of engine no. 200.

5- TANGKU:-

Arrived 1:48 p.m.
Departed 1:57 p.m.

There was 7 trains in the yards here all westbound, there was 24 75s on the trains and 7 - 37mm the train were loaded with troops of the 18th Div of the 3rd army approx 300 head of horses and mules on the trains here also long carts and forage. No ammunition in view here. The troops cothing was in a very shabby cond. There was no ships in the harber.

6- PEI TANG:-

arrived 2:17 p.m.
departed 2:18 p.m.
There was 12 armed soldiers on the platform.

7- CHA TING:-

arrived 2:35 p.m.
departed 2:36 p.m.

No troop activity here.

8) HANKU:-

arrived 2:47 p.m.
No stop. No troops here.

9- LU TAI:-

arrived 3:00 p.m.
decarted 3:12 p.m.

No troop trains here. Approx 100 long carts loaded with flour etc., 200 soldiers here quartered in the village.

10- TIEN CHUANG:-

arrived 404 p.m.
departed 407 p.m.

No troop activity here.

11- TANG FANG:-

arrived 4:22 p.m.
departed 4:36 p.m.

No troop activity here.

12- HSUKOCHUANG:-

arrived 4:53 p.m.
departed 5:24 p,m.

No troop activity here. Allied train on siding here departed at 4:55 p.m. Delay here due to train ahead of us.

13- TANGSHAN:-

arrived 5:41 p.m.
departed 6:29 p.m.

1 supply train of 27 gondolas, the supplies were covered with straw matting. 1 train of 23 cars carrying mules horses and long carts approx 150 head of mules and horses very little supplies, 30 soldiers as guards. The provost guard here reports that the Neutral Shensi had disbanded. There was approx 150 long carts loaded with flour and supplies on the platforms here, they are being loaded on west bound trains, there was very few troops in view here. Major Martin left train here, 6 company "K" men left train. Our engine took water here. Engine and 22 cars on the nroth siding, these cars are being loaded with long carts, supplies and horses.

14- KAI PING:-

arrived 6:45 p.m.
departed 6:48 p.m.

Westbound engine and 31 gondolas on the south siding with approx 300 head of horses and mules, 35 long carts. Westbound ehgine and 25 car on the south siding with approx 100 head of horses and 75 long carts, approx 150 troops on these trains as guards. On the north siding there was a WB engine and 21 gondolas and flatcars loaded with approx 100 long carts 100 head of horses, few soldiesr as guards.

15- WALI:-

arrived 6:59 p.m.
departed 7:01 p.m.
No troops here.

16- KUYEH:-

arrived 7:16 p.m.
departed 7:19 p.m.
No troops here. 3 "p" company men left train here.

17- PEI CHA TZE:-

Arrived 7:30 p.m.
depasted 7:32 p.m.
No troops here.

18- LEICHUANG:-

arrived 7:51 p.m.
departed 7:55 p.m.
No troops here.

19- TOUTZUTO:-

arrived 8:10 p.m.
departed 8:17 p.m.
WB engine with 14 gondolas and 3 box-cars of supplies on the south siding there was a few armed troops as guards. WB engine No. 92 with 14 box-cars 12 gondolas and 5 coaches carrying approx 200 soldiers xxxx 100 cecilies, 15 long carts 35 head of horses, R.R. ties and Rails and repairs equipment. Our delay here due to awaiting arrival of engine no. 92.

20- LAN HSIENG-

arrived 8:33 p.m.
departed 9:24 p.m.

The situation here is still unchanged, the main activity is loading supplies on west bound trains, there are two trins on the main line loaded with supplies and forage, long carts and mules, very few soldiers in view here. There was approx 100 long carts on the north platform loaded with flour. they are being put on WB trains. Japanese unloaded supplies here, thecause of our delay here was due to Captain Suzuki going to the Japanese Barracks.

21- CHU KO CHUANG:-

arrived 9:45 p.m.
departed 9:46 p.m.
WB engine and 37 gondolas, 5 box-cars with approx 150 head of horses and 100 long carts and supplies forgge and wood.

[redacted]

22- SHIHMEN:-

arrived 9:54 p.m.
No stop. 10 gondolas of horses, 3 gondolas of Long carts and 4 gondolas of supplies. There was no engine on these cars.

23- ANSHAN:-

arrived 10:09 p.m.
departed 10:10 p.m.
No troops here.

24- HOU FENG TAI:-

arrived 10:20 p.m.
departed 10:21 p.m.
No troops here.

25- CHANG LI:-

arrived 10:36 p.m.
departed 10/57 p.m.
Delay here due to awaing train orders. No troops here.

26- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:-

arrived 11:09 p.m.
departed 11:10 p.m.
No troops here.

27- LIU SHOU YING:-

arrived 11:22 p.m.
departed 11:23 p.m.

No troops here.

28- PEI TA HO:-

arrived 11:44 p.m.
departed 11:49 p.m.
No troops or trains in view here, our engine took water.

29- NAN TA SSU:-

arrived 12:03 a.m. November 13th,
departed 12:05 p.m.
No troops here.

30- CHIN WANGTAO:-

arrived 12/24 p.m.
departed 12/55 p.m.

30-cont'd.
The 75s and 37mm which were on the north platforms here has been taken away. There are very few troops in view. Everything appears to be very quiet.

31- At 1:15a.m. we stopped 1 mile east of Shanhaikuan and at 9:56 a.m. we moved ahead delay due to traffic conjestion in the yards.

32- SHANHAIKUAN:-

arrived 10/10 p.m.
departed 12:06 p.m.

There has been no changes here. The 75s and 37mm which were at C.W.T. are on a Mukden bound train in rhe yards here. North of the station there are 23 - 75s,15- 37mm, 8 M.Gs. 5 trench mortars and apprex 2000 rifles, these arms were captured from the chihli forces. About 500 yards west of the station rifles and ammunition are being unloaded from long carts, there are apprex 1500 rifles, 3 M.Gs. 4 trench mortars, 11 boxes on hand grenades, 25 boxes of rifles ammunition and 3 boxes of 3 inch shells all these are captured goods. The camoufladged field pieces are still here. The troops here are practically the same ones which were here when we were up here last. 8 British solsiers joined train here. The japanes took on supplies here. Engine No. 84 was attached to the rear of our train and it pulled us back to C.W.T. the cause of that was that the trains were filled with trains that our regular engine wasnt able to switch arround.

33- CHINWANGTAO:-

arrived 1:03p.m.
departed 2:04 p.m.

One companynof Japanes infantry joined the train here with their equipment. The equipment was loaded in the empty box car. Chinese troops are drilling about ¼ mile north of the station. The whole town of C.W.T. is still occupied by troops. Everything appears to be getting back to normal conditions again. There was about 35 cars in the yards which were burnt up these cars contained ammuniton, forage and supplies.

34- NAN TA SSU:-

arrived 2:25 p.m.
departed 2:27 p.m.

No troops here.

35- The troops which were in the villages between here and Peitaho have moved out.

36- PEI TA HO:-

arrived 2:39 p.m.
departed 2:41 p.m.

It appears that all the troops have moved out of here, there was

36- cont'd.

only six armed soldiers on the platforms, no others in view.

37- LIU SHOU YING:-

arrived 2:55 p.m.
departed 2:57 p.m.

There was about 25 soldiers here, armed.

38- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:-

arrived 3:01 p.m.
departed 3:02 p.m.

No troops here.

~~38~~ 39- CHANG LI:-

arrived 3:22 p.m.
departed 3:24 p.m.

There are only approx 150 troops here. The bombing ~~XXXXX~~ plane which was lying west of the station has been moved up close and is being dismantled.

40- HOU FENG TAI:-

arrived 3:37 p.m.
No stop. No troops here.

41- ANSHAN:-

arrived 3:46 p.m.
departed 3:56 p.m.

15 armed soldiers on the platform here. our engine took water.

42- SHIHMEN:-

arrived 4:11 p.m.
departed 4:13 p.m.

WB engine No. 39 with 32 cars hauling arty troops 9)75s and cassions, 25 long carts and approx 100 head of horses , there was approx 100 soldiers on this train, most all the troops were wearing the fur caps.

43-CHU KO CHUANG:-

arrived 4:21 p.m.
departed 4:36 p.m.

No troops here.

44- LAN HSIEN:-

arrived 4:51 p.m.
departed 5:14 p.m.

44-cont'd.

WB engine No. 215 with 36 cars of supplies, 150 head of horses, 60 long carts and a few soldiers as guards. There was 22 boxcars of supplies on the north siding, there was no engine on the box-cars, the long carts are still coming overland to here. The troops here are still quartered in the town. Everything appears to be the same here.

45- TOU TSU TO:-

arrived 5:29 p.m.
departed 5:31 p.m.
No troops here.

46- LEICHUANG:-

arrived 5:42 p.m.
departed 5:44 p.m.
No troops here.

47- PEI CHA TIEN:-

arrived 5:59 p.m.
No stop. No troops here.

48- KUYEH:-

arrived 6:10 p.m.
departed 6:12 p.m.
No troops here.

49- WALI:-

arrived 6/25 p.m.
departed 6/26 p.m.
No troops here.

50- KAI PING:-

arrived 6/27 p.m.
departed 6/38 p m.
No troops here.

51- TANGSHAN:-

arrived 6/55 p.m.
departed 7/52 p.m.
WB engine No. 405 with 12 gondolas of horses, 4 flat cars of long carts, 12 box-cars with approx 150 russians and supplies. There was approx 240 head of horses cond very good. The platforms here are clear of evrything, the long carts have all been taken away. Major Martin and Lieut Lehr joined train here. There was a few armed troops on the station platform.

52- HSU KO CHUANG:-

arrived 8:05 p.m.
departed 8:10 p.m.
No troops here.

53- TANG PANG:-

arrived 8:39 p.m.
departed 9:05 p.m.
No troops here, cause of delay here was due to train ahead.

54- TIEN CHUANG:-

arrived 9:45 p.m.
departed 10/05 p.m.
No troops here, cause of delay still due to train ahead.

55- LU TAI:-

arrived 10:30 p.m.
departed 10:50 p.m.
Engine No. 197 EB with 9 coaches and one gondolam pulled out of here as soon as we arrived, the coaches were all dark. We pulled on the south siding as soon as we arrived here and at 10:39 p.m. we pulled over on the main line as soon as engine 197 left. The cause of delay at the other stations and here was due to the WB allied coal train which washere when we arrived, the allied coal train wanted to leave before we did but as soon as they found out who we were they cohsented to let us go first. There was only a few troops in view here.

56- HANKU:-

arrived 11:05 p.m.
departed 11:27 p.m.
No troops here. At 11:26 p.m. eastbound engine No. 217 with 20 gondolas and 10 box-cars all empites ~~xx~~ passed thru here, the cause of our delay here was due to awaiting the arrival of this train.

57- Att 11:44 p.m. we stopped and att 12:42 a.m. Nov 14th we moved ahead delay due to ~~xxxxx~~ track being bloacked ahead, with train. WB

58- CHA TING:-

arrived 12:45 ~~p~~.m. a.m.
departed 12/55 ~~p~~.m. a.m.
WB engine No. 40 with 31 cars of forage and supplies was at the station here. No troops here.

59- PEI TANG:-

arrived 1:20 p.m.
departed 1:42a.m.
One train of 19 cars at this station there was approx 100 head of horses, 75 long carts and 50 soldiers as guards.

60- TANG KU:-

arrived 2:17 a.m.
departed 4:03 a.m.

There was eight supply trains in the yards here, four of these trains were in the eastyards with apprex 90 cars there was apprex 300 head of horses and 200 long carts on these four trains there was very few soldiers in sight, the remained of these cars were loaded with clothing, forage, wood and food supplies. The four trains on the main line sidings have apprex 75 cars on them with 300 head of horses and 100 long carts the other cars loaded with supplies. There was one train of Russian soldiers here, these cars are loaded with apprex 150 head of horses and apprex 100 russians. Engine No. 231 is attached to the ~~Russian~~ Russian troop train. At 2:46 a.m. one train left this station going toward Tientsin., it had 25 cars and it was hauling stock, this train was ordered to proceed to Tientsin immediately otherwise the ~~tr~~ line would have been clear all the way to Tientsin for the Allied train.

61- HSIN HO:-

arrived 4:20 a.m.
departed 5:12 a.m.

No troop here, delay due to blocked track.

62- CHUN LIANG CHENG:-

arrived 5:27 a.m.
departed 5:54 a.m.

No troops here. The cause of delay here was still due to the train which left Tangku ahead of us.

63- ~~tr~~ CHANG KUEI CHUANG:-

arrived 6:15 a.m.
departed 6:29 p.m,

No troops here. Cause of delay still the same as above.

64- At 6:49 a.m. we stopped east of Tientsin yards awaiting clear track.

The morale of the U.S.Troops was Excellent.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN TO SHANHAIKUAN AND RETURN.

Corp.Co."G"15th Infty. Pfc. Co."G"15th Infty.

Tientsin, China,

November 13, 1924.

Report on trip of International Train between Tientsin and Peking, November 12 and 13, 1924.

The International Train composed of six coaches and guarded by detachments from British, French troops and Sailors from Italian Gunboat, all under the command of Captain Pinteaut, left East Station at 12.30 P.M., November 12th.

Prior to the departure of this train from East Station, I was informed, by the Commanding Officer of Allied Troops, Captain Pinteaut, British Army, that I would not be permitted to display the American Colors on this train. I requested to be informed as to the authority of that order. I was then informed that it was by order of the Commanding Officer of Troops aboard International Train. Further inquiry was made as to the reason of that order. I was then further informed by the Commanding Officer of Troops, that since I was the only American Soldier aboard this train, it would require not less than two or more soldiers of the American Forces to permit the display of the American Colors. Nothing further was said about this matter. Captain Pinteaut, in our conversation, was courteous and in his manner, [illegible] indicated other than a friendly attitude in the matter.

Arrived at Tientsin Central, 1.09 P.M.

At this station there was no evidence of any congestion of traffic. It is believed that the regular train No. 6, for Peking, which left East Station at 11.00 A.M., had the "block" ahead. Everything seemed quiet about the station. There were a few disarmed Wu stragglers and a Chang Tso Lin guard at the station.

Left Central Station at 1.35 P.M.

Arrived at Pei Tsang, at 3.00 P.M.

The line at this point was blocked by the Supply Trains of Chang Tso Lin, 3 in number, which have been at this point for several days, shunting from main tracks to sidings, to permit us to pass. At this point, upon our arrival, were spotted on main track. In immediate vicinity of the station three or four-hundred Chang Tso Lin troops are posted. This number includes those observed on the Supply Trains.

Left Pei Tsang at 3.27 P.M.

S-2

Arrived at Yang Tsun, at 3.45 P.M.

At this point the greater number of Chang Tso Lin's forces were observed. An accurate estimate as to the actual number could not be made, due to the reason that but a few men were seen at the Railroad station, but, it was observed that all of the huts in the immediate vicinity of the station billeted Chang Tso Lin's troops. These troops seemed to be a better type of soldiers than those previously noted in the report.

Left Yang Tsun, at 3.54 P.M.

Arrived at Lao Fa, at 4.30 P.M.

At this point General Feng's troops were first seen. These troops were a clean looking lot of soldiers for Chinese soldiers, alert and apparently well trained, seemingly contented and cheerful.

Left Lao Fa, at 5.32 P.M. The delay at this point was due to the fact that two trains were in the block from the north, one a train of Shensi troops the other a passenger train which left Peking at 11.00 A.M.

Arrived Lang Fang, at 6.00 P.M.

Nothing in particular was noted at this point. The usual station guard of British troops and Feng's men were observed at the station. Further observation could not be made on account of darkness.

Left Lang Fang, at 6.25 P.M.

Arrived Fengtai, at 9.10 P.M.

Here was noted a large concentration of Shensi troops entrained for Honan. "These troops were evacuated from Tungchow, leaving that place without any troops". (Major Kromer's quote).

Left Fengtai, at 9.20 P.M.

Arrived Peking, at 10.30 P.M.

All quiet in Peking. There is considerable feeling against Feng, augmented by his recent act of dispossessing the Emperor. There are strong rumors of trouble among the various Chinese Military Elements in Tientsin, and that Chang Tso Lin's influence predominates the Tientsin Conference.

Left Peking, at 1.20 A.M., November 13, 1924.

There was a delay of forty minutes shortly after leaving the station. I went to sleep and awoke upon our arrival at Pei Tsang, at 6.00 A.M. The same conditions as on the up trip prevailed, the supply trains of Chang Tso Lin spotted on the main track.

Left Pei Tsang, at 7.52 A.M.

At 8.00 A.M., arrived at a point about one half mile outside of Central Station. There was no visible activity at this point to permit the train to enter the station. At 10.30 A.M., I left the train and walked to Central station.

Note: Other than the activities at Fengtai there were no other noticeable military activities along the line. The outstanding feature of the congestion in the vicinity of Central station is the fact that all the tracks were blocked with empty cars, and that there were about 15 Locomotives with steam up and Crews, guarded by Chang Tso Lin's soldiers and but one of these locomotives was in motion while the 12 remained motionless, this condition was noted during one hour of observation.

(sgd): [illegible] Sgt Mtg. M.C

Company "L" Fifteenth Infantry,
American Barracks,

Tientsin, China.
November 12th, 1924.

Subject : Report on International Train Trip, November 6th - 9th Incl.

To : Commanding General, Allied Forces in China, Tientsin, China, (thru channels).

1.- The International Train commanded by me departed from Tientsin East Station 10:36 A. M., November 6th, and returned at 1:30 A. M., November 9th, 1924.

2.- The only appreciable delays were at Tangku and Shan Hai Kwan on the trip to the sea and Chang Kwei Chuang on the return trip. These delays were all due to over congestion of troop trains at those stations or at stations next abead.

3.- The physical condition of the railway and its auxiliary installation is satisfactory.

4.- Open communication from Peking to the sea cannot be assured due to the congestion of troop trains at various points. Points of congestion are shifting daily but the most serious point is at Tientsin.

5.- Copies of all telegrams sent and received are attached hereto.

J. D. Miley,
Capt. 15th. Infantry,
C. O. of Train.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVERS ON ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO SHANHAIKUAN AND RETURN, November 5,1924 to Nov. 6,1924.

To: Intelligence Officer, G-2, U.S.A.Forces in China.

1- Departure of Allied train from Tientsin East Station 10:36 A.M. November 5, 1924.

Allied Detachments consist of:-

U.S.Army Forces:- 2 Officers and 15 enlisted men.

Japanese:- 1 Officer and 19 Enlisted men.

Italian:- 1 Sailor.

French:- 2 enlisted men.

Train consisted of:-

Engines No. 190 and 166.

9 Coaches (U.S.Coach No. 257)

1 Baggage with mail.

1 Gondola with R.R. ties.

1 Box-car with R.R.Coolies and equipment.

There was four more box-cars attached to the train just before we left here these cars are carrying supplies, an engine was also attached to the rear of the train.

Lieut. Gray, F.D. and Sergt. joined train here, enroute to Tangshan.

There are two Fengtien troop trains in the yards here consisting of 1 engine and 35 cars and 1 engine and 34 cars. On the south side of the platform there are armed fengtien Soldiers patrolling the platform.There was no field pieces on either of these trains, these soldiers were of the 4th Army which was previously at Lan Hsien, there is approx 50 head of horses, Cond. good. The Morale of these troops was good, their clothing was a little shabby from long wear.

There is one engine and 40 cars of the north siding with approx 600 Feng troops, their morale is good and they are well equipped and they have sentrys patrolling the north platform, the soldiers of both Armies appear to be very friendly and are standing and talking to each other of the platforms, there is several chinese stoves in operation on the platforms cooking chow for the troops.

2- CHANG KHEI CHUANG:-

Arrived 10:57 A.M.
Departed 11:17 a.m.

Delay due to three westbound troop trains coming here, west bound engine No. 40 with 26 cars passed here with approx 300 Fengtien troops, some of these troops appeared to be Chihli troops which had taken up arms with the Fengtien forces, there was some captured supplies aboard this train, there was six gondolas of dough-balls, these soldiers were well armed and appeared to be in high spirits, there was 50 head of horses and mules on this train cond good.

3- At 11:14 a.m. 400 Chihli troops were marched to this station and disarmed by the Fengtien forces, they all appeared to be very down-hearted, westbound engine No. 243 with 18 cars passed here at 11:14 a.m. there was six gondolas of ammunition and approx. 600 troops all these troops were well armed and their morale was very good. some of them were Chihli captives, 50 head of mules with packs, cond good. there was four longs carts dismanteled on this train. West-bound engine No. 283 with 23 cars passed here at 11:16 a.m. these troops approx 800 with Chihli captives all the Fengtien troops were well armed and seemed to be in high spirits there were no field pieces of any kind aboard this train.

4- CHUN LIANG CHENG:-

Arrived 11:36 a.m.
Departed 11:39 a.m.

There are still two captured Chihli planes lying in the field south of this station. There was four troop trains here loaded with Fengtien troops approx 3000 troops, the armored car manned by the Russians is at this station on the south siding, there is one flat car with two 75s on the armored train. Engine No. 163 with 22 cars on the main line siding with nine 75s with cassions, there was fifteen 75s at this station altogether these troop trains were all non the sidings here, all the troops appeared to be in high spirits, there was approx 200 head of horses and their cond was good, there was approx 100 Russians here and their clothing was in pretty bad condition, all these trains are westbound some of them are carrying supplies.

5- HSINHO:-

Arrived 12:06 p.m.
Departed 12:1o p.m.

Westbound engine No. 218 with 7 cars hauling approx 100 soldiers Body-guards apparently an Officer train, there was ten head of horses cond good on this train. This train departed from here at 12:07 p.m.
West bound engine No. 99 41 cars of supplies, there was thirty head of horses and 50 soldiers as guards on this train.

6- TANGKU:-

Arrived 12:26 p.m.
Departed 3:17 p.m.

Westbound engine No. 216 with 19 cars of supplies, there was 3 coaches of Chinese officers and bodyguards about 50 soldiers as guards. There are 34 cars on the north siding these cars are hauling approx 200 soldiers, there was no field pieces on this train, there was no engine attached to these cars. Westbound engine No. 214 hauling 29 cars with eight 75s and approx 300 soldiers and 100 horses cond good, this train left at 12:45 p.m. West bound engine No. 202 arrived here at 1:02 p.m. with 36 gondolas approx 800 soldiers four 37mm ~~mmm~~, there was fourteen pack mules loaded and 40 other mules with no packs 10 head of horses and ~~km~~ 10 Long carts empty, this train left here at 1:25 p.m. all these troops we5e of the 2nd Fengtien Army. There were no ships in the harber here today and everything appeared to be very quiet with the exception of the immediate troop trains coming and going thru here. At 1:50 p.m. engine No. 408 with 11 box-cars of ammunition and supplies and 12 gondolas and flatcars hauling 13 - 37mm, 4 - 75s, 50 head of mules with packs 12 Long carts and twenty-five head of horses with saddles, there was approx 200 soldiers on this train and as soon as it arrived here it pulled on the north siding. Westbound engine No. 212 arrived here at 1:57 p.m. with nine coaches and four box-cars coaches were carrying officers and bodyguards, box-cars were carrying supplies and approx 100 soldiers as bodyguards this train left here at 2:39 p.m. Engine No. 514 westbound arrived here at 2:53 p.m. with 26 Cars approx 300 soldiers and 100 head of horses and 3 camels there was no field pieces on this train, the horses cond was good. At 3:L9 p.m. on leaving this station we passed engines no. 142 - 608 - 356 and 114 with 100 cars approx 900 soldiers and 200 head of horses these trains were on the south siding in the east yards. Just as we left this station westbound ~~mmmm~~ engine No. 222 pulled in here there was six box-cars 29 gondolas approx 300 horses cond good, four camels 50 long carts 300 soldiers, the soldiers morale was good. All the Fengtien troops which passed thru this station seemed very friendlt toward Foreigners. The cause of our delay at this station was due to the main lines being bloacked with west bound troops trains.

7- FEI TANG:-

Arrived 3:41 p.m.
Departed 3:45 p.m.

When we stopped here engine No. 24 westbound, ~~[illegible]~~ passed thru here without stopping there was six gondolas with troops and horses two trench mortars and one 75, there was approx 200 soldiers and 30 head of horses.

8- CHA TING:-

Arrived 4:04 p.m.
Departed 4:34 p.m.

Delay here due to Fengtien troop train coming west on main line, westbound engine No. 123 with 7 box-cars of supplies and troops and 19 gondolas with approx 150 head of horses cond good, there was 75 long carts and approx 200 soldiers on this train, they did not appear to be very orderly as they were yelling at us when they passed here.

9- HANKU:-

Arrived 4:47 p.m.
Departed 4:56 p.m.

We unloaded "I" company supplies here, there was no troops at this station.

10- LUTAI:-

Arrived 5:22 p.m.
Departed 5:25 p.m.

Westbound engine No. 145 and 227 with troops and supplies the cars were on the main line siding, our train had to go on the round about siding, there was approx 3000 troops here and 100 Russians, there are soldiers halted and camped on both sides of the R.R. these appear to be Cavalry as they have horses picketed near the camps, there was approx 1000 head of horses here. Long carts were being loaded on the cars here. The troops on the trains are riding on top of the cars and inside of them, these troops appear to be very friendly toward us, these soldiers are of the 2nd Fengtien Army and were all well armed ~~xxx~~. 5 Japanese soldiers left the train here with telephone equipment.

11- TIENT CHUANG:-

Arrived 5:38 p.m.
No stop. No troops here.

12- At 5:41 p.m. we passed westbound engine No. 176 with 20 coaches and 9 gondolas of coal. The coaches contained Chinese Officers and bodyguards and a few passengers.

13- TANG FANG:-

Arrived 5:56 p.m.
Departed 5:57 p.m.

No troop activity here.

14- HSUKOCHUANG:-

Arrived 6:13 p.m.
Departed 6:14 p.m.

No troop activity here.

15- TANGSHAN:-

Arrived 6:30p.m.
Departed 7:17 p.m.

Coming into this station we passed twenty-seven cars of supplies on north siding in the west yards there was no engine on these cars. There was six flatcars with 4 scout planes complete and parts of two others and two autos with search lights on them, no engine attached. Everything appeared to be very quiet when we arrived at this station. There is two trains on the north siding being loaded with Long Carts and mules, there are apprex 1000 long carts on the station platform with mules hitched to some of them these carts have been here for about 3 days they came overland to this station and are being loaded on westbound trains. There is approx 300 troops on the platforms here most of them are unarmed, they are unloading the long carts, armed sentrys are still patrolling the platforms and the viaduct, the 5000 neutral Shensi troops are still camped on the north side of town, some of them are assisting the Fengtien troops in unloading the long carts. It is reported that there are posters all over town written in chinese warning the Fengtien troops against looting and molesting the foreigners here. Lt. Gray and Sergt. left train here. We also unloaded supplies for "K" Company. The Fengtien troops here are very well disciplined. Their attitude toward foreigners is friendly.

16- KAI PING:-

Arrived 7:32 p.m.
Departed 7:33 p.m.

No troop activity here.

17- WALI:-

Arrived 7:44 p.m.
Departed 7:45 p.m.

No troop activity here.

18- KUYEH:-

Arrived 8:00 p.m.
Departed 8:08 p.m.

There was eight armed soldiers patrolling the platforms here. The long carts which were here on the previous trips are still here. We unloaded "G" and "F" companies stpplies here. "F" and "G" company men report that everything is O%K% here and that they havent been molested by any of the chinese troop passing here.

19) PEI CHA TIEN:-

Arrived 8:20 p.m.
Departed 8:21 p.m.

No troop activity here.

20- MEICHUANG:-

Arrived 8:40 p.m.
Departed 8:42 p.m.

No troop activity here.

21- TOU TZU TO:-

Arrived 8:57 p.m.
No stop. At this station we passed engine and 13 cars, 11 cars of horses approx 200, 50 soldiers as body guards and two coaches of officers.

22- LAN HSIEN:-

Arrived 9:11 p.m.
Departed 9:25 p.m.

There was approx 200 troops on the platforms here there were several piles of confisicated rifles, bayonets and bandoleers of ammunition on the platform, there was 100 cases of small arms ammunition, 7 - 75s with cassions and 500 long carts dismantled and approx 100 mules and horses picketed on the platforms, there was 30 cars of supplies and 5 cars of long carts of horses, there was no engine attached to these cars. Theix clothing of the soldiers appeared to be in much better condition than the other Fengtien troops which we met before we came to this station.

23- CHUKOCHUANG:-

Arrived 9:35 p.m.
Departed 9:36 p.m.

No troop activity here.

24- SHIHMEN:-

Arrived 9:44 P.M.
Departed 9:45 p.m.

No troop activity here.

25- ANSHAN:-

Arrived 10:01 p.m.
Departed 10:04 p.m.

No troop activity here.

26- HOUFENGTAI:-

Arrived 10:14 p.m.
Departed 10:15 p.m.

No troop activity here.

27- CHANG LI:-

Arrived 10:28 p.m.
Departed 10:36 p.m.

There was fifteen armed soldiers patrolling the platforms here, no other soldiers in sight, our engine took water here.

28- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:-

Arrived 10:49 p.m.
Departed 10:50 p.m.

No troop activity here.

29- LIU SHOU YING:-

Arrived 11:01 p.m.
Departed 11:05 p.m.

No troop activity here.

30- PEI TA HO:-

Arrived 11:24 p.m.
Departed 11:29 p.m.

There was nine Fengtien soldiers patrolling the platform here, Engine No. 537 is on the south siding with 23 empty gondolas and box-cars.

31- NAN TA SSU:-

Arrived 11:45 p.m.
Departed 11:46 p.m.

No troop activity here.

32- At 11:50 p.m. we passed many abandoned long cart alongside of the R.R.

NOVEMBER 6TH 1924.

33- At 12:01 a.m. we stopped ½ mile west of Chinwangtao station at 12:32 a.m. we moved ahead delay due to train ahead of us on main line.

34- CHINWANGTAO:-

Arrived 12:39 a.m.
Departed 1:31 a.m.

Engine no. 208 with 23 cars hauling supplies and mules approx 60 head of mules, there was 50 armed soldiers as guards, this train was on the south siding westbound. There was 7 Coaches and 9 Gondolas on the south sidings also, there was no ~~xxxx~~ engine attached to these cars, there was approx 150 soldiers, the gondolas contained flour. There are seventeen 75s with cassions and thirty-two 37mm on the north platform, these guns are captured guns and their breech blocks have been removed. At 1:26 a.m. we passed over the new spur track near the wreck, the wreck appeared to be untouched.

35- At 3:21 a.m. we passed engines No. 168-102 with thirty-nine cars loaded with approx 150 long carts, approx 200 mules, three gondolas of wood and supplies, there was approx 100 soldiers as guards, this train was westbound.

36- SHAN HAI KUAN:-

Arrived 3:55 a.m.
Departed 9:47 p.m.

On the south siding there was 5 coaches, 3 box-cars and two flat cars, the flat cars carried one auto and three carriages of carrier pigeons, these blonged to the Japanese.

The station platform was decorated up, this was apparently for some officer coming from Mukden. There was a wounded train lying here with 150 wounded and 10 dead, the strecher bearers were carrying these wounded soldiers into the walled city. There was 4 flatcars on the north siding with 5 - 75s and cassions, these guns were camoufladged there was approx 200 rounds of ammunition piled upon the ground near these flat cars and two box cars of ammunition attached to these flat cars. Engine No. 87 with twenty four cars pulled in here at 8:00 a.m. with approx 600 men unarmed, 75 long carts and 100 head of horses this train was westbound. There was three 75s with cassions about 200 yards from the platform on the north side of the R.R. there is an armed sentry guarding them. There is parts of the 27th Div. of the 3rd Army and 1st Division of the 3rd Army at this station.

36-Cont'd.

The Japanese unloaded supplies at this station, there is approx 500 rounds of small arms ammunition piled up inside of the station in boxes.

37- At 10:02 we passed 5 long carts loaded with forage going toward Shanhaikuan, there was 15 armed soldiers as guards.

38- At 10:07 we passed 7 longcarts empty and twenty five armed soldiers going toward Chinwangtao.

39- At 10:08 we passed 75 long carts loaded with supplies going toward Chinwangtao there was 100 soldiers as guards with this Long Cart train.

40) At 10/13 a.m. we passed 14 companies of Fengtien soldiers at drill about ½ mile north of the R.R. they were drilling under arms.

41- At 10:25 a.m. we passed over the new R.R. spur, near the wreck everything went O.K.

42- At 10:30 a.m. we stopped about 800 yards east of Chinwangtao station at 10:42 a.m. we moved up the delay was due to traffic conjestion in the yards.

43- CHINWANGTAO:- Return.

Arrived 11:45 a.m.
Departed 11:54 a.m.

While we were here a Fengtien plane was flying very low over this station. In the east yards there are five box-cars loaded with small arms ammuntion and rifles, these rifles and ammunition are captured goods. On the south siding there are 3 flat cars with the body of a scout plane and two gondolas with approx 100 unarmed troops. Engine No. 174 with two armored steel box-cars 5 coaches and 15 gondolas the coaches were carrying approx 150 armed troops, the gondolas were carrying supplies and R.R. ties this engine was also armored and was westbound. There was 12 burnt gondolas lying on the south siding. All of the 75s and the 37mm are still on the platform here. There was large bundles of uniforms piled on both of the platforms awaiting to shipped away, these are of the Chihli forces. The troop here are mixed some of them are of the 27th Div of the 3Rd army some of the 1st Div of the 3Rd army some 9th Div of the 2nd Army, there morale was very good and they appeared to be in high spirits their clothing was in fair condition and their attitude toward foreigners was friendly. The Prison camp which was here has been taken down but there are many prisoners here yet, they are still being used for laborer work some of the prisoners are being shipped to Mukden, they appear to be very downhearted and their clothing appears to be very shabby.

44- At 11:59 a.m. we passed approx 700 unarmed soldiers on foot going toward Nan Ta ssu, their luggage was thrown across their backs.

45- NAN TA SSU:- return.

Arrived 12:14 p.m.
Departed 12:16 p.m.

No troop activity here.

46) At 12:28 p.m. as we passed section house 67 just west of N.T.S. we passed approx 200 armed troops these troops were in small groups near a little village about ½ mile north of the section house, there was about twenty long carts loaded with supplies with them.

47- At 12: 32 p.m. about ½ mile north of R.R. we passed approx 400 troops in a little village, there was 10 - 75s mounted, approx 100 long carts and 150 head of horses, these soldiers are camped in this village.

48) ½ mile south of Peitaho station there was approx 3000 unarmed soldiers assembled in a box fashion apparently listening to a lecture or attending a ceremony of some kind.

49- At 12:43 p.m. we passed engine No. 356 with 2 gondolas and 2 box cars with approx 150 soldiers, there was 50 Fengtien soldiers aboard as guards.

50- PEI TA HO:- return.

Arrived 12:55 p.m.
Departed 1:01 p.m.

Westbound engine No. 67 with twenty cars of approx 300 unarmed soldiers some of the cars carried supplies. There are approx 200 well armed soldiers in view at this station some of the have the 1st div of the 3rd army insigna and some have just a 5-B on their collars these troops are quartered in the town here.

51- LIU SHOU YING:- return.

Arrived 1:17 p.m.
Departed 1:19 p.m.

On our arrival here there was approx 1000 mounted men passed thru this station, they were all well armed and were headed north west, their horses appeared to be in good condition, these troops were well discipline and all were wearing high canvas boots with leather bottoms, these troops must have been from the 3rd army because they were wearing the black bands on their arms.

52- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 1:33 p.m.
Departed 1:34 p.m.

No troop activity here.

53- CHANG LI:- return.

Arrived 1:45 p.m.
Departed 1:53 p.m.

Our engine took on water here. On the north siding there was 16 box cars of supplies and 2 flatcars with 6 - 75s and 6 cassions, there was no engine on these cars. There is troops quartered in every little compound here, they are either cavalry or artillery there is apprex 100 head of horses in each of these compounds. There was one scout plane and a big bomber lying just wouth west of the station here, these planes belonged to the Chihli forces. The field pieces and the trench mortars have been removed from the R.R. track at the edge of town and the trenches have been covered up. Everything appears to be very quiet here.

54- HOU FENG TAI:- return.

Arrived 2:07 p.m.
Departed 2:09 p.m.

No troop activity here.

55- ANSHAN:- return.

Arrived 2:12 p.m.
Departed 2:18 p.m.

No troop activity here.

56- SHIHMEN:- return.

Arrived 2:34 p.m.
Departed 2:35 p.m.

No troop activity here.

57- At 2:38 p.m. we passed 16 mounted soldiers with loaded long carts going west.

58- CHU KO CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 2:42 p.m.
Departed 2:46 p.m.

No troop activity here.

59- At 2:54 p.m. we passed three Fengtien Scout planes, they had landed on the Han River bed and there was one soldiers guarding them.
Long cart trains are crossing the Han river by barges.

60- At 2:55p.m. we stopped on the bridge over the Han river. Moved ahead at 3:19 p.m. delay due to traffic conjestion at Lan Hsien.

61- LAN HSIEN:- return.

Arrived 3:22 p.m.
Departed 3:39 p.m.

Engine No. 215 was on the north main line with 20 gondolas, 15 Box-cars and 2 coaches with apprex 150 soldiers on the train as guards, there was 280 head of horses and 150 long carts this train was west-bound. There was seven 75s and cassions on the platform last night when we passed here but there are only three here to day. There are only about 500 troops in view here, but there is apparently many more quartered in the town here, all these troops appeared to be well equipped. Many of them are wearing the fur hats now. There was approx 150 empty long carts on the platforms here, the long carts are coming to this station overland and are being loaded on west bound trains. We saw one Russian Officer here and from his dress he was apparently an aviator. There was three trains on the south sidings, they were loaded with rifles, ammunition and supplies, these were captured from the Chihli forces.

62- At 3:47 p.m. we passed a Fengtien plane about ¼ mile south of the R.R.

63- TOU TZU TO:- return.

Arrived 3:50 p.m.
Departed 3:52 p.m.

No troop activity here.

64- LEICHUANG:- return.

Arrived 4:03 p.m.
Departed 4:05 p.m.

No troop activity here.

65- PEI CHA TIEN:- return.

Arrived 4:18 p.m.
Departed 4:22 p.m.

No troop activity here.

66- KUYEH:- return.

Arrived 4:32 p.m.
Departed 4:35 p.m.

There was five armed soldiers patrolling the plaform here.

67- WALI:- return.

ARRIVED 4:46 p.m.
Departed 4:47 p.m.

No troop activity here.

68- KAI PING:- return.

Arrived 4:57 p.m.
Departed 4:58 p.m.

There was 80 long carts coming on the platform all the long carts were loaded with ammunition and little supplies, there was three sacks of forage thrown over the tops of the ammunition. There was about 75 armed soldiers on both platforms, just in rear of the north platform there was apprex 75 more long carts these are also apparently hauling ammunition.

69- TANGSHAN:- return.

Arrived 5:12 p.m.
Departed 6:14 p.m.

On the north siding there are 25 gondolas loaded with horses, long carts and supplies, apprex 200 head of horses, cond good, 75 long carts and apprex 100 armed soldiers as guards, there was no engine on theses cars. Engine No. 227 with 19 gondolas and two box cars on the north siding this train is hauling supplies west bound no soldiers aboard. The long carts which were on the north platform last night are still here. The long carts which were on the sourh platform were taken away some time today the south platform is clear of everything and is swept up clean. The Neutral Shensi troops are still here. The flat cars containing the Aeroplanes and Auto are still here. There is apprex 200 soldiers on both platforms here. Everything has been very quiet around here today.

70- HSU KO CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 6:28 p.m.
Departed 6:32 p.m.

No troop activityhere.

71- TANG FANG:- return.

Arrived 6:50 p.m.
Departed 6:51 p.m.

No troop activity here. The R.R. police are patrolling the platform.

72- TIEN CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 7:08 p.m.
Departed 7:15 p.m.

No troop activity here.

73- LU TAI:- return.

Arrived 7:40 p.m.
Departed 7:48 p.m.

There are no troop trains on the south siding here today, the camp on the south side of the R.R. has been moved away. West bound engine No. 142 with 35 cars and approx 300 troop, 150 head of horses and some supplies, there was no field pices in this train. West bound engine No. 227 with 24 cars with two 75s and cassions approx 200 troops and 100 head of horses, one box-car bontained 3 inch ammunition, these two trains were on the main lines and we had to take the round siding to pass thru this station. There are a feww armed troops patrolling both platforms here. 100 yards north of this station there are about 150 long carts all loaded the contents are unknown, the mules and horses wre picketed near them.

74- HANKU:- return.

Arrived 8:01 p.m.
Departed 10/34 p.m.

Company "I" detachment of 43 men joined train here, there was no native troops here.

75- CHA TING:- return.

Arrived 10:45 p.m.
Departed 10/46 p.m.

No troop activity here.

76- PEI TANG:- return.

Arrived 11:04 p.m.
Departed 11:05 p.m.

no troop activity here.

75- TANG KU: return.

Arrived 11:27 p.m.
Departed 1:56 a.m. November 7th.

Engine No. 4 on the south siding with one coach and two gondolas of pack mules and 16 cars of supplies of forage, there was a few armed soldiers on this train as guards, there was approx 100 mules and 150 soldiers. On the north siding there was 31 cars of supplies, forage and approx 60 mules cond of mules good, there was no engine attached to this train, there was about 50 soldiers as guards. On the south siding there was 21 cars of forage, mules and supplies and a few soldiers as guards, therebwas no engine attached. There was no troop trains at this station when we arrived. Cause of delay here was due to awaiting clear track.

76- HSIN HO:- return.

Arrived 2:15 a.m.
Departed 10:54 a.m.

At 2:25 a.m. eastbound engine No. 105 with twenty empty gondolas passed thru this station. We reed communication from Chun Liang Cheng that the tracks there were blocked with trains. Lt. Snodgrass with 3 U.S. Sentrys, and 1 Japanese sentry , a R.R. Inspector and an Interpreter left here at 8:56 a.m. with the engine, we arrived at Chun Liang Cheng and found 12 box-cars and 14 gondolas, all empties, lying on the main line track about 600 yards west of here, our engine hooked on to them and brought them back to Hsinho and put them on a siding there. Everything seemed very quiet here, there was about two troops of cavalry here and their horses were picketed in rear of the station, about 500 south of here there was 2 captured Chihli planes, there was 12 box cars and 15 gondolas lying on the siding here, these cars were all empties and had no engine attached to them, engine 212 was lying on the south siding here with no cars attached. There was 25 loaded long carts north of this station there were about 75 soldiers near them. We left Chun Liang Cheng at [illegible] a.m. and arrived back at Hsinho at 10:07 a.m. After we came back to Hsinho our engine with the four sentrys went to Tangku for water, the engine left at 10:10 a.m. and return at 10:42 a.m. hooked on our train at 10:44 a.m. Just before we left Hsinho to go to Chun Liang Cheng to get the empty cars eastbound engines No. 506-163-608 and 176 with 26 gondolas and 8 box-cars with apprex 200 head of horses, 150 troops, 75 dismatnled long carts, 10 steers and a few supplies. While we were at Hsinho we reed a report from the American barracks over the K.M.A. private lines that the Native City of Tientsin was being shelled by Sinh artillery we reed this report at 9:24 a.m. The report also stated that General Yang I-teh the Police commissioner has resigned.

77- CHUN LIANG CHENG:- return.

Arrived 11:26 a.m.
Departed 11:32 a.m.

There was 11 cars of supplies and twelve lencarts and 15 head of horses and about 75 soldiers, there was no engine attached to these cars.

78- At 11:55 a.m. we stopped at the block signal just east of Chang Kuei Chuang at 11:59 a.m. we moved ahead. delay due to two engines with no cars on the main line track stalled.

79- CHANG KUEI CHUANG:- return.

Arrived 12:02 p.m.
Departed 1:00 a.m. NOVEMBER 8Th.

79-cont'd.

On the main line siding there was engines No. 149 and 236 with 10 coaches, westbound, this train was the special train of Gneral Yu commanding General of the Fengtien Army. There was 12 empty box-cars, 1 empty gondola and 7 loaded gondolas loaded with coal on the siding just in the rear of the speacial train, there was no engine on these cars. The cause of our delay here was due to the xxx yards at Tientsin East Being blocked with troop trains.

80- TIENTSIN EAST:- return.

Arrived at 1:3o a.m. November 8thx 1924.

The Morale of the U.S.Troops was excellent.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO SHANHAIKUAN AND RETURN.

Charles A Peyton.
Corp. Co. "G" 15th Infantry.

George F. Olmstead.
Pvt. Co. "G" 15th Infantry.

REPORT OF MILITARY OBSERVER
ON "ALLIED TRAIN" TIENTSIN TO PEKING AND RETURN
NOVEMBER 1-2 1924.

Left Tientsin, 10:55 AM November 1st.

Arrived at Yangtsun 1:30 PM. Wu Pei-fu's front line was about 3 miles north of town and approximately 2000 soldiers were observed in trenches firing rifle fire in the direction of Feng Yu-hsiang's front line, 1500 yards north. Feng's artillery was in action and firing on Wu's line. Train arrived at Chang Chuang at 2:40 PM. While train was standing on main track about one mile south of Chang Chuang station, Feng's Infantry fired on it and three shots hit the train, one bullet passing through side of dining car and two shots hit baggage car in which 5 marine guards were riding.

Arrived at Laofa at 3:40 PM. Observed artillery and infantry troops being detrained at station. Also reinforcements moving up to front.

Arrived at Langfang at 4: PM. 25 artillery pieces were observed on dirt road going toward Laofa.

Arrived at Peking at 7: PM.

RETURN TRIP.

Left Peking at 4:10 AM November 2nd.

Arrived at Chang Chuang at 10:30 AM. An interpreter for Feng's forces was on the station platform and approached me and asked that I inform the different allied commanders aboard the train that the report that his men (Feng's troops) had fired on the International train on November 1st, was a mistake; that the firing was done by Wu Pei-fu's troops, who followed the International train from Yangtsun. I informed him that a French Officer was in command of the train and that he should talk with him. The Feng military commander here, also informed the train commander that there were sand bags on the track two miles south of the station, between Chang Chuang and Yangtsun and he requested that the allied train proceed to that point, stop and remove the sand bags, then proceed. This request was discussed for several minutes, when it was decided that the British officer, who with a force of about twenty men, was patrolling that sector take his engine and one coach with a detachment of British soldiers and precede the International train to the point where the sand bags were and move them from the track and that the allied train follow up. This was done and the International train arrived at Yangtsun at 12:10 PM which was found to be occupied by Feng's troops. The station master informed me that the town had been taken by Feng's troops early in the morning; that they had looted every house in the town and had even taken the station clock.

Left Yangtsun at 1:30 PM and arrived at a point about 2 miles north of Peitsand, where a rail had been removed from the track. The rail was replaced in 45 minutes by American, British, French, Japanese military personnel and civilian passengers. The train carried no railway spike pullers, spike hammers or other necessary tools for repairing the track. The train proceeded to a point about 600 yards from Peitsand, where Wu Pei-fu's troops in trenches near station opened up heavy rifle fire on the train. The train immediately stopped and the train engineer refused to proceed, but after a few minutes a soldier was placed on the engine who compelled the engineer to proceed to Peitsand, where through an interpreter, the French train commander asked the Chinese military commander to explain why he had fired on the International Train, which carried flags of the American, Great Britain, French and Japanese nations on front of the engine. He replied that his men could not see the flags, that they thought it was one of Feng's troops trains but that after the train stopped he realized the mistake and immediately had "cease firing" blown. Train left Peitsand at 4:40 PM and arrived at a point one mile north of Tientsin Central station, where it remained (due to traffice congestion) until 9 AM November 3rd, .924.

W.J. Johnson,
Warrant Officer, USA.

Source
G-2, USAFC.
11/3/24

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVER ON ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO SHANHAIKWAN AND RETURN, OCT.30TH to [redacted] NOVEMBER 3RD 1924.

To: Intelligence Officer, G-2, U.S.A.Forces in China.

1- Departure of Allied Train from Tientsin East Station 1:11 P.M. October 30th 1924.

Allied Detachments consist of:-

U.S.Army Forces:- 1 Officer and 12 Enlisted men.

British:- 1 Officer and 12 enlisted men.

French:- 1 Officer and 12 Enlisted men.

Japanese:- 2 Officers and 12 enlisted men.

Train consisted of:-

Engine Number 190.

9 Coaches (U.S.Coach No. 177)

5 Box-cars (2 Flour, 1 "I" Co. Equip. and 2 Supplies)

2 Gondolas (1 empty and 1 with ties)

1 Flat-car (Loaded with rails and hand-car)

Captains Grumbine and Sward and Lt. Stuart joined train here.

"I" Company detachment joined train with supplies enroute to Mukden.(43 Men)

Japanese brought 2 crates of pigeons on board here.

On main line siding is one of the Anti-aircraft guns which were at Shanhaikwan on my first trip there, this gun is still mounted on the Auto Truck and it is still in good condition it is evidently headed for Yang Tsun. There is 11 gondolas of horses and 4 gondolas of long carts on siding here condition of horses poor.

3- At 1:19 P.M. we passed 125 empty gondolas enaiding just east of Tientsin N.R. Yards.

3- CHANG KHEI CHUANG:

Arrived 1:28 P.M.
No Stop.

4- At 1:40 P.M. we passed 7 chinese soldiers in torn clothing walking west toward Chang Khei Chuang some of them had luggage thrown across their back some of them were armed.

5) CHUNG LIANG CHENG:

Arrived 1:43 P.M.
Departed 1:46 P.M.

½ mile south west of this station are 4 scout planes and two bombers they are all set up and ready to fly.
there are 3 gondolas and two box-cars on south siding here these gondolas are carrying parts of areoplanes. There are approx 100 soldiers at this station.

6- 1:46 P.M. Japanese released 3 pigeons.
1:50 P.M. Japanese released 4 pigeons.

7- 2:00 P.M. We are passing many chinese walking alongside of the R.R. some of them have the uniform on and some have only part of the uniform others are dressed in the civilie clothing they all are walking west toward Chung Liang Cheng, they have no equipment or arms.

8- HSIN HO:

Arrived 2:06 P.M.
Departed 3:20 P.M.

Engine No. 356 East bound on siding here with 3 boxcars and 12 armored gondolas there are 3 - 75s mounted in these cars and 4 - Machine guns these guns are all ready for action. there are approx 250 soldiers Infantry and MachineGun and Arty. These men are from the Honan 3rd Division and their morale is Good.
Engine No. 230 with 1 coach and 5 boxcars on south siding, approx 75 soldiers. (Body Guards).
2:58 P.M. Japanese released 2 pigeons.
3:00 P.M. Japanese released 2 pigeons.

9- TANGKU:

Arrived 3:40 P.M.
Departed 5:25 A.M. October 31st.

Engine No. 520 and 18 cars approx 300 troops mixed no arms this is a wounded train.

Engines No. 197, and 138 with 4 boxcars and 14 gondolas approx 150 troops few of these troops have arms. Engine No. 510 with 30 cars approx 500 troops mixed all armed there are two machine guns pointing out of the car door on one of the box-cars. Engine No. 188 with four flat cars with autos and 2 box-cars and 1 gondola approx 100 troops, these troops are riding on top of the cars or any where that they can ride, some of these troops are armed and some are not, they seem to be in very poour xxxxx spirits and they appear to have plenty of supplies and forage but there is very few animals in view. At 11:00 P.M. there was a wounded tr in carrying approx 700 troops passed thru here.

The cause of the delay at this station was due as follows:

The armored train at Main Ho is holding all the traffic up here the Shangsi General in command ( General Li Yu Fung) came up here with a body guard and held a conference with the Foreign Officers here, his statements were that in order to clear the road he would have to leave all the troops train which were stalled outside of Tangku pull in here and if they were General Wu's loyal troops and trains they could go right thru, but if they are the disloyal Shansi troops they would have to pull on a sidding here, the rumor here is that a confliet between the Loyal and disloyal Wu troops is expect to break at any moment, there are approx 15000 troops in and around this station the troops here are of the 52nd(Commanded by General Chin Han Tung) and 26th Shansi Divisions. The road was clear at 11:20 P.M. but no one wanted to leave xxxx except the American Officer, the Japanese Commander did not xxxxx say that he didnt want to leave but he didnt show any effort towards passing the train ahead, the French nationals here wanted the train to stay here until morning so that they could put all the women on a Tientsin bound boat. Nothing happened during our stay here.

10- PEI TANG:

Arrived 5:30 A.M.
No stop.

There approx 200 soldiers on the platform here all are armed and appear ready to board a train which is on the siding.

11- CHA TENG:

Arrived 6:09 A.M.
Departed 6:11 A.M.

No troop activity here.

12) HANKU:

Arrived 6:25 A.M.
Departed 6:53 A.M.

"I" Company Detachment detrained here.
There are 29 armed soldiers on the platform here when the train stopped they went back to the gondolas on our train and was going to get aboard and Lt. Johnson had to put 3 sentrys back there to keep them off the train. At 6:50 A.M. we unhooked box-car containing "I" companys supplies on siding by bridge.

13- LU TAI:

Arrived 7:29 A.M.
Departed 7:32 A.M.

Westbound engine with 9 cars loaded with four 75s and approx 100 head of horses cond good, and approx 150 soldiers Morale good, there are six train s at this station, three of them are empties and the other three have troops and supplies and forage all these trains are west bound, the branches here are infantry with (3 III and 3 II ) on their collars artillery and few cavalry. there are approx 800 troops on these trains with approx 300 head of horses some of the horses from the trains are picketed on the north side of the R.R. Track.

7:40 A.M. we passed 70 long carts loaded some with troops and some with supplies approx 200 mounted men and approx 400 troops dismounted these long carts and troops were headed for Lu Tai.

14- TIENH CHUANG:

Arrived 7:46 A.M.
Departed No stop.

7:55 A.M. we passed 3 scows on canal on north side of R.R. going west with approx 75 soldiers in each scow all of these troops were armed.

15- TANG PANG:

Arrived 7:58 A.M.
Departed 8:00 A.M.

No troop activity here.

8:04 A.M. we passed approx 100 coolies walking west on side of canal these coolies were apparently coming from Tangshan they appeared to be soldiers who had discarded their uniforms, between Tang Pang and Houkouchuang we passed more of these chinese going west with their baggage.

16- KOUKOCHUANG:-

Arrived 8:17 A.M.
Departed 8:23 A.M.

No troop activity here, in the west part of this town there was a building on fire was unable to ascertain the cause.

8:36 A.M. we sighted about 15 mounted soldiers about ¼ mile north of R.R. going toward Tang Shan all were armed.

17- TANGSHAN:

Arrived 8:40 A.M.
Departed 9:40 A.M.

There are only four troop trains here with approx 500 troops there are two Machine guns on the platform. It has been report that Chihli troops have been seen going overland toward Peking from this town there were approx 200 camels loaded left here for Peking sometime yesterday. Orders were issued to the guard that there was an anti-American feeling down the line and that our train may be fired upon we were told not to return the fire unless for our own safety the reason for these cautions were that an American Guard work train was fired upon by Feng Tienk troops. The Japanese Commander has taken full control of this train on account of the friendly feeling between the Japanese and Chang Tso lin our guards were ordered not to stand on the train platform but to remain in the cars. Captain Sward departed from the train here. We unloaded "K" company supplies here.

9:49 A.M. we are passing Chihli outposts, several of these out posts have machine gun emplacements. These outposts are situated on both sides of the R.R. about 1 mile north of Tangshan, many of them are concealed behind chinese graves.

18- KAI PING:

Arrived 9:56 A.M.
Departed 9:58 A.M.

No Troop activity here.

19- WALI:

Arrived 10/10 A.M.
Departed 10:11 A.M.

No Troop activity here.

20- KUYEH:

Arrived 10:35 A.M.
Departed 10:36 A.M.

The long carts which were here on my last trip are still lying idle here by the R.R. track. We unloaded supplies for our detachment here. There are no Chinese troops here. Lt. DePass reports that Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan was taken by Fengtien troops. Capt. Woodbridge Landguage Officer USA narrowly escaped being beheaded by the Fengtien Forces and that his nerves are wrecked and that he is at Tangshan at the present time. A French Officer stationed at this station reports that when C.W.T. was taken all the Chihli troops left by transport, that LanNaien is now occupied by the 2nd Division of the Fengtien 4th Army and that the Fengtien forces are dispersed toward all fesdigmer. The French officer here also reports that the train which was fired upon was a R.R. Coolie work train and now and American Guard train.

21- LEICHUANG:

Arrived 11:07 A.M.
Departed 11:09 A.M.

No troop activity here.

22- At 11:11 A.M. we passed approx 100 Fengtien troops marching toward Leichuang they were all armed.

23- At 11:14 A.M. we passed approx 500 more Fengtien troops they all seemed to be very well equiped and they seem to be in high spirits. These troops are dressed the same as the Chihli forces except that they have little black bands with white circles on their arms instead of the red band like the Chihli forces have. One of these soldiers was carrying a red flag with the number 11 on it, all these troop are marching toward Leichuang they have pack mules with them. Their morale was very good and their clothing was in good shape.

24- At 11:29 A.M. we were stopped by an armed guard of Fengtien troops they are standing on a high embankment on each side of the train and have their rifles pointed towards our train a few of them have hand grenades in their hands all ready to threw, about 500 yards on the north side of the R.R. is a MG emplacement which is trained on the R.R. there were approx one thousand soldiers on the ridges on both sides of the R.R the colonel who is in command of these troops wanted to search our train to see if we had any of the Chihli troops but after he was assured that there were no Chihli troops on our train he consented to let us pass he put an armed guard on the front of the engine to insure our saftey in entering To Tzu Tou.

25- At 11:35 we are moving forward. The morale of these men seemed very good and their clothing was in good condition their shoes seemed to be new and are made of felt, they are high shoes. The ridges where the troops we at are three miles north of Leichuang and he has men strung all along the top of them.

26- TO TZU TOU:

Arrived 11:43 A.M.
Departed 12:02 P.M.

There are approx. 1000 soldiers in this town and they are quarted in dobe shacks.

27- At 12:11 P.M. Passed one of Chang's planes on the south side of the R.R. it was hidden from observation by a clump of trees.

28) LAN HSIN:

Arrived 12:20 P.M.
Departed 1:23 P.M.

In coming into this station we passed many Russians which are in the Fengtien forces, we received the report here that the 2nd Fengtien Army is occupying this place. There are approx 800 troops on the patform here with their rifles stacked. there are 2-75s on the platform here, this station appeared to be in a wreck, engine No. 345 is a complete wreck. The 2nd Army here is commanded by General ~~Chang~~ Chang Chung Cheng. We were unable to find out how many russians there was here, but the ones that are here are handling Machine guns and artillery guns, one Russian soldierx says that Chang has one regiment of Russians Commanded by a Russian General, these russians are paid twenty dollars per month. Their clothing and bodily appearance seems to be much worse than the chinese.

28- Cont'd.

The report about Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao being taken was confirmed by this russian, there is one russian red cross nurse at this station and a hospital dressing station. I saw four of the machine rifles here and they appeared to be new, the morale of these troops here is very good and they seem to be in excellent spirits, their horses seem to be well fed, the mens clothing is a little shabby from long wearing, the rifles are pretty well scratched up from long service. These rifles are the Spandau Rifle Model 1890 and their bayonets are the Japanese style, they are very well disciplined, when ever Lt. Johnson passed an armed sentry he was slatted by the present arms. The General here said that the road was clear bo he would not vouch for our safety in passing some of the lines. The attitude of these troops towards all foreigners is friendly. The Generals Headquarters was guarded by a double row of sentrys and when Lt. Johnson went into headquarters they all came to the present arms, very few of the russians here carried any riples or pistols, some of them carried knives stuck in the tops of their leggins, all of the chinese here who didnt have a rifle carried a pistol, the Fengtien Forces here captured 375 long carts and 57 head of horses, General Chang Chung Cheng met and shook hands with all the foreign officers on our train.

29- CHOU KO CHUANG:

Arrived 1:32 P.M.
Departed 1:35 P.M.

No Troop activity here.

30- SHIH MEN:

Arrived 1:42 P.M.
Departed 1:44 P.M.

No Troop activity here.

31- At 2:00 P.M. we passed some fIat cars carrying 6 areoplanes and parts of two others, there were two big autos which had search lights mounted on them. These planes were just recently captured by the Fengtien forces.

32- At 3:02 P.M. we stopped just west of Anshan at 3:09 P.M. we moved head, delay due to troop train ahead of us.

32- ANSHAN:

Arrived 3:11 P.M.
Departed 3:19 P.M.

33-Cont'd.

It has been reported that Chang has 10000 prisoners of Wu's and in the yards here are three troop trains loaded with prisoners apprex 4000 and some cars of supplies, there are apprex 2000 Fengtien troops here and also a few russians.

33- At 3:20 P.M. we passed Changs lines, the trenches are well manned there are no field pieces are in view. ~~xx~~ There is a Pagoda about ¼ mile north of here is occupyed by Fengtien troops apprex 300, unable to see is there were any field pieces.

34- At 3:22 P.M. we passed several cars on the main siding one of these cars was burning, it was reported that this car contained small arms ammunition. On the siding here there engines No. 142 - 27 - 143 - 140 and 40 with sixty cars apprex 400 prisoners and some supplies. Engine No. 514 with twenty cars on siding apprex 300 prisoners, engine no. 233 on main siding with apprex 1000 prisoners 6o cars some with supplies.

35- At 3:35 P.M. stopped at HouFengtai Cabin No. 1, delay due to rails being spread, it seems that there was a derailment here and when the car or engine went off the track it spread the rails, we immediate put our R.R. coolies to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ work and soon had the track repaired. After the track was repaired our engine went ahead to HouFengTai to moved some empty cars from the main track to a siding so that we could get thru. At 4:30 P.M. we moved ahead.

36- HOU FENG TAI:

Arrived 4:33 P.M.
Departed 4:55 P.M.

The R.R. Coolies on our train attempted to loot some box cars here that were loaded with flour, they carried several sacks in the car and had them hidden all over the car.

38- CHANG LI:

Arrived 5:15 p.m.
Departed 5:55 P.M.

on entering this town we passed some more of changs trenches which were on both sides of the R.R. there were 4-75s and two trench mortars trained on the R.R. and there was apprex 1500 soldiers in the trenches here, the guns were on the north sid3 of the R.R. and were pointed both ways East and west. As soon as we stopped all the soldiers in the trenches assembled and came back in town all these men were well armed and were very well

37- Cont'd.

disciplined and their morale was very good. . The troops here are under the command of General Ting started to arrived here at 3:00 P.M. this afternoon (Oct 31st) in small detachments at a time.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS GIVEN ME BY DOCTOR HUBBARD OF THE CHINESE RED CROSS.

Early this morning part of the 14th Brigade of Chihli retreated from Shihmenshai and some thru Chang Li, moving southward overland toward Lao Ting they said that they had orders from Peking to proceed to Lao Ting and await further orders there. There were approx 2000 troops in this bunch and they did not loot in passing thru here, they were very orderly when they passed thru here, their attitude toward foreigners was friendly. most of these men were without arms and they [illegible] abandoned several of their 75s here and left a large pile of ammunition stacked up here, this ammunition is still here, very few of them had any luggage or equipment, they had discarded all of this on their retreat. At Fu Ning the 23rd Brigade retreated overland toward this town and went overland south toward Lao Ting, they did not loot either. Most of these troops seemed very downhearted and appeared very glad to get away from the [illegible] scenes of war. At Titsuying there were three brigades which disbanded and fled to the Hills in Jehol it is uncertain as to whether they turned bandits or not.

38- The areoplanes which were here on my last tripp have been confiscated by the Fengtien Forces there is one big plane here now lying about 4 mile south of R.R. it is a Chihli plane. The Fengtien troops here appear to me be very friendly toward foreigners and appear to be much better trained that any of the chinese troops that I have ever saw. They are also very well eqhipped and their small arms and 75s appear to very in very good condition the stokes mortars are pratically new and appear to be American made, it doesnt appear that the Fengtien troops want any of the Chihli supplies as they have been touching any of them.

39) CHANG CHIA CHUANG:

Arrived 6:15 P.M.
Departed 6:18 P.M.

It was too dark to see any thing at this station.

40- LIU SHOU YING:

Arrived 7:36 P.M.
Departed 7:38 P.M.

No troop activity here.

41- At 7:25 P.M. we were stopped by an armed guard at the Pei Ta Ho signal tower after they found out who we were they let us go thru, some of these men started at get on the train but were stopped.

42- PEI TA HO:

Arrived 7:32 P.M.
Departed 8:55 P.M.

As soon as we arrived here some of the Fengtien troops boarded the engine and wanted to go thru our cars, some of them carried their pistols in their hands with the hammers cocked. The General Commanding the Fengtien troops here was bent on searching our train and after much talking the Foreign Officers agreed to let him look in the cars by himself, after he looked in the Japanese Troop car he didnt go any further and was satisfied that there were no Chihli troops on the train while he was in the train his body guard was very anxious to come on the train with him but they were stopped at the steps of the car, one of them with a pistol which was cocked came up and shoved it into the stomach of one of the U.S.Guards and commanded that he be admitted, but the sentry shoved his bayonets toward the soldier blocking the step, the General hearing the argument came out and made his troops step back away from the car step. The real reason of the General wanting to look thru our train was that the Japanese Officer if command of the train jumped off with two men before we stopped here and went over to the Chinese Barracks.## (I was unable to find out what his mission was in going to the Japanese Barracks) The General wanted to know why this Japanese Officer went over there, there was never any explanation made on account of the arguing against the officers and the General. Lt. Johnson told the interpreter to tell the General to inform his men never to point their pistols or rifles at an American again. The General Said that he would Phone to Nan Ta Sou and tell them that we were coming down and that we were O.K. Another cause of our delay was due to no lights in the troop coaches the General said that we would have to have lights put in them because we might be fired upon at any time. The Fengtien troops here are all armed and are walking around the platform as if they were awaiting a signal to start something, their pistols are carried out of the holsters and they appear to ready for use at any time. When we first arrived here there was a shot fired some where off to the right of our train, was unable to find out what the shot was fired for, it may have been a signal of some sort. There was no communication between here and Nan Ta Sou. We are moving forward at our own risk. Two more guards have been put on the engine, it is thought that we might be fired upon on our trip to Nan Ta Sou.

43- At 9:00 P.M. we are just barely moving.

44- HAN TA HSU:

Arrived 9:21 P.M.
Departed 9:32 P.M.

The R.R. Station here has been wrecked and there isnt any station master here, the telephone and telegraph communications have been cut here. There were no troops at this station.

45) CHIN WANG TAO:

Arrived 10:00 P.M. Oct 31st
Departed 1:37 P.M. Nov 2nd.

We were not molested in any way on our trip to this station there doesnt appear to be any soldiers here, there are many idle trains lying in the yards here, when we arrived here there were no soldiers of any kind to stop or meet the train.

NOVEMBER 1ST 1924.

Chinwangtao is now occupied by the 27th Division of the 1st Fengtien Army, these troops began to come here at 1:30 P.M. yesterday Oct 31st there was a small battle when the Chihli troops retreated to the sea, those who did not get on the transports were taken prisoners, the prisoners here are cleaning up the place and are hauling supplies from the platforms to some cars, most of the trains here are lying dead in the yards some of them are loaded with supplies, six of the cars have been burnt up, there are some gondolas here that have 3 scout planes of Wu's on them. Since 8:00 A.M. there has been shots fired occassionally from all over the yards here, the reason of these shots are that the Fengtien troops who have confisicated the Chihli rifles are testing them to see if they are serviceable. One mile east of this station there are two wrecked engines and they are part of the troop trains, there was approx 40 killed and several wounded the rest of the Chihli troops which were on the trains fled to the sea, the wreck was caused by a rail being pulled up from the inner rail, there were two engines going the same way and when the engine on the north track hit the broken place it derailed and pushed the other eggine over, there is equipment of all sorts lying all over there are many rifles and field pieces and machine guns on the ground here near the wreck. While we were in C.W.T. the Civil Governor of Kirin and Marshal Chang's son came into the station, the first evidence of their arrival was a body guard of Mukden Soldiers who came on the platform with their pistols drawn and their rifles all ready to fire after they found out who we were they became friendly toward us and started to talk to us. The Morale of the troops

45- Cont'd.

at this place is excellent they are very well equipped and clothed There is a prison camp on the east side of S C.W.T. about 75 yards north of R.R. the prisoners are being used for labor work. It has been reported that the prisoners number to about 30000, there has been 15000 prisoners sent to Mukden.

NOVEMBER 2ND 1924.

There has been no field pieces in view at this station, this morning the soldiers had a number of coolies policing up the R.R. yards and the place is beginning to look clean and orderly at 2:11 P.M. we passed over the new spur which was built around the wreck near here.

46- At 2:15 P.M. we passed one of the Chihli captured planes about 500 yards east pf the wreck, from the place of the wreck to approx 1 mile east of there there are all kinds of hats, stoves, papers and many other kinds of equipment thrown all over the field by the troops from the trains which was wrecked.

On our way to Shanhaikuan we passed many Fengtien troops working in the fields here.

47- SHANHAIKUAN:

Arrived 2:45 P.M.
Departed 8:05P.M.

In coming into the yards here we passed an armored train of Chang's the engine was armored and the box cars had small loop holes cut in the sides , on coming to the station there was apprex 150 soldiers on the platform armed with pistols and spears, their spear are made of small tree limbs with a knive blade stuck in it, as soon as we arrived at the station they departed to the city. I went into the walled city and everything seemed to be very quietb there, there are several long carts hauling forage and supplies in and out of the city, there is a sentry patrolling around a pagoda on the city wall. I went on top of the Great Wall and saw a regiment of Fengtien Artillery camped apprex ½ miles north east of 1st Pagoda there seems to be very little activity around the camp. On coming back to the train there was 3 companies of Infantry ready to march toward C.W.T. they had their full field eqiyment and arms. In the North Yards here are 5- 75s these were captured, their condition is good. At 4:50 P.M. a west bound train pulled out of the yards with three 75s, six cassions and many coils of barb wire and two areplane motors on this train. This place is practically the same as it was on my last tripp up here. There has been no looting here by the Fengtien troops at C.W.T. or this place. The troops here are very well disciplined. This place is much more dirteir than C.W.T. but it appears that they are beginning to ploice it up. There are several supply trains lying in the yards here they were left here when the Chihli troops retreated.

48- at 8/45 P.M. we passed over the new spur track on return trip.

RETURN TRIP

49- CHINWANGTAO:

Arrived 8:49 P.M.
Departed 9:0[illegible] P.M.

The platforms here are practicallly clear of all refuse, there are 25 head of horse all saddled and one tent with eight men occupying it. On the north side of the platform there are stacks of Chihli uniforms these clothing are being loaded on long carts and being sent to S.H.K. all the captured supply cars are being cleaned up and put in order, everything very quiet, one supply train of 35 cars on north siding awaiting to proceed west.

50- NAN TA SSU:

Arrived 9:29 P.M.
Departed 9:30 P.M.

The lines of communications have been fixed and the station master has come back from his hiding place, there are no trains or troop here.

51- PEI TA HO:

Arrived 9:45 P.M.
Departed 9:54 P.M.

There are a few armed troops still patrolling the platforms here, one engine and four coaches on south siding. Our engine took on water here.

52- LIU SHOU YING:

Arrived 10:12 P.M.
Departed 10:16 P.M.

No troop activity here, there are four box cars on siding the contents are unknown.

53- CHANG CHIA CHUANG:

Arrived 10:34 P.M
departed 10:35 P.M.

we enetered this place very cautiously, reason unknown, there doesnt appear to be any troop activity here, there were no troops on the plaforms when we arrived.

54- CHANG LI:

Arrived 10:50 P.M.
Departed 10/53 P.M.

The platform here is still patrolled by armed troops there are 15 gondolas of supplies on south siding no engine. On north siding there are apprex 35 cars of supplies no engine. The field pieces controlling the R.R. are still mounted .

55- HOU FENG TAI:

Arrived 11:10 P.M.
Departed 11:12 P.M.

There are still several cars of supplies on the south siding these cars were here when we passed thru here on our up trip. there seems to be no troops here.

56- ANSHAN:

Arrived 11:27 P.M.
Departed 11:35 P.M.

There were only eight armed tropps on the platform here. There has been no changes made here since our up trip. Our engine took on water here. A Chinese soldier was very insistent about riding on our train our guard had to chase him off at the point of a bayonet.

57- SHIHMEN:

Arrived 11:57 P.M. November 2nd
Departed 12:30 a.m. November 3rd

No troop activity here. Awaiting train orders.

58) CHOU KO CHUANG:

Arrived 1:00 a.m.
Departed 1:55 a.m.

delay due to awaiting train orders. There was one east bound troop train on siding here. There was 4 aeroplanes and two search lights mounted on autos on the train here.

59- At 2:25 a.m. we passed 5- 75s on train of twenty empty gondolas west bound apprex 15 soldiers aboards as guards.

60- LAN HSIEN:-

Arrived 2:37 A.M.
Departed 6:08 A.M.

Everything seems to be the same as it was when we passed thru here on our up trip. The station platforms are covered with ma: refuse of all descriptions, there are several trains lying here in the yards some of them are carrying supplies some of them are just empties, there are large quantities of supplies plied upon the platforms here, they all appear to be untouched. There are a few armed troops patrolling the platforms. There are four trains being held up here until daylight, the report is that these trains are being held up to take General Chang Chung Cheng and his headquarters to Tangshan. The R.R. Police have been put back on duty at the R.R. station here.

61- TO TZU TOU:-

Arrived 6:30 a.m.
Departed 6:31 a.m.

No troop activity here, the ridges which were occupyied by troops on ~~xxxx~~ our up trip appear to be deserted. They have all advanced west toward Tangshan.

62- LEICHUANG:-

Arrived 6:43 A.M.
departed 6:44 a.m.

No troop activity here.

63- PEI CHIA TIEN:

Arrived 6:55 a.m.
departed 6/57 a.m.

No troop activity here.

64- KUYEH:

Arrived 7:08 a.m.
Departed 7:09 a.m.

No troop activity here.

65- WALI:

Arrived 7:26 a.m.
Departed 7:27 a.m.

No troop activity here.

66- KAI PING:

Arrived 7:38 A.M.
Departed 7:41 a.m.

About one mile east of this station there was approx 200 long carts loaded with supplies coming toward this station there was approx 500 soldiers with this train all armed, there were about 75 soldiers at this station some of them were armed and some were not, the soldiers are in charge of the signal tower of this station.

67- TANGSHAN:

Arrived at 7:54 a.m.
Departed 8:47 a.m.

Tangshan fell at 1:30 p.m. yesterday, the Shensi troops here revolted and started to fight amongst themselves there was quiet a fight here many were killed and wounded, Fengtien troops arrived last night and had no trouble whatsoever in taking the town, the Shensi troops looted the town and tore everything up in general, there are approx 4000 Shensi troops here now some of them have been disarmed others are still walking about with the red bands and have their rifles with them, all the Shensi troops here are neutral and have a camp on the north side of town, they are carrying supplies away from the depot to their camp. There was two trains of Chihli equipment looted by the Shensi troops, the station here is shot up quiet a bit, there are bullet holes in the iron rail on the viaduct. There is an armored gondola here manned by russian soldiers of the Fengtien forces, they have one 75 and 3 machine ~~xx~~ guns on it. The first Fengtien troops to arrive here were four officers and after they came small detachment began to come in, they have been coming in almight long. The armored train here is the advance guard for the Fengtien troops they have been running up and line from here to Kouhochuang and back, the Fengtien troops have not looted anything here and they seem very well disciplined. There is one dead Shensi soldiers lying on the R.R. track here. The station platform is covered with straw and all kinds of refuse which was left after the fight between the Shensi troops. Captains Sward and Woodbridge joined train here.

68- KSUKOCHUANG:-

Arrived 9:02 a.m.
Departed 9:03 a.m.

There are several armed shensi troops here. ~~xxxx

69- At 9:15 a.m. we passed 16 armed soldiers marching toward Tang Pang they were apprex 400 yards south of the R.R.

70- At 9:18 we passed 15 unarmed Chihli troops going toard Tang Pang they were carrying their luggage with them.

71- At 9:24 a.m. we passed two armed parties apprex 300 yards yards south of R.R. going toward Hsukochuang.

72- TANG PANG:

Arrived 9:25 a.m.
Departed 9:33 a.m.

No troop activity here.

73) TIEN CHUANG:

Arrived 9:49 a.m.
Departed 9:52 a.m.

No troop activity here.

74- at 10:00 A.M. we stopped at bridge no. 21 and went ahead to see if any damage was done to the bridge, the reason of this was because of the reportb that we received at Tient Chuang that the track was torn up, there was nothing worng with the track or bridge, at 10:07 a.m. we moved ahead.

75) at 10/21 a.m. we passed 45 long carts loaded with supplies and soldiers going west there were apprex 300 armed soldiers in this long cart train.

76- at 10:25 a.m. we were stopped because of rail being taken up one milesast of Lu tai, there was one section of the rail taken up and thrown down the embankment. at 10:36 a.m. mail all fixed we moved ahead.

77- We passed Wu's rear Guard lines there were very few soldiers in the dug outs.

78- At 10:45 a.m. stopped about 700 yards east of Lu Tai delay due to traffic conjestion in the yards. there are four troop trains in the yards here with apprex 2000 ChiIhli troop, approx 400 head of horses no field pieces on these trains, the 13th Division is here General Lu and Chen commanding this division, these men are the rear guards of Wu's retreating troops and are headed for Tangku. The morale of these men if fair. On the north side of the staion ther are 14 cassions but no guns are in view.

Sh

78- at 11:31 we moved ahead to Lu Tai.

80- LU TAI:

Arrived at 11:35 a.m.
departed 11:36 a.m.
There are 100 cars and 4 engines here.

81- at 11:45 a.m. we passed a mounted patrol of 27 men. they were going parlell with the RgR.

82- HANKW:

Arrived 11:59 a.m.
Departed 12:01 p.m.

There were approx 300 soldiers marching west overland about 300 yards south of this station they were all armed.

83- at 12:15 P.M. stopped by "I" company detachment and unloaded 3 bales of barb wire which we got at Tangshan. Capt. Cronkhite reports that the Chihli troops are retreating southwest crossing the river there by boats. nothing unusual has happened here. Departed from there at 12:34 p.m.

84- CHA TING:-

Arrived 12/41 p.m.
departed 12/42 p.m.

No troops here.

85- at 1:03 P.M. we stopped ½ mile west of Pei Tang delay due to west bound troop train ahead of us. moved ahead at 1:10 p.m.

86- PEI TANG:

Arrived 1:12 p.m.
departed 1:15 p.m.
No troops here.

87- There has been two troop trians following us since we left Lutai.

88- At 1:45 p.m. we stopped just east of Tangku delay due to troop trinas on main line in Tang Ku.

88- TANKU:

Arrived 4:00 p.m.
departed 4:15 p.m.

There has been 22 transport coming and going from this place since October 30th the boats have been coming from C.W.T. with troops, when the Chihli troops retreated from C.W.T. they boarded transports in the harbor and came here. The 13th Didvision which was at Lutai disbanded here upon arrival, the General commaning them General Chan, asked Lt. Johnson if he could go to Tientsin with us, he said that he would discard his uniform and don civilian clothing this was said after he had heard about Marshal Wu Pheeing. Marshal Wu left here by boat at 4:30 p.m. yesterday afternoon. This place was looted by the disbanding Shensi troops which were here when we passed thru on our up trip, the platform is covered with refuse which was discarded by the disbanding troops There are 7 Chinese Transports here now 3 of them are being loaded with troops the troop trains which came here with us are practically the last of the Chihli troops below here , except the Shensi troops at Tangshn who are netrual.

89- HSINHO:-

Arrived 4:24 p.m.
departed 4:26 p.m.

No troops here.

90- CHUNG LIANG CHENG:

Arrived 4:44 P.M.
Departed 4:56 p.m.

There are approx 200 troops at thss station, there is one company of infantry on south platform here, these troops are armed and seem ready to move out. at 4:53 p.m. this company of infantry moved out to the southall armed. they had 7 long carts loaded with luggage and supplies. The five planes are still lying here.

91- CHANG KUEI CHUANG:-

Arrived 5:12 p.m.
departed 5:16 p.m.

No troops here.

92- At 6:35 p.m. we stopped about one mile east of Tientsin east station on account of troopx trains ahead of us, the engines of the troop trains were dead and the soldiers were leaving the trains with their luggage and arms and starting to

92 - Cont'd.

Walk toward Tientsin. Most of the Detachment commanders left the train and had their detachments come in by foot.

The report is that the train arrived at Tientsin East at 6:00 P.M. November 4th.

The morale of the U.S.Troops was excellent.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN TO SHANHAIKWAN AND RETURN.

Charles A Peyton
Corp. Co. "G" 15th Infantry.

Sheet No. 21.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVER ON ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO PEKING, OCTOBER 29TH to OCT. 30TH 1924.

To: Intelligence Officer, G-2, U.S.A.Forces in China.

1- Departure of Allied Train from Tientsin East Station 12:04 P.M. October 29th 1924.

Allied Detachments consist of:-

U.S.Army Forces:- 1 Officer, 12 Enlisted men.

British:- 1 Officer, 12 Enlisted men.

French:- 1 Officer, 12 Enlisted men.

Japanese:- 2 Officers, 12 Enlisted men.

Train consisted of:-

Engine No. 190.

9 Coaches. (U.S.Coach No.137)

3 Box-cars. (1 with R.R.Equipment, other 2 with supplies)

2 Gondolas. (1 with ties, other empty.)

1 Flat-car. (Loaded with rails and hand-car.)

2- Lt. Colonel Barnes joined our train here.
There are 5 troop trains and apprex. 1200 Troops in the yards here, some of them have been here for two days.

3- There are still 42 armed soldiers with fixed bayonets patrolling the R.R. east of Tientsin Central.

4- 12:20 P.M. Stopped.
1:00 P.M. Moved ahead (Delay due to traffic jam at Tientsin Central.

Sheet No.1

5- TIENTSIN CENTRAL:-

Arrived 1:04 P.M.
Departed 1:30 P.M.

Conditions at this station are the same, there are 13 troop trains in the yards here and some of them have been here from two to three days.

Delay at this station was due to troop train on main line the Japanese Commander wanted to pass on the track according to regulations, the track on the north side was cleared for us, but the Japanese Officer did not want to run on that track and made the officials there clear the right track.

6- PEI TSANG:-

Arrived 1:47 P.M.
Departed 1:50 P.M.

No change at this station.

7- YANG TSUN:-

Arrived 2:10 P.M.
Departed 2:27 P.M.

There are 4 Vickers Machine Guns, Mounted, on the platform at this station the conditions of these guns are good. There are 200 soldiers on this platform, they are armed and have their luggage and extra bandoleers of ammunition with them. The Field pieces are still in view on the dyke on the South of the R.R. and soldiers can still be seen hanging around these guns. On the North platform there are 4- 75s dismounted, cond. good. There are 3 troop trains here with approx 1400 soldiers mixed morale Fair and condition of clothing is fair, most of these soldiers appear to have plenty of money some of them are flashing silver dollars. There are only 85 head of horses in view here now. The soldiers are of the 22nd and 26th Divisions.

In passing the trenches soldiers can bee seen working around them completing these trenches by making embankments in from of the trenches with little places for the rifles to fit in when they go into action.

8- CHANG CHIANG:-

Arrived 2:45 P.M.
Departed 2:47 P.M.

The station platform here is patrolled by armed soldiers with fixed bayonets. These are the only troops in sight here.

9-

2:50 P.M. we passed Wu's front lines and many soldiers can be seen at work completing his trenches they are throwing embankments up in front of the trenches.

10- 2:52 P.M. The Japanese released 3 carrier pigeons.

11- LAO PA:-

Arrived 3:02 P.M.
Departed 3:21 P.M.

Conditions are unchanged at this station, there are no troops at this station except the British Detachment which is stationed here.

3:03 P.M. The Japanese released 3 pigeons.
3:05 P.M. The Japanese released 3 pigeons.
3:06 P.M. The Japanese released 3 pigeons.
3:10 P.M. The Japanese released 6 pigeons from the left side of the train.
3:15 P.M. The Japanese released 6 more pigeons.
The British unloaded supplies for their detachment here.

12- 3:27 P.M. we passed 12 mounted soldiers of General Feng these soldiers were headed toward Lao Pa.

13- 3:36 P.M. we passed 66 Soldiers (Infty) advancing in a column of twos toward Lao Pa, they we all armed and carried extra bandoleers of ammunition.

14- 3:40 P.M. we passed 320 more soldiers (Infty) advancing toward Lao Pa. They were all armed.

15- 3:42 P.M. we came in sight of General Feng's front lines and in front of them are approx 4000 soldiers (Infty) waiting for the orders to move out toward Lao Pa. There are 150 head of camels and 100 Long Carts loaded with supplies and ammn.

16- 3:45 P.M. stopped ½ mile east of Lang Fang and there are 4 regiments of Infantry halted on both sides of the R.R. one battery of light field artillery, the pack mules with the battery are all loaded with ammunition. Most of the Infantry soldiers are carrying these long knives used for close fighting slung across their backs. Each company appears to have about 4 automatic rifles, one of these companies are armed with rifles and pistols beside the knives. These troops started to move out toward Lao Pa at 3:50P.M. by Battalions. The morale of these soldiers appears to be good and they appear to be very well disciplined, condition of clothing is good.

17- LANG FANG:-

Arrived 4:04 P.M.
Departed 4:08 P.M.

It appears that General Feng has moved all his troops from Fengtai up to this station and established his main camp here. There are approx 8000 soldiers (Mixed) camped on the north side of the station soldiers can be seen pitching tents and there are many tents which have been pitched already, there are approx 2000 head of horses around this camp, the morale of the soldiers is good and the condition of the horses is good. It has been reported that the cavalry and artillery here are Feng's own troops and the infantry others are Shensi troops. There are 5 trains in the yards here 3 of them are loaded with troops and supplies and the other two are empty they have just recently been unloaded.

18- 4:21 P.M. we passed 40 long carts loaded with soldiers and supplies going to Lang Fang.

19- WAN CHUANG:-

Arrived 4:24 P.M.
Departed 4:26 P.M.

There are 30 gondolas and 5 flat-cars on the siding here, no engine. There are 10-75s on the flat-cars, 13 of the gondolas are loaded with 130 camels and there approx. 250 soldiers (Infty and Arty) on this train.

20- AN TING:-

Arrived 4:40 P.M.
Departed 4:43 P.M.

West-bound engine and 16 box-cars and 18 gondolas these cars are carrying: Troops, horses and camels, there are approx 150 soldiers 400 head of Horses cond. good and 30 camels.

21- WEI SHAN CHUANG:-

Arrived 4:55 P.M.
Departed 4:56 P.M.

West-bound engine with 11 box-cars and 14 gondolas there are approx- 300 soldiers mixed, (INfty mainly, little Arty and Engineers) their morale is good, 20 head of Horses, cond good, and 4 long carts.

22- HUANG TSUN:-

Arrived 5:07 P.M.
Departed 5:09 P.M.

No troop activity here.

23- HUANG TU PO:-

Arrived 5:20 P.M.
Departed 5:22 P.M.

No troop activity here.

24- FENG TAI:-

Arrived 5:33 P.M.
Departed 5:45 P.M.

Everything here seems to be very quiet, there are no troop trains in the yards here, there only about 100 soldiers here and there are no armed troops in sight. There are 3 engines (Dead) with 100 box-cars (All empties) and 40 gondolas some loaded with matting covering over them, unable to ascertain their contents. On the outskirts of this station there are 18 pyramids tents with about 100 soldiers occupying them and 75 head of horses picketed near them.

25- YUNG TING MEN:-

Arrived 6:00 P.M.
Departed 6:21 P.M.

There are 10 gondolas on siding here (No engine) loaded with sacks of rice and bran. There are 14 armed soldiers with packs on the platform. Delay here due to awaiting train orders.

26- 6:30 P.M. we were stopped by an armed guard and we had to show our authority to enter the Great Wall Gate. 6:47 P.M. we moved ahead.

27- YUNG PIEN MEN:-

Arrived 6:56 P.M.

No Stop.

29- PEKING:-

Arrived 7:08 P.M.
Departed 11:25 P.M.

There are no armed soldiers patrolling the platform this time, but at the end of the platform there is an armed guard of 6 men patrolling with fixed bayonets. At 8:00 P.M. I went into the city and saw a number of camels in the park by the French Depot, these camels arousing my curiosity I went over there and found out there were there were approx 150 camels all loaded with supplies and approx 2000 soldiers mixed camped there, there were 7-75s all mounted for actions with packs mules loaded with ammunition standing right behind the guns. At 8:30 P.M. while I was in the city I heard six shots fired and came back to the train thinking that there was some trouble there, I was unable to ascertain where these shots came from or what there cause was. The city streets are stilled patrolled by armed soldiers. I was informed that there was regiment of Feng Infty left Peking in heavy marching order this afternoon. There was 3 more coaches attached to our train here and 1 baggage car loaded with mail.

RETURN TRIP

29- YUNG PING HSIN:- Return.

No stop.

30- YUNG TING HSIN:- Return.

No Stop.

31- HSIN TAI:- Return.

Arrived 12:13 P.M.
Departed 12:25 P.M.

We dropped off one of our coaches here, the coach was broken.

32- HUANG TSUN:- Return.

No Stop.

33- WEI SHAN CHUANG:- Return.

No Stop.

34- AN TIEN:- Return. OCTOBER 30th 1924.

Arrived 1:30 P.M.
Departed 2:40 P.M.

Delay here due to Red Cross Train East Bound on Main Track stalled, and one train of empties west-bound.

35- WAN CHUANG:- Return.

No Stop.

36- LANG FANG:- Return.

Arrived 3:45 P.M.
Departed 4:55 P.M.

Delay due to traffic congestion, all officers were asleep and the British officer in charge of the Local was the only one that tried to get the train thru. No Troop activity here.

37- LAO FA:- Return.

Arrived 5:50 A.M.
Departed 5:55 A.M.

There were two 75s dismounted on the platform here.

38- At 6:07 A.M. we passed General Feng's lines which had advanced from Long Fang the night before, his troops were in a line of skirmishers and were crawling toward Wu's lines they were approx 1500 yards from Wu's front lines at the time.

39- At 6:11 A.M. we passed Wu's front lines his trenches appeared to be well manned but they didnt show any signs of excitement when Feng's troops were advancing toward them. The fighting will evidently be between Lao Fa and Chang Chuang.

40- CHANG CHUANG:- Return.

Arrived 6:14 A.M.
Departed 6:18 A.M.

No Change here.

41- YANG TSUN:- Return.

Arrived 6:39 A.M.
Departed 6:55 A.M.

In coming into this station we passed Wu's rear lines and they appeared to be deserted, but his field pieces were still mounted on the dyke.

42- PEI TSANG:- Return.

Arrived 7:22 A.M. No stop.

The camp on the south of the R.R. is still unchanged with the exception of two more TS mounted and six cossions, there was approx 200 head of horses, cond. good.

43- At 7:30 A.M. we stopped on bridge just east of Tientsin Central we moved ahead at 8:06 A.M. delay due to traffic congestion in yards.

44- There are two armored gondolas lying in the yyyyy yards here with [redacted] 3-37mm mounted in each car with their muzzels pointing out of loop holes, there is no engine on these gondolas.

45- TIENTSIN CENTRAL:- Return.

Arrived 8:10 A.M.
Departed 10:09 A.M.

There has been no movements of troop trains since yesterday. There are no field pieces or tents on the platform and very few troops on the platforms. Unable to find out what the cause of delay was due to.

46- TIENTSIN EAST:- Return.

Arrived 10:25 A.M.

Everything very quite in coming into yards here.

The morale of the U.S.Troops was excellent.
The attitude of the chinese soldiers toward foreigners was fr friendly.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A CORRECT AND TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN TO PEKING AND RETURN.

Charles A Peyton
Corp. Co."G" 15th Infantry.

RECORD OF EVENTS
ALLIED TRAIN, OCT 29th TO NOV. 4th, 1924.
Tientsin - Peking
Peking - Shan Hai Kwan
Shan Hai Kwan - Tientsin

Tientsin, East: Departed 12:04 P. M.
Tientsin, Central: Arr. 1:04 P. M. Dep. 1:30
Station congested, mixed troops here. Wu Pei Fu's train here guarded by Cadet Battalion from Luyang. These troops are boys 14 and 15 years of age.
Pie tsin: Arrived 1:47 Dep. 1:50.
Yang tsun: Arr. 2:10 Dep 2:27.
200 troops here, three troop trains on siding containig apprex. 1500 troops belonging to 2nd and 26th Divisions.
Chang Chuang: Arr. 2:45 Dep. 2:47 Station patrolled by armed Soldiers.
2:50 P. M. Passed Wu's front lines. 2:52 Japs released, three pigeons.
Lao Fa: Arr. 3:02 Dep. 3:21. British detachment is here. 21 pigeons released here from 3:03 to 3:15.
3:27 P. M. 12 mounted soldiers of Gen. Feng's troops headed toward Lao Fa.
3:36 P. M. 66 Inf. Soldiers in column of two's toward Lao Fa.
3:40 P. M. 300 Inf. Soldiers marching toward Lao Fa.
3:42 P. M. Gen. Feng's front line. About 4000 troops here. 150 camels. 100 long carts containing supplies.
3:45 P. M. One-quarter of a mile east of Lang Fang: 4 regiments of Inf., on both sides of railway.
Lang Fang: Arr. 4:04, Dep. 4:08: Apprax' 8000 soldiers camped on right side of city. The Cavalry and Art., are Fang's own troops, others appear to be Shensi troops. Five trains in the yards, 3 troop trains.
4:11 P. M. 40 long carts loaded with supplies and soldiers moving in direction of Lang Fang.
Wan Chuang: Arrived 4:24 Dep. 4:26 P. M. 10 - 75s on flat-cars. 13 cars of camels. About 250 soldiers.
Feng Tai: No troop trains here. About 100 soldiers here. 75 horses and a camp of 18 tents.
Yang- Tiang-Men: Arrived 6:00 Dep. 6:21. 10 gondollas on siding containing food.
6:30 P. M. Stopped at outer wall by armed guard. Passed through by use of visiting card.
Peking: Arr. 7:08, Dep. 11:25. Peking quiet, patrolled by armed guards. No rolling stock in yard. Marines took over guard of train while here.

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PEKING TO SHAN HAI KWAN

Peking: Dep. 11:25.
Anting: Arr. 1:58, Dep. 2:40, Delay here due to Red Cross Train on main track, bound east. 1 train of empties here bound west.
Lang Fang: Arr. 3:45 Dep. 4:55. Traffic congested.
Lao Fa: 5:50 Arr. Dep. 5:55. 2- 75mm Guns on platform.
6:07 A. M. Passed Feng's lines which had advanced fron Lang Fang the night before. The opposing lines were eighteen hundred yards apart. Feng's troops advancing in line of skermishes, crawling. Main battle expected between Lao Fa - Chang-Chuang.
Yang Tsun Arrived 6:39, Dep. 6:35 A. M. Passed through Wu's rear line here% Field Pieces on dike.
Pei Tsang: 7:22 A. M. Camp unchanged,XXXXXXXX
Tientsin, Central: Arr. 8:10, Dep. 10:09 A. M. Congestion between this Station and Tientsin East.
Tientsin East: Arr. 10/25

Tientsin East: Dep. 1:11. The question arose whether two cars of flower should be transported to Tongshan for use of the K. M. A. Coolies working in the mine. Capt. Sasaki, Japanese Army, in Command of the Train after confering with the officers decided to take same. Capt. Chronkite with 43 men of Company "I" entrained here for Han Ku accompanied by Lieut Stewart and Capt. Sward. Capt Sward to Tongshan. The Jananese increased their supply of pigeons here.

1:40 P. M. Just beyound Chang-Kui-Chaung 7 Chinese soldiers unarmed marching toward Tientsin.

Chung-Ling-Cheng: Arrived 1:43 Dep. 1:46. 1/4 mile south-west of this station four scout planes and two bombers in the field.

1:48 P. M. Japanese released three pigeons. 1:50 Japanese released four pigeons.

2:00 P. M. Numerous Chinese passing toward Chang-Liang-Cheng.

Hsin-Ho Arrived 2:06 Dep. 3:20. An armoured train on the siding consisting of twelve armoured Gondolias with three box-cars, manned by 250 men, 3 75mm guns, 5 machine guns, remainder of men equiped with rifles. 3:00 P. M. 3 pigeons released by Japs. The C. O. of this train was in Tangku, his name was Gen. Li Yu Fung, he had orders to blow to pieces the first Shensi train that attempted to leave Tangku for Tientsin. Upon arriving here the C. O. of the French troops at Tangku drove up in a car and called for a council of officers. He was very excited and stated that the people in Tangku were extremely frightened, that Wu pa Fu had issued orders that these Shensi troops be dis-armed. These Shensi troops had no officers with them and were very much disorganized. These troops had been in an engagement at Lanchow. He requested that we dis-arm them with the aid of the French troops stationed there, this was out of the question and he was told so.

Tangku: Arrived 3:40 P. M., Oct. 30th, Departed 5:25 A. M. Oct. 31st. Approx. 18000 troops here. Ten trains of Shensi troops, one coal train, one train of wounded, (800 men). The situation here is as follows, Wu Pa Fu desired to dis-arm these Shensi troops. To do this he had a portion of the 26th Division here and the armoured train manned by the 3rd Division men to prevent them getting to Tientsin. This created a block of trains at Tangku which had been accumulating for the last twenty-four hours. The opposing Generals were brought together and after much conferring it was decided to move the armoured train back three miles toward Tientsin: let the Wu trains through and fill up the sidings between Tanku and Hsin-Ho with Shensi troops, also using the yards. All these enginss 36 needed coal and water, and before moving out had to get same. This was the only way for us to get out. The C. O. of Shensi troops was Chin Kan Tung. This blockade was broke at about 1:00 A. M. It was decided to stay here until dawn so that "I" company could detrain in day-light. The civilians had asked also for the train to stay over night and that the women would be sent to Tientsin by boat the next day. The tension here between the troops were very high, nothing occured during our presnece.

Pei-Tang: About two hundred soldiers on platform.

Han-Ku: Arrived 6:25, Departed 6:53. "I" Company entrained about 30 Chinese Soldiers, tried to beard the flat cars here. They were told to get off and did so.

Lu-Tai: Arrived 7:20 Departed 7:32. Six trains here, three loaded with troops, about 500 in number, 300 horses.

Tien-Chuang: 7:46 A. M. no stop.

Hsu-Ko-Chuang: Arrived 8:17, Departed 8:23. Seven stores on fire here. Fire not caused by fighting.

Tongshan: 8:40 A. M. Arrived Departed 9:40. Detrained one-half car supplies for Co. "K" Also Capt. Sward. Received orders here from Capt Dabney regarding situation below Tongshan. This consisted of the following information:

(1)The Fengtien troops are occupying points along the Peking-Mukden Railroad in the vicinity of Lanchow and Tou tsu tou.

(2) It is advised that you hold the Allied Special here in Tongshan overnight and resume your journey to Shan hai kuan in the day time. This is deemed advisable for the following reasons:

(a) It being impossible to recognize the train at night which would unquestionably draw fire under the circumstances.

(b) A work train under American Guard was fired upon yesterday afternoon in the vicinity of Tou tzu tou.

(c) All trains entering Lan Chow either from the East or the West have been fired upon by Chang's troops which occupy Lan Chow in large numbers.

(d) Wu Pei Fu's men are organizing points between here and Lan Chow and may cause you considerable trouble.

(e) Lan Chow was looted yesterday by Chang's troops and considerable fighting occured there, therefore Chang's men are in a fighting mood and would not hesitate to fire on any train approaching their lines especialy at night.

(f) Artillery is so placed so that it can easily cover the Railroad at long range.

(g) American Headquarters has been notified of this request to have you remain in Tongshan overnight and resume your journey in the day time.

H.H.Dabney
Captain 15th, Infantry,
Commanding.

In addition to the above I was told by Capt.Dabney in person that there was an Anti-Foreign feeling among Fengtein Troops.A conference was held. Japanese guards were placed in the cab of the engine and the train left at 9:40 A.M.

9.49 A.M. Passed American outpost with Machine gun emplacement.

Kai-Ping Arr 9:56 Departed 9:58

Wah-Li Arr 10/10 Departed 10:11 A.M. Oct 31st.

Ku-yeh Arr about10:30 A.M. Met Lt.Depass here.Their rail road car is stationed here.Unloaded supplies here for Lt. DePass and Lt. McCammon's outposts.Was informed of the Capt.Woodridge episode here by DePass and also at Tongshan.by Capt. Dabney. Lt.De-Pass reports Ching-wang-chow and Shan Hai Kuan taken on the 30th.

Lei-Chuang Arr 11.07 Departed 11.09 A.M. Oct 31st
11.11 A.M. Fengtein scouts and small groups seen for first time.Arm insignia as follows Blackarm band with white circle.Later found to be insignia of II Army whose headquarters at Lang Chow commanded by Gen. Chang-Chung-Chang.
11:19 A.M. Train stopped by Fengtein troops with red flag.About the strength of a Company. The Colonel of this detachment was here Their soldiers covered the train with their rifles from the banks along the track.Troops well equipped with Luger pistols rifles of Japanese make.Equipped with grenades very similar to those used in World War. An Artillery piece covered the Rail road from a saddle in the hills to the left of the track.
To-Tzu-Tou arr 11:43 departed12:02 About 1000 troops here. This was possible the troops from which, the detachment that stopped us was sent.
12:11 Aeroplane on right about a mile just in rear of woods.

Lan Chow Arr. 12:20 departed 1:23 P.M.October 21st
This is the Headquarters of Gen.Chang-Chung-Chang Commanding the II Army of Fengtein troops.He is a man over six feet tall and very intelligent looking.He gave me tea and cigarettes and had quite a talk with him in which he expressed his attitude as friendly to foreigners,that he permitted no looting.His troops were paid weekly.He asked the purpose of train and stated he woul wire ahead so our train would not be delayed.Ther are quite a few Russians here.Apprex a regiment.They have Mounted Red Cross Women workers here.Troops seem well in hand ,very quite and orderly. Artillery,Cavalry and Infantry here.All equipped with entrenching tools. The General has at least 200 men in his body guard. Gen. said GWT and SHK were taken on the 30th .This was later found to be true. Capt T.Sato Japanese Commander at Lan Chow asked about Capt.Woodridge's health and he also told me of the narrow escape of Woodridge. General's card Attached, this report
Also Capt. Sato's Card.

Shih Men Arr 1:42 departed 1:44 No troop activity.

2:00 P.M. One train going west containing 6 planes and two searchlights mounted on trucks.

Anshan Arr 3:11 Departed 3:19 P.M.
about 2000 troops here(mixed)

3:22 Passed atrain of 3 cars no engine .One car was burning fiercely.

Hou-Feng-Tai Arr 4:33 Departed 4:55 P.M.
Repaired rails here. A derailment had occurred here sometime befor and been cleared but the rails were very crooked.A train of abandoned flour and grain was on the siding.Had to stop the train ecelies from taking same.

Chang-Li Arr5:15 departed 5:55 P.M.
Just outside of Chang Li the Train was stopped in force by the Feng tein troops. They had received information that we were a Chili Troop Train. About 1200 men were put in position on both sides of the track with one plane. After being told they formed quickly and reentered the town of Chang Li. Met Dr.Hopkins of the Chinese Red Cross(american citizen resident in China 39 years He desired to go to Shan Hai Kuan and thence to Teinsin with us Also met Dr. Baldwin and another gentleman(missionary)who remained.These troops had entered the city only a few hours previous. About 1500 Chili troops went south through this place at 8:00 A.M. bound for Lo Ting.

Pei-Ta-He arr 7:32 departed 7:55 P.M.
About one half a mile this side of station(outside block) were stopped.Soldiers tried to board engine.After a little talk were told to get off.Did so reluctantly. Train started up and two got on engine. I jumped off and entered the engine. Saw the English and Japanese guard covered by two chinese soldiers.On Entering cab was also covered. I told the engineer to stop but they scared him into proceeding .After a few minutes talk they lowered their from our stomachs. In this manner we rode until the station was reached. Here the Commander wanted to know why the two japs got off at the outside block.I knew nothing of this at the time and through an interpreter explained situation. He wanted to know what was in the darkened troop cars. He was told he could not go in,but could see from the outside.There were no lamps in the car at this time as they go out when train is stationary. to overcome this it was decided to let the commander himself go in.I went in with him and struck some matches to see.Pvt Reynolds was guarding at the end of car.This chinese Officer's body guard became restless and tried to enter car.I heard the noise outside and Lieut.of the English detail say"Dont fight" repeatedly.The Chinese officer and I returned to the end of car to see what was wrong.He took my right hand and held it up so his guard could see and called them to attention. In this way the tension was broke, and train permitted to go ahead. He said the telephone and telegraph was broked between here and Ching wang tao and that he would not be responsible if we went through. the engineer was afraid .We put more guards on engine and told him to proceed slow ly.

Nan Ta Szu Arr 9:2[illegible] Departed 9:3[illegible] P.M. October 31st 1924
No trac[illegible] in sight..Interior of sta[illegible]n completely wrecked. telephone broken, telegraph instruments smashed. Drawers pulled out and papers and clothes scattered about. A few soldier caps here,a big hole in the floor.

Ching Wang Tao arr 10:00 P.M. Oct 31st 1924
departed 1:30 P.M. November 2 1924
The Japanese guard was the first person to stop us at the station.The whole station and rail road yards completely covered with discarded uniforms,rifles,bayonets,gas masks, refuse,dead animals such as horses,mules,donkeys,oxen. A few dead bodies of soldiers still scattered about.There were many animals running around loose eating what they could find in the rail way yards.A large number of dogs seen eating the bodies lying around the yards. About three quarters of a mile east of the station two Engines were lying across the tracks preventing the progress of the train. At this time the only soldiers at the station was a troop of cavalry and about fifty soldiers sleeping in the station.In speaking with the soldiers they said there was no looting as they had specific orders on that point. A proclamation had been issued for store keepers to open their stores for business but must have fair prices any disorders would be handled severely.

Nov 1 1924

Upon awakening we could see more than the evening before.Early this A.M. prisoner details were seen beginning to clean up the refuse ,arms,dead and dead stock. Other details were putting rifles in one pile,Bayonets in another,Gas masks in another and other articles in similar piles.The engine pulled the work cars up to the scene of the wreck and the coolies unloaded prepared to build a deviation around the wreck as no crane was here. The wreck was caused by the removal of a rail.Two trains were coming toward CWT abreast of each other.The one on the up track jumped off and threw the one on the down track over on its side.There were many sodiers riding this train judging by the numbers killed in the wreck. Those riding the engine were pinned under.Those in between box cars were smashed.Some dead were on top the train. One man still was alive but had his leg caught between the cab and the rail of the engine that laid on its side. About 1200 men were seen appreaching the wreck from a work train that had come from Shan Hai Kuan.They started to build a Deviation around the wreck. The train coolies were withdrawn and the train returned to the station at CWT.I then took a walk with one of the intelligence men through the city of CWT to two places in particular where the American Flag was displayed. No Americans there. We came upon the scene of a Fengtein soldier that had just been shot through the head for looting.There were several horses running around loose that were blinded by head wounds.Would run into walls then turn away. Dogs were seen eating the dead animals.Salvaging continued through out the day.Four cars of one train in the yard showed x signs of being destroyed by fire .A field wirless was wrecked here. The I and III Armies are here combined under command of Chang Hsueh Liang the son of Chang Tso lin. The armbands are yellow with following inscription

A $\frac{I}{III}$

The same insignia is on the collar .
About a half mile beyond the wreck is a double track bridge.There must have been hundreds of men upon this bridge retreating when the train plowed through them as there were about 50 bodies cut to pieces in every conceivable way. Heads, arms, legs and other portions were scattered some in the creek below, others on the bridge.Behind the wrecked train on the up track was the train of General Pung ,Commander of the 15th Div.Chili troops.He escaped himself,but not by boat.Fengtein troops are searching for him.Maps attached to this report taken from his car.

Nov 2 1924

[redacted]

Nov. 2nd: Salvaging operations continued during this date. FengTein Troops in finding rifles would fire off the cartridges that were in them to test the rifle out, holding the rifle in a horizontal position, or in any direction except up in the air. Grenades that were found unexploded were thrown. The deviations was tested out at this time and the ties sank about a feet, more dirt was filled in and the railsstraightened. Our train passed the wreck at 2:00 P. M.

ShanHaiKwan: Arrived 2:45. Japanese Officer's said we would lay here until 6:00 P. M. This place was quiet and orderly, stores began opening today. Walked to the city wall and back to the station thenge around railway yards and railway hotel. About ten shell holes in railway shop buildings. A few in the hotel. A dug-out built with ties and rails about 50' square had been constructed in therailway yards

8:00 P. M. Departed.

ChingWangTao: Arr. 8:45. The following passengers were picked up here: Three French Priests for Anshan. 1 Russian lady for Tientsin. 1 Railroad man to Tangshan. This made six passengers including Dr. Hopkins. Dep. 9:03.

Peitaho: Arr. 9:43 P. M. Dep. 9:46.

Chang Lei: Arr. 10:48 Dep. 10:52.

Hou Fang Tai: Two supply trains here on siding. 30 calvarymen guarding same. Arrived here 11:07. Dep. 11:10.

Lanshin: Arr. 2:45. Delayed here for about three hours due to second army preparing to move to Tangshan.

Tangshan: Arrived 8:00 A. M. Dep. 8:30. Picked up Capt. Sward and Capt. Woodridge and several rolls of barb wire to be dropped off at Han Kow.

Han Kow: Arrived here 12 O'clock. At Tangshan an armoured train of Feingten troops maned by Russians were in the R. R. yards. They had arrived the day before. The Shensi troops that are here have placed additional red patch on their right arm showing they will fight for the side who pays the most. All civilians here are at the American Barracks. Feingten troops have the situation well in hand. Some looting by Shensi troops. Between Tongshan and Han Kow wagon trains calvary and small groups of soldiers seenretreating toward Tongshan across country, not following the railway. Wire dropped off here and the situation explained to Capt. Chronkhite.

Tangku: Arrived here 1:45 P. M. Nov. 3rd Wu Pa Fu reported to have come here at 4:30 A. M. this date with about 3000 soldiers, embarked on the steamer "Shaoshin" bound south. Rumored destination is Sang Tao. One mile east of LuTai we replaced a rail that bad been taken out. At Lu Tai, there were five trains of troops, two of these trains went ahead of us in to Tang Ku. At 2:00 the remainder ofthese trains pulled in behind us at Tangku. These troops detrained and started to embark on four stramers tied here at the dock. There was some confusion here, soldiers going on and off the boat. The Crews had left and there was no coal on these steamers. Departed from here approx 4:00 P. M.

ChangKueiChuang: Arrived 5:12 Dep. 5:16.

Tientsin: Train arrived outskirts of Tientsin about 5:45 P. M. The train was blocked at Section House No. 14 which is about the east end of the Tientsin Golf course in the Russian concession. There were nine trains between us and Tientsin east. The crews of these trains had dissapeared, there was one train behind us. Later on another train arrived and ran into the train in rear of us, throwing two cars and the tender off the track. The train stayed here until 6:00 o'clock the next night, November 4th. All the guard except two men and one Corp., were relieved at 3o'clock on the third. Train finally entered Tientsin East Station at 8:00 P. M.

I certify that this is a true copy taken from the war map at Ching-wang-tao on the 31st Oct 1924 by me.

E C Johnson
1st Lt. 15th Inf

Not to scale.

Chili
Fengtien



Supplementary Sheet

## Insignia & Commanders of Armies

| Troops | Arm Insignia | Commander |
|---|---|---|
| Fung Yu Hsuen | Red Band with White Circle | Fung Yu Hsuen |
| Chili | Red Band | Wu Pei Fu |
| Fengtein 1st & 3rd Armies Comb | Yellow Band A III | Chang hsuh Liang |
| Fengtein 2nd Army | Black Band with White Circle | Chang Chung Chang |
| Fengtein 4th Army | Yellow patch on breast with A IV on it | ChangTso Hsiang |
| Fengtein 5th & 6th Armies | These armies forming in the three small provinces between Manchuria and Mongolia in vicinty of Kaigan. | |
| Fengtein Prisoners | Being sent to Mukden to form other armies. | |

General Chang Hsuh Liang Commands Combined I and III Armies.
General Chang Hsuh Liangs regular command is the III Army
GeneralTsaing(Kiang) commands the I Army
General Kou is assistant commander of the I Army Fehgtein troops

On Nov 1st Generals of the 1st and 3rd armies returned to Mukden for Conference. Left about 2:00 P.M.

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Met a Lt. Col. [redacted] Wong a graduate of 1922 West Point class at GWT. He furnished me with the above information regarding Fengtein Armies and made the accompaning sketch from the war map (Japanese make) in the station there where the situation was explained in detail to me. Was told that they were not going to accept any peace offers from Wu Pei Fu but were to push on to Peking. That this war was not a unification of all china, and that new factions would arise in a year or two and there would be another war.

Distance Between Stations
As Accompany Report

| Stations | Miles |
|---|---|
| Peking | |
| Tung-Pien-Men | 1.78 |
| Tung-Ting-Men | 4.05 |
| Pengtai | 8.09 |
| Hsung-Tsun | 10.15 |
| An-Ting | 10.83 |
| Wan-Chuang | 6.97 |
| Lang-Fang | 6.70 |
| Lao-Pa | 9.37 |
| Chang-Chuang | 6.35 |
| Yang-Tsun | 6.77 |
| Pei-Tsun | 9.23 |
| Tientsin Central | 6.04 |
| Tientsin | 2.7 |
| Chang-Kwei Chuang | 6.9 |
| Chun-Liang Cheng | 7.5 |
| Hsinho | .6 |
| Tanghu | 2.6 |
| Pei-Tang | 2.7 |
| Cha-Ting | 8.8 |
| Nan-Men | 4.9 |
| Lu-Tai | 4.9 |
| Tien-Chuang | 7.8 |
| Tang-Pang | 8.2 |
| Nan-Ko-Chuang | 7.8 |
| Tangshan | .6 |
| Kai-Ping | 8.8 |
| Wa-Li | .4 |
| Nu-Yeh | 8.1 |
| Pei Chiu-Tien | 3.7 |
| Lei-Chuang | 5.5 |
| Ta-Tzu-Tsu | 4.8 |
| Lan-Hsien | 4.5 |
| Chu-Ko-Chuang | 2.5 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Shih-Hsu | 2.7 |
| Ai-Chun | 7.3 |
| Kuo-Fung-Tai | 4.1 |
| Yen-Yu-Ho | 3.1 |
| Chang-Ji | 2.3 |
| Chang-Chia-Chuang | 4.2 |
| Liu-Chou-Ying | 3.9 |
| Paitalu | 7.2 |
| Kuo-Ta-Gou | 3.3 |
| Ching-Wang-Tao | 3.1 |
| Shan-Hai-Kwan | 20.7 |

(Sgd) 1st Lt E. A. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OBSERVER ON ALLIED TRAIN
FROM TIENTSIN EAST TO PEKING, OCT. 27th to OCT. 28th 1924.

To: Intelligence Officer, G-2, U.S.A.Forces in China.

1- Departure of Allied Train from Tientsin East Station 9:51 A.M. October 27, 1924.

Allied Detachments consist of:-

U.S.Army Forces:- 1 Officer, 12 enlistmen.

British:- 1 Officer, 12 enlisted men.

French:- 1 Officer, 12 enlisted men.

Japanese:- 2 Officers, 28 enlisted men.

75 Railroad coolies.

Train consisted of:-

Engine No. 190

8 Coaches. (U.S.Coach No.137)

1 Baggage. (Loaded with British supplies)

2 Gondolas. (One with ties, one empty)

1 Flat Car. (Loaded with rails and hand-car)

2.-Westbound Engines No. 191-618, at Tientsin East Station hauling 9 Gondolas loaded with supplies and soldiers, 2 Box-cars with men, 1 flat car with 3-75s (Cond Good) 6 Armored Gondolas loaded with 60 head of horses (Cond Good) Appprox. 200 soldiers aboard this train.

3. 10:00 A.M. Stopped.
10:53 A.M. Started ahead (Delay due to traffic jam at Tientsin Central.

Sheet 1.

4.- West bound Engines No. 216 and 611 hauling 28 Coaches and 1 baggage, approx 200 Body Guards. This train was just east of Tientsin Central.

5.- TIENTSIN CENTRAL:-

Arrived 11:00 A.M.
Departed 11:07 A.M.

There were 4-75s on the platform here.
One flat car on the siding with 2 ARMORED TANKS (Cond Good)
16 cars on the siding without an engine and one coach, 2 Machine Guns (Vickers) and 2 Howitzers, Cond of guns Good, approx. 300 troops on board this train.
There were approx. 500 troops at this station.

11:13 A.M. Westbound Engine No.198 with 3 Box cars and 8 Armored Gondolas, 75 Soldiers on board.

6.- PEI TSANG:-

Arrived: 11:27 A.M.
Departed: 11:30 A.M.

Westbound engine No. 626 and two coaches on siding with 75 soldiers (Infantry) aboard all armed with rifles and carrying loaded bandeleers.

7.- YANG TSUN:-

Arrived: 12:26 P.M.
Departed: 12:30 P.M.

This place appears to be Wu's supply and reserve fortification, on entering this place I observed as follows: On the south side of the R.R. were 2 - 3 inch Field Pieces mounted on the dyke with the caisons on the right of the guns, in the rear of each Field Piece are tents (white pyramid) and there are several soldiers loitering around each one of these tents, it is thought that these tents hold ammunition for the two field pieces, several soldiers can be seen carrying boxes (ammunition) up to the vicinity of these tents, there were two soldiers standing by each gun looking as if they were all ready to go into action.

Just to the right rear of these guns are approx 300 head of horses picketed, (Cond Good).

Approx. 300 yards in front of these guns and to their right are embankments thrown up with trenches dug in behind them, there are 30 of these embankments on the south side of the R.R. no activity can be seen around them.

There are about 25 long carts here with the horses all hitched up to them, these carts are all empty.

Fifty cars on eastbound siding with approx. 600 soldiers (Cav., Art. and Infty) these appear to be unloading here.

The Cavalry here is camped in the rear of the two

Par. # 7 Con't.

Field Pieces on the dykes and their horses(apprex 200) are picketed right near them, the marks on their collars read 26,---and 3 III. The Infantry and Artillery didnt have any numbers or characters on their collars. There are apprex. 800 Soldiers (Mixed) at this station.

In leaving this station there were some more trenches on the North side of the R.R. extending fully 2 miles to the north, these trenches were also behind embankments, there were apprex. 1000 soldiers (Infantry) inview with their rifles stacked about 3 yards in the rear of the trenches.

Par. 8.-

When the Japanes came on board at Tientsin East Station they brought a crate of pigeons aboard the train and as soon as we arrived at this station (Yang Tsun) they released 10 of them, was unable to find out what their purpose was in releasing these pigeons.

Par. 9.- CHANG CHUANG:-

Arrived: 1:08 P.M.
Departed: 1:10 P.M.

½ mile west of this station were about 500 Soldiers (Infantry) digging trenches, these trenches are only about 3 feet deep and about 5 foot wide, the soldiers are putting straw on the ground in the trenches. 600 Yards in front of these trenches is a patrol of four men, all armed and with fixed bayonets. There were no field pieces or M.G.s in view here.

Par. 10.- LAO FA:-

Arrived: 1:26 P.M.
Departed: 1:52 P.M.

No Activity here. The British unloaded supplies for their detachment which is stationed here.

Par. 11.-

After leaving Lao Fa we came in sight of the front lines of Gen1 Fengs troops, his trenches are gun dug amongst a lot of trees on both sides of the R.R. and the only soldiers which we could see were the ones who were

Par. 11.- Cont'd)

near the R.R. All these troops are armed and are just lying around the trenches. These Soldiers look the same as Wu's but they have little xxxx white circles on the red band with chinese characters written on it. This place is situated 4 miles west of Lao Pa. About 2 miles from these trenches are some more trenches on both sides on the R.R. These trenches seem to be built much better than Wu's they are approx. 5 ft. deep and 4 ft. wide with small embankments thrown up in front of them.

Par. 12.- 2:17 P.M.

Two companies of Infantry marching in columns toward Lao Pa, it appears that they are going to the trenches that we just passed.

Par. 13.- LANG FANG:-

Arrived: 2:25 P.M.
Departed: 2:34 P.M.

Two Engines with empties are on the siding here, they have already unloaded their troops, supplies and equipment. 1 Engine with 25 cars loaded with Supplies and Soldiers (Infantry) approx. 300 Soldiers on this train awaiting orders to get off the train. There are approx. 200 soldiers in this town mixed (Cav. and Infty.) There hasnt been any field pieces in view yet.

Par. 14.-

A British Officer (The commander of the British Local which is running up and down on this line) informed me that the front lines of Wu and Feng and approx. 20 li apart, and Lao Pa is situated almost in the center of No Man's Land.

Par. 15.-

There was no sounds of firing while we were passing thru either of the front lines, but from the appearances of reinforcements which General Feng is bring up to the front the hostilities may commence at any moment.

Sheet. No. 4.

Par. 16.-

General Feng's front line trenches are situated in a much better place than Marshal Wu's. Feng's front lines are wholly concealed by trees and shrubbery while Wu's are in the open country.

Par. 17.- WAN CHUANG:

Arrived: 2:51 P.M.
Departed: 3:00 P.M.

At 2:56 P.M. and eastbound freight Engine No. 108 with 10 Gondolas and 8 Box-cars. Approx. 400 Feng Troops aboard this train, clothing Good, Morale Good. 2 Gondolas with 50 head of Horses (Cavalry). Box cars were carying troops and very little forage. These troops were all armed and were carrying bandoleers of ammunition. There were no Field Pieces or Machine Guns aboard. Condition of the horses was Very Good.

Par. 18.- AN TING:

Arrived : 3:15 P.M.
No Stop.

Par. 19.-

Engine No. 335 with 20 gondolas, 2 flat cars and 2 box cars, the flat cars were ~~xxxxx~~ carrying 4 - 3 inch field piece and the box cars were apparently carrying ammunition for the field pieces. Approx 300 Feng Troops all armed and carrying Bandoleers and entrenching tools, shovels, picks, axes, saws and knives. Approx 100 head of horses, (Cond Good) this train carried Infty, Arty and Cav. The mens ~~xxxx~~ clothing was in fair shape, it seem to be made of the light ecolie cloth, Morale Fair.

Par. 20.- WU SHAN CHUANG:

Arrived : 3:29 P.M.
No Stop. No troops here.

Par. 21.- HUANG TSUN:

Arrived: 3:39 P.M.
Departed: 4:13 P.M.

Par. 22.- HUANG TSUN: (Cont'd)

4:12 P.M. Eastbound engine No. 308 with 16 Gondolas, 12 Box cars approx. 400 Feng Troops, 100 head of horses, one gondola loaded with bran, 2 box-cars loaded with supplies, No Field Pieces on this train. The delay at this station was due to awaiting the arrival of this train. No troop activity here.

Par. 23.- HUANG TU PO:

Arrived: 4:29 P.M.
No Stop. No troop activity here.

Par. 24.- FENG TAI:

Arrived 4:40 P.M.
Departed 5:14 P.M.

Remarks: This seems to be the main concretration point of General Feng. there are 8 troop trains and 3 supply trains all ready to leave here, it has been report to me that General Feng is hauling all of his supplies and troops Overland from Peking by camels. In the yards here there approx 1000 camels, used for transportation. There are approx 8000 soldiers here mixed (Cav. Art and Infty) On 3 flat cars there are 6 - 75s. On the outskirts of this station (In the Yards) there were 25 Gondolas loaded with forage, no engine on these gondolas. From reports, there were very few troops of any branch at this station early this morning. The troops and supplies began to come here since NOON. They all come Overland. The soldiers here seemed to be well clothed and in good spirits.

Par. 25.- YUNG TING MEN:

Arrived: 5:32 P.M.
Departed: 5:35 P.M.

On leaving this station we passed 21 Gondolas and 4 Box cars, they were carrying 100 head of horses (Cond Good) and 12 Long Carts, these Horses are Pack animals and some cavalry horses are in with them. There were 8 camels on this train, 150 soldiers [illegible]. Aboard this train. There was no engine hooked on these cars.

There were 400 soldiers all armed and 200 head of Horses camped on the North side of the R.R. near this station. These men are Cavalry and Infantry. No Field Pieces in view here. Condition of Men and Animals Good.

Par. 26.- TUNG PIEN MEN:

Arrived: 5:50 P.M.
No Stop.

Engine and 1 Gondola with 50 men at this station.

Par. 27.-

A few tents can be seen on the great wall with soldiers occupying them, probably look outs.

Par. 28.-

5:53 P.M. Upon entering the Station Yards of Peking there was very little activity in sight.

Par. 29.- PEKING:

Arrived 6:00 P.M.
Departed 6:09 P.M.

General Feng's soldiers armed with rifles and with bayonets fixed are patrolling the station platform here. Outside of the station gate are 75 Long Carts, Hitched up, all empties.

At 6:05 P.M. I went into the city of ~~Kuk~~ Peking and everything seemed to be very quiet within the city.

The city streets are patrolled by Armed soldiers with fixed bayonets.

I was informed that there was a Division of Feng Artillery with apprex 500 camels left Peking this morning. The troop activity here seems to be very quiet.

At ~~6~~ 7:30 P.M. there were 2 first class coaches put on the train here and 30 civilians joined the train here.

The British brought on additional supplies and have ½ of the baggage car loaded with these supplies.

There seems to be a quite a few of desolate foreigners here, 3 Russians were trying to board our train without proper passes.

The Pagodas or Gates of HATAMEN and CHIENMEN are occupied by Feng's troops and have the controlling position of the legations.

The attitude of Feng's soldiers and other chinese toward foreigners is very good.

The Japanese Civilians and Military men seem to be very discourteous toward foreigners, Lieut. Brown, ~~M~~ U.S.M.C. had to forcibly put 3 Japanese civilians from a 1st class coach, his orders were to allow no one to board this train without an authorized pass, therefore these Japanese having no authorized passes were excluded from the train.

Par. 29 Cont'd.

Have noticed about 10 Japanese civilians riding in the Japanese Military Coach, was unable to find out whether they were authorized to or not.

RETURN TRIP

Par. 30.- TUNG PIEN MEN: Return

Arrived 9:22 P.M.
No Stop.

Par. 31.- TUNG TING MEN: Return

Arrived 9:38 P.M.
Departed 9:41 P.M.

Four armed soldiers were on the platform at this station.

Par. 32.-

In pulling into PENGTAI on our return trip three armed soldiers who were on guard came over to the train with their pieces carried on their sides as if they were ready to fire. After they talked to the Engineer they departed.

Par. 33.- PENG TAI:

Arrived: 10:14 P.M.
Departed: 10:25 P.M.

Eastbound engine No. 209 with 2 Box-cars loaded with 3 inch ammunition and supplies and 7 flat cars on siding with 14 - 3 inch Field Pieces, approx. 150 soldiers aboard this train, 5 gondolas loaded with 75 head of horses (Cond. Good).

12 Box-cars loaded with supplies, 26 gondolas loaded with: 4 - 3 inch field pieces, 10 - 37mm, 2 Motor-cycles, 4 bicycles, approx 150 head of Horses (Cond Good) approx. 100 mm soldiers, no engine on this train.

Eastbound engine No. 64 with 14 gondolas approx 200 troops aboard.

Eastbound train loaded with camels on siding approx. 100 camels, (Note: I did not have time to make a through check of this train)

Most of the troop trains that were here have moved out,.

Par. 34.-

At 10:45 P.M. we passed engine and 35 gondolas loaded with approx. 100 camels, 200 head of horses, 75 Long Carts, and 8 Bicycles. Approx. 150 soldiers. The condition of the Camels and Horses were Good. There were no field pieces on this train.

Par. 35.-

At 10:47 P.M. delayed on siding.
We moved forward at 3:00 A.M. October 28,1924, the delay was said to be caused by tropp movements ahead of us.

Par. 36.- HUANG LU PO: Return.
Arrived 3:25 A.M.
No Stop.

Par. 37.- HUANG TSUN: Return.

Arrived 3:45 A.M.
No Stop.

Par. 38.- AN TING: Return.

Arrived 4:01 A.M.
No Stop.

Par. 39.- WAN CHUANG: Return.

Arrived 4:16 A.M.
No Stop.

Passed engine 318 with 35 gondolas and 2 box-cars gondolas loaded with troops, approx 250. 150 head of horses. No field pieces were on this train.

Par. 40.- At 4:34 A.M. we were stopped by Block signal, six soldiers came over to the engineer and asked questions about this train, they were carrying their rifles on their sides as if they were ready to fire, when they found out who we were they departed.
At 4:45 A.M. we moved forward.

Par. 41.- LANG FANG: Return.

Arrived 4:52 A.M.
Departed 5:09 A.M.

Engine No. 335 with 20 gondolas, 2 box-cars, approx.100 head of horses, 4 - 75s, there were approx 200 men on this train, the condition of the horses were good.

Par. 43 Cont'd.

Three trains (empties) on siding here, troops, supplies and animals have been unloaded.

A British Officer gave orders to proceed with caution as we are nearing Feng's front lines and to be especially watchful of the bridges and tracks ahead.

The British Officer in charge of the British Local running on this line informed me that Feng has moved his front lines 1½ miles back toward Lang Fang.

Par. 42.-

At 5:15 A.M. we are passing Feng's lines and have noticed that his trenches have been covered with straw for concealment of troops in the trenches.

At 5:20 A.M. we passed Feng's front lines, his trenches are concealed with matting, straw and shrubbery.

At 5:23 A.M. we entered No Man's Land and everything seems to be very quite.

Par. 43.- LAO FA: Return.

Arrived 5:40 A.M.
Departed 6:01 A.M.
No activity here.

Par. 44.- At 6:18 A.M. we passed an outpost of six men of Wu Pei Fu's, (Infantry)

At 6:20 A.M. we passed Wu's front lines, his front lines extends approx 5 miles, the R.R. runs right thru his lines.

Par. 45.-

CHANG CHUANG: Return

Arrived 6:23 A.M.
Departed 6:25 A.M.
Marshal Wu's front lines are approx ½ mile west of here. No Field pieces here.

Par. 46.- YANG TSUN: Return.

Arrived 6:44 A.M.
Departed 7:03 A.M.

The situation here seems unchanged only I have notice this morning that there are 15 tents(pyramids) near a branch R.R. of the main line. The field pieces are still

Par. 46 Cont'd.

mounted on the dykes on the south of the R.R. As we entered this station I noticed that the trenches ~~xhmxk~~ have been completed and are occupied by approx 1500 soldiers, (Infty). The cavalry and artillery still have their camp and horses picketed behind the lines, there was only one train of empties on the main line siding, everything quite here.

Par. 47.- PEI TSANG: Returns.

Arrived 7:25 A.M.
Departed 8:00 A.M.

W.B. Engines No. 198 with 15 box-cars, 14 gondolas, boxcars are loaded with ammunition, flour and boxes of supplies. 4 gondolas of forage, one flat car carrying 6 caissions, 4 - 75s were unloaded from this train and they are on the platform, 3 - 37mm on the platform.

~~300~~ Ft. south of the platform is a camp and picket line in the camp are 8 tents and 4 - 75s with caissons on their right, approx 150 head of horses on the picket line, cond of horses good, approx. 300 soldiers at this station.

~~xx~~ 80 ft. north of the platform is 25 horses all saddled up they are tied to a picket line.

Engine No. 116 on siding with 4 gondolas, 1box-car and 1 flat car, there are 3 - 37mm on the flat car and the box-cars contain supplies and approx 200 rounds of 37mm ammunition. Gondolas are carrying troops, ~~approx~~ 75 soldiers.

There are approx 300 soldiers here, their morale is very good and seem very friendly toward foreigners, cond of their clothing is good, and sanitary cond are good. All the field pieces and 37mm are in good condition. The troops here are mainly Cav. and Art, very little Infantry.

Par. 48.-

At 8:20 A.M. we were delayed ½ mile west of Tientsin Central, at 8:37 A.M. we moved forward, delay due to traffic jam at Tientsin Central.

Par. 49.-

Going into Tientsin Central we passed a Westbound engine with 33 cars and 200 troops and 32 coffins (new).

Sheet No. 11.

Par. 50.- TIENTSIN CENTRAL: Return.

Arrived 8:43 A.M.
Departed 8:52 A.M.

6 Trains in station, approx 500 troops mixed. 4 tents are pitched on platform, there 4 - 75s and 4 - 37mm on the platform, rifles are stacked in front of the tents on the platforms and about 75 head of horses picketed on platform.

Par. 51.-

After leaving Tientsin Central I noticed that there was an ~~xxx~~ armed ~~xxxx~~ guard of 42 soldiers with fixed bayonets patrolling along side the R.R. track.

Par. 52.- TIENTSIN EAST RETURN.

Arrived 9:10 A.M. October 28, 1924.

17 Gondolas with men and horses, 6 flat cars with 3 Howitzers, 2 - 37mm Anti-aircraft pieces, 4 - 75s, the soldiers are all artillerymen, approx 200 soldiers and 150 horses. There were two troop trains here when we arrived. ~~xxx~~

The morale of the U.S.Troops was excellent.

Lieut. Brannon was in charge of our detachment.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A CORRECT AND TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED TRAIN FROM TIENTSIN TO PEKING AND RETURN.

Charles A Peyton
Corp. Co. "G" 15th Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN BARRACKS,
Tientsin, China,

October 28, 1924.

Subject: Report of trip of Inter-Allied Train from Tientsin to Peking and return, October 27-28, 1924.

To: Commanding General, U.S.A.F. in China, Tientsin, China.

1. There was a slight delay in starting, due to a traffic jam between Tientsin East and Tientsin Central. The Special left Tientsin East at 9:50 A.M. and proceeded to a point just outside of Tientsin Central; after some delay the train pulled into Tientsin Central and left there shortly after 11:00 A.M.. The first stop of any length was made at (Pei Tsang) where we waited to pass a train of empties presumably returning from Yang Tsan. The Special arrived at Yang Tsan about 1:00 P.M.. There appeared to be quite a concentration of troops at this point. Four field pieces could be seen on the left of the track. The right piece was about 200 yards from the track and the left about 300 yards. The two right guns were on top of a six foot dyke, the two left pieces just behind the dyke. There were about 200 led horses on either side of the track. There were about a hundred troops in and around the station. A kitchen was in operation alongside the track and carts appeared to be distributing food to the front lines. I saw two carts loaded with dough-balls and a large cauldron filled with small slabs

wadough and cabbages.

There were five or six engines in the yards. A train load of supplies with two engines was on a track parallel to the main line. No effort was being made to unload and several soldiers, apparently train guards, were in each car.

A pilot engine with one car and a detachment of British troops preceded us from this station to (Lan Fang). Several hundred Infantry were in position on the right of the track. Their line appeared to extend along the Tientsin side of the Yun Ho about 500 yards. A few troops were in position in fox holes dug in the covered side of a dyke on the left of the track. This position appears very strong when opposed to a frontal attack. There is a river just in front and on the right there is a large inundated area. On the left there is not so much water but the ground seems very soft and open. From the train I could not form an accurate estimate as to the facilities for a turning movement. One thing I noticed especially was a line of embrickments on top of the dyke. These were about four feet high and thirty feet long. At a distance they give the appearance of Chinese graves, but upon closer inspection it is apparent that they are too large and too evenly spaced. Also they appeared to be freshly made. They are about twenty feet apart.

At (Chang Chung) there appeared to be a forward outpost line. There was a line of rifle pits perpendicular to the tracks on both sides. The line is about 500 yards long and appeared to be garrisoned by about 200 men. I saw only Infantry and no machine guns. There was only one line of trenches and

no covered route to the rear. The ground to the front is as level as a floor and mostly under cultivation, but this affords no cover. I was struck by the fact that although the trenches were dug in the open, they had a low visibility. The soil for several feet down is so dark that the fresh earth is not apparent. From a distance these trenches would be very hard to pick up, but I believe that they would show up very plain on an aerial photograph.

The Japanese brought aboard about two dozen pigeons. Six or seven were released at (Yang Tsan). This seemed significant as it was at this point that the first concentration was seen.

Many of the engines on the Chinese troop trains were very rusty and apparently have not been well kept up. This seems especially true of the Peking-Hankow engines.

I believe the position of Wu's troops is well taken. The main position behind the river is a very strong defensive one to cover a concentration. The forward out-post position which is really a bridge head will, if held, greatly facilitate an advance.

About two (2) miles East of (Lan Fang) we passed Feng's first out-post. From 50 to 100 men were scattered on either side of the track. The main line of resistance seemed to be about 400 yards East of Lan Fang. Some troops (about 100) were digging rifle pits on both sides of the track. I saw about 100 men on the line and about fifty men moving into position. One train load of troops was on the siding in (Lan Fang). Another train load was

passed at (Wan Ching). This train had two cars of horses which appeared to be cavalry horses. The troops told me that (Lan Fang) that all the men there were Shensi men. I did not see any artillery or machine guns. No cavalry patrols were visible from the train. I do not believe that there are any working between the lines. Either side could occupy (Lao FU ) but apparently both sides feel too weak to make a further advance at present. The position of Feng's troops does not seem as strong as Wu's, as the ground is good for maneuvering to the front and there is some cover for the attackers.

We passed another train at (An Ting) and finally arrived at Feng Tai at about 5:00 p.m.. This place presented a scend of great but apparently well ordered activity. I counted seven trains loaded with troops. However, the railway people told me that five (5) trains had gone out and six more were to go. It is possible that two of the trains I saw were later coupled together. The troops were all on board,and supplies and ammunition (mostly ammunition) were being unloaded from camels and put on the trains. The camels were led over the station bridge and right alongside the cars. A few were loaded on the cars. It was impossible to form an accurate estimate of the number as they were coming and going in a steady stream. I was told that they were coming overland from ( ) and that Feng had 3000 of them.

At Feng Tai I saw the first troops with Feng's badge, a red diamond with a small white diamond superimposed. The Shensi troops in the front line and on the trains did not have this insignia. Between Feng Tai and Peking we passed an engine and one

car with a few soldiers. We arrived in Peking at 6:00 p.m..

I was met at the station by Major Kroner who was authorized by Colonel Bernard to receive my report. I explained fully all I had seen on the trip and also what I knew of affairs in Tientsin. I was then taken to Mr. Bell to whom I again outlined the conditions between Tientsin and Peking and in Tientsin.

Notes from Major Kroner:

Saturday night there were heavy patrols on the streets. Sunday night the streets were practically deserted by soldiers. Restrictions on Chinese noticably laxer, yesterday and today. The Peking Police were at first disarmed, but now have their arms back. Civilians were stopped at first, but last night they were not stopped. Chienmen and Hatamen are occupied by Feng's troops. That is, the towers are occupied. These command a part of the Legation Quarter. There is no anti-foreign feeling apparent. Official relations with Feng's troops have been most pleasant.

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Major Kroner accompanied me back to the station where we arrived at 8:30 p.m.. I had Corporal Peyton go over his report to check the number of trains and the organization of the various troops. I also gave Major Kroner a copy of the Peking & Tientsin Times and one of the North China Star. He requests that hereafter the Intelligence Officer send him copies of Tientsin papers by Inter-Allied Train, as the mails are slow. After finishing with Major Kroner, I merely had time to check up my detail before the departure of the train, which left promptly at 9:00 p.m..

We passed one troop train between Peking and Feng Tai.

At the latter place we were held up outside the yards for about five minutes. We then ran into the yards and stopped for about fifteen minutes. There were several trains loaded with troops and impedimenta. Apparently they were all set and waiting for right of way to proceed to the front. There was no sign of activity about the station. The yards were orderly and no trouble was experienced in getting through.

We arrived at Huang Tsan at about 11:20 p.m. and here experienced our first delay. We were told at Feng Tai that eight (8) trains had been dispatched today. We overhauled the last one at Huang Tsan. However, this train was allowed to pull into the main line ahead of us and proceed on its way.

We waited here ~~from about midnight~~ until 2:30 a.m.. Finally, one train of empties passed us returning to Feng Tai. Then two loaded trains backed past us and we ran in ahead of them. At the next three stations we passed a train on the siding of each, all headed East. We did not make another stop until we reached Lang Fang. We were held up here for a time but proceeded as soon as the line could be cleared. At this point it was too dark to see if any changes had been made in the disposition of the troops. We reached Lao Fa just as day started to break.

The country between this point and Wu's front line is very level, with a few scattered scrub trees. West from Lao Fa the country seems more wooded. Between Lao Fa and Chang Chuang there are two streams, each about sixty feet wide. Wu's outpost line just west of Chang Chuang was built up a good deal from the day before. In the dim light it was hard to estimate distances

accurately,but I believe the trench line is now at least 800 yards long and manned by about 500 men. No machine guns or artillery were visible.

At Yang Tsun there did not appear to be as many troops as the day before. We left this place at 7:00 a.m..

There was no further incident until we arrived at the bridge just outside of Tientsin Central Station. This station seemed jammed with troop trains. The same condition existed at Tientsin East. Our train was stopped between two troop trains which made the unloading very difficult.

The train was under the command of Captain Cunningham, of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. The train was well conducted. There were no unpleasant incidents and no show of bad feeling on the part of either faction. I believe they both did everything in their power to expedite our train. The delays were caused by the large number of troop trains.

E.M. Brannon,
First Lieutenant, 15th Infantry,
Commanding,American Detach.

REPORT OF OBSERVERS ON ALLIED TRAIN
FROM OCT. 20TH TO OCT. 24TH 1924.

TO: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER U.S.A. FORCES IN CHINA.

1. Departure of the Allied Train from Tientsin East Station, 12:20 P.M.

Allied Detachments consist of:

U.S. Army Forces, 1 Officer, 12 enlisted men.

British, 1 Officer, 12 enlisted men.

French, 3 Officers, 12 enlisted men.

Japanese, 5 Officers, 42 enlisted men.

Capt. Sward(USAMC) and 1 enlisted M.C. on train for Tongshan.

120 R.R. coolies and two complete reliefs for the train crew.

Train consisted of:

Engine No. 190 (Peking-Mukden R.R.).

8 coaches (U.S. coach 115)

1 baggage.

3 flat cars.

2 box cars containing Japanese supplies and forage.

2. Chang Kuei Chuang

Arrived 12:40 P.M.
Departed 12:42 P.M.

3. Chun Liang Chang

12:55 No stop

4. Hsin Ho

1:16 No stop

5. Tang Ku

Arrived 1:22 P.M.
Departed 1:45 P.M.
French took on additional supply of forage and stoves West Bound goods train , all empties, no troops. Japanese Captain reports 12 men in his detachment, personaly counted 42 men, there may have been more. 7 cars food stuffs on siding, east bound. No troops. 1 K.M.A. Boat at coal dock at Tang Ku.

6. Pei Tang

2:00 P.M. no stop

7. Cha Ting

Arrived 2:16 P.M.
Departed 2:19 P.M.
First noticed guards on bridges, west this station. Four Japanese soldiers and equipment left train, also had material for wire and telegraph lines.

8. Han Ku

2:30 P.M. no stop
8 Bridge guards west this station.

9. Lu Tain ( Tai)

Arrived 2:39
Departed 2:43
35 Native soldiers , west bound with luggage, no arms. 4 Japanese soldiers left train here same equipment as the former.

10. Tien Chuang

2:57 no stop
8 Bridge guard at this station.

11. Tang Pang

3:09 No stop

12. Nao Ko Chuang

Arrived 3:23 P.M.
Departed 4:[illegible] P.M.
4 Japanese soldiers, equipment and telephones left train here 14 Native soldiers, west bound, baggage no other equipment. 4 native soldiers on platform, no equipment. Train Watered here. Two Natives rather well versed in English, very inquisitive and interrogatory on platform. Claimed to be Lts. in Chinese Army. 4:16 P.M. Eng. 27 pulling 27 flats, 8 boxes and 4 Gondolas west bound with 250 soldiers and 100 coolies, 75 casualties mostly arm wounds, dressed in long coats, wool or hair lined. Shoes in very bad condition. Coolies in rags. 30 New native Coffins in Gondolas, was informed that these were officers remains

13. Tang Shan

Arrived 5:00 P.M.
Deaprted 5:42 P.M.
Arrived west yards this stattion at 4:32 but was held up by movements of troop trains on all tracks at station. The following summarizes the native soldiery at this point. 75 Soldiers 80 horses, 15 carts east bound at 5:20 P.M. 2 cars equipage for mountain batteries. 75 horses, 2 Peking Carts, 2 cars supp. 100 soldiers, left Tang Shan 5.09. Troops of the 1st. 2nd. 3rd. and 4th. Divisions on platform. 4 Jap. Tel and Tel men left train here equipage and wire including field phones. Eng. 337 P and S 5 coaches, 1 Baggage and 1 Mail, 400 soldiers 20 rifles for the guard. East Bound. ( from Provost Guard Tang Shan, 3rd. Bn. 4th. Reg. 500 Inf. 60 Horses, 4 carts, 200 Horses, 75 carts, 100 coolies. 5 cars Supplies east ) 5:40 P.M. Wreck reported at Kai Ping, wrecking train and crew in front of our train at Tang Shan.

14. Wali

Arrived 6:38 P.M.
Departed 6:45 P.M.
4 Japanese soldiers boarded train here, track being patrolled by native soldiers first noted at this point.

15. Kuyeh

Arrived 7:10 P.M.
Departed 7:17 P.M.
Apprex. 1000 long carts at the station, our train is running much slower at night.

16. Pei Chia Tien
Arrived 7:37 P.M.
Departed 7:39 P.M.

17. Leichuang
Arrived 8:07 P.M.
Departed 8:08 P.M.
Passed west bound train at 7:46 on double track moving over bridge, too fast to note contents.
Passed Passenger Train on main line at Leichuang at 8:04 West bound, 11 coaches.

18. Ta Tze Tou
Arrived 8:25 P.M.
Departed 8:27 P.M.

19. Antimet
Lan Hsien
Arrived 9:06 P.M.
Departed 10:39 P.M.
Cautious approach to Lan Hsien West Board against us. Pulled up to the Station at 9:06. In yard; Supplies, 1000 bags on west platform, delay due to shifting of train of two cars, supplies and 15 gondolas loaded with 150 long carts ay stattion east bound side. 15 native soldiers on platform rifles and fixed bayonets as if guard for supply train as they are keeping close to it. Japanese unloaded 2 cars supplies, piles, wires, ropes, coal, forage, and other bags of articles, 8 Japs remain here. 2 trains on siding . 40 cars forage or supply. 2 trains waiting to leave east. Delaying train due to Japanese discharging Tel. Adm. Supplies. Further delay said to be caused by Jap officer leaving the train for tea. French Commandant reluctant to leave without him.

20. Chu Ko Chuang
Arrived 10:52 P.M.
Departed 10:54 P.M.

21. Shih Men
Arrived 11:06 P.M.
Departed 11:07 P.M.

22. Anshan
Arrived 11:32 P.M.
Departed 11:40 P.M.
Cut loose from the train and took water.

23. Hou Feng Tai
Arrived 11:57 P.M.
Departed 11:58 P.M.
Goods train . 18 box cars, 3 coaches on south siding, West Bound. Train, ( ? bound) 10 gondolas, 3 boxes, 3 coaches, 2 engines, one at each end headed eah way.

October 21st.

24. 12:07 AM. Passed west bound train 34 boxes 8 Gondolas.

1209 A.M. Passed West bound train eng. and lear. Both trains on west track between Hou Feng Tai and Chang Li. Could note by the light of our engine on which I was riding at the time that there were a good may bandages on the first train but could not distinguish the extent of the wounds or the exact nature.

12:24 Stopped at distant block ( ChangLi) account of trains at the station.

25. Chang Li
Arrived 1:50 A.M.
Departed 2:58 A.M.

Troop activities consisted of, unloading from 18 gondolas and 4 flats about 300 head of horses and 50 carts, from the second train ahead of us. Engine and 6 cars on track west lights dimmed and about 40 soldiers all in summer clothing. 30 soldier Long coats and baggage in stattion awaiting east train. 4 car Forage on track north of ststtion about 80 coolies and 20 soldiers at work on the platform. Delivered message to the station master that the Allied train would pick up the American Missionaries at that point on on its return trip should they care to go. 5 boxes loaded with supplies, on south side of station no eng. four soldiers on guard. Horses very thin and seemed to be suffering for the want of water and the Mafoos who are in charge of them are nearly knocked over by the eager animals. Train following us from Kia Ping pulled up to the block in rear of us 2: 00 A.M. ~~XXXX~~ Three flats on siding carrying two autos mounted with searchlights and one areoplane ( dismounted)

26. 3:07 Passed west bound double header pulling all empties. trains were stalled outside of Chang Li.

27. Chang Chi Chuang
Arrived 3:22 A.M.
Departed 6:12 A.M.

Cause of delay troop trains all along the line were trying to get the staff for further moving. We pulled on siding in accordance with written oerders that the engineer re'cd at Chang Li to proceed to this station with caution and to stop whereever an emergency called for it. 4:10 A.M. freight cosisiting of 12 boxes west bound no stop. From the apperaance it may have been carrying wounded. Two trains carrying troops stalled on main track at this point. First train hauling four boxes second one ten coaches, apprex. 200 troops on the both trains these trains arrived at 4:21 A.M.

Shen Xing

Arrived 6:26 A.M.
Departed 9:40 A.M. Oct. 22.
( 25 hours and 4 Min. Delay )

Pulled on siding due to 22 gondolas loaded with forage on main track departed 7:11 AM stop 7:30 delay due to traffic jamb ahead. Eng. 217. 3 cars rails and bridge decking, 5 cars Coolies. P S Eng. 329 and service cars. PMR eng. No. 231 hooked on behind third class coolie car five soldiers aboard. PMR eng. No. 148 . 5 Boxes, 4 coaches, containing three mules, three hundred litters. PMR eng 135. Unloaded 65 ( see. House 65) Long carts, 100 mules and horses. 50 soldiers armed with rifles and loaded bandoleers on return at ten A.M. the carts had all been assembled and taken away. P S eng. 353 . 15 gondolas loaded with forage and supplies east bound. P S eng. 222 . 10 empty boxes. Presumed to have unloaded its cargo at sea. house 65. 8:20 A.M. Areoplane flying south of sea. house 65 ele. approx. 4000 ft.. P.M. eng 202. 13 gondolas of forage, 2 wood, and 1 empty , east bound . Eng. 83, hauling PMR coolie car No. 3754, on bridge train, end of which was smashed in. P M eng. 250. 2 gondolas of flour, 5 of wood, 8 gondolas of forage, 14 box cars of flour also aboard this train twenty cases of petrol and two packs field tel. Eng. PM. 133. 4 boxes, carrying 150 coolies, and 1 box of supplies Eng. 123 PMR . 4 boxes grain. 8 gons forage. 3 gons sanitary supplies, 1 car med. supplies, 1 flat carrying one dodge graham bus capacity twenty passengers. Eng. ~~MMX~~ 37. 1 box, locosh. 15 soldiers aboard., Eng. 226 . 9 coaches, 1 guard car, 9 R.R. guards. 8:35 A.M. Areoplane flying east, south of R.R. Eng. 254. 1 coach, 4 boxes, 1 gon, 2½ coolies and fifty soldiers. Eng. 185 ,4 three inch pieces complete, condition very good, four horses, three hundred troops all armed, twenty six tents on cars one hundred machine rifles, 16 boxes and 12 guns these all art. Eng. 59. 6 boxes, Art. Ammo 1800 rounds, soldiers armed with Spanish rifles cal.28 ~~Mannlicher~~ Model 1892. approx. 150 Sol. 5 cars flour. Eng. 604, this engine was hauling fifty boxes, fifty guns. Gondolas loaded with tents, and machine and mountain guns. Approx. 150 soldiers. ART., 4 three in. field pieces condition good, three thousand rounds ammo, two vickers machine guns fixed mountings, old type. Eng. 327. 2 coaches, 6 boxes, 4 guns, carrying 150 soldiers, all armed, and 40 cavalry.( horses) Condition of horses very good. On this train strong odors of OPIUM were in evidence. Eng. 206 . 1 coach, apparently carrying Native officers of high rank. Eng. 229 . 6 empty Boxes and 1 coach. 9:15 A.M. Areoplane left Pei Ta Ho going west. 9:55 A.M. Areoplane going west. 10:12 A.M. Train passed us going west with three coaches and two boxes, seemed to be carrying wounded, train going too fast to ascertain the number.

Sheet 5

We were about to enter the yards at Pei Ta Ho at this time when the Passenger Traffic manager and the French Commandant and the Guard came from Pei Ta Ho and asked us to return with them as then had a hand Car, this we did as we had been on foot since the train reached Liu Shou Ying that morning. On the hand car trip back we endeavered to check up the numbers of the cars and t aing that we had taken the number s of that morning, we reached the train again about ten fifteen A.M. 10:58 A.M. three engings, Nos. 319, 277, 274 east bound, carrying approx. 3000 soldiers mixed, 60 head of horses, 5 cars supplies mixed, 2 cars wood, and 8 empties. 11:19 A.M. inbacking up we passed eng. 343 P. S. with three boxes, and fifteen soldiers and one well dressed native officer. ( found out later that he was a general who had lost his command) named not ascertained. 11:21 A.M. arrived back at Liu Shou Ying , held up again, it was reported th that a rush troop train is due here, 11:42 AM. switched over on west track, 11:50 AM., Lt. Golightly had to take armed guard, and force stubborn engineer to back his train on siding, so that we could go forward. 1:40 P.M. West bound freight nine empty boxes thirty soldiers and twenty coolies. Eng. 286 West bound, arrd., here at three seven, with one private coach containing twelve officers, seemed to be in a great hurry, departed at three ten P.M West bound freight, nine boxes, three gondolas, containing one hundred and seventy five wounded, thirty of the hundred and seventy five being deceased officers. arrived at three fifteen PM and departed at three eighteen PM. 4:20 PM. French Commandant and one man from each force excepting Japanese, proceeded to Pei Ta Ho to see General Wang, about clearing the road for the Allied Train, party arrived Pei Ta Ho 5:40 PM. Colonel Tsung[illegible] adviser to General Wang, with Mr. Doo PM. Traveling Inspector, with the rank of a Major in the Chinese Army, who spoke excellent English, met us on the platform, prepared to telephone( HDQRS of Gen. Wang ) to Marshall Wu at Chin Wang Tao , Phone report is that General Chang is in command of the yards at Chin Wang Tao and that as soon as possible they will open the line to Shan Hai Kuan and allow the ALLIED TRAIN the first passage. Left Pei Ta Ho 6:30 PM. Arrived Liu Shou Ying 7:05 . Train arrived west bound thirty cars, 100 soldiers 30 officers , at 7:55 PM. leaving 8:00 PM. At Pei Ta Ho Mr. Doo reports that there are thirty trains between Liu Shou Ying and Chi Wang Tao, we know of at least twenty three engines and trains of various lenghths between Liu Shou Ying and Pei Ta Ho. Platform at Pei Ta Ho very busy, 80 horses being discharged on the station platform thre were six tents and four machine guns on the station platform and about three thousand soldiers in the yards. Morale very good, disciplime very poor. Liu Shou Ying, engine switched off train at 9:51 headed back to Chang Li for water, arrived Chang Li at 10:40 PM, was accompanied by two english soldiers escort on the engine, arrived Chang Chia Chuang 10:25 PM. Dpt. 10.26 PM. Watered at ten forty P.M.

28 (Con.)

Train on siding by the water tank, 1 gun containing 4 three In. Field pieces condition good, 6 boxes, apparently supplies east bound. one troop train east bound, all 32 coaches, may have been officers from the appearance of the uniforms at a distance. Departed Chang Li 10:51 PM. Arrived Chang Chia Chuang 11:05 PM. Engine held up here awaiting permission to proceed on west bound track. departed 11:40PM. Arrived Liu Shou Ying 12:02 AM. 8/27/38. Engine hooken on at 12:05 AM. East bound engine #39 , 25 boxes 2 coaches passed us on siding carry 300 soldiers, at 7:30 AM. Departed from Liu Sho Ying 7:40 AM.

29.

Pei Ya Ho
Arrived 8:12 A.M.
Departed 10:26 A.M.

West bound wounded train leaving Pei Ya Ho at 7:32 AM. Mostly shrapnel some cases of mumps some of the wounded are in pretty bad conditions 12 boxes, 10 Gondolas, and 1 box looked. 7.0 Negroe ~~mumbbbbbbbx~~ claims that the lookedour containg approx. 30 dead. Approx. 250 wounded on this train. East ~~WWWW~~ Bound engines #40 130, 218. 35 boxes of supplies, 28 Gondolas, approx 150 Soldiers, 24 head horses, 12 long Carts and 50 coolies. 10:00AM . ALLIED TRAIN coupled in rear of Chinese Troop and ammunition train. ( due to the misunderstanding of the interpreter) Uncoupled at 10:07AM. X 4 Cases of new rifles loaded on above ammunition train.

30.

Nan Ya Nan
Arrived 10:45 AM.
Departed 11:36 AM.

West bound engine No. 339 wounded train, 47 cars 4 coaches. 75 wounded mostly head wounds. Approx. 125 soldiers aboard. ARMORED TRAIN OF TWENTY SIX GONDOLAS ON SIDE TRACK NORTH OF STATION. LOOP HOLES CUT INTO THE SIDE FOR MACHINE GUNS OF LIGHT FIELD PIECES AND ALSO LOOP HOLES FOR FOURTEEN RIFLES. ENGINE ALL STEAMED UP AND READY TO LEAVE AT ANY TIME. Engine No. 41. 11:02 AM. Areoplane going west over Nan Ta Ssu .(WU FEI FU) 11:03 AM. Growing sleep in hills north of Shan Hai Kuan ( ARE FINE En-route to Nan Ta Ssu passed engines 236,322, 605,140,235. each engine hauling about fifteen cars of supplies and forage. Eng. No. 522 stalled just east of Nan Ta Ssu , 15 boxes, 10 Gondolas, 50 soldiers, 5 cars supplies, 1 car wood. Passed K.K. camp at Nan Ta Ssu 11:42 everything seemed to be intact. 11:45 passed Eng. No. 139. 8 boxes, 16 gons, and 15 horses, and 20 soldiers. 11:46 passed Eng. 518 . 29 gons, 2 cars Supplies 150 soldiers. 11:47 passed eng. 615 . 11:50 Eng. No. 203 Dead, hooked up to 16 empty gons. 11:51 AM. eng . 26 Dead. 18 cars of forage, 4 cars baskets, 15 boxes, 7 empties. 11:53 eng. K.K. 103 Dead, 18 gons and 1 Box empty. 11:55 passed eng. 355, 7 boxes on bridge. 11:57 Passed Eng. 76 with 1 box. Eng. 608 Dead, 100 horses 7 dead from starvation, 60 gons, and 100 long carts.

Sheet 7

30 Contd.
11:59 passed eng. [illegible], four boxes, 12[illegible], Passed 50 Boxes at over head bridge Shin Wang Tao, 200 Soldiers, 100 Horses 50 long carts camped 200 yds. north of tracks, 50 tents on right of tracks, 24 tents and 80 horses at west signal station. [illegible]

31.

Chin Wang Tao
Arrived 12:11 P.M.
Departed 1:26 P.M.

200 Bales Blankets, 55 tents, 50 cars Supplies half loaded, P.M. 1st. Class cars on siding. Marshall Wu has ordered P.M. to prepare to receive 75 trains from south on the T.P. RR. from Marshall Chi's Division. Large Tent camp north of Sec. House approx. 300 tents, 40 coaches on siding next to Main Lines, mostly first and second class cars. Many Cavalry on P.M. cars. 30 cars on siding ( 4th. from Main line) covered with tents. Camps on platform, 200 rolls of bedding on platform, ten long carts. 400 soldiers.( INF) Camped 250 yds. North of Station, 100 Long carts with red flags.( RED FLAGS INDICATE INF. WAGON TRAINS) one Bn. Chinese Inf. Sent scouts out at 12:54 P.M. the remainder of the Bn@ moving overland at a slow march towards the field of action. On station Platform there are 300 bags Bran, 250 bags Rice, 50 bales Hay, 30 horses, ( picket line) 25 Caissons, ( No pieces) 50 men camped on platform and 50 in the station. Four 75s Art. ( JAP. MANFU) 50 men, 100 east of station platform. 2 Mtn. Howitzers, ( Jap Manu) on main platform. 60 wounded , five dead. wounds mostly hands and head, only three with leg wounds and they were injured during art. action.

32.

Shan Hai Kwan
Arrived 2:07 P.M.
Departed 7:04 P.M.

Field wireless stations in operation, 250 yds. NE of Station. Occasional artillery fire can be heard in the hill north of SHK . Coach hit by shrapnel on station platform, 5 officers killed and 2 wounded, 3rd. Cl. Car No. 61. Several bodies completely shattered clothing driven thru the seats and four seats completely demolished Freight pulled out West bound 3:54 P.M. all empties. Took a walk to the Great Wall near the Station and saw where the Govt. troops are holding their lines several li north of the wall, many trenches and Light Art. Emplacements can be seen . Det. Govt. Troops camped in city outside of Great Wall, Vaer little artillery fire at this time and no small arms fire. Block Signal Station damaged by overhead bomb, also R.R.Hotel and Station Hotel, Two Anti Air Craft Guns ( 75mm) mounted on Italian Trucks in position on Flat cars 400 yards NE of Station. Box car on siding containing one mountain Howitzer and 500 rounds of ammunition (cal 3") Field wireless set also in car, along with many other modern supplies, loading devices, and material for loading a 1000 more rounds of 3" ammunition. Three other guns of this battery are at the front this gun being back for repairs, there are 15 complete tool chests containing modern instruments, and a competent chinese left in charge.

sheet 8

32 cont.

Took a walk into the Walled City and observed the following: 1 shop store having 200 rounds, for 3" mountain battery, with a detachment of five men from the 26th Div. on guard. Entire walled city patrolled by mounted men armed with rifles. Long carts on way to the from could be seen from the walled city as far as could be seen with our glasses. 1 Hosp dressing station, about 100 men stationed there. Detachment of the 1st Div. on Guard at a go-down just out side the walled city in which was stored ammunition for 3" pieces, unable to ascertain just how much. Most of the troops in Shanhai Kwan at the present time are Labor Battalions, and Engineers. All seemed very friendly and disposed towards us, there was no looting that we could see, but the few merchants that were open for business were selling for cash only, the troops seemingly having considerable money and were not bargaining to any great extent. There were many AMAHS on the streets and all were busy sewing fur and hair lining on the long coats for the winter campaign. ( this applies to CWR also) Approx number of troops in Shan Hai Kwan at the time 8000. Noticed that a few men were wearing a european model trench helmet and questioned a man a CWR about his, he claimed to be at one time in a Canadian Labor Battalion in France and had brought his home with him, however during the day we noticed over fifty more and using an interporter we found that the men at the front are now being equiped with this helmet account of the superior shrapnell fire of Chang So Lin. 5 Gondolas of grain on side tracks east of station, all other supplies have been removed to Storage.

33. 6:25 rocket signal, and at 6:35 PM. a general battle started in the hills about four miles north and slightly west of Shan Hai Kwan, could see shrapnell burst very clearly, and discern machine gun and rifle fire plainly, the artillery was the dominant arm of this battle, stray shells could be heard going over Shan Hai Kwan. Leaving Shan Hai Kwan our engineer was given orders to proceed with caution, as there was heavy artillery fire on our right four miles. About 7:26 rocket sent up from fields near track, was riding in the engine at the time and saw the man light it, our fireman called it PENG PAO. As soon as this rocket had expended itself the fire grew heavier. 7:45 Stopped by lantern signal C W T near main station, at crossing leading into the main part of town. There was a train of 30 empty gondolas ahead of us. Night Battle North ¼ West C W T shrapnell bursting bursting quite high and almost a constant light in the air from the bursts. Vantage Points such a overhead bridges and two story houses filled with people watching.

Sheet 9

33 con.
There were searchlights from the Feng Tien [illegible] almost constantly at work, 8:25 train composed of 30 cars horses, ten long carts four cars forage and supplies, about eighty men, and four Italian 75s. This train backed into C W T at 10:30 P.M. 10:30 Art. fire at this time much lighter, Inf. and M.G. much heavier. Capt. Kennedy Int. Officer. British Forces came on board with Civ. employee B.A.T. 10:45 Art. resumes heavy firing. a train of long carts left for the front, saw about fifty moving out and started to overhaul them so as to find out the contents, about 12:15 I reached the head of the column about two miles from C.W.T and found that there were 150 long carts each containing 3 cases of ammunition for 75s each case containing 9 rounds of amm. There were about twenty carts of bedding and supplies other than amm. 400 men, 320 mules, 2 pieces of mountain Art. , 4 pieces Italian 75s , also in a small train that I passed returning to C.W.T. a small train of mountain battery amm. 20 cases. From my position north of C W T the action seems much less pronounced Art. firing only Ocassionaly.

34. October 23rd. 1:15 to 2:00 AM. Art. Fire very heavy, after 2:00 A.M. firing at intervals of 5 or 10 minutes. 3:00 Searchlights playing over the hills from bothe forces picked up an areoplane, very clear for a moment in the light of both lights, the CHIHLI force light seemed to be several miles nearer than the Feng Tien one. 3:15 AM. another increase in firing of all arms, lasted untill 3:30 ocassional Art. and Inf. action the balance of the night; the Inf. action seemed fainter as if further away. 5:30 Three additional 75s unloaded at platform at C W T. 6:15 A.M. Discharged at C W T station 800 Infantry collar device 54 I equipment as follows; rifles, 250 rounds of amm. per man. all men well clothed and all carried new entrenching tools, saws, picks, shovels; 2 automatic rifles ( covered) 20 cases amm. 2 repair chests, 300 horses excellent condition and well fed. 5 cars of supplies 8, 75s , ( Italian) This regiment was well drilled and the discipline was the best that we have observed. The men all gathered around the regimental commander for instructions ans when finished they fell back into orderly ranks, as they were about to move away twenty men came up all carrying 50 hand grenades each, the model was plunger. 7:40 Areoplane west Wu Pei Fu. 8:55 one engine east bound [illegible] with box car amm. 75s and rifle. 8:25 Areoplane North , no red band band assume it to be Chang So Lin's. 9:45 A.M. 22 long carts loaded with 1000 rounds of amm, for 75s and supplies about 4[illegible] soldiers all well armed, moving towards front. 9:50 ALLIED TRAIN moved towards C W T station 9:57 AM. stopped. 1pounder Anti Air Craft on station platform, movable base, 500 rounds amm.

34 con.
Coolies on track south of station delivered 2000 rounds of expended 75s. 20 car loads of Flour and 50 cars of forage at siding C W T . Kitchens Kitchen centers north of tracks are making dough balls and issuing them to All classes of troops here. Pulled into C W T station 10:30 A.M. Three field wireless stations in yards. Marconi field type with twin opposed motor for generations Approx. 15000 troops of all classes here. Principal arms branches Cav. and Art. Train on east platform loaded about three hundred wounded. very few dead seem to be coming into C W T . the majority of the wounded are litter cases, the slightly wounded and head wounds nearly always being compelled to walk in to the trains.

DEPARTED C W T RETURN TRIP 11:03 AM.

35. On narrow guage track west of C W T 4 pieces of Art. Looked to be 75s loaded on the cars and dinky engine with steam up ready tomove out. ( Laying three new additional side tracks at C W T north of station)

36. Passed 8 troop trains loaded with supplys, troops, forage and wood. East bound, all stalled between C W T and Nan Ta Ssu.

37. NAN TA SSU RETURN TRIP
Arrived 11:[illegible] A.M.
Departed 11:28 A.M.
Armored train with steam up still in position. Engines 537, 616, 235, 408, stalled at Nan Ta Ssu, troops and supplies East. Two BLUE EXPRESS CARS noted this morning at Nan Ta Ssu.

38. Between Nan Ta Ssu there were the following trains all held up apparently for lack of room at C W T . Eng. 236, 322, 220 with cars loaded with troops supplies and forage. Approx. 200 troops and 50 head of horses at Nan Ta Ssu.

39. PEI TA HO RETURN TRIP
Arrived 11:45 A.M.
Departed 12:01 P.M.
Engines, 123. 231, with cars loaded with 75 long carts, 150 head of horses, and two cars forage, horses in fair condition. Engine 515 west bound 25 empty boxes. Eng. and 12 coaches East. 200 troops .

40. Between Pei Ta Ho and Liu Shou Ying there were the following; Eng. 233 with 26 gons coal east. Eng. XXXX 234 with supplies east. Eng. 145, east with 22 cars, 200 troops, 50 head horses, 10 long carts, 2 cars forage, 3 cars supplies.

42. LIU SHOU YING RETURN TRIP
Arrived 12:25 P.M.
Departed 12:40 P.M.

Eng. 44 , east, 3 coaches, Eng. 329 East two cars., 12:42 Eng. 40 , 1 Coach, 12:45 Eng. 337 P.S., 1 supply car, 150 soldiers 150 head horses, condition fair, 20 carts, 1 Coach, 50 coolies and 20 gons. 12:47, Eng. 82, 150 horses, condition fair, 200 soldiers, 50 coolies, 5 cars forage, 5 boxes, 30 gons. 60 long Carts, many red flags on the carts, 2 coaches. 12:49 [illegible] Eng. 618, 4 cars and 1 coach. 12:50 Eng. 211 2 Boxes, 21 gons forage. 12:52 Eng. 623 P.M. 30 cars, 200 Soldiers. 12:54 Eng. 403, 15o horses, 400 soldiers. 12:58, Eng. 234, 8 cars. Eng. 127, 50 soldiers, 5 cars wood & Box cars.

42. CHANG CHIA CHUANG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 1:02 P.M.
No stop

43. 1:14 P.M. stopped east of Chang Li, delay due to a west bound freight ahead. 1:16 West bound freight pulling ahead, 1:18 proceeded west. 1:19 P.M. Passed east bound engine No. 255, fifteen gondolas with forage, 7 boxes supplies , 7 soldiers and 10 coolies. 1:44 P.M. Passed engine 148 east bound. 3 Boxes with supplies.

44. C HANG LI RETURN TRIP
Arrived 1:48 P.M.
Departed 2:04 P.M.

Mile south Chang Li near clup of trees 8 scout Planes and two Large Bombers. 7 Engines loaded with boxes and supplies east bound stalled in Chang Li. Search light and Dismantled Aeroplane in former position.

45. 2:15 P.M. Eng. 134 East , 9 coaches and 2 Gondolas, 200 troops.

46. HOU FENG TAI RETURN TRIP
Arrived 2:20 P.M.
Departed 2:26 P.M.

47. ANSHAN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 3:09 P.M.
Deaprt 3:22 P.M.

48. SHIH MEN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 3:55 P.M.
Departed 4:40 P.M.

49. CHIA KO CHUANG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 4:55
Departed 5:05 P.M.

50. LAN HSIEN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 5:15 P.M.
Departed 5:38 P.M.
Jap Soldier brought aboard at this station in litter, head in bandages. Eng. 620 P.M. East. 30 boxes,20 gondolas, 8 forage and 12 empties. 100 soldiers. 5 Cons no eng. loaded with sacked grain on siding.

51. Eng. and 6 coaches east bound.

52. TO TZU TO RETURN TRIP
Arrived 5:55 P.M.
Departed 6:10 P.M.

53. LIECHUANG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 6:27 P.M.
Departed 6:47 P.M.

54. 6:54 P.M. Passed 10 Cons loaded with troops approx 200 east bound.

55. PEI CHIA TIEN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 7:08 P.M.
Departed 7:48 P.M.

56. KUZEN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 7:56 P.M.
Departed 8:32 P.M.
Long carts have not been removed, 10 cars supplies in yards, small detachments of soldiers riding cars.

57. WALI RETURN TRIP
Arrived 8:50 P.M.
Departed 8:52 P.M.

58. KAI PENG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 9:08 P.M.
Departed 9:37 P.M.

10 gondolas forage, six, guns tanks. 30 head horses. 20 native soldiers. 2 eng. steamed up over on forage and soldier train east bound. Other engine in yards ahead of string. Empty boxes. many empty guns in yards. 4 Armored tankd Rapid fire guns mounted in turrets . ( Caterpiller Type tractors ) appear to be quite new, and in excellent condition. These are in yards back of stone fence and have native soldiers guarding them.

59. 9:40 arrived east yards Tang Shan. delay occasioned by station tracks filled with trains. Passed 3 Boxes . 10 guns, 60 men east bound.

60. TANG SHAN RETURN TRIP
Arrived 10:13 P.M.
Departed 11:03 P.M.

U.S. Provosts Guard at the station platform reports U.S.Guards proceeding to Liaohusng at Nine P.M. Also that Gen Feng has delivered his forces to the enemy side. About 500 troops in Yards here in troop trains. Troop Train West was due to leave as SPECIAL when we took the staff from him and proceeded on his schedule. At Tang Shan the civilians who visited the ALLIED TROOPS TRAIN seem much worried by possible invasion of chinese troops, into foriegn homes and businesses.

61. HSO KO CHUANG
No stop

62. TANG PANG
No Stop

63. TIEN CHUANG
No Stop

64. LU TAI
Arrived 11:55 P.M.
Departed 11:58 P.M.

65. MAN KU
Arrived 12:09 A.M. Oct. 24.
No Stop

66. CHA TING
Arrived 12:17 A.M.
Departed 12:24 A.M.

67. PEI TANG
Arrived 12:39 A.M.
Departed 12:47 A.M.

68. [illegible] RETURN TRIP
Arrived 1:00 A.M.
Departed 1:03 A.M.
Coal Train West Bound on siding.

69. HSIN MO RETURN TRIP
Arrived 1:09 A.M.
Departed 1:18 A.M.

70. CHUNG LIANG CHENG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 1:40 A.M.
Departed 2:10 A.M.
6boxcars 26 flats here on goods train east bound. 25 Gondolas East bound empties. Delay occasioned by yards being blocked by trains. 25 gondolas west bound, mostly coal.

71. [illegible] KUEI CHANG RETURN TRIP
Arrived 2:25 A.M.
Departed 3:50 A.M
Two engines and 47 cars supplies east bound. Awaiting this train was cause of the delay.

72. TIEN TSIN
Arrived 4:10 AM.

The morale of the American troops was Excellent and there was no occasion to complain of duty or of the mess.

Lt. Golightly was in command of the detachment and recommended that the sentries would be on each end of the platforms at all stations, this was carried out to the letter.

The third class car that was assigned to these forces was very uncomfortable the first night as there was no steam heat, this was remedied as soon as was possible by the detachment commander, who had the U.S. and other foriegn cars placed first in the train line up.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A CORRECT AND TRUE COPY OF THE DIARY KEPT BY MYSELF ON THE TRIP OF THE ALLIED SPECIAL FROM TIEN TSIN TO SHAN HAI KUAN AND RETURN.

Edward Thilly
Hqrs. Co. 15th. Inf.

Charles A Peyton
Co. "G" 15th. Inf.

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN BARRACKS,
TIENTSIN, CHINA,

October 17, 1924.

Subject: Report on Trip with Inter-Allied Train from Tientsin East to Shan-hai-kuan and return.

To: The Senior Commandant, Allied Troops, Japanese General Headquarters, Tientsin, China. (Thru channels).

1.- In compliance with instructions the following report on the trip from Tientsin East to Shan-hai-kuan and return with the Inter-Allied train, is submitted;

2.- Schedule of trip:

| DATE | LEAVE PLACE | TIME | DATE | ARRIVE PLACE | TIME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct.14/24 | Tientsin East | 12:15 P.M. | Oct.14/24 | Tungku | 1:45 P.M. |
| " 15/24 | Tungku | 12:55 A.M. | Oct.15/24 | Tongshan | 5:00 A.M. |
| " 15/24 | Tongshan | 5:30 A.M. | " 15/24 | Lan-Hsien | 7:30 A.M. |
| " 15/24 | Lan-Hsien | 7:45 A.M. | " 15/24 | Chinwangtao | 11:30 A.M. |
| " 15/24 | Chinwangtao | 6:45 P.M. | " 15/24 | [illegible] | 7:30 P.M. |
| " 15/24 | Shanhaikwan | 11:30 P.M. | " 16/24 | [illegible] | 12:15 A.M. |
| " 16/24 | Chinwangtao | 2:15 A.M. | " [illegible] | Lan-Hsien | 6:30 A.M. |
| " 16/24 | Lan-Hsien | 7:00 A.M. | " 16/24 | Tongshan | 8:10 A.M. |
| " 16/24 | Tongshan | 9:20 A.M. | " 16/24 | Tungku | 12:15 P.M. |
| " 16/24 | Tungku | 3:30 P.M. | " 16/24 | Tientsin East | 6:00 P.M. |

3.- Railroad:

(1) The railroad and all structures and auxiliaries are in good condition from Tientsin East to Shan-hai-kuan. All bridges are guarded by men of the Chih-li forces and no attempt has been made to injure the tracks or communication facilities in any way.

(2) General Wu's Army are constructing special sidings at Chinwangtao in order to relieve congestion of traffic at that point.

(3) The double track is in operation from Shan-hai-kuan to Tongshan except the additional track is not under control of the block signal system. The new road bed appears to have been carefully constructed.

4.- Traffic congestion. - Traffic congestion existed at only two points along the railroad. These points are at Tung-ku and Chinwangtao.

The traffic congestion is due mainly to one fault; that is, Chih-li soldiers threatening the railroad men, who in turn leave the yards thereby leaving the train without a staff. At Tung-ku the blocked condition of the railroad on October 14, 1924, was due to three trains without staff

[redacted]

Copies of these telegrams are attached.

[redacted]
(Copies of Telegrams).

PAUL STEVENS,
Captain,15th Infantry,
Commanding Inter-Allied Train.

HQ. AM. FORCES in CHINA
RECEIVED
OCT 18 1924

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
5-3
2657-D
230
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

Subject: [redacted]

In spite of the fact that the atrocities committed by the Chinese troops incident to the Saigon affair are beyond description in the language of civilized people, the Chinese, in order to cover up these atrocities, are now picturing absolutely false propaganda in the attempt to mislead public opinion and arouse sympathy for themselves, but such a shameless policy should be observed and any explanation considered valueless. In the explanation of the affair which is given below, it is clear that there can be no doubt left as to where the blame lies.

The Southern Army Guard reports that the Japanese troops committed atrocities against some of the Negotiation Committee officials (i.e., Nanking Negotiation Committee according to the newspapers) while said officials were within the area which was under control of the Japanese troops, but the fact is that these officials were given full protection. Mr. Tsai, chief the Negotiation Committee officials, was not even at the place described when the affair occurred. Mr. Kung-Po, another official of the Committee, spent some the entire day at our Brigade Headquarters after the affair had broken out and he, without any doubt, recognized the lawlessness of the actions of the Chinese and so stated, expressing regret for the whole affair.

A part of one Chinese barracks and part of a wireless station were blown up by a mine which was hired by the Northern troops and our troops can in no way be held responsible for these occurrences.

The following is an account of the murders and atrocities committed by the Chinese soldiers and which were confirmed by our troops immediately after the affair (The names are known but they are omitted here).

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The following events occurred near Ito-shi street:

After murdering a Japanese coach, they stripped her, gouged out both eyes and cut out her private parts.

They murdered a Japanese man, cut off his private parts and exposed them on his chest.

They murdered a Japanese man by splitting his head open with a wood chopper.

According to the reports of newspaper correspondents, the atrocities were so dreadful as to be unprintable. In this document, only the important points are officially reported.

Damages among foreigners were as follows:

2 houses of foreign hotel.
1 American missionary murdered.

These are known facts.

The official report of the known damage and injuries among the Japanese up to May 5th is as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Killed | 12 |
| Whereabouts unknown | 32 |
| Suspected killed | 2 |
| Damages on women | 2 |
| Wounded | 9 (among them 4 women) |
| Looting incidents | 28 |

Reports and photographs of these atrocities committed by the Chinese soldiers against our men and women residents are expected to arrive soon.

It is the mission of our expeditionary force to guard the district in which our people live. This has been published both at home and abroad.

We honor no hostile feelings towards any of the Chinese parties who are fighting as shown by our policy of non-interference when the Northern Army retreated from Hsiuyen and the Southern Army entered that place.

When the Northern Army entered the present that Japanese troops consider the Northern Army as an army in defeat that punishments and renews the defensive measures which you are now engaged in repairing," our troops appreciated the sincerity of their intentions, but since the Nanking Incident the anti-Japanese spirit has sprung up and Kuo Yu Ko's troops have shown their contempt for our troops, even going so far as to display placards with "Destroy Liu Hsiang," "Down with Japanese Imperialism," etc. written on them right in front of our lines of security. This was clearly insulting and when we even entered it, they flatly hold our military dignity in such contempt that they entered our security area, brazenly looting and even firing upon our officers and men who are engaged in preventing these practices. In the attempt to oppose our activities, they simultaneously opened a propaganda attack against our Hsiang native line. At the same time they engaged in committing inexcusable atrocities against our resident people, especially against the women and children who are powerless to oppose them and entirely innocent and harmless. These facts have been heretofore stated.

It was not sufficient that we inflict punishment for these atrocities which are unbearable in the eyes of God and man, but our troops also desired to prevent the harmless Chinese civilians from coming under fire, so upon agreement with the Southern Army, we eventually consented to suspend action. However, the orders of the Southern Army Headquarters could not be enforced with any expediency, with the result that regardless certain Chinese troops cruelly insulted our Liaison officers and otherwise displayed insincerity and bad faith in the content of our mutual agreement.

For these reasons we were unable to recognize any sincerity on their part nor could we believe that any authority over the Chinese troops existed. We then attempted positive remedial action by going forward in order to enable us to accomplish our mission, but the Southern Army continued a policy of futile procrastination until we were finally forced to recognize that they had no intention of recognizing our demands. So at dawn, May 9th, we commenced disarming the Southern Army troops and a general engagement continued all of that day resulting in the annoying away of most of the Southern Army.

As previously shown, our troops were unavoidably forced to fight by reason of their mission which was to use every means to protect residents and finally in self-defense.

There is not one point during this time which can be obviously criticized from the purest view of fairness and justice, but in spite of this, the Southern Army has attempted to harass us by spreading false propaganda. This propaganda is intolerable and we pity the lameness of such a policy.

It is our recollection that since the China-Japan and Russo-Japanese wars, our troops have had a reputation for fairness and justice as their actions have clearly shown. This is recognized throughout the world. And now the Southern Army spreads outrageous false propaganda which thoughtful people will merely hold up to laughter. However, we cannot guarantee that this persistent injurious propaganda will not be used with evil motives by certain people who would seek to employ it for selfish purposes. Therefore, we herewith without delay make clear the real facts, which are based upon official reports already promptly.

Please bear in mind that, of various related causes, there are many facts in the above report which we have avoided making public in the press.

---oOo---

[redacted]

1.- The chinese hope to cover up their atrocities by the circulation of false reports, especially regarding the alleged murder of the Legation Counsilor number, Mr. Enk, although, according to the official reports made by our troops, the facts were, that at theyry time when this event was supposed to have taken place, steps for diplomatic exhchange negotiations were being formally undertaken by ourselves and Mr. Mr Ming Yeh, and our troops were in ignorance of there being a personnel such as a member of the counsilor. Also at that time the officers of the Comission were decoyed by Chinese troops who opened fire upon our troops with the result that we suffered many casualties and were unavoidably compelled to resist to force in the disarming of the Chinese troops. While this was going on a number of Chinese officers who opposed us were killed, but naturally their names are unknown.

2.- According to the propaganda spread by the Chinese, our troops first of arrive, with the house of the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee,Mr. Kumbin,as their target, although from the commencement of the affair Mr. Kumbin was under the protection of our troops and was received and treated with every consideration at our Brigade Headquarters. He signed a statement in which he greatly regrets the violence of the Chinese troops and explains the fact that our troops were attacked. In the evening he was sent back to Sha-Hai-Kuan.

3.- Of the great amount of proof on hand, the two examples which follow give ample proof of the intention of the Japs with the Japanese and the Japanese troops:

1.- [redacted] the incident occurred, a detachment of Japanese troops entered the house of a Mr. Mo [redacted] which is on the waterfront, and a search conducted later on resulted in the discovery of the following documents:

[redacted]

3 - On the 10th certain troops of the 3rd Army southern Front, investigated the Roman Church which is near the Niigata Girls Middle of the walled city, and subsequently took possession of the Church and of the Primary school belonging to it. These facts are evident, for "Keep with the Foreigner" was written in large characters on the blackboard of the school and a number of rounds of rifle ammunition and grenades were scattered all about.

According to an American newspaper, the Washington Post, through a thorough dispatch, it is stated that the Japanese troops who were in Niigata had entered and occupied the University there which is under American management, but the facts of this affair are described below in order to give a clear understanding to everybody:

[redacted]

Memo of the statement issued July 11, 1938.

As a result of the hostilities which have been in progress for a long time in China, the very existence of the people is insecure and China is rapidly falling into a condition of complete subjection.

Conditions are such that the foreigners residing there have to assume that there will be any safety or stability for their various callings. Everyone desires that hostilities will some day soon come to an end and that a peaceful China will emerge.

The members of the Corps Diplomatique strongly desire this, especially those of countries adjacent to China and those who have the interests of the Empire deeply at heart. But now the disturbed conditions in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin is spreading, generally toward Manchuria, where the influence is being felt.

With the peace of Manchuria in mind, the situation is being very carefully watched by the Empire and if that peace is disrupted the Imperial Government, by very strenuous means, intends to check the source of this disruption of Manchuria's peaceful conditions because, in case of hostilities, at present being carried on in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin, have more widely spread and the disturbance extends to Manchuria, the Imperial Government must take the necessary steps to insure peace in Manchuria and put into force effective means of controlling the situation. However, an attitude of strict neutrality must be maintained towards the various belligerent groups.

The policy of the Imperial Government has undergone no change whatsoever in this respect, as stated above, in case it becomes necessary to take over control of the situation, the methods employed towards both belligerents will show the utmost impartiality. We affirm that the greatest care will be exercised in this regard.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1925 2657.9-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

COPY--NO. 76

# CONFIDENTIAL

## SITUATION SURVEY

### FOR THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 11TH to JANUARY 24th 1924.

### INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

### HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA.

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## MILITARY

At 2:50 P.M. on the 11th, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, accompanied by most of his staff and his son, General Chang Hsueh-liang, left Tientsin Central Station for Mukden. His train was preceded by a train of his body guard and two heavily loaded troop trains followed. So the Provisional Executive, Tuan Chi-jui, is left alone to his fate in Peking without military support and with his political following, from many indications, gradually vanishing. Chang's excuse was that his presence was urgently required in Mukden over the Chinese New Year, but many observers are inclined to credit another explanation, i.e., that after his Machang force of Fengtien troops had finally been committed to the southern campaign against Chi Hsieh-yuan in the Shanghai district, Chang felt that he would be safer in his home territory, since Feng Yu-hsiang still loomed as an uncertain quantity. Chang also stated that he would not be present at the Rehabilitation Conference of Tuan's but would send a representative. All of Chang's troops from Yangtsun, Peitsang, and in or near Tientsin, followed him back to Mukden within a few days; however, no troops were sent back from Machang or anywhere along the Tientsin-Pukow line. These troops along the Tsin-Pu were all under the command of either Chang Tsung-chang or Li Ching-lin and had been turned over to these leaders to employ as they judged best. Chang, however, is now in Mukden and from all reports is satisfied to remain there if unmolested, for his triumphal march to Peking has not been nearly as successful as he had hoped.

Lu Yung-hsiang moved into Nanking shortly after the arrival of General Chang Tsung-chang and his Fengtien Chinese and Russian troops (Situation Survey # 75) but Chi and Sun Chuang-fang immediately sent detachments north from Shanghai as far as Chinkiang along the river, establishing their headquarters at Soochow on the Shanghai-Nanking railway. Lu Yung-hsiang then began to call on Chang Tso-lin for more reinforcements and on the 18th the first train of Fengtien troops passed through Tientsin for the south from Lutai to reinforce Lu. Six more trains have followed to date but it will be noted that none of these have come from Mukden. Chang has

sent several cars of ammunition but no troops except from the Lutai section, where it was estimated some weeks ago there were about 5000. Requests have been made to the railway authorities for five more trains to transport the remainder of this Lutai detachment but up to the present it is impossible to obtain either locomotives or cars, hence there has been no movement of troops in any direction for the past several days. Lu therefore remains in Nanking without any large reinforcements coming, from Chang Tso-lin at least. In Shanghai, however, there has been more activity. General Chang Yuan-ming, the new Defence Commissioner, recently appointed by Executive Tuan Chi-jui,had about 11,000 troops in and near Shanghai with his main concentration at Lunghua Junction. Sun Chuang-fang's troops from Chekiang, in conjunction with Chi's from Shanghai, attacked Lunghua and Siccawei and after a twenty-four hours' battle succeeded in capturing the entire lot. These troops were immediately disarmed and interned in the foreign concessions. In the meantime, foreign marines and sailors had been landed from the American, British, French, Italian and Japanese vessels in Shanghai harbor, for the protection of the foreigners in Shanghai proper. On Chi's northern front sufficient force had been brought to bear by Lu at Chinkiang so that Chi fell back to Soochow, where his line was entrenched in a generally northeasternly direction to the river. The problem then of chief importance to the foreign population in Shanghai was the disposition of the 11,000 disarmed Chinese troops interned under foreign guard in Shanghai. The solution finally arrived at was to charter ships and send the entire number to Tsingtao from which point it was stated they could be distributed to their homes in Shantung and northern Kiangsu. Several boats were therefore chartered, the expense being chiefly borne by Chambers of Commerce and various foreign organizations, and all the troops were finally landed at Tsingtao. This was an opportunity which could not be overlooked by Lu Yung-hsiang still in need of reinforcements. Lu immediately seized all the spare rolling stock on the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway and assembled it at Tsingtao. The troops were transferred directly to the waiting cars, given two dollars each, and shipped to Tsinan where arms were supplied. From here they were sent south-over the Tsin-Pu to again fight under

their former chief, although now attacking Shanghai instead of defending it. The effect of this reinforcement, however, has not yet been felt in the front line, since it is reported by the railway authorities that the Tsin-Pu is entirely blocked between Suchowfu and Pukow. Little change has occurred in the lines since the advance of Lu's to Chinkiang, although it is reported that Sun Chuang-fang has sent detachments west of Lake Tai Hu to Ishing, which materially increases Chi's line of defence. Chinese New Year was too near at hand for any serious warlike activity, hence on the 23rd a seven days' truce was declared in order to permit the observation of this holiday by the contending troops. What will occur after the expiration of this respite remains to be seen. Chi now has under his direct command his old 6th Division and the 19th Division and Sun Chuang-fang has at least the equivalent of three divisions, although his actual strength is not known. Lu so far has only the Fengtien troops and the once defeated 11,000 of Chang Yuan-ming. The loyalty of the old leaders of Kiangsu, including Bei Bo-shan, all formerly subordinate to Chi, is still questionable and, if they decide to cast their lot again with their ex-leader, Chi Hsieh-yuan, Lu will find his position most difficult as their troops are all in Northern Kiangsu in excellent position to cut Lu off from any northern reinforcements and entirely surround him.

Wu Pei-fu is still at Shishan in Hupeh and no new developments have occurred along the Peking-Hankow with Sun Yueh, Hu Ching-yi, and Hsiao Yao-nan. There is a rumor to the effect that Chi and Sun Chuang-fang will be joined by Wu and Hsiao Yao-nan in a general Yangtze uprising but there is nothing at present to substantiate this.

## POLITICAL

The most important political development during this period, while not of particular significance to China, was the signature in the early morning of the 21st of the Russo-Japanese treaty. This was the culmination of more than three years of negotiation and by its signature Japan recognizes Soviet Russia. The complete text will not be made public until after ratifications have been exchanged. The Japanese Legation issued the following outline of the documents, in all consisting of six :

1. Convention embodying the basic rules for the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia.

2. Two Protocols.

3. Declaration by Mr. Karahan to the effect that the recognition by Soviet Russia of the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty does not signify the Soviet Government shares with the former Tzarist Government political responsibility for its conclusion.

4. One set of notes relating to the continuance of work in North Saghalien which is now being carried on by the Japanese in the oil and coal fields.

5. One annexed note signed by Mr. Karahan by which he renders to the Japanese Government an expression of sincere regret for the Nikolaivesk incident of 1920.

6. The Protocol of signatures.

The Convention embodies seven articles which are outlined as follows:

1. With the coming into force of the present convention, diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the two countires.

2. Relative to the Portsmouth and other treaties, and

conventions shall be re-examined at a subsequent conference for revision or annulment.

3. Upon the coming into force of the present convention, the governments shall proceed to a revision of the Fishery Convention of 1907. Pending the conclusion of a convention, Soviet Russia shall maintain the practice established in 1924 relating to the lease of fishery lots.

4. Upon the coming into force of the present convention, they shall proceed to the conclusion of a treaty commerce and navigation in conformity with the principles undermentioned. Pending the conclusions of such treaty, general intercourse shall be regulated by these principles.

The people of both contracting parties shall in accordance with the laws of the country:

(a) have liberty to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other.

(b) enjoy protection for their lives and property.

(c) Each shall in accordance with the laws of the country accord the people of the other on condition of reciprocity, the right of private ownership and liberty to engage in commerce, navigation, industry and other peaceful pursuits.

(d) It is understood that neither party shall apply any discrimination against the other, any measure or prohibition, restraint or impost, which may serve to hamper the growth of intercourse, it being the intention of both parties to place the commerce, navigation and industry on the footing of the most favored nation.

5. Both contracting parties solemnly affirm to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental service for them and all organizations in receipt of financial assistance from them, from any act liable to endanger the order and security in any part of the territory of Japan and Soviet Russia. Neither Party shall permit the presence in the territories (a) of organizations pretending to be the government for any part of the territory of the other party or (b) of aliens who may be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organizations.

6. The Soviet Government is willing to grant to Japanese concessions for the exploitation of minerals, forests and other natural resources in all the territory of Soviet Russia.

7. Provides for the ratification of the present convention.

PROTOCOL (A) is composed of the five articles:

1. Relative to the return embassies and consulates in Russia and Japan.

2. All questions of debts due to the government or subjects of Japan on account of public loans or treasury bills issued by the former Russian Government are reserved for readjustment at subsequent negotiations, provided that the government of Japan shall not, all other conditions being equal, be placed in any position less favorable than that which the Soviet Government may accord to the government or nationals of any other country on a similar question. All questions relative to claims of either government against the government of the party or the nationals of one party against the nationsals of the other are reserved for adjustment at subsequent negotiations. (This is understood to apply to claims other than debts such as arising from warfare in Siberia, etc.)

3. The Japanese troops in Northern Saghalien shall be completely withdrawn from said region by May 15, 1925. Such withdrawal shall be commenced as soon as climatic conditions will permit and all districts in Northern Saghalien evacuated by Japanese troops shall immediately be restored in full sovereignty to the proper Soviet authorities. The details relating to the transfer of administration shall be arranged at Alexandrovsk between the Japanese Commandant and the Soviet representative.

4. Both parties declare that there exists no treaty or agreement of military alliance, nor any other secret agreement upon nor a menace to the territorial rights or natural security of the other party.

5. The present protocol is to be considered ratified by the ratification of the Convention embodying the basic rules for the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia.

PROTOCOL (B). (Concessions in Saghalien nine articles.)

POLITICAL (Cont'd)

Soviet Russia grants to Japanese firms recommended by the Japanese Government concessions to exploit 50 percent in area of each oil field in Northern Saghalien, mentioned in the memorandum of August 29, 1924. Each said concession shall be divided into checker board squares from 15 to 40 desatin each, the number to squares representing 50 percent of the oil area allotted to Japan. With regard to the remaining unleased lots, Japanese firms shall be afforded equal opportunity in such concessions granted to foreigners. The Soviet Government authorizes the Japanese Government to prospect oil fields for a period of from five to ten years, (other than those mentioned in the memorandum) over an area of 1,000 square versts, to be selected within one year after concessions for 50 percent in area of oil fields shall be granted to Japan.

As to coal fields, the grants to Japanese concerns recommended by the Japanese Government, for exploitation coal fields on the west coast of Northern Saghalien. The Soviet Government also grants to such Japanese concerns, concessions in the Doue coal fields. With regard to the coal fields outside the specified districts, the Soviet Government agrees that if it shall decide to offer them to foreign concessionaires Japanese concerns shall have equal opportunity in the matter of concessions. The period of these coal and oil concessions shall be from forty to fifty years. The royalty in the case of coal shall be 5 to 8 percent on the gross output and in the case of oil from 5 to 15 percent. In the case of an oil gusher this may be raised to 45 percent. These royalties are to be paid annually to the Soviet Government.

Permission to fall trees is given to the private enterprises. The importation or exportation of articles, materials or products made by or obtained for such enterprises, shall be free from duty. Such enterprises shall not be subject to any taxation or restriction as may in fact render their remunerative working impossible. The Soviet Government shall give reasonable protection and facilities to such enterprises. All other details shall be arranged in the contracts for the concessions.

POLITICAL (Cont'd)

Shortly after the signature it was reported that Mr. Joffe would be the first Ambassador to Japan and that Mr. Karahan would return to Moscow as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Karahan's successor in Peking has not been announced.

The Provisional Government in Peking is still in power but the influence which this power really exerts is a matter of conjecture. Tuan Chi-jui, the Executive, is now left with no military force to carry out his multiple mandates. His policy appears to be one of peaceful conciliation but this may be due to force of circumstances since he has been practically deserted by all the militarists who now control any appreciable number of troops. His decrees are apparently without limit and touch everything from the appointment of minor Salt Inspectorates in far off Provinces to Mandates demanding cessations of hostilities between rival military leaders. Those of minor importance are generally disregarded while those of major concern are invariably ignored. Predictions in Peking are to the effect that his regime cannot last longer than six months but as yet no likely substitute has appeared on the horizon. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang following may succeed him but recently a definite split has occurred even in this party and the right and left wings are now reported to be irreconcilable. Sun, however, is at the point of death and if death does occur the coordinating force in the Kuomintang will have passed. Then the extreme radical element, now more or less sponsored by Feng Yu-hsiang and the Russian sympathisers, may exert itself and take over control of the Government from Tuan without much opposition. What results will follow or that the above will actually come to pass it is impossible to predict. The Chinese political situation for the past months has been so enshrouded by uncertainty and indecision that any development is possible and no one is in a position to state with any certainty what twenty-four hours may bring about.

## ECONOMIC

### PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY

Marshal Chang Tso-lin has wired the Government abrogating the office of the Mukden-Shanhaikuan Railway. He says that for the sake of unity in communications, he now restores to the control of the Chiaotungpu the Feng-Yu line, together with all cars and engines. All receipts are to be remitted to Peking from January 1st, 1925. For the purpose of releasing cars and engines for commercial purposes, he has ordered the Fengtien troops at Lanchow, who are to be withdrawn to Fengtien, to march home instead of using the Railway.

### TIENTSIN-PUKOW RAILWAY

The transportation situation on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway is reported to be very unsatisfactory at the present time. According to official report, on account of the lack of rolling stock, which is being held by military leaders, there are no less than seventy thousand tons of merchandise awaiting transportation accumulated at Pukow, Tientsin, and other stations. The situation is made more serious from an economic point of view on account of the approaching Chinese New Year. It is the Chinese Custom that all accounts and debts must be settled before New Year's Day, which falls this year on Jan. 23rd. Numerous Chinese firms, on account of the non-arrival of their goods, find themselves unable to secure funds to square up their accounts.

### PEKING-HANKOW RAILWAY

The following report on the traffic conditions, caused by the failure of the militarists along the Peking-Hankow Railway to give up rolling stock, has been made by the Managing Director of that line to the Ministry of Communications: "Since the outbreak of war, most of the cars of this line have been detained by different military authorities. Though negotiations have been carried on repeatedly with them, and though they promised to release the cars as soon as possible, yet very little progress has been made.

"This causes the suppension of the ordinary goods traffic and also that of coal transportation for the railway itself. Since the beginning of this month, the stock in the coal godowns of the different stations, such as Peking, Kuang Seai, Hankow and other smaller stations, is barely sufficient for a few days

and some of them are even already being exhausted. For the lack of coal, the trains are obliged to stop at one station or another.

"Empty cars have been sent to Cheng Feng Mine and Tsing-Hsing mine for coal, but when the cars reached Shihchiachwang, they were instantly detained by the soldiers there. Though repeatedly negotiations have been carried on and though the cars were released, yet they could not go forward on account of the lack of engines to draw them.

"On the 8th instant at Shihchiachwang station, there were more than forty cars fully loaded with coal; and on the 11th, 310 tons of goods were at Chihchiachwang, 400 tons at Paoting and 350 tons at Shun Teh. On the 13th, 810 tons of merchandise were at Shihchiachwang, 300 tons at Paoting, and 350 at Shun Teh. These goods were kept at the station on account of the lack of cars to carry them.

"Four engines lent to the Lung Hai Railway are detained by the Shensi troops. Besides these, there are eight engines some of which are held by the 2nd and 3rd forces; one of them is employed by the P.U.M.C. for carrying coal and two of them are detained by Cheng Feng Mine. These above number are the engines at Shih-chiachwang. The 5th Brigade of the 2nd force has detained three engines and another three were detained at Han Tao Station also by the troops, the officers of which promised to release one of the three engines to the railway."

ARMED GUARDS ON TRAINS

The director of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway reports that, following the example of the Peking-Mukden Railway, one armored car and forty armed soldiers under the command of a lieutenant will accompany each train from Tientsin to Pukow and vice versa for the protection of passengers from bandits. For facilitating the performance of duties by the armed guards on the train, electric bells have been installed on each coach and pistols have

been distributed to the soldiers by the railway administration. Instructions have been issued by Mr. Yeh, Minister of Communications, that all railway guards and police must be yound and strong men between eighteen and thirty-five years of age and that special training be given them to beter enable them to combat bandits and dangerous characters. Special flags and lamps and strong whistles have been provided for use in case of emergencies on the trains. It is believed that similar measures will also be adopted by the authorities for the protection of passengers on the Peking-Hankow and Peking-Suiyuan lines.

NEW ROAD FROM PEKING TO TIENTSIN

Work has been commenced on a new road to be built by flood relief labor under the auspices of the Yung Ting Ho Conservancy Board from Hsi Pien Men, Peking to Tientsin. Grain for the work is being donated by the Fengtien Army. The estimate calls for 280 li of road to be built by 3,000 flood victims, through Machang, Lu Ku Chiao, Wan Ping Liang Hsiang, Ho An, Yung Ching, An Tse, Wu Ching, and Yangtsun, small villages in a line almost parallel to the Railway. It is planned that part of the road will be along the dyke which will also be widened and improved.

1924 SALT REVENUE

The net Salt Revenue, after meeting administrative expenses, credited in the Group Banks, during the year 1924, amounted to $70,544,000, which shows a decrease of $9,001,000 as compared with the revenue released in 1923 ($79,545,000), and is a serious decrease on the revenue realized in all former years since 1916. The decrease was largely, if not entirely, due to the difficulty and uncertainty of transportation on account of the Civil War in the Lower Yangtze and the North of China, as well as by the confusion caused by the arbitrary interference of Tuchun Chi of Nanking with the Salt Administration during the last four months of the year, in direct violation of the Reorganization Loan Agreement.

The reserve in the Group Banks was maintained during the year at $7,000,000.

KAILAN MINING ADMINISTRATION
and the PEKING COAL SHORTAGE

On Jan. 20th the General Manager of the K.M.A. wired the Chief of the Railway Department, Ministry of Communications, Peking, as follows: "Owing to the inability of the Peking-Mukden Railway to supply locomotive power and owing to serious delay to cars consigned to Peking, I am obliged to suspend coal supplies to Peking until situation improves." In a letter later explaining and defending his action, which it is claimed is causing a coal famine in Peking, he states that the locomotives and wagons allocated to the K.M.A. for coal transportation only from Tongshan to Tientsin, Peking, and Chinwangtao, number five locomotives and three hundred 40-ton wagons; that, considering the problem of supplying Tientsin and Chinwangtao only with coal, assuming the time necessary for a round-trip to either of these places to be two days, there should be at the mines every day a tonnage of car capacity amounting to 6000 tons, whereas, for the fifteen days from Jan. 5th to Jan. 19th, the average daily tonnage capacity at the mines was actually only 3,018 tons. He gives as reason for this discrepancy (1) extremely bad turn-round, due to the fact that five locomotives are not a sufficient number, eight being necessary to properly employ the three hundred wagons; and (2) the interference of military authorities, who continue to commandeer cars and locomotives in disregard of their allocation to coal transportation only. He says that attempts, under present adverse traffic conditions, had shown that every ton of coal despatched to Peking caused a reduction of the shipments to Tientsin by at least three times that amount; that inasmuch as there are mines situated nearer Peking than the Kailan Mines, from which Peking coal supplies could be drawn with less waste of car supply, the Company had considered it necessary to concentrate its efforts on supplying localities wholly dependent on the K.M.A. His opinion is given that the only remedy for the situation is the provision of foreign troops as train guards to prevent seizure of the locomotives and cars by the Chinese military authorities for their own use.

Reports from Peking indicate that the government is taking

the matter of the Peking coal supply up with the British Legation and that, in case the K.M.A. cannot be induced to change their decision, the Ministry of Communications will reduce the number of wagons granted the Company for coal transportation by half. It is claimed there that the K.M.A. is neglecting the Peking market owing to the higher price that can be obtained in Shanghai and other ports.

Cooperation with local civil authorities and foreign troop commanders is maintained.

Attitude of Chinese and other foreigners toward Americans is friendly.

The morale of the command is "Excellent".

Walter C. Phillips

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

COPY NO. 113.

CONFIDENTIAL

# SITUATION SURVEY

## INTELLIGENCE ---- OFFICE

## HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA

For the Period;

January 1st to 23rd 1926.

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## MILITARY

### THE 4th KUOMINCHUN:

As was reported in Situation Survey #112, after the defeat of Kuo Sung-lin's 4th Kuominchun Army in Manchuria, General Wei Yi-shan, a former subordinate of Kuo's, succeeded in holding intact about 8000 troops at Shanhaikuan. Wei declared he would defend the Shanhaikuan area against the Fengtien advance southward and he sought reinforcements from the 1st Kuominchun 9th Division with headquarters at Kai-ping. Wei's forces alone were entirely too small to make any determined stand on the difficult front at Shanhaikuan and the 1st Kuominchun did not appear to be willing to send him material reinforcements. On January 18th the Fengtien forces under Chang Hsueh-liang advanced through the passes in the wall north of Shanhaikuan around the left flank of Wei's line and on the 19th Wei's entire force withdrew to Lanhsien, west of the Lan River. There was no serious fighting on this front and with the exception of small outpost engagements, the Fengtien advance was unopposed. Many rumours were now current that this was the beginning of the return of Chang Tso-lin's troops to Tientsin. Other reasons for this move appeared more logical at that time, however. Chang Tso-lin's port of Newchwang, was icebound and Chinwangtao is a prize he has long desired. Hulutao has not been sufficiently developed to accommodate large ocean-going vessels and although Dairen is open to him, it is under Japanese control. The possession of Chinwangtao would give him easy access to the sea for receiving much-needed war material, large orders of which, it is reported, have been recently placed with various European firms. It will be remembered that the Japanese have always opposed any Fengtien move south of the Great Wall, but it is not believed that they will seriously object to Chang's acquisition of Chinwangtao. However, any further advance would be opposed by Japan, hence it is not probable that Fengtien troops will move south of Changli on the Peking-Mukden.

Shortly after the retreat of General Wei Yi-shan to Lanhsien, large Kuominchun reinforcements were dispatched northward from the

vicinities of Peking and Tientsin. The 1st Kuominchun concentrated the 9th and 11th Divisions along the right bank of the Lan River and the 3rd Kuominchun sent one mixed brigade from Tientsin. There is little indication that this movement is more than for the defense of the sector and no attempt to push the Fengtien forces north of the Wall is anticipated for the time being.

It is reported that Fengtien units are now advancing through Chaoyang with Jehol as their objective. The occupation of this area is necessary in order to prevent a flanking attack by the Kuominchun down the Lan River. It is not believed that any more fighting will occur in this area for some weeks;however,with the coming of Spring the Fengtien troops will doubtless be forced to defend their gains.

LI CHING-LIN --- CHANG TSUNG-CHANG ARMY:

On January 14th reports were current that an advance on Tientsin had been started by the joint forces of Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang, and that, in conjunction with Chang Tso-lin's advance through Shanhaikuan, the Kuominchun forces would soon be driven out of Chihli Province. After Li's defeat around Tientsin, his small army had succeeded in joining with Chang Tsung-chang's troops in Shantung. At the time of the report, however it was not thought probable that sufficient time for reorganization and re-equipping had elapsed for Li to be making a general attack on Chihli Province. Some fighting did occur just north of Tehchow in northern Shantung, but Li's alleged 70,000 troops seemed disinclined to advance north of the Shantung border if any opposition was offered. The 3rd Kuominchun had troops along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway just north of Tehchow and after the advance units of Li's had been repulsed, no further fighting occured. It is not believed that there was any coordination between the Fengtien advance on Chinwangtao and Li Ching-lin's abortive attempt to enter Chihli Province. The troops in Shantung, including all the Fengtien units, have been fighting intermittently for over three months and necessarily much ammunition and equipment has been expended. As a result, therefore, a certain time for peaceful recuperation must follow each conflict before another war can be instituted. This is the situation on practically all the battle areas in North China at this time and no serious conflicts are anticipated until, at the earliest, the 1st of March.

## MILITARY (Cont'd)

### WU PEI-FU:

Marshal Wu Pei-fu took no part directly in the Wars of 1925. He has remained at Hankow and, it is reported, has finally induced Hsiao Yao-nan to send his troops north into Honan along the Peking-Hankow railway. Wu's advance units are reported at Chumatien where some opposition has been met. Wu has under his influence in Hupeh Province the following troops:

| ORGANIZATION | LOCATION | COMMANDER |
|---|---|---|
| 8th NAT. DIVISION | Ichang | Wang Ju-ching |
| 15th Brigade | Shihshou | Liu Chien-chang |
| 16th Brigade | Ichang | Ying Tse-li |
| 18th NAT. DIVISION | Shasi | Lu Ching-chan |
| 35th Brigade | Shasi | Yang Ying-jung |
| 36th Brig ade | Ichang | Liu Chung-yi |
| 25th NAT. DIVISION | Wuchang | Cheng Chia-mou |
| 49th Brigade | Wuchang | Wang Chi-kuei |
| 50th Brigade | Puchi | Yu Ying-sen |
| 1st HUPEH DIVISION | Wushenkuan | Kou Ying-chieh |
| 1st Brigade | Kuangshui | Ho Kuo-kuang |
| 2nd Brigade | Kwayuan | Chia Wan-hsin |
| 2nd HUPEH DIVISION | Hsiaokan | Liu Tso-lung |
| 3rd Brigade | Hsiaokan | Wang Kuei-jung |
| 4th Brigade | Wuhsueh | Cheng Yao-chian |
| 2nd Nat. Mixed Brigade | Kungan | Hu Nien-hsien |
| 17th Nat. Mixed Brigade | Siangyang | Chang Lien-shen |
| 18th Nat. Mixed Brigade | Ssunan | Yu Hsueh-chung |
| 21st Nat. Mixed Brigade | Shasi | Wang Tu-ching |
| 1st M. B. of Hupeh | Huayuan | Sun Chien-yi |
| 3rd M. B. of Hupeh | Patung | Sung ta-pei |

The strength of these units is undetermined, however it is estimated their total is about 50,000. Wu Pei-fu's plans, further than the capture of Honan Province and the elimination of Yueh Wei-tsun are unknown but he does want Honan Province and if his troops are at all as reported, Wu's efforts will meet with success.

## POLITICAL

Political occurrences of this period have been of a secondary nature to the many military movements. This, however, has not been by reason of the import of the political happenings, for under ordinary circumstances the Customs and Extraterritoriality Conferences would have occupied positions more important in the press and public opinion in China than any political happenings since the Washington Conference in 1922.

### Customs Tariff Conference.

The Chinese Customs Conference was opened on the 26th of October 1925 with twelve foreign nations and China being represented, namely: United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. On the 23rd, Chang Tso-lin began his concentration around Tientsin and war broke out between the Fengtien troops and Sun Chuan-fang in southern Kiangsu. Much apprehension was felt as to the effect this civil war might have on the Central Government and the foreign delegates attending the Conference. It was officially stated, however, shortly thereafter, that the Inter-provincial Wars would not interfere with the work of the Customs Conference provided Peking proper was not included within the area of hostilities. From the outset, it was apparent that the Chinese delegation was intending to insist on tariff autonomy and it was also apparent that the foreign delegates were inclined to concede this, provided the Chinese Government would do away with the inter-Provincial tax or likin. After the appointment of Committees, other related subjects were included in the early discussions of the conference; however, Chinese tariff autonomy and the abolition of likin have been the chief topics to date. The following four significant points have been presented, having been drafted by the Second Committee and express about all of any concrete nature that has been done so far:

"(1) The Powers represented at the Special Conference, other than China, hereby recognize China's absolute right to the enjoyment of her tariff autonomy;

(2) The said Powers undertake to abrogate all the existing treaties between themselves and China, which stipulate restrictions on China's tariff rates;

(3) The said Powers agree to the enforcement of the Chinese National Tariff Law on the first of January, 1929;

(4) China hereby declares her intention to abolish the likin system on or before the first of January, 1929 and to enforce the Chinese National Tariff Law simultaneously with the abolition of likin."

POLITICAL (Cont'd)

Extraterritoriality Commission:

This Commission on Extraterritoriality was to convene on December 16th, but as severe fighting was going on at that time between the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Ching-lin along the Peking-Mukden Railway, between Tientsin and Peking, it was impossible for some of the foreign delegates to get to Peking. The Conference was finally convened in Peking at 11 A.M. on January 12th. The opening session included the election of the Chairman, address of welcome by the Minister of Justice and a response by Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Chief Delegate. The Chinese Minister of Justice was elected Honorary President and the Secretaries, etc., were nominated. Mr. Silas Strawn, the American Delegate, was unanimously elected Chairman of the Commission. Various committees were appointed to investigate the Chinese judiciary, visit the courts at several points in the interior and inspect the prisons. So far little has been published of the progress made by the Commission.

A more unfavorable time could hardly have been hit upon since the Revolution, for convening conferences of such great potential importance to China. The present Government under Tuan-Chi-jui is merely existing by reason of the conferences; yet the foreign delegates are expected to make serious concession to this Government in view of certain guarantees for the carrying out of which this government will assume entire responsibility. All the foreign delegates are aware of the unstableness of Tuan's regime and the little likelihood of a better successor, yet if the Conferences break up now, when will it be possible to again convene with any government in power? There appears to be a sincere desire on the part of all foreign representatives to really assist China in any and every way, but just what course to adopt which will result in actual aid to this country appears to be yet a matter of conjecture among the delegates. Under the present circumstances it would therefore seem fruitless to attempt to draft any new international treaties with Tuan's government, but a termination of the Conferences at this time would doubtless have more serious results. It is reported that most of the delegates fully realize this dilemma and as yet no definite plan or prediction of what the outcome may be has been intimated. However, it is the general opinion of observers from without that the whole procedure is doomed to failure and nothing of any real benefit to China can be accomplished by negotiations with a few Chinese appointees who base their authority solely on the tottering Privisional Government of Tuan Chi-jui.

## POLITICAL (Cont'd)

**New Cabinet.**

On December 31st, a Presidential mandate was issued announcing the personnel of the new cabinet under Premier Hsu Shih-ying. The Cabinet consists of the following:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dr. C. T. Wang. . . . . | Foreign Affairs | Ma Chun-wu . . . | Justice |
| Yu Yu-jen . . . . . | Interior | Yi Pei-chi . . . | Education |
| Admiral Tu Hsi-knei . . | War | Kung Hsin-chan . | Communications |
| Chen Ching-tao . . . . | Finance | Kou Hsia . . . . | Agriculture & Commerce |

The majority of the members were doubtless named due to the pressure of the Kuominchun influence for they are mostly of Kuomintang tendencies. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, War, Finance, Justice, and Agriculture and Commerce all have either Kuominchun or Kuomintang antecedents. The Minister of the Navy, will not likely serve as his appointment appears to have been a gesture to placate Wu Pei-fu's Yangtze Alliance. Admiral Tu is reported as being in Hankow at Wu's headquarters. Mr. Yi, Minister of Education has publicly announced that he will not serve in the Cabinet as long as Tuan Chi-jui is President. Mr. Kung of Communications is of no particular political party and may serve in the Hsu Cabinet.

The appointing of this Cabinet has had little effect on the general political situation. After Premier Hsu's appointment some effort was made to oust Tuan Chi-jui and place the Cabinet in a governing position. Tuan has been maintained in office and it now appears to be his intention to remain there as long as he can safely do so. Just how long a period this will be cannot be determined. However, it is the general opinion that when theanticipated hostilities break out in the early spring, Tuan will be swept aside with the advance of the conquerors.

The attached clipping includes the final report of the Judicial Investigation of the May 30th, 1925, Incidents, at Shanghai, and the original Diplomatic Report of the same incidents.

## ECONOMIC

**Taonan-Angangchi (Tsitsihar) Railway.**

Recent reports show that two-thirds of the construction work has been completed on the new extension of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway Line (Survey #111), and that the other span (about 80 kilometres) is expected to be completed by the middle of March and opened for rail traffic.

ECONOMIC (Cont'd)

**Strike at Singapore:**

According to reports, the strike at Canton is affecting the construction of the British Naval Base at Singapore. It appears that a large number of agitators arriving from Canton, either dispatched by the Strikers' League or Communists' Headquarters, are instigating Chinese labourers to quit work. These agitators tell the strikers "that they are perfectly at liberty to work for the promotion of peace and well-being of the world, but to engage in the building of a fortress for an Imperialistic State menacing the world peace by force was a disgrace to the peace-loving citizens of the Chinese Republic, and that if they did not stop their work, they would be drastically dealt with".

Banks Without Capital:

According to a report made by the Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information, under date of January 9, 1926, the business activities of the three trading cities on the Mongolian border, Paotouchen, Kweihua, and Suiyuan, are controlled by the native banks. No commercial enterprises can start business without first establishing relations with one of them. Yet they have not a cent of capital of their own, and have to rely on the business houses in the three cities to entrust their capital to their keeping. The report further states that: the banks pay no interest on deposits, and, all cash received by a firm in the regular course of its business, small though the amount usually is, must be similarly deposited with one of the banks. The Bank of China, established a branch at Paotouchen after the Peking-Suiyuan Railway was extended to that place, but it cannot do business with the commercial firms directly. Its loans to local business men as well as other transactions are required to be made through one of the native banks.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infatry,
Intelligence Officer, USAFC

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
OFFICE G-2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,

Tientsin, China,

9: A.M. Sept. 16, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 2.

September 11th.

1. Kailan Mining Administration was advised by the Chihli Military officials that all empty coal cars would be seized for military purposed. The K.M.A., officials immediately issued orders that no coal would be shipped from any mine and that the empties at Chingwangtao would remain there on K.M.A., property, but that there would be no immediate suspension of mining operation.

2. Reported railway cut by Chang Tso-lin at Manchiatun, the first station north of Shanhaikwan about 10 kilometres distance, where several rails were removed.

September 12th.

3. 15th Division commanded by General Feng Shu-hsin with Headquarters at Luanhsw started moving north in 11 trains. Movement started in Luanhsw and Lutai and a Cavalry unit was the first to arrive at Shanhaikwan, where camp was made about a mile beyong the wall.

September 13th.

4. At 1 P.M., the first troop train arrived at Tientsin East Station from Peetingfu with 35 cars and approximately 1100 troops of the 12th Mixed Brigade. The Commanding General, Ko Shu-ping and staff were aboard.
At 12:45 P.M., 486 Japanese troops detrained at Tientsin East from Tangku, which are replacements for the present North China Occupation troops. The present contingent leaves on the 17th for Japan.



Kile

September 14th.

5. From 9; P.M., on the 13th to 11;30 A.M., on the 14th 8 trains passed through Tientsin East consisting 195 cars. The transportation as a whole was very poorly utilized, as there were many cars unoccupied. It was estimated that there were about 6000 troops on these trains, eight cars of animals and 4 (75's) on flat cars although there were many closed cars. The following were observed at Tientsin East:

| Time | Trains | Cars | Men | Animals | Field Pieces. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5;30 P.M. | 1 | 25 | 500 | 56 | 2 (3") & 2 1-pound. |
| 4; P.M. | 1 | 27 | 500 | 56 | |
| 4;30 P.M. | 1 | 30 | 800 | 12 | 4 Machine Guns. |
| 8; P.M. | 1 | 40 | 1100 | 144 | |
| 9;20 P.M. | 1 | 35 | 800 | 50 | 2(3" ) |

Two or three thousand troops had arrived at Shanhaikwan by 11; 30 A.M., and several Mountain Batteries were noted. The Infantry troops went into camp inside the wall and excellent discipline was apparent. The tents were pitched in good shape and the commissary, etc., were well managed.

At Chingwangtao there were about 2000 troops of the 15th Division from Lutai and several trains were arriving with more troops, also 300 native carts.

September 15th.

6. The 13th and 14th Mixed Brigades have passed Tientsin East and are at Luanchow and Lutai.

The 7th and 8th Mixed Brigades, General Feng Yu-hsiang's troops have left Peking, destination unknown, but it is thought they are going to Hsi Feng-kou.

22nd Division is reported as entraining at Machang and Lung Fung for the Shanhaikwan sector.

Chang has moved one division (perhaps 27th) to Chaoyang.

7. There has been no contact yet between the Fengtien and Chihli troops. It is reported gas masks are being manufactured for Chihli troops in Tientsin (?).

8. There are now approximately 15,000 troops in the Lanchow - Shanhaikwan area.

WALKER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

(G-2 Rq.USAFC)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
OFFICE G-2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,

Tientsin, China.

9: A.M., Sept. 17, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 2.

September 15th.

1. At a conference with Wang Chang-ping and a Mr. Tsao, Wangs confidential adviser and cousin of Tsao Kun, it was stated to an operative from this office that Chang Tso-lin was undoubtedly coming down through Kai Feng-hsu within 10 days or two weeks at most. Chang's show north of Shanhaikwan was merely a retaining force which he would keep in sufficient strength to prevent the Central Government troops from coming north, but Chang himself had no idea of utilizing this route. It was also stated that Chang has fortified Hulutao and perhaps Newchwang, and has airplanes at Newchwang. General Wang intended to go to Peking on the 16th to attend a military conference with the President, Feng Yu-hsiang and perhaps Wu Pei-fu. However, he was not sure that Wu would be present, but might send a representative. During the conversation it was apparent that both predicted a fall for him as "his head was too big" and he was "too clever". In reply to a question as to what General Wang himself was going to do it was stated that he was an old man, but that when the proper time arrived he would come out with his old friend Tuan Chi-jui. Mr. Tsao later stated that this was about the end of the present regime and that Feng was most friendly to Wang Chang-ping. No mention was made of the fate of President Tsao Kun in case of a debacle, although this Mr. Tsao is a blood relation to the President

2. There was comparatively little troops movement during the day, and all units of the 12th Mixed Brigade with Lanchow as their destination. There were about 1000 officers and men with over 200 animals and one complete train of 21 cars containing Chinese carts.

September 16th.

1. The distribution of Chihli troops in the Shanhaikwan Lanchow area is as follows:

Shanhaikwan: One-half of 15th Division
Most of the 14th Division. MIXED DIV.

Chingwangtao: 12th Mixed Brigade.
Part of 15th Division.

FILE

Int. Bul. No. 2 Cont'd. CONFIDENTIAL

Pei-Shi-Ho: Remainder of 15th Division.
Elements of the 14th Mixed Brigade.

Lanchow:---- Elements of an unidentified Division.
(25 or 26th ??)

2. At 1; A.M., the first troops of the 22rd Division were identified at Tientsin Central as coming from Lung Pang with Lanchow as their destination. The train consisted of 54 cars estimated at about 1000 officers and men and perhaps the Commanding General Wang Wein-chang was aboard, although this was not confirmed. During the day up to 10 P.M., eight trains were cleared of this division, including about 3200 officers and men. This included one train of equipment and a hospital train.

3. At 8:PM an airplane squadron was reported aboard a train coming north over the Tientsin-Pukow line, with Shanhaikuan as their destination. This report has not been confirmed.

September 17th.

1. Up to 3:15 AM two trains had passed Tientsin Central, whith about 700 men, Six one pounders were counted in open cars and thirty machine guns.

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WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Confidential.

HEADQUARTERS, U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence.

Tientsin, China,
9 A.M., September 18, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 3.

September 17th:

1. Wu Pei-fu arrived in Peking and the conference has commenced work. The President, Generals Feng Yu-hsiang, Wang Chen-pin, Wang Huai-ching and Wu Pei-fu are the chief warlords conferring. Nothing official has been published of the plans of their campaign.

The following troops were cleared through Tientsin during the day:

| 17th | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:15 AM | Langfang | Lanchow | 23rd Div. | 800 | 19 |
| 12:58 AM | Machang | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 22 |
| 1:20 AM | " | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 22 |
| 3:10 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 500 | 22 |
| 4:20 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 800 | 20 |
| 5:45 AM | " | " | 9th Div | 1000 | 19 |
| 6:12 AM | " | " | 13th Div | 800 | 20 |
| 6:58 AM | Paotungfu | Changli | 14th Brig | 1000 | 18 |
| 9:20 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 9th Div | 500 | 15 |
| 10:20 AM | Machang | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 18 |
| 11:05AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 230 | 4 |

2. It will be noted that most of the units are concentrating at Lanchow, which is on the Lan River and the nearest point to Hsi Feng-Kow bu using san pans up the river.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence.

Tientsin, China.
9 AM, Sept 19, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 4.

September 17th:

1. In addition to the troop trains reported in Bulletin No. 3, the following passed through Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Descpt. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4:25 PM | Machang | Lanchow | 23rd Div | 300 | 21 | Cavalry |
| 5:30 PM | Paotungfu | " | 14th Brig | | 15 | Munitions |
| 8:10 PM | Peking | " | 13th Div | 800 | 17 | Infantry |
| 8:50 PM | Langfang | " | 23rd Div | 800 | 14 | Infantry |
| | | | | 1900 | 67 | |

2. Five airplanes of Chang Tso-lin's flew over Shanhaikuan from Chinchow and dropped a number of small bombs without casualties to troops or serious damage and returned in about 20 minutes,. No actual fighting ocfured between the Fentien and Chihli troops.

3. The following troop trains were cleared through Tientsin East. September 18th:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:30 Am | Machang | Shanhaikuan | 23rd Div | 800 | 13 | Infantry |
| 2:25 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 600 | 16 | Infantry |
| 3:30 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 9th Div | 400 | 18 | Coolies |
| 4:00 AM | Langfang | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 20 | Art.Cav&Guns |
| 4:35 AM | Peking | " | 13th Div | 500 | 23 | Infantry |
| 5:30 AM | Paotunguf | " | 14th Brig | -- | 15 | Munitions |
| 6:14 AM | " | --- | 7 Airplanes, 300 men to Chinwt.18cars. | | | |
| 8:15 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 13th Div | 200 | 12 | Artillery |
| 10:14 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 500 | 12 | Coolies |
| 11:25 AM | Langfang | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 14 | Infantry. |
| 11:40 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 500 | 17 | Infantry |
| 12 Noon | Peking | " | ---- | 818 | 21 | 150 coolies |
| 12:30 PM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 415 | 18 | 4 cars Equip |
| 5:45 Pm | Peking | " | 9th Div | 83 | 18 | Sup & Carts |
| 6:40 PM | " | Shanhaikuan | Infantry | 75 | 14 | Sup & Animals |
| 10:40 PM | " | " | Artillery | 250 | 19 | 4 guns & animals |
| | | | | 6433 | | |

4. According to a Reuters report from Peking the following stated in a Presidential mandate is the distribution of command of the Chihli forces:

"Wu Pei-fu is hereby appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces to be engaged in the suppression of rebellion. Wang Chen-ping is appointed Vice-Commander-in-Chief and Commandant at the base, where he will undertake the necessary measures connected with the organization of these forces. Peng Shou-hsin is appointed Commandant of the First Army, Wang Huai-ching Commandant of the Second Army, and Feng Yu Hiang Commandant of the Third army, Wang Wei Ching and Tung Cheng Kao Vice Commandants of the Thrid Army, Mi Chen Piao Vice Commandant of the Second Army, Liu Fu Yu Commandant of the Advance Guard of the Second Army with Kung Han chi as his second in Command, Chang Chih Chiang to Command the front line of the Third Army, Chang Fu-lai, Commandant of Reinforcements, assisted by Tsao Yin, Hu Ching yi and Chin Yun ao. Admiral Tu Shih-kuei is appointed Commander in Chief of the Navy with Wen Shou-teh second in Command. Chen Shih-chi(Tuli of Shantung) is appo9nted Commandant of the Coast Defenses of Chihli and Shantung. Liu Fu Li is made Assistant Diredtor of Military Affairs at Jehol, Chang Tien Ju High Military Commissioner of Defense at Chifenghsien and Kailu, Chang Lien tung, Military Commissioner at Kailu and Huaiting.

5. Conscription is reported to have commenced in and round Kuyeh.

September 19th:

1 The following roop trains cleared Tientsin East.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3:15 AM | Langfang | Lanchow | 23rd Div | 300 | 25 Infantry |
| 3:35 AM | " | " | " | 299 | 29 Cavalry |
| 3:47 AM | " | " | " | 200 | 3 Medical |

Walter C. Phillips
Captain, 15th Infantry.
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,
9:00 A.M.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 5,

September 19th.

1. The following troop trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area in addition to those in yesterday's bulletins

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESCR'N. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:40 AM | Nanking | Lanchow | 25rd Div | 400 | 18 | Infantry |
| 7:30 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 225 | 12 | Inf & animals |
| 8:10 AM | " | " | 9th Div | 300 | 15 | Infantry |
| 12:noon | " | " | 15th MB | — | 21 | Mil. stores |
| 4:55 PM | Taiyuan | " | 26th Div | 510 | 12 | Hq & Staff |
| 6:35 PM | " | " | 26th Div | 600 | 10 | Hqrs. |
| 7:20 PM | " | " | 26th Div | 250 | 9 | Animals |
| 8:00 PM | " | " | 26th Div | 450 | 16 | Infantry |

2. Shanhaikwan and Chinwangtao were both bombed by airplanes on the 18,and 19, but little damage was done and only one casualty was reported from Shanhaikwan. At Chinwangtao one bomb fell between the Kyushu Maru, a Japanese boat chartered by the Kailin Mining Administration and the Kuhsu, a Chinese boat chartered by the same company, but no damage resulted.

3. Telephone communications are now open between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan.

4. No fighting has yet occurred on the Shanhaikwan-Jungtien front. At present the Chihli troops in this area consist of the 15th Division, 25rd Division, 9th Division, 13th Division, 12th Mixed Brigade, 14th Mixed Brigade, and units of the 13th Mixed Brigade. The 26th Division is apparently also moving into this area. There are approximately between 35 and 40,000 Chihli troops now concentrated on this area. Recruiting and drafting has been going on for a week or ten days, and it is impossible to estimate the additional troops acquired by these methods. It has also been impossible to ascertain what troops, if any, have gone up the Lan river to Hsi Feng-kou, but since Wang Hsi-ching has been made Commander of the Second Army with Headquarters in the Hsi Feng-kou area, it is

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likely that his 13th Division will move north along the Lan river road.

5. The Kiangsu - Chekiang war has been brought out by Chi Hsieh-yuan of Kiangsu if according to "Reuters" report. General Pai Commanding the southern Chekiang forces joined Sun Chuang-fing from Fukien and are marching on Hangchow, the capital of Chekiang, while General Ma Lien-chu from Anhwei advanced east into Chekiang and captured Ma Chowfu and also Kunsin. He then turned west and took Chang Hsin southwest of Lake Tai-Hu. The Chekiang forces at Ishing therefore were practically surrounded, and cut off from a retreat south and hence capitulated. Lu Yung-hsiang hurriedly left Hangchow for Shanghai and the chief of the local constabulary in Hangchow is now in control. Lu still has Shantung mercenary troops and his 4th Division under General Chen Is-shun along the Hangchow-Lishe line. His position, however, at present is very unstable as his left flank is open to the south by an advance over the Hangchow-Shanghai railway, and his absolute defeat is imminent.

September 20th.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC'P'T |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:35 AM | Paotingfu | Laochow | 15th MB | 800 | 20 | Cav & Inf |
| 12:25 AM | " | " | 15th MB | 800 | 20 | Infantry |
| 3:40 AM | Tochow | " | 26th Div | 600 | 20 | Infantry |

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

TIENTSIN, CHINA.

9: A.M. Sept. 21, 1934.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 6.

Sept. 19th.

1. Units of the 26th Division were reported as passing Tientsin in four trains. This is believed to be in error as three of these trains consisted of units of the 22nd Division and one of the 15th Division. No trains of the 26th Division are believed to have passed Tientsin to date.

Sept. 20th.

1. The train of the 26th Division carried in Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, was in error. The following trains cleared Tientsin East in addition to the two trains reported yesterday;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | REMARKS & REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:AM | Peking | Lanchow | 15th Div | 250 | 14 | Cav & Arty |
| 8:30 AM | " | " | 9th Div | 400 | 25 | Inf & Art |
| 5:40 AM | " | " | 9th Div | 325 | 22 | Inf |
| 7:20 AM | Shanhaikwan | " | 22nd Div | 500 | 24 | Sig. Corps |
| 6:15 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 550 | 25 | Infantry |
| 10:20AM | Fengtai | " | 3rd Div (?) | 400 | 22 | Infantry |
| 11: AM | Peking | Tangshan | Medical C | 150 | 11 | Med. Corps |
| 11:35 AM | " | Lanchow | 9th Div | 500 | 21 | Infantry |
| 11:10 PM | " | " | 22nd Div | 200 | 12 | Infantry |
| 12:40 PM | " | " | 22nd Div | 200 | 12 | Medical C |
| 4:27 PM | " | " | 22nd Div | 200 | 12 | Arty |
| 5:30 PM | " | " | 3rd Div (?) | 200 | 12 | Inf |
| 6:PM | " | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 40 | 11 | Hay & equip |
| 11:PM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div (?) | 450 | 16 | Infantry |
| 11:55 PM | " | " | 3rd Div (?) | 260 | 19 | Arty |

CONFIDENTIAL. Intel. Bul. No. 6 Cont'd.

2. It will be noted that fresh trains passed,reported from the 3rd Division, which is Wu Pei-fu's own command. These are the first elements of this Division reported east of Fengtai.

3. Eight thousand gas shells were shipped from Peking on one of the trains of the 3Brd Division and twenty-four recruits were taken aboard at Tientsin, General Wang Yeih-chang commanding the 3Brd and his staff cleared Tientsin East at 2:55 P.M.

4. Conscription of men, mules and Chinese carts is continuing in the Tungshan-Shanhaikwan area.

5. The British submarine L-16 arrived at Chinwangtao at 11: A.M.

6. A train was made up at Tientsin West at 10:30 A.M., cargo consisting of 12 one pounders, five cars of 1-pounders' ammunition, one car of rifles and one car of service ammunition.

Sept. 21st.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESCRIPT & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | Lungs-Fang | Lanchow | 22nd Div | 150 | 21 | Arty 75's |
| 4: AM | " | " | 22nd Div | 250 | 14 | " |
| 4:30 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 400 | 25 | " |
| 5:40 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 350 | 22 | " |

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,

9: A.M. Sept. 22, 1926.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 7.

1. In addition to the four trains reported in yesterday's bulletin, the following cleared Tientsin; Sept. 21st.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | Chengchow | Shanhaikwan | 3rd Div | 500 | 22 | Cavalry |
| 4:20 AM | Peking | " | 2nd Div | 300 | 20 | Infantry |
| 5:AM to 8AM | Lung-tung | " | 5-ocolie trains | 200 | men | collies |
| 6:30 AM | Tungtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 300 | 19 | Infantry |
| 8:35 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 370 | 28 | Arty |
| 9:AM | " | " | — | — | 13 | Carts |
| 9:30 AM | Loyang | " | 3rd Div | 640 | 26 | Arty & S.C. |
| 2:20 PM | Peking | " | 23rd Div | 150 | 13 | Arty |
| 4:35 PM | " | " | 23rd Div | 150 | 13 | Arty |
| 5:20 PM | " | " | 23rd Div | 325 | 22 | Arty |
| 7:15 PM | " | " | 9th Div | 185 | 10 | Arty |
| 8:15 PM | " | " | 23rd Div | 450 | 19 | Arty |
| 10:15 PM | Tsinan | " | 5th Div | 477 | 15 | Infantry |
| 11:15 PM | " | " | 5th Div | 755 | 25 | " |
| | | | | 4570 | | |

2. Some bombs were again dropped on Shanhaikwan and the Chihli anti-aircraft guns were put in action, but without result.

3. The Chinese cruiser "Haichee" is in Chinwangtao harbor and unofficial inquiries have been made for coaling ten Chinese men-of-war at Chinwangtao.

4. Forced loans and war assessments have been levied on the wealthy Chinese in southern Chihli and heavy levies will doubtless be made throughout the Province.

5. The first Shensi Division, Commanded by General Hu Ching-yi is reported concentrated east of Peking in addition to the 7th, 8th and 25th Mixed Brigades which have moved north to Ko-Sen-kou.

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Intl. Bul. No. 7 Cont'd.

September 22nd.

The following trains cleared Tientsin up to 4:20 A.M.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESCRIP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:30 AM | Tsinan | Lanchow | 5th Div ? | 325 | 17 | Inf & Animals |
| 3:30 AM | Laoyang | " | — | 100 | 36 | Motor Trucks |
| 4:AM | Tsinan | " | 5th Div ? | 500 | 18 | Inf & Supplies |
| 4:30 AM | " | " | — | — | 19 | animals & equip |

WALKER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence.

Tientsin China.
9:00A.M., Sept.23,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 8.

Sept.22nd.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East in addition to the four mentioned in yesterday's Bulletin:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Desc. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:00 AM | Peking | Lanchow | — | 100 | 17 | Coolies & Supplies |
| 7:15 AM | Chengchow | " | 3rd Div | 500 | 20 | Infantry |
| 7:30 AM | Kalgan | " | -- | -- | 13 | Animals |
| 9:50 AM | Peking | " | 13th Div | 150 | 19 | Art.Cav.Inf. |
| 10:45 AM | Loyang | " | 3rd Div | 750 | 21 | Infantry |
| 11:30 AM | Chengchow | " | 3rd Div | 500 | 18 | Infantry |
| 11:50 AM | Peking | " | — | --- | 19 | Coolies |
| 12 noon | Peking | " | 13th Div | 110 | 8 | Sup. & Ammunition |
| 12:45 PM | Langfang | " | 23rd Div | 720 | 20 | Artillery |
| 2:20 PM | Langfang | " | 23rd Div | 700 | 20 | Infantry |
| 3:05 PM | Machang | " | 26th Div | 650 | 20 | Artillery |
| 3;35 PM | Machang | " | 26th Div | 700 | 20 | Infantry |
| 7:15 PM | Peking | Shanhaikuan | ~~23~~ | — | 15 | Carts.Inf. |
| 8:30 PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 575 | 22 | Inf.Med Corps. |
| | | | | 4455 | 252 | |

2. Correction: The units of the 5th Division from Tsinan reported inbulbetin No. 7, is thought to be in error as these troops were from the 26th and 23rd Divisions. No units of the 5th Division have cleared Tientsin.

3. Numberous carts and camels are going to Lanchow in the supply trains and undoubtedly there is a big movement of troops to Hsi Feng-Kou-Jehol up the Lan River Road.

4. One hundred and thirty eight empties came through from the Shanhaikuan sector and were routed to Peking and down the Tsin-Pu line.

5. The British submarine was at NewChang, but returned to Chinwangtao.

6. From the general plan of troop command, Wang Wei-ching commanding the 23rd Division and Feng Cheng-kuo commanding the 9th Division, being vice-commanders of the 3rd Army under Feng Yu-hsiang, should be moving up the Lan River into Feng's area. Feng is reported to have gone north from Peking to Ko-bei-kou to take command of his army in the field.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, L5th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
Tientsin, China,
9: A.M., Sept. 24, 1934.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 9.

Sept. 23rd.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:25 AM | Kalgan | Lanchow | 4th MB | 400 | 23 | Infantry |
| 9:50 AM | " | " | 4th MB | 65 | 5 | Arty |
| 11:30 AM | Machang | Shanhaikwan | 26th Div | 418 | 14 | Infantry |
| 1:22 PM | Peking | Lanchow | 15th Div | 400 | 15 | Infantry |
| 5: PM | " | " | 15th Div | 250 | 20 | Engineers |
| 5:30 PM | " | " | 7th MB | 400 | 18 | Infantry |
| 6: PM | Kalgan | " | 4th MB | 400 | 16 | Infantry |
| 10:55 PM | " | " | 4th MB | 250 | 15 | Arty |

2. Two trains of the 20th Division from Shensi Province have been identified at Lanchien. This Division has been stationed at Pingchowfu on the Eastern border of Shensi Province and is commanded by General Yen Chih-tang.

3. It will be noted that this is the smallest number of trains that have gone north in one day through Tientsin since the mobilization started. The traffic congestion is undoubtedly becoming a grave proposition. There were 119 empties returned south during the day.

4. Shanhaikwan has been bombed on the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 23rd, and Chinwangtao on the 19th, 20th, 21st and 23rd. Lanchien was bombed on the 21st without damage. Chang's airdrome is at Lanchengchien, 40 miles north east of Shanhaikwan on the P.M.R. Wu Pei-fu is establishing

his airdrome at Liu Shou-ying just west of Pei-Ho-Kn. At this station there are 7 Avros and 2 bombers. There were five additional planes arrived on the 22rd from Peking. The bombs dropped by Chang's machines are about four or five pounds and have so far done little damage. They have been made in the French mortar section of the arsenal at Mukden.

5. Forty 77-M.M. guns have gone up the Lan river toward Hsi Feng-kou.

6. Provisions have been made for the evacuation of all foreigners, including the British and French troop detachments from Shanhaikwan. Signal communication is now established between the British at Shanhaikwan and the French at Chinwangtao.

7. The following is the reported distribution of the Fengtien commands.

1st Army: General Chiang Kung-kwuan,
4th Mixed Brigades.

2nd Army: General Li Ching-lin
1st Fentien Division at Chaoyang.
3rd Infantry Brigade at Hui Nan, Gen. Chang Tsung-chang
1st (?) Inf. Brigade at Chin Feng, Gen. Kun Chao-hsi.

3rd Army: General Chang Hsueh-liang,
27th Division at Chinchow
2nd Inf. Brigade at Mukden, Gen. Kuo Sung-Lin
4th Inf. " at Mukden, General Sung Chih-ling
27th Inf. " at Mukden, General Wen Tsan-yu.

4th Army: General Chang Tso-hsiang, Kirin Province.
8th Infantry Brig. at Harbin, Gen. Tung tso.
9th " " " " " Chen Yu-jen
10th " " " " " Yu Shen-chung
15th " " " " " Chi Hsung
18th " " " " " Chang Hsun-hsiang
20th " " " " " Yan Yu-chun
21st " " " " " Tsai Yun-chen
26th " " " " " Li Kwei-lin

Int. Bul. No. 9 cont'd.

5th Army: General Wu Chun-sheng, Heilungkiang Province.
29th Division at Tsitsihar.
15th Inf. Brigade, General Wan Fu-lin
11th Inf. Brigade, General Pa Ying-o
22nd Inf. Brigade, General Shih- [illegible]o-shan
2nd Cav. Brigade, General Li Huan-ying

6th Army: General Hsu Lan-chu
4th Cav. Brigade. This army will be on all fronts and on special duty for the other five armies.

Sept. 24th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:midnight | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 23rd Div | 160 | 11 | Infantry |
| 1:40 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 15th Div | 180 | 12 | Inf & arty |
| 3:AM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | | | 9 | Coolies |
| | | | Total; | 340 | | |

WALTER C. PHILLIPS;
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution;

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

TIENTSIN, CHINA

9 AM September 25, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 10.

Sept. 24th.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;midnight | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 22nd Div | 160 | 11 | Inf |
| 1;40 Am | " | Lanchow | 13th Div | 100 | 12 | Inf & arty |
| 3; AM | " | Shanhaikwan | ——— | ——— | 9 | coolies |
| 5;AM | " | Lanchow | 25th [illegible] | — | 15 | Munitions |
| 5;15 AM | Changchow | " | 4th MB | 500 | 21 | Inf. |
| 7;10 AM | " | " | 4th MB | — | 27 | Mil.Equip. |
| 7;50 AM | Peking | " | 22nd Div | 600 | 29 | Transp.& coolie |
| 8;10 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 500 | 28 | Infantry |
| 8;40 AM | " | " | 4th MB | 300 | 16 | Cavalry |
| 10;30AM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 13th Div | — | 29 | Med & Red cross |
| 12;40 PM | Changchow | Lanchow | 20th Div | 75 | 8 | Hq.Staff |
| 2;15 PM | Machang | " | 23rd Div | 200 | 15 | Equipment |
| 2;45 PM | Peking | " | 3rd Div | 400 | 21 | Inf |
| 6;15 PM | " | Shanhaikwan | 3rd Div | 40 | 14 | Equipment |
| 1);30 PM | Nangtai | Lanchow | 9th Div | 500 | 19 | Cavalry |

2. There were no new units noted, but elements of the 20th Division and 4th Mixed Brigade from Shensi are still moving north.

3. Eighty-two empties were reported as coming into Tientsin East from the north.

4. The bombs being dropped by Chang's airplanes are larger than formely and estimated to weight about 50 lbs, making a hole 10 feet in diameter by 6 feet deep. Four planes bombed Lanshien on the 23rd without damage. Wu's planes have been assembled and some short trial flights have been made but no counter flights or bombing into Manchuria.

Eight Dodge automobiles were reported being shipped to Lanchow.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 10

[illegible] Sept. 22, 1924

TIENTSIN, CHINA

OFFICE OF G-2, NINTH U.S. INFANTRY
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Bul. No. 10 Cont'd.

5. The following report from Mukden shows Chang's counter to Wu Pei-fu's fleet movements:

"The local authorities have recently acquired two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, apparently for use against the opposing naval forces. These ships have not yet been delivered.

Two other steamers - the HSIANG LEE (5,790 tons) and the [illegible] LEE ( 1,625 tons) - have also been purchased from a Chinese company at Mukden. They are said to be undergoing repairs at a Japanese dockyard in Port Arthur. It is stated that they will be armed, each with a field gun - at Newchwang".

6. The Independent fleet at Shanghai is reported to have gone over to Wu Pei-fu and is sailing north along with the Nanking fleet and the boats of Admiral Wem at Tsingtao to join the "HAICHIEH" already at Chinwangtao.

7. The following trains have cleared Tientsin East for the north: Sept. 25th.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 AM | Machangjy- | Shanhaikwan | 23rd Div | 200 | 12 | Infantry |
| 2:5 AM | Machang— | " | 23rd Div | 200 | 16 | Infantry |
| 2:15 AM | Changchow | Luchow | — | 225 | 29 | Coolies & transp. |
| 4:30 AM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 9th Div | 375 | 26 | Cavalry |
| | | | | 1000 | 83 | |

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,

9:AM Sept. 26, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 11.

Sept. 25th.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:AM | Tshchow | Shanhaikwan | 26th Div | 200 | 12 | Infantry |
| 2:AM | " | " | 26th Div | 200 | 16 | Infantry |
| 2:15 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | — | 225 | 29 | Coolies & transp |
| 4:30 AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 375 | 26 | Cavalry |
| 9:AM | " | " | 9th Div | 60 | 10 | Animals |
| 1:PM | " | " | 9th Div | 40 | 24 | Animals |
| 4:30 PM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 350 | 20 | Cavalry |
| 5:20 PM | " | " | 20th Div | 400 | 22 | Inf. |
| 6:PM | " | " | 20th Div | 300 | 17 | Inf. |
| 9:45 PM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 475 | 24 | Inf |
| 10:30 PM | Pengtai | " | — | 25 | 31 | Carts & equip. |
| 10:40 PM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 9th Div | 475 | 27 | Cav &animals |
| | | | | 3125 | 288 | |

2. On the 23rd one train of the 25th Division passed Tientsin for the north, but no further units have been noted. The 25th Division is stationed at Hankow and commanded by Hsiao Yao-nan, Tuchun of Hupeh. A confirmed report states that this was only Telegraph Section of the 25th. Units of this Division have been reported in Kiangsu fighting with Chi Hsieh-yuan

3. One hundred and twenty-five empties were returned from the Shanhaikwan sector.

4. The following units have been completely or in part mobilized in the Shanhaikwan area since September 12th, when the first units of the 15th Division were moved north from Entai and Lanchow: 15th Division, 13th Division, 9th Division, 23rd Division, 26th Division, 3rd Division, 20th Division, 12th Mixed Brigade, 15th Mixed Brigade, 14th Mixed Brigade, 4th Mixed Brigade. The estimated peace time strengths of these units are as follows:

OFFICE OF G-2 [illegible]
[illegible] G-2 [illegible]

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Int. Bul. No. 11 cont'd.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15th Division, | | 3000 | |
| 15th | " | 3000 | |
| 9th | " | 3000 | |
| 23rd | " | 3000 | |
| 24th | " | 3000 | |
| 3rd | " | (10,000) 4000 | Approximately one brigade of this Division has gone to this sector. |
| 20th | " | 7000 | |
| 12th Mixed Brigade | | 3500 | |
| 13th | " " | 3500 | |
| 14th | " " | 3500 | |
| 4th | " " | 3570 | |
| | Total:- | 45570 | |

It is impossible to estimate the amount of recruiting and impressing done in the last few weeks, but a thousand per Division and 750 per Mixed Brigade is thought to be an approximate figure. This would increase the total eleven thousand, making a grand total of approximately fifty-seven thousand men. Most of these troops have moved on northward, either up the Lan river to Hsi Feng-kou or through Funning hsien or through the pass Chieh Ling-kou on the Chaoyang post road. It is believed not over 25,000 troops are to be kept in the Shanhaikuan sector.

5. The following is reported as the distribution of the Chihli command in the field and a partial distribution of the troops:

1st Army: Feng Shou-hsin, Commanding.
Hqrs. Shanhaikuan.
15th Division, Feng Shou-hsin
9th Division, Feng Cheng-kuo
23rd Division, Wang Wei-cheng.

2nd Army: Wang Huai-ching, Commanding
Hqrs. near Chaoyang
15th Division, Wang Huai-ching.

3rd Army: Feng Yu-hsiang, Commanding.
Advanced Hqrs Chihfeng.
Rear Hqrs, Jehol.
11th Division, Feng Yu-hsiang
7th Mixed Brigade, Chang Chin-chiang
8th Mixed Brigade, Li Ming-chung
25th Mixed Brigade, Sun Chi-yuan.

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Int. Bul. No. 11, cont'd.

Sept. 26th.

The following troop trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNITS | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1;45 AM | Peking | Tongshan | - | 40 | 21 | animals |
| 3;30 AM | " | Shanhaikwan | — | 6 | 6 | 4-ton motored automobiles. |

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

9:AM Sept. 27, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 12.

Sept. 26th.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Peking | Tangshan | | 40 | 21 | Animals |
| 8:30 AM | " | Shanhaikwan | | 6 | 6 | 4-automobiles automobiles |
| 8:AM | Peking | [redacted] | | 35 | 25 | Supplies & equip. |
| 11:30 AM | " | Lanchow | | 300 | 25 | Recruits |
| 5:PM | " | Lanchow | | 75 | 25 | Ambulo |
| 6:PM | " | Lanchow | | 22 | 12 | Animals |
| 7:30 PM | Pootingfu | Pei ' o Ho Aviation | | 20 | 7 | One small bomber |
| 11:30 PM | Peking | Lanchow | | 50 | 29 | Animals |

One hundred and two empties came from the Shanhaikwan area.

It will be noted that either Wu's concentration is about complete or the traffic jam is so serious that no more cars are available. It is however, believed to be the former as he now has but few units unemployed.

The mouth of the Hai Ho at Tangku has been occupied by Chinese troops, about 1000 of the 20th Division. They are encamped in tents on the north and south sides of the river and have placed their field guns (doubtless 77's) on the left bank between the North Fort and the Tidal Signal Station.

2. The Chihli troop distribution at Shanhaikwan is as follows: The front line is beyond the wall just south of Chihli Province border. The 30th Brigade is on the right flank and the 29th Brigade on the left. Both Brigades of the 15th Division. The 14th Mixed Brigade is in reserve encamped within the wall. The G.H.Q of this army is in the Railway Hotel, Shanhaikwan.

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The 15th Mixed Brigade has gone through the wall west of Shanhaikwan at Chieh Ling-kou.

Parts of the 15th and 22nd Divisions have passed through Hsi Feng-kou.

The 9th, 26th, and parts of the 3rd, 15th and 22nd Divisions are still at Lanchow.

Sept. 27th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan sector:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:35 AM | Changchow | Lanchow | | 225 | 26 | Recruits |
| 3: AM | " | " | | 200 | 15 | Coolies |
| 4: AM | Mochang | " | 22nd Div | 280 | 17 | Infantry. |

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry.
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Sunday, Sept. 28, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 15.

Sept. 27th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan sector:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:35 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | | 225 | 26 | Recruits |
| 3: AM | " | " | | 200 | 15 | Coolies |
| 4: AM | Machang | " | 23rd Div | 500 | 17 | Infantry |
| 4:30 AM | Lungfing | " | 20th Div | 40 | 11 | Inf |
| 11:AM | Chengchiu | " | 20th Div | 500 | 22 | Arty |
| 1:PM | Peking | " | 11th Div | 50 | 15 | Equipment |
| 2:15 PM | Fengtai | " | 20th Div | 500 | 21 | Inf |
| 5:PM | Tsinanfu | " | — | 480 | 12 | Coolies |
| 10:30 PM | " | " | — | 320 | 25 | Coolies & equip. |
| | | | | 2475 | 161 | |

One hundred and fifty-four empties were returned from the Shanhaikwan area.

No fighting has yet occurred on the Shanhaikwan sector. Troops are continuing their move up the Lan river and also through Hsi Fengkwu.

No bombing has occurred during the last two days.

Sept. 28th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan sector:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:05 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 20th Div | 250 | 15 | Engineers |
| 1:30 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 300 | 16 | Infantry |
| 1:45 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 250 | 15 | " |
| 2:45 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 200 | 14 | " |
| 3:30 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 250 | 15 | " |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 250 | 15 | " |
| | | | | 1500 | 90 | |

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Int. Bul. No. 15 cont'd.

One hundred and thirty-four empties arrived from the Shanhaikwan area from 12 midnight up to 5: A.M.

Capture of Chengyang and Hailu in northeastern Chihli by Fengtien troops is officially confirmed.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Monday, Sept. 29, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 14.

Sept. 28th.

1. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikuan sector:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:05 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 20th Div | 250 | 15 | Engrs. |
| 1:20 AM | " | " | " | 300 | 16 | Infantry |
| 1:45 AM | " | " | " | 250 | 15 | " |
| 2:45 AM | " | " | " | 200 | 14 | " |
| 3:50 AM | " | " | " | 250 | 15 | " |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | " | 250 | 15 | " |
| 7:50 AM | Machang | Shanhaikuan | --- | 150 | 21 | Carts & transp. |
| 9:15 AM | " | " | --- | 100 | 27 | Animals & carts |
| 10:10 AM | Peking | " | --- | 150 | 31 | Carts & trans. |
| 1:PM | " | Lanchow | 23rd Div | 200 | 20 | Red-Cross |
| 5:PM | " | " | --- | 50 | 13 | Equip.& trans. |
| 7:55 PM | Shantung | Shanhaikuan | --- | 250 | 26 | coolies |
| 11:PM | Tientsin | Lanchow | --- | 30 | 20 | supplies |

2. Three hundred and fifteen empties were returned from the Shanhaikuan sector. This is over twice the number of empties brought south at any time since the concentration started, within a period of twenty-four hours.

3. The arrival of the Chinese gunboat "Peichien" (?) at Chinwangtao at 1:30 P.M., on Saturday is reported by wire from Chinwangtao. There is no Chinese naval boat of this name, however, it may be the "Pehging" which has a draught of 15.6 and was last reported about Tsingtao. The "Haichee" is also in Chinwangtao. The " Haichee" has a complement of about 450 officers and men and has the following guns aboard; 2-8 inch; 10-4.7 inch; 12-3 pounders; 4-1 pounder Maxims and 6-7 mm m.m. quick firing guns.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Tuesday, Sept. 30, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 15.

Sept. 29th.

The following trains cleardd Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:30 AM | Tientsin | Lanchow | — | 100 | 31 | Supplies |
| 8:20 AM | Machang | Changli | 23rd Div | 225 | 26 | Arty & Cav |
| 9:AM | " | " | " | 125 | 15 | Transportation |
| 9:30 AM | Pengtai | Lanchow | 20th Div | 250 | 27 | Inf & trans. |
| 11:10 AM | " | " | " | 175 | 19 | Arty |
| 1:30 PM | Pao-Tingfu | " | --- | 250 | 23 | coolies |
| 2:PM | " | " | — | 200 | 19 | coolies & suppl. |
| 5:40 PM | " | " | — | 200 | 18 | " " |
| 6:15 PM | Tsinanfu | " | — | 225 | 19 | " " |
| 8:25 PM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | 4th MB | 300 | 16 | Inf &Cav |
| 9:15 PM | " | Lanchow | — | 25 | 5 | Paymaster & guard |
| 9:45 PM | " | Shanhaikwan | --- | 150 | 24 | coolies & suppl. |
| 10:30 PM | " | " | — | 150 | 30 | Animals |
| 11:45 PM | " | " | — | 60 | 15 | " |
| | | | | 2255 | 285 | |

Ninety-eight empties were returned from the Shanhaikwan sector.

The Chinese gunboat " Chunyu" is reported off Taku Bar. This boat is of Admiral Wen's Fleet from Tsingtao, having a draught of 8 feet and is armed with 2- 12 C.M. Guns; 2- 6.5 M.M., and 2- 25 M.M. This is more indication of Wu's naval concentration in the Gulf of Chihli.

No new military units have passed Tientsin in the last three or four days and it is believed when the last of the 20th Division and a few scattered elements of the 4th Mixed Brigade are mobilized at Lanchow the concentration will be complete on this front. Supplies and recruit trains of course will continue.

At Pengtai on the 28th, soldiers from the 1st Shansi Division had some altercation with troops from Wu Pei-ju's 3rd Division and a shooting affray was started which was soon quelled by their officers. The casualties are not known, however, the shooting continued for three or four minutes. The 1st Shansi Division was immediately ordered to Tungchow where they will remain until the 3rd Division has cleared out.

Confidential. Int. Bul. No. 15 cont'd.

Sept. 30th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the northeast

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | FREIGHT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:20 AM | Peking | Lanchow | — | 40 | 10 | Animals |
| 8:20 AM | " | " | — | 32 | 21 | " |
| | | | | 72 | 40 | |

Walter G. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U..S ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF [redacted], MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,

Wednesday, Oct. 1, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 16.

Sept. 30th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC.&REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:20 AM | Peking | Lanchow | —— | 40 | 19 | Animals |
| 5:20 AM | " | " | —— | 30 | 21 | " |
| 7:15 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 150 | 26 | Equipment |
| 8:AM | " | " | 20th Div | 125 | 27 | transportation |
| 10:15 AM | Peking | Pei Ta Ho | Aviation | 75 | 21 | 6-airplanes |
| 12:30 PM | Changchow | Lanchow | 20th Div | 500 | 28 | Artillery |
| 2:PM | " | " | 20th Div | 320 | 22 | Equipment |
| 3:30 PM | Machang | Chinwangtao | — | 100 | 15 | Animals |
| 4:PM | Peking | Lanchow | —— | 30 | 10 | Airplanes |
| 6:15 PM | Machang | Shanhaikuan | — | 400 | 18 | Recruits |
| 8:35 PM | " | " | — | 180 | 28 | Supplies &animals |
| 11:PM | Tientsin | Lanchow | — | 50 | 24 | Supplies. |

Sixty-three empties were returned from the Shanhaikuan area and reports from Changchan verify the fact that the traffic congestion is being cleared.

The "Haichao" left Chinwangtao and was absent during the day, but returned to anchor at 8: P.M.

Three cars of wounded were brought in to Shanhaikuan from beyond the Wall, estimated at about fifty men. Heavy firing was heard in Shanhaikuan and the fighting was thought to have taken place about 7 miles north of the city, being the first real contact in this sector.

It will be noted that a large number of the trains now going through are of the 20th Division, but the peace time strength of the 20th is 7,000 men, over twice as large as the 13th or 15th Divisions.

October 1st.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:m-night | Changchow | Lanhsien | 20th Div | 500 | 19 | Infantry |
| 1:AM | " | " | 20th Div | 300 | 21 | Infantry |

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Int. Bul No. 16 cont'd.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Brought forward | | 800 | — 40 | |
| 2:50 AM | Peking | Lanhsien | — | 50 | 15 | coolies |
| 5:35 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 200 | 17 | Inf & animals |
| 6 AM | Tsinan | " | — | 40 | 12 | coolies |
| | | | | 1090 | 82 | |

Walter G. Phillips,
[redacted], 154th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Thursday, October 2, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 17.

October 1st:

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC.& REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:Midnight | Chengchow | Lanhsien | 20th Div | 500 | 19 | Inf. |
| 1:AM | " | " | 20th Div | 300 | 21 | Inf. |
| 2:30 AM | Peking | " | —— | 20 | 15 | coolies |
| 5:35 Am | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 200 | 17 | Inf & Animals |
| 6: AM | Taiyuan | " | —— | 40 | 12 | coolies |
| 6:10 AM | Pengtai | Lanchow | 23rd Div | —— | 18 | Supplies-carts |
| 10: AM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 200 | 20 | Munitions |
| 10:30 AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | —— | 38 | Animals &carts |
| 11:10 AM | Peking | " | 3rd Div | —— | 30 | Straw & animals |
| 2:45 PM | " | " | —— | 150 | 22 | Coolies & equip. |
| 5: PM | " | " | —— | 80 | 22 | Animals |
| 5:30 PM | " | " | —— | 30 | 20 | " |
| 6:15 PM | Tungchow | " | —— | 300 | 8 | Recruits |
| 7:30 PM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 700 | 28 | Inf. |
| 8:05 PM | " | " | " | 100 | 30 | Equipment |
| 8:35 PM | " | " | " | 900 | 29 | Inf. |
| 11:10 Pm | Peking | " | —— | 200 | 21 | Coolies & equip. |

Ninety-one empties were returned from the Shanhaikwan area.

The fighting at Shanhaikwan was more of a general bombardment by the artillery as there was no contact between units of the Infantry and no advance by either side.

October 2nd:

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan sector:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:05 AM | Peking | Luchow | — | 50 | 10 | Animals |
| 1:20 AM | " | " | — | 30 | 14 | " |
| 2:30 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 600 | 28 | Inf & Cav |
| 3:30 AM | Peking " | " | —#— " | 30 | 15 | Animals |
| 4:05 AM | " " | " | —#— " | 30 | 14 | " |

WALTER G. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Friday, October 3, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 18.

October 2, 1924.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:05 AM | Peking | Lanchow | — | 50 | 10 | animals |
| 1:20 AM | " | " | — | 50 | 14 | " |
| 2:50 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 600 | 28 | Inf & Cav |
| 3:30 AM | [illegible] | " | [illegible] Div | 50 | 15 | animals |
| 4:05 AM | " | " | [illegible] Div | 50 | 14 | " |
| 6:05 AM | " | " | 20th Div | 500 | 20 | Infantry |
| 7:40 AM | " | " | 20th Div | — | 8 | Munitions |
| 9: AM | Peking | " | 23rd Div | — | 20 | Mule carts |
| 10:30 AM | " | " | 23rd Div | — | 25 | " " |
| 1:30 PM | Pengtai | " | 2nd Brig(?) | 311 | 22 | Infantry. |
| 9:PM | Tientsin | " | —— | — | 32 | supplies |
| 10:30 PM | Pengtai | " | 2nd Brig(?) | 800 | 25 | Infantry |
| 11: PM | Peking | " | 9th Div | 150 | 14 | Equip. |
| 11:35 PM | Tsinan | Shanhaikwan | 23rd Div | 100 | 24 | animals |
| 11:55 PM | " | " | 23rd Div | 150 | 30 | " |

The 2nd Division has been reported several times since October 1st, as passing through Tientsin. The 2nd Division is now south of Shanghai, commanded by Sun Chuan-fang, hence this designation must be in error. The 2nd Brigade alone is doubtless from the 1st Shensi Division at Tungchow.

Seventy empties were returned from the north through Tientsin.

October 3rd.

The following trains passed through Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 9th Div | 60 | 12 | Gen. Offider & staf |
| 2:55 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 3:40 AM | Peking | " | —— | 60 | 10 | animals |
| 4:30 AM | Changchow | " | 20th Div | 450 | 21 | Infantry. |
| | | | | 1070 | 68 | |

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Confidential. Bul. No. 18 cont'd.

The "Haichee " and "Chuyn" left Chinwangtao harbor on the 2nd and had not returned at 4: P.M.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS
Captain, 15th Infantry.
Intelligence Officer.

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Tientsin, China,

Sunday, Oct. 5, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 20.

October 4th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 20th Div | 600 | 11 | Cavalry |
| 3:25 AM | Peking | " | ——— | 60 | 23 | Recruits |
| 5: AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 400 | 25 | Arty |
| 6:30 AM | Techow | " | 26th Div | 200 | 21 | Animals; Cav |
| 2:55 PM | Paotingfu | Shanhaikuan——— | | 100 | 14 | " |
| 3:40 PM | " | " | ——— | 200 | 25 | coolies & equip |
| 5:15 PM | Tungchow | Lanchow | 2nd Brig. | 450 | 17 | Infantry |
| 5:40 PM | Chengchow | " | 14th Div | 500 | 22 | Engineers |
| 6:45 PM | Peking | Shanhaikuan ——— | | 15 | 12 | Transportation |
| 7:20 PM | Pengtai | Lanchow | ——— | 150 | 29 | coolies & equip |
| 9:15 PM | " | Shanhaikuan ——— | | 175 | 28 | " |
| 12:PM | " | Lanchow | 20th Div | 250 | 18 | Infantry ? |

One hundred and eighty-seven empties were returned from the north.

One train of the 14th Division, Commanded by General Chin Yun-e from Honan Province has passed through Tientsin for Lanchow. This is the first unit of this Division to appear north of Honan. The 24th Division now is the only large unit in North China which has not been moved with this concentration.

It has been definitely ascertained that General Wang Cheng-pin and his entire staff have gone to Jehol.

An unconfirmed report from Taku states that 20 river sampans are being lightly armor-plated and a one pounder gun is being mounted on each one. A large shipment of heavy guns has also arrived at Taku and the report is that they are to be reshipped aboard a man-of-war. This would seem to indicate that Wu is planning for a landing party, perhaps at Hulatao or somewhere along the Manchurian Coast in conjunction with the navy.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,

Saturday, October 4, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 19.

October 3rd:

The following trains passed through Tientsin East for the north.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DEMS & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Peking | Lunshow | 9th Div | 60 | 12 | Gen. Off & staff |
| 2:55 AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 3:45 AM | Peking | " | --- | 60 | 10 | animals |
| 4:20 AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 450 | 21 | Infantry. |
| 7:05 AM | Loyang | " | 3rd Div | 20 | 25 | supplies |
| 9: 25 AM | Paotingfu | " | ------ | 450 | 16 | Refs & arty. |
| 11:25 AM | Machang | " | ------ | 50 | 22 | animals |
| 2: PM | Tungchow | " | 2nd Brig(Shansi) | 300 | 14 | Arty. |
| 4:50 PM | Peking | " | ------ | 75 | 9 | supplies |
| 8:40 PM | " | " | ------ | 50 | 5 | " |

On September 20th, Martial law was declared in Tientsin Native City, which also included the Ex-German, Ex-Russian and Ex-Austrian Concessions. It has not been ascertained what restrictions this imposed but at present squads of Military Police are paraded at various times through these sections. There have been no reports so far that this force has interfered with any of the normal activities of either the Chinese or foreigners. Their uniforms are regular police outfits with the exception of a red band of cloth worn around the right arm and they carry fixed bayonets, also some ammunition. It was stated by the Chief of Police that this force numbers about one thousand and all are carefully picked men, drilled as soldiers, but belonging to the city Police force. They have not been recently recruited, but are a regular reserve force, always up to full [redacted] The declaration of Martial Law, according to the Chief of Police, merely gives him the right of search and seizure, which otherwise he would not have and he deems this necessary at this time when so many troops are passing through Tientsin.

The Chinese Gunboat "Chuyo" has returned to Chinwangtao harbor, although the"Haichoo" is still at sea.

The British submarine L-20 is in Chinwangtao harbor and the "Foxglove", British sloop has just arrived in Tientsin.

Fifty empties were returned from the northern sector.

General Wang Huai-ching's Troops of the 15th Division have been reported as forty li north of Long Kou; perhaps this is Chieh Long Kou on the Chao Hung postal road.

October 4th:

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 20th Div | 600 | 11 | Cavalry |
| 3:25 AM | Peking | " | ——— | 60 | 23 | Recruits |
| 5: AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 400 | 25 | Arty. |
| | | | | 1060 | 59 | |

Requisitioning of carts has been stopped for the time being in Tientsin due to the objection of several foreign firms through their respective Consular Officers to the Civil Governor. The carts taken were ordinarily hired by the firms to transport various cargoes within the city and their seizure directly interfered with business. Troop detachments were making the seizures of the ~~animals~~ and carts. Active recruiting, however, is being carried on at numerious stations in the Native City.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Tientsin, China,

Monday, Oct. 6, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 21.

October 5th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Peking | Lanchow | ——— | 25 | 21 | Transportation |
| 6:30 AM | Tientsin | " | ——— | 20 | 16 | Supplies |
| 7:55 AM | Peking | " | ——— | 100 | 10 | Recruits |
| 11:45 AM | " | " | ——— | 200 | 14 | " |
| 12:35 PM | Pengtai | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 220 | 27 | " |
| 1:40PM | Paotingfu | Lanchow | 1st Shansi Div | 275 | 11 | Infantry |
| 2:50 PM | " | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 250 | 30 | Recruits |
| 6:30 PM | Pengtai | " | ——— | 200 | 17 | animals |
| 6:40 PM | Tientsin | Lanchow | ——— | [illegible] | 25 | supplies |
| | | | | 1290 | 171 | |

One hundred and twenty-one empties were brought south from the Shanhaikwan sector.

The line between Lanchow and Shanhaikwan is reported clear, although there is some congestion south of Lanchow.

One train of the 1st Shansi Division noted above is the first of this unit to go to the front. This apparently a new Division or a combination of the Shansi Mixed Brigades as heretofore there has been unit designated as the 1st Shansi Division.

The 2nd Brigade of Shensi troops carried in Bulletins Nos. 18, 19 and 20 has been identified as the 2nd Shensi Division. The 1st Shensi Division is scheduled for Jehol.

On the 4th, the"Chuyu", Chihli Gunboat, at Chinwangtao captured an armored barge belonging to the Fengtien troops. This is now anchored off Chinwangtao.

It has been reported from several Chinese sources that October 10th has been decided upon by Wu Pei-fu as the day for a general advance of Chihli troops.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China,
Tuesday, Oct. 7, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 22.

Oct. 6th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 AM | Machang | Lanchow | 26th Div | — | 26 | Carts & stores |
| 10;55 AM | Fengtai | " | ——— | 150 | 15 | Animals |
| 12; noon | Tientsin | " | ——— | — | 15 | Motor transp. |
| 1;50 PM | Paotingfu | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 190 | 33 | Equipment |
| 3;15 PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 2nd Shansi | D.260 | 20 | Infantry |
| 5;15 PM | " | " | " " | 400 | 24 | " |
| 8;45 PM | Peking | " | ——— | 20 | 15 | Supplies |
| 10;40 PM | Fengtai | " | 20th Div | 250 | 31 | Animals |
| | | | | 1270 | 179 | |

Two hundred and forty-four empties were returned from the north and eight loaded cars. On the 5th there were 278 loaded cars, mostly coal and salt returned south. Traffic ~~o~~ generally is much improved.

Two men of the crew of the captured Fengtien armored boat, reported in Bulletin No. 21 attempted to escape in a row boat and were fired upon with machine guns aboard the "Chuyu". The British submarine L-20 was in direct line and was hit, but no damage was done. The"Haichee" and "Chuyu" have both left the port and had not returned up to 4: P.M.

The British submarine L-20 is under orders to be relieved by the L-19.

Nine Chinese Merchant ships have been requisitioned in Tientsin harbor; 4 from the North China Steamship Navigation Company, 4 from the Chihli-Shangtung Line, 3 from the China Merchant Company. These boats average about 350 tons and have a maximum draught of about 10 feet. They can accomodate from five hundred to six hundred men each with freight and baggage. The railway authorities have been ordered to prepare for forty trains arriving at Hsin Ho which is on the Hai Ho river, just East of Taku.

Twenty-five hundred tons of coal have also been ordered for Hsin Ho. There is yet no indication of the troops that are to detrain at Hsin Ho.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Wednesday, Oct. 8, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 23.

October 7th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaukwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Machang | Lanchow | 23rd Div | 260 | 46 | Mule carts |
| 3:10 AM | Peking | " | ——— | 30 | 21 | Rice |
| 6:30 AM | " | " | ——— | 40 | 22 | animals |
| 7:50 AM | Chengchow | " | 20th Div | 100 | 24 | Mule carts |
| 10:05 AM | Tientsin | " | ——— | ——— | 15 | Mil.stores |
| 11:30 AM | Peking | " | ——— | ——— | 24 | Mule carts |
| 12:noon | " | " | ——— | ——— | 17 | Rice |
| 2:PM | Tsinanfu | Changli | 5th Div | 160 | 25 | Equipment |
| 2:55 PM | " | " | " " | 40 | 31 | " |
| 7:45 PM | Peking | Lanchow | ——— | 520 | 25 | Recruits |
| 12: M.night | Machang | " | ——— | 30 | 27 | animals |

One hundred and thirty-nine empties were returned from the north.

The British submarine L-19 has arrived and the L-20 has gone to Wei Hai Wei.

Heavy artillery fighting began in the early morning on the Shanhaikwan front and was continuing up to 4: AM. No Infantry advance was noted by either side. One Fengtien airplane dropped four small bombs on Shanhaikwan during the day.

The railway authorities have been given definite orders to make up 15 trains at Tientsin. No troops have yet been moved to Hsin Ho, however, coal is being unloaded at this station. It now appears that troops are to be embark from Hsin Ho and also that the boats are to be coaled there. The troops most likely will be elements of Honan units, either the 3rd, 14th or 24th Divisions, and Shansi troops.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.

Thursday, Oct. 9, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 24.

Oct. 8th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MAN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Tsehow | Shanhaikwan | 26th Div | 500 | 24 | Infantry |
| 2:12 AM | Peking | Lanchow | ——— | 150 | 30 | Mule carts |
| 2:35 AM | " | " | ——— | 125 | 24 | " |
| 3:40 AM | " | " | ——— | 20 | 3 | Bombs & Elec.equip. |
| 6:50 AM | " | " | ——— | 10 | 2 | Ammunition |
| 7:05 AM | Machang | " | 26th Div | 100 | 11 | Mil. stores |
| 11:50 AM | Peking | Tongshan | ——— | 10 | 3 | Ammunition |
| 3:PM | Taimanfo | Lanchow | ——— | 200 | 27 | Recruits |
| 5:15 PM | Machang | " | 26th Div | 500 | 40 | Art.Cav.Eng.MG 4-77/ |
| 5:45 PM | Changchow | " | (Shensi-2nd Div ) | 600 | 23 | Infantry |
| 8:00 PM | Peking | " | ——— | 210 | 15 | Recruits |
| 9: PM | " | " | ——— | ——— | 19 | Supplies |
| 10: PM | Loyang | Chinwangtao | 3rd Div | 350 | 26 | Arty & supplies |

Fifty-nine empties were returned from the north.

No new units have been moved north for several days, and it would appear that the concentration is complete on this front. Some scattered elements of the units already in the line continue to move up and also the necessary supplies, but such moves are to be expected.

The 29th Brigade of the 15th Division, Chihli troops, holding the left of the line on the Shanhaikwan front was flanked by the right of the Fengtien troops and Chin-Hsien, a pass north of Shanhaikwan in the Great Wall was captured. The Chihli troops are reported retreating to Shih-men-chai on the Ta Shih river, which is northeast of Shanhaikwan. There is a narrow gauge railway running from Shanhaikwan to Shih-men-chai. This places the Fengtien troops well in rear of the Chihli line and will doubtless flank them out of Shanhaikwan.

A Japanese report states that there is a general withdrawal of the Chihli forces south of the Yu Shih river toward Chimsangtao, but this has not been confirmed. There was no report of the use of reserves, the 14th Mixed Brigade or the 20th Division, which are in Shanhaikwan behind the 15th Division.

There are no further developments reported of the Hsin Ho embarkation. More boats have been chartered in Chefoo by Wu Pei-fu and the Yangtze fleet of Admiral Tu is again reported as coming north to the Gulf of Chihli.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence

Tientsin, China,
9:AM
Friday, Oct. 10, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 25.

Oct. 9th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DEMS & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:40 AM | Peking | Luanhsien | | 20 | 7 | Mil. stores |
| 12:40 AM | " | " | | 75 | 24 | " |
| 12:20 AM | " | " | | 100 | 38 | Mule carts |
| 2:10 AM | " | " | | 50 | 21 | Rice |
| 2:40 AM | " | " | | 10 | 5 | Munitions |
| 5:40 AM | " | " | | 50 | 5 | Infantry |
| 5:40 AM | " | " | 26th Div | 300 | 16 | Inf.Cav.Arty |
| 6:46 AM | Machang | " | 20th Div | 20 | 27 | Mule carts |
| 10:20 A | Peking | " | 26th Div | 200 | 27 | Supplies |
| 6: PM | Machang | " | 3rd Div | 300 | 32 | Engineers |
| 7:50 PM | Pochingfu | " | " " | 450 | 25 | Arty & inf |
| 8:15 PM | Pochingfu | " | — | 150 | 7 | Ammunition |
| 10:15 PM | Peking | " | —— | 150 | 10 | Recruits |
| 11:PM | Fengtai | " | 3rd Div | 525 | 27 | Infantry |
| 11:PM | " | " | " " | 600 | 24 | " |
| 12: PM | " | " | | 3170 | 297 | |

There were eighty-eight empties returned from the north.

The report of the capture of Chiu-Hsien and the general withdrawal of the Chihli forces from the Shanhaikwan line appears to have been in error as more recent reports state that the Shanhaikwan line is intact, and the city is quiet, while the Chihli forces at Chiu-Hsien are still in the line. Fengtien, however, did make a strong attack at Chiu-Hsien, but the gain was immaterial.

The general attack by the Chihli forces, announced some days ago is imminent as large units of the 3rd Division are passing Tientsin and Marshal Wu Pei-fu himself is reported to be ready to leave for the Shanhaikwan front at any time.

The 5th Division is reported to be coming from Tsinanfu over the Weihsien-Chefoo road, and planning to embark at Chefoo for some point on the Manchurian coast.

There are no further developments of the planned embarkation at Hsin Ho.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Saturday, Oct. 11, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 26.

Oct. 10th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4: AM | Pengtai | Lanchow | ----- | 150 | 32 | Mule carts & pots |
| 8: AM | Peking | " | | 20 | 16 | supplies |
| 11:30 AM | Pengtai | " | | 50 | 25 | Equipment |
| 12:40 PM | Paotingfu | " | 14th Div | 500 | 30 | Infantry |
| 1:35 PM | " | " | " " | 500 | 27 | " |
| 3:55 PM | Pengtai | Pei Ta He | 3rd Div | 600 | 28 | Arty & inf |
| 5:20 PM | Paotingfu | Tangku | | 30 | 5 | ammunition |
| 6:30 PM | Tientsin | Chinwangtao | | 175 | 5 | " |
| 6:45 PM | Paotingfu | Lanchow | 14th Div | 845 | 27 | Engineers |
| 8:PM | Pengtai | " | | 10 | 10 | Straw |
| 10: PM | Tientsin | " | | 100 | 14 | Recruits & supplies |

There were one hundred and thirty-six empties returned from the Shanhaikwan area.

It will be noted that large trains of the 14th Division are now going through Tientsin. This Division is from Chengchow in Honan, and is Commanded by General Chin Yun-o. The 24th Division also from Honan stationed at Kaipeng is now entraining and units may be expected in the Shanhaikwan area.

The Shanhaikwan sector remains unchanged with the exception of Army Headquarters being moved to Chinwangtao. Reinforcements have been sent to Chin-Men and the whole line is practically intact. The Fengtien troops undoubtedly made an attack in force, but the gains were immaterial. There are no reports of further Fengtien advances except at Chihpeng, which was reported captured by Fengtien troops.

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Bul. No. 26 cont'd

The British submarine L-55 has relieved the L-19, which has gone to Wei Hai Wei.

The double-tracking of the Peking-Mukden Railway from Tongshan to Chinwangtao is completed and will be open for regular traffic in a few days.

One hundred and seventy-five thousand rounds of Mauser pistol ammunition and three hundred and fifty Mauser pistols were captured by the B.M.C. Police. The shipment was enroute through the British Concession, consigned to Chi Kaich-yuan, Nanking, from the American-China Export - Import Company, Henry W. Krippendroff, Manager. Mr. Krippendroff is an American citizen. The "manifest" was dated October 5th. Several other previous shipments have been made.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Sunday, Oct. 12, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 27.

October 11th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12: 45 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 550 | 31 | Infantry |
| 3:05 AM | Peking | Chinwangtao | ---- | 50 | 8 | Mule carts |
| 3:30 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 550 | 34 | Infantry |
| 3:45 AM | Changchow | " | 24th Div | 450 | 28 | " |
| 4:15 AM | Fengtai | " | 3rd Div | 600 | 29 | " |
| 10:05 AM | Peking | " | -- | 160 | 19 | transportation |
| 10:35 AM | " | " | -- | 200 | 30 | Inf. |
| 12:noon | Machang | " | ---- | 300 | 30 | [illegible] |
| 1:05 PM | Peking | " | ---- | 300 | 24 | Wu Pei-fu & Staff |
| 3: PM | Fengtai | " | 3rd Div | 550 | 28 | Artillery |
| 4: PM | " | " | 24th Div | 550 | 16 | Supplies & arty |
| 4:30 PM | Peking | " | 24th Div | 25 | 15 | Supplies |
| 9:30 PM | Changchow | " | 24th Div | 800 | 28 | Infantry |
| 15-Trains | | | | 4985 | 310 | |

Forty empties were returned from the north.

The Hsin Ho embarkation has started and the troops of the 14th and 24th Divisions are being detrained at this station. No further report has been received of the troops coming by water from Chefoo, but doubtless these forces will unite in a landing, perhaps at Hulatao or Newchwang.

Units of the 24th Division appeared for the first time today, passing through Tientsin. This Division is now Commanded by General Tang Ching-chen and is from Honan Province, with home station at Kaifeng. Its exact destination has not been determined. With elements of this Division on the line Wu has mobilized, in whole or in part every large military unit in North China. This has never been done before.

Two bombs were discovered on the tracks of the Peking-Mukden railway some distance east of Tientsin East station by some Russian Dairymen. This was several hours before Wu Pei-fu's train pulled into Tientsin Central, but the consensus of the Chinese opinion deems to be that it was an attempt to kill the Marshal. As a result Marshal Wu's train was very heavily guarded and only officials and his staff were permitted at all near this train.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Monday, Oct. 13, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 25.

Oct. 12th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:35 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 500 | 30 | Cavalry |
| 4:35 AM | Changchow | " | 24th Div | 800 | 35 | Infantry |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | " " | 500 | 35 | Arty. 10-guns |
| 6:30 AM | " | " | " " | 500 | 36 | Infantry |
| 7:10 AM | Peking | " | ------ | -- | 12 | Mil. Stores |
| 7:35 AM | Changchow | " | 24th Div | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 9:30 AM | " | Tangku | 14th Div | 800 | 28 | Inf.to embark |
| 9:40 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 400 | 20 | Artillery |
| 4:20 PM | Changchow | " | 14th Div | 600 | 34 | Artillery |
| 6:30 PM | " | " | " " | 625 | 21 | Engineers |
| 7:45 PM | " | " | " " | 400 | 27 | Inf & M.Guns |
| 8:15 PM | Tientsin | " | ------- | 100 | 26 | Red Cross & supplies |
| 8:20 Pm | Changchow | " | 14th Div | 625 | 35 | Transportation |
| 10: PM | Peking | " | -------- | 50 | 9 | Animals |
| 12midnight | Machang | " | 26th Div | 500 | 24 | Inf & red cross |
| 15-Trains | | | | 6900 | 397 | |

There were one hundred and twenty empties returned from the north.

Two trains of wounded arrived from the Shanhaikwan area and went on to Peking.

Marshal Wu's train went directly to Shanhaikwan and returned to Chinwangtao, later going back to Lanhsien. There is no news of any advance to date.

The "Haichee" and the "Chuyu" have been coaled by the K.M.A., at Chinwangtao.

The "Chantilly" carrying 20 new"Breguet" airplanes fro Chang Tso-lin landed at Dairen. The "Haichee" and the "Chuyu"were both on guard watching for this vessel, but the planes were landed without interference. The new Commander of the French forces in North China, Colonel Huntzeger, was aboard and landed at Dairen, returning to Tientsin. It is not confirmed whether the planes were put ashore at Dairen or Newchwang.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Tuesday, Oct. 14, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO 29.

Oct. 13th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:24 AM | Peking | Lanchow | ——— | 50 | 19 | Red Cross |
| 2: AM | Fengtai | " | 3rd Div | 600 | 31 | Arty |
| 3:25 AM | Peking | Tangku | 14th Div | 600 | 37 | Cavalry |
| 5:20 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 800 | 36 | Infantry |
| 6:50 AM | Peking | " | 14th Div | 500 | 30 | Infantry |
| 11:10 AM | Machang | Chengli | 23rd Div | 100 | 55 | Mule carts |
| 10:30 PM | Machang | Lanchow | 23rd Div | 15 | 20 | Supplies |
| 11: PM | Peking | Hsin Ho | 14th Div | 360 | 30 | Cavalry |
| 11:20 PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 24th Div | 700 | 25 | Infantry |
| 12: Midnight. | Chengchow | " | 24th Div | 400 | 22 | Infantry |
| 10-trains | | | | 4125 | 305 | |

One hundred and twenty empties were returned from the north.

The " Tung Hsiang", Chinese gunboat with the Transports "Pei Kong " and the "Pei Hsu" arrived in Chinwangtao. The fleet of transports including 16 vessels is assembling off Taku bar, and is expected in Chinwangtao to pick up the other boats and sampans. The "Haichao" has been patrolling and conveying the Manchurian coast just south of Hulutao in the Ning Yuan district .

Ping Chuan is reported to have been captured by Chang Tso-lin's troops.

The traffic congestion on the Peking-Mukden railway is the worst since the mobilization started on September 12th. The double track is open and being used from Chinwangtao to Tongshan, but between Tongshan and Tientsin every station is blocked.

Lu Jung-hsiang and Ho Feng-lin have fled to Japan aboard the Japanese boat "Shanghai Maru". This was due to the surrender of Lu's General, Chen Lo-shan, commanding the 4th Division on Lu's southwestern front. According to "Reuters", Chi's troops are now perhaps in the city of Shanghai and Lu's entire force has surrendered. Lu's Headquarters is deserted.

The first allied train leaves Tientsin East for Shanhaikwan at 12 noon on the 14th. Detachments from the American, Japanese, British and French Garrisons with a group of traffic officials from the railway office are included. Hereafter two trains a week, on Monday and Thursday will be despatched until the emergency has passed.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Wednesday, Oct. 14, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 50.

Oct. 14th. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | Fengtai | Tanku | 14th Div | 400 | 22 | Artillery |
| 5: AM | " | " | " " | 800 | 50 | Infantry |
| 6:15 AM | Peking | Lanchow | ---- | 10 | 21 | Mule carts |
| 8:30 AM | Fengtai | Chinwangtao | 14th Div | 900 | 48 | Inf & Cav |
| 12:Noon | Teintsin | Shanhaikwan | ------ | --- | 15 | International Train |
| 3: PM | Fengtai | Lanchow | 24th Div | 650 | 28 | Infantry |
| 3: PM | " | " | 24th Div | 200 | 27 | " |
| 3:30 PM | " | " | 24th Div | 600 | 29 | " |
| 4:10 PM | " | " | 24th Div | 500 | 30 | Cavalry |
| 6:30 PM | Taiyuanfu | " | 1st Shansi | D.400 | 24 | Artillery |
| 8:30 PM | Machang | Shanhaikwan | 26th Div | 250 | 20 | Infantry |
| 11-trains | | | | 4710 | 274 | |

Twenty-eight empties were returned from the north.

Admiral Wen Shu-teh is at Chinwangtao and it is reported the General Headquarters of the Chihli forces is now established there.

Fengtien troops have again attacked at Chiu-Men and the line is now reported half-way between Chiu-Men and Shih-Men-chai, which places Fengtien troops within the wall, about fifteen miles north of Shanhaikwan.

There were no bombing operation or any move made by the naval vessels in Chinwangtao.

Thirty-one cars of coal were shipped from Tongshan to the arsenal at Tsehow on the Tientsin-Pukow line. One small coal train also arrived in Tientsin.

The International Train had arrived in Tongshan at 6:45 A.M., on the 15th.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf. I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U..S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Thursday, Oct. 16, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 51.

Oct. 15th. The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:50 AM | Peking | Lanchow | Shansi 1st Div | 500 | 50 | Infantry |
| 10:30 AM | Machang | Tongshan | 26th Div | 400 | 22 | Inf & Cav |
| 4: PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | ---- | 14 | 14 | Animals |
| 8: PM | " | " | 24th Div | 800 | 50 | Infantry |
| 8:30 PM | Machang | " | 26th Div | 200 | 20 | Engrs. |
| 11:30 " | Chengchow | " | 24th Div | 30 | 24 | Infantry |
| 6-trains | | | | 1944 | 182 | |

One hundred and thirty-seven empties were returned from the north.

Three trains of wounded troops came into Tientsin with approximately 600 wounded. Most of these troops were taken off at Tientsin.

It will noted that this is the smallest movement of troops since the concentration was commenced.

The general attack on the Shanhaikwan front has been confirmed and last reports stated that the line ran from Shih Men-chai on the north to Shen Tao-kuan at the wall north of Shanhaikwan and from there on according to the former Chihli line to the sea. A report also is to the effect that the Cavalry of the 3rd Division has been defeated at Yi-Yuan-kou, a pass in the wall north of Shih Men-chai. This latter report has not been confirmed.

According to observer at Chinwangtao only one squadron of the 3rd Division - Cavalry had arrived there by the 15th. This doubtless is the unit which went to Yi Yuan-kou. Chang's tactics, however, appear to be a turning movement by his right flank, through the mountain passes. The 15th Chihli Division now hold the line from the sea to the railway, while the 26th Division is holding the front from the railway north to about Chiu-[illegible]. Units of the 20th Division, 12th, 15th and 14th Mixed Brigades are in the Shih Men-chai -Chiu Men area.

Confidential. Bul. No. 51 cont'd.

Eight of Wu Pei-fu's transports are now disembarking troops at Chinwangtao and Wu is reported to be aboard the "Haichao". These troops are doubtless of the 14th and 24th Divisions embarked at Shih and Nain Ho.

The International train has arrived at Shanhaikuan and started back to Tientsin.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9; AM
Friday, Oct. 17, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 52.

October 16th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;50 AM | Peking | Lanchow | —— | 250 | 21 | Recruits |
| 2;20 AM | Changchow | " | 24th Div | 400 | 19 | Infantry |
| 6;30 AM | Peking | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 100 | 25 | Recruits |
| 11; AM | " | Lanchow | ——— | 250 | 14 | " |
| 12;10 PM | Changchow | " | 24th D. | 400 | 39 | Inf & Engrs |
| 12;55 PM | Peking | " | ——— | 400 | 28 | Infantry |
| 5;30 PM | " | " | ——— | 300 | 35 | Rats. & Mule carts |
| 10; PM | Mukden | " | 26th D. | 350 | 35 | Rats. Rice & Straw |
| 11; PM | Fengtai | " | 24th D. | 300 | 34 | Rats & animals |
| 9-Trains | | — | | 2750 | 250 | |

Ninety-three empties were returned from the north.

One train of 14 cars of wounded troops (approximately 600) arrived in Tientsin at 8;00 A.M., from the north.

Between 9 and 10 A.M., October 15th, 9 Transports left Tangku for Chinwangtao.

General Chang Fu-lai has requested the use of one of K.M.A., buildings at Tongshan for his Headquarters.

Heavy artillery firing is reported all along the line, afternoon of the 16th, between the railway and the hills.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9, AM
Saturday, Oct. 18, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 35.

October 17th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Fengtai | Lanchow | ——— | 20 | 21 | Supplies |
| 1:50 AM | " | " | ——— | 100 | 32 | Mil. stores |
| 3:10 AM | " | Chinwangtao | ——— | 50 | 29 | Rice |
| 5:45 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 17th Div | 600 | 32 | Infantry |
| 6:00 AM | Peking | Changli | 26th MB | 800 | 28 | " |
| 8:00 AM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 14th Div | 500 | 20 | " |
| 9:50 AM | Peking | Changli | ——— | --- | 10 | Munitions |
| 11:00 AM | Kalgan | " | ——— | --- | 21 | Camels |
| 12:Noon | Peking | " | 26th Mix.B | 325 | 24 | Infantry |
| 12:30 PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 14th Div | 600 | 30 | Infantry |
| 1:00 PM | Kalgan | Changli | ——— | 15 | 16 | Carts & animals |
| 1:10 PM | Kalgan | Shanhaikwan | ——— | 100 | 32 | Wood & Hay |
| 1:10 PM | Peking | Changli | 26th Mix.B | 400 | 28 | Cav & Engrs |
| 4:00 PM | " | " | " " | 300 | 17 | Infantry |
| 4:30 PM | Techow | Lanchow | --- | 150 | 25 | Horses & animals |
| 6:45 PM | " | " | ——— | 100 | 14 | " " |
| 7:00 PM | Kaifeng | Chinwangtao | 24th Div | 300 | 13 | Infantry |
| 8:30 PM | " | " | " " | 400 | 31 | Cav.Art & Inf |
| 10:45 PM | Peking | Lanchow | 26th Mix B | 350 | 25 | Arty |
| 19-Trains | | | | 5110 | 456 | |

One hundred and ninety empties were returned from the north.

Three Japanese gunboats arrived at Chinwangtao.

Desultory fighting continues along the entire line, but no further advance has been made by either side.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence

Tientsin, China,
9: AM Sunday,
October 19, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 34.

Oct. 18th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikuan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 24th MB | 500 | 18 | Infantry |
| 5:55 AM | " | " | " " | 500 | 17 | " |
| 8:10 AM | Chengchow | " | 24th Div | 425 | 35 | " |
| 8:15 AM | " | " | " " | 140 | 28 | Supplies |
| 11: AM | " | " | " " | 375 | 27 | Artillery |
| 1: PM | " | " | ----- | 20 | 20 | Supplies |
| 2:15 PM | Machang | " | ------ | --- | 25 | " |
| 5:30 PM | Peking | Chinwangtao | ----- | 20 | 21 | Equipment |
| 10:45 PM | Chengchow | Lanchow | 24th Div | 350 | 15 | Gen.Off.&Staff |
| 9-Trains | | | | 2330 | 204 | |

Seventy-five empties were returned from the north.

Large trains of the 24th Division continue toward the north. This division has a peace strength of 8000 men, which is large for Chinese divisions. The equipment is excellent and the rifles are new. They have winter clothing, blanket rolls, entrenching tools and one hundred rounds of ammunition per man. However, about one third of the personnel are about 16 to 18 years of a age. The officers present a snappy appearance, with clean uniforms and the discipline maintained is very good.

A time bomb was found on the platform of the East Station, and also one on the platform of the Central Station. These were in straw suitcases with a clock set for 9: P.M.

One report from the Shanhaikuan sector stages that the Fengtien forces have been driven out of Shih Men-chai, but this has not yet been confirmed.

The landing of troops along the Manchurian Coast has been abandoned by Wu for the time being, as all his armored junks and sampans, together with his transports are now lying empty in Chinwangtao harbor.

Confidential.

Bul. No. 34 Cont'd

A report from Mukden states that Chang is withdrawing his expeditionary forces from the Chaoyang front and rapidly moving them toward Shanhaikwan.

Many wounded troops are returning daily to the hospitals in Tientsin and Peking. The majority of the cases are hand or arms wounds.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Monday, Oct. 20, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 55.

Oct. 19th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Loyang | Pei Ta He | — | 15 | 5 | Airplane supplies |
| 3:40 PM | Tientsin | Lanchow | — | 172 | 21 | Supplies |
| 8: PM | Fengtai | " | 1st Shensi | D.300 | 13 | Infantry |
| 10:15 PM | " | " | " " | 250 | 11 | " |
| 11:30 PM | " | " | " " | 460 | 20 | " |
| 5-Trains | | | | 1197 | 70 | |

One hundred empties were returned from the north.

This is the smallest number of trains going north since the concentration started, although the line is clearer than at any time for two or three weeks, according to the railway officials. Tientsin East and Central stations were practically clear of troop trains. One passenger train is now dispatched daily to Shanhaikwan and also one or two to Peking.

The first Fengtien prisoners were returned from the front and detrained at the East Station. There were ten in all and with the exception of one they were between 16 and 17 years of age. They were stripped of all insignia, but had on padded cotton cloth uniforms.

The British ship "Foxglove" which has been in Tientsin harbor went to Taku at 2:PM.

A Japanese report states that Chihfeng has been captured by troops of Feng Yu-hsiang, likely the 7th or 8th Mixed Brigades. These units were reported at Ping Chuan about two weeks ago.

A "Reuters" report states that the Chihli troops have retaken Chiu-Men on the Shanhaikwan front.

The second International train leaves Tientsin East for Shanhaikwan at 12 noon on the 20th, Commanded by the ~~British~~ French.

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WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Inf. I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Tuesday, Oct. 21, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 56.

Oct. 20th.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:25 AM | Peking | Lanchow | 15th Div | 600 | 22 | Infantry |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | ---- | 20 | 12 | Mil. stores |
| 5:25 AM | " | " | ---- | 30 | 25 | Fuel & straw |
| 2: PM | Hankow | " | 25th Div | 425 | 21 | Infantry |
| 4:15 PM | Tsinanfu | " | 20th MB | 500 | 30 | Inf & arty |
| 5:10 PM | " | " | " " | 400 | 25 | Infantry |
| 8: PM | " | Chiuwangtao | " " | 350 | 19 | " |
| 10:20 PM | Hankow | Lanchow | 25th Div | 450 | 17 | " |
| 11: PM | Kengtai | " | ------ | 10 | 14 | Supplies |
| 11:10 PM | Hankow | " | 25th Div | 200 | 20 | Cavalry |
| 11:20 PM | " | " | ----- | 25 | 15 | Supplies |
| 11-Trains | | | | 3010 | 217 | |

One hundred and fifty empties were returned from the north.

It will be noted that two new units appeared during the day. The 20th Mixed Brigade from Shantung is the first Shantung troops which have been identified, actually going to the Shanhaikwan front, although the 5th Division was reported marching to Chefoo to embark. The three trains of the 25th Division from Hankow, Hupeh Province are the first large elements of this unit. A train consisting of communication troops of the 25th Division, however, went to Lanchow over two weeks ago

The British sloop "Foxglove" has returned to Tientsin with the British Admiral Loveson aboard.

Chihli organizations identified by observer on the Shanhaikwan front are as follows: 3rd Division, 14th Division, 15th Division, 24th Division, 26th Division, 1st Shensi Division and 15th Mixed Brigade. The report of the recapture of Chin-Wen by Chihli troops has not been confirmed. The observer reports Government troops still attacking Shih Men-chai.

The Chinese report a landing of Chihli troops at Hulutao, but this is yet unconfirmed. Wu's transport fleet at Chinwangtao, however, has gone to sea, but the boats were empty. It is possible that the 5th Division has embarked from Chefoo and has made a landing at some point along the coast, but no reports of such a move have been received.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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CONFIDENTIAL. HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM
Wednesday, Oct. 22, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 57.

Oct. 21st.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1;05 AM | Peking | Lanchow | | 50 | 16 | Mil. stores |
| 2;12 AM | Fengtai | " | | 100 | 24 | Labors & mule carts |
| 2;30 AM | Peking | Chinwangtao | | 160 | 9 | Recruits |
| 5;05 AM | " | Shanhaikwan | | | 5 | Ammunition |
| 7;55 AM | " | Lanchow | | 10 | 15 | Rice |
| 8;15 AM | " | Shanhaikwan | | 30 | 4 | Ammunition |
| 1;30 PM | Changchow | " | 14th Div | 600 | 28 | Infantry |
| 5;00PM | " | " | 14th Div | 500 | 21 | " |
| 8-Trains | | | | 1450 | 102 | |

One hundred empties were returned from the north.

Four trains of wounded, about 1000 and 80 dead arrived in Tientsin from Shanhaikwan. The fighting at present is most severe and both sides are suffering many casualties. The 15th Division is reported to have lost over half their strength; the 15th Mixed Brigade decimated; the 26th Division losses very heavy; the 2nd Shensi Division commander killed and enormous losses, and one regiment of the 3rd Division annihilated. From Japanese reports, which are probably true, the Fengtien forces have lost even heavier along this front and it is doubtful whether Fengtien has sufficient reserves to fill up the line. Wu is throwing in reserve as rapidly as the troops arrive at Chinwangtao, and the actual result is now in the balance with position and communications in Wu's favor. With sufficient fresh troops on either side, it is reported, the issue could be very shortly settled.

The International train left at 12 noon on the 20th, and has been held up at Linshsuying, the first station south of Pei Ta Ho, for twenty-four hours. Whether to attempt to push on or return is at present undecided.

Wu's transport fleet which went to sea yesterday, has returned to Chinwangtao.

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Bul. No.57 Cont'd.

Nothing has been heard from [redacted]'s forces during the last week. With practically the entire Pengtien concentration at Shanhaikwan, now is the auspicious time for his advance on Chaoyang, as he must have units in this sector. Nothing has been heard from the 9th and 15th Divisions since they went north from Lanchow and Changli over three weeks ago.

Walter C. Phillipsy
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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CONFIDENTIAL. HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence

Tientsin, China,
9:AM Thursday,
October 23, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 38.

October 22nd.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:15 AM | Fengtai | Shanhaikwan | 1st MB Honan | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 5:30 AM | Peking | Lanchow | ----- | 50 | 14 | Mil stores |
| 5:40 AM | Fengtai | Shanhaikwan | 1st MB Honan | 500 | 31 | Cavalry |
| 6:40 AM | " | " | " " " | 500 | 28 | " |
| 9:35 AM | " | " | " " " | 600 | 31 | Artillery |
| 10:20 AM | Peking | " | ---------- | 200 | 40 | Mil. Supplies |
| 12:noon | Fengtai | " | ---------- | 10 | 7 | Ammunition |
| 1:55 PM | Loyang | Lanchow | 3rd Div | 600 | 28 | Infantry |
| 1:00 PM | " | " | " " | 10 | 15 | Supplies |
| 3:00 PM | Machang | " | ------- | 250 | 20 | Recruits |
| 5:50 PM | Peking | " | ------- | -- | 9 | Supplies |
| 4: 00PM | " | " | ------- | 20 | 15 | " |
| 5:50 PM | Fengtai | " | ------- | 150 | 5 | Recruits |
| 10:45 PM | Kalgan | Chinwangtao | ------- | 40 | 7 | Animals |
| 11:00 PM | " | " | ------- | 20 | 6 | " |

Ninety-seven empties were returned from the Shanhaikwan area.

The wounded continue to come south, approximately 400 arriving in Tientsin.

From Japanese reports the Fengtien troops are now occupying a line paralled with the railway from three to five miles north, extending from the original line north of Shanhaikwan near Chiao Shan-ssu to a point near the Shang river north of Chinwangtao. Three Brigades of Fengtien cavalry are reported on the right flank of the Fengtien line. If this situation is correct, Wu is in a most precarious position. The Japanese also report that it is doubtful whether Chang has sufficient reserves to accomplish the final advance, since his units now in line have suffered more casualties than Wu's troops. The reports generally are so contradictory that it is impossible to get any clear view of the actual situation. The "S.J. Service" on the Sino-Japanese News Service, with headquarters in Mukden, furnishes most startling reports of Fengtien victories, most of which are apparently uncensored. The other legitimate news agencies as "Reuters", etc, being restricted to the Government communications for transmission of their reports fall under the censorship of the Chihli Government, and naturally no reports of Chihli defeats are passed.

Bul. No. 58 Cont'd.

It is safe to state, however, that up to the present no decisive victory has been won by either side.

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WALKER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Friday, Oct. 24, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 39.

Oct. 23rd.

The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikwan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | MDSE & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:05 AM | Fengtai | Fengnien | ——— | — | 27 | Supplies |
| 11:30 AM | Tientsin | Lanchow | ——— | 500 | 18 | Recruits |
| 2:30 PM | Tsinanfu | " | ——— | 150 | 6 | Coolies |
| 3:25 PM | Changchow | Shanhaikwan | 14th Div | 400 | 16 | Infantry |
| 4: PM | " | " | " " | 150 | 6 | Inf & srty |
| 4:20 PM | Laoyang | " | 3rd Div | 450 | 32 | Infantry. |
| 6-Trains | | | | 1650 | 105 | |

Two hundred and nineteen empties were returned from Shanhaikwan area.

Three large trains of wounded arrived from Shanhaikwan.

General Feng Yu-hsiang seized Peking, and closed all the gates of the city, cutting railway, telephone and telegraph communications. His occupation was unopposed, and he immediately posted proclamations demanding a (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) abdication of Tso Jun, and (3) the arrest and punishment of all responsible for the present war. This, entirely changes the aspect of the present conflict, for Wu Pei-fu is now cut off from his base of supplies, and finances, and has practically his entire force in the field, wholly dependent upon direct support from Peking. The latest reports from our Shanhaikwan observer state that Wu's troops are on a line from Chiao Pen, a small village just west of the Tang river, about eight miles north of Chinwangtao, extending directly west to a point on the wall, Chiao Shan-sau, and then to the sea- conforming to the original line. The report states further that Wu's troops are being well fed, and have ample clothing and ammunition. From a military standpoint, the report states, the situation for the Government troops has never been more favorable. At the time of this report the news of the occupation of Peking had not reached Shanhaikwan, and it is now a problem that only Wu Pei-fu can solve.

The British are stationing troops at the bridges along their sector, and dispatched six men and an officer from Fengtai to repair the telegraph lines, but this detachment was forced to return to Fengtai by the Chinese troops coming from Peking. The British Headquarters have requested a cruiser for Chinwangtao, and at the request of the Japanese have dispatched one platoon of troops from Shanhaikwan to assist in protection of the Japanese wireless station there.

The International train, which left for Shanhaikwan at noon on the 20th, arrived at Tientsin about 6: A.M., the 24th.

The political aspect of the Feng Yu-hsiang's Coup d'Etat is rather interesting in that C.T. Wang and Huang Fu participated in it. C.T. Wang is an old Kuomintang leader, and in 1920 was speaker of the Canton Senate. He is a graduate of Yale and studied four years in Japan. His last mission for the Central Government was as the original negotiator of the Sino-Russian Treaty. In the midst of the negotiations he was relieved and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Wellington Koo took over Wang's duties. This was an open affront to him, and opposed by many prominent Chinese at the time. Huang Fu was recently appointed Minister of Education in the new Yen Cabinet. He was born in Chekiang and graduated from the Army Cadet College, Japan. He has the rank of a Lieut. General. Wang Ke-min, Minister of Finance has been arrested and also General Li, confidential adviser to the President. The President and other Cabinet Ministers are under surveillance. It is planned that the present Government will be by a committee, which will invite Chang Tso-lin, Sun Yat-sen, Tuan Chi-jui and other prominent leaders to a round table conference, with the object of unifying China, adjusting debts, disbanding superfluous troops, and forming a new Government.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf.

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence.

Tientsin China.
9AM
Saturday, Oct. 24, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 40.

Oct.24th:
The following trains cleared Tientsin East for the Shanhaikuan area:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Desc & Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:10 PM | Tientsin | Tongshan | | 42 | 3 | Clothing |
| 4:30 " | " | Chinwangtao | | 20 | 32 | Supplies |

There were 172 empties returned from the North.

Three trains of wounded arrived from Shanhaikuan.

It is reported that the Peking-Mukden rails are torn up at Yangtsun, second station west of Tientsin Central, and that every station to Peking is occupied with troops of Feng Yu-hsiang.

One train of the 26th Division of Infantry and Artillery arrived at Tientsin Central at 10:15 PM but returned immediately to Machang on the Tsin-Pu line.

The Military Police in the Native City, Tientsin, the Ex-German, Ex-Russian, and Ex-Austrian Concessions have taken off their red arm bands, formerly worn as an emblem of the Central Government at war.

Nothing has been reported from the situation at Shanhaikuan.

The situation in Peking is unchanged.

A general evacuation is taking place from the Native City, Tientsin, to the foreign Concessions but other than an apparent general excitement the situation is uneventful.

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM
Sunday, Oct. 26, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 41.

Oct. 25th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1205 AM | Tientsin | Lang-fang | 16th MB | 350 | 15 | Infantry |
| 2: AM | " | Lanchow | ------ | 110 | 19 | Coolies |
| 9: AM | Tsinanfu | " | ------ | | 8 | Supplies |
| 4:25 PM | Machang | Lang-fang | 26th Div | 600 | 19 | Infantry |
| 6:30 PM | " | Yang-tsun | " " | 500 | 16 | Infantry |
| 8:15 PM | Chinwangtao | Lang-fang | 26th Div | 400 | 24 | Infantry |
| 9:15 PM | " | " | " " | 50 | 12 | Artillery |
| 11: PM | " | " | " " | 150 | 8 | Infantry |
| 12 mid.Nt. | Tientsin | Lanchow | ------ | 15 | 40 | Supplies |
| 9-trains | | | | 2155 | 161 | |

Fifty-three empties were returned from the north.

Two hundred wounded were brought south from the Shanhaikwan area.

Wu Pei-fu and staff have left Shanhaikwan for the south, accompanied by three trains of troops. Chang Fu-lai and Feng Shou-shin are left in command at Shanhaikwan, with a force estimated at 70,000. This is reported to be far superior to the number of Fengtai troops along this front.

It will be noted that units of the 26th Division have come south and also some from Machang, and are detraining at Yangtsun and Lang-fang. Wu's plan apparently is to hold the line at, perhaps Lang-fang and bring up his reinforcements from Khahsal Chi Hsieh-yuan at Nanking, over the Tientsin-Pukow line. It is possible that the 25th Division under Hsiao Ko-nan at Hankow may advance up the Peking-Hankow and attack Peking from that direction.

Tsao Ming, the commander of the 26th Division is at present in the native city, Tientsin.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA.
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9: AM
Monday, Oct. 27, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 42.

October 26th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4: AM | Lanchow | Lang-fang | 3rd Div | 40 | 5 | Infantry |
| 4:45 AM | Chinwangtao | " | 26th Div | 550 | 26 | " |
| 5:30 AM | Tangku | Tientsin | ------- | 20 | 1 | Officers |
| 11:30 AM | Chinwangtao | Lang-fang | 3rd Div | 200 | 24 | Cavalry |
| 11:45 AM | " | " | Marshal WU-PEI-FU and Staff | | | 28 cars. |
| 5:30 PM | Lanchow | Yangtsun | 26th Div | 550 | 24 | Infantry |
| 4:35 PM | Tientsin | Lanchow | ------ | 20 | 2 | Infantry |
| 5:15 PM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin | 3rd Div | 500 | 25 | Engineers |
| 5:45 PM | Lanchow | " | ----- | 100 | 6 | Infantry |
| 9 PM | Chinwangtao | " | 26th Div | 550 | 15 | Infantry. |
| 10-trains | | | | 2150 | 155 | |

Marshal Wu Pei-fu arrived in Tientsin from Chinwangtao at 11:30 A.M. on the 26th. He was preceded by a train of Cavalry of the 3rd Division, on which the horses were saddled up and the troops were under arms ready to detrain at once. Wu's train consisted of three locomotives and about thirty coaches. As the train pulled into Tientsin East station guards were thrown out, but no effort was made to prevent white foreigners from seeing the Marshal in his car. However, two Japanese soldiers appeared at the back of the crowd, and were immediately thrown out by about twenty of the guard. A Japanese officer later appeared with his card, but he was given the same treatment and the three were placed under a guard off the station platform until Wu's train pulled out. Marshal Wu's train pulled on to Tientsin Central where he remained until 2:30 P.M., at which time it was backed into the yards and Wu's Headquarters is now reported near the Central station.

About 2000 Shansi troops arrived at Lang-fang from Peking, but one-half of this number returned immediately. The troops of the 11th Division which were south of Peking have all been recalled. Wu Pei-fu's concentration appears to be between Yangtsun and Langfang. His troops todate have all come south from the Shanhaikwan sector with the exception of two trains of the 26th Division, which came up from Machang. Ten trains of troops from Marshal Chi's forces at Nanking are reported at Techow on the Tientsin-

Pukow line. The 24th Division units were reported as arriving in Tientsin early on the 27th.

The situation at Shanhaikwan is reported quiet, and there has been no material change in the line.

The International train left at 9:40 A.M., 27th, for Peking with Captain Cunningham, British forces in command.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence

Tientsin, China,
9 AM
Tuesday, Oct. 28, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 45.

Oct. 27th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:AM | Lanhsien | Yangtsun | ----- | 20 | 8 | Supplies |
| 5: AM | Lanchow | " | 24th Div | 200 | 15 | Infantry |
| 7: AM | Chinwangtao | " | ------ | -- | 22 | Supplies |
| 8:40 AM | Tangshan | " | ------ | 75 | 30 | Coal |
| 8:15 AM | Tientsin East | " | ------ | -- | 26 | Supplies |
| 12:30 PM | " " | Tangshan | ------ | -- | 7 | " |
| 4:30 PM | Lanchow — | Yangtsun | 24th Div | 200 | 8 | Arty & Inf. |
| 7:40 PM | Chinwangtao | " | 3rd Div | 600 | 58 | Cav & Inf |
| 8: PM | " | " | 24th Div | 200 | 15 | Artillery |
| 10:30 PM | Lanhsien | " | " " | 50 | 14 | " |
| 11:45 PM | Chinwangtao | " | 3rd Div | 60 | 7 | " |
| 11:55 " | " | " | " " | 450 | 27 | Arty. 5" guns |
| 12-trains | | — | | 1855 | 238 | |

Seventy-five empties were returned from the north.

Two hundred wounded arrived from the Shanhaikuan front.

The situation at the Shanhaikuan front is unchanged, and fighting has practically ceased. Two hundred and twenty Japanese troops were landed from Port Arthur on the 25th. Eighty of these embarked on the 27th aboard a Japanese transport for Tientsin. Four Japanese destroyers are still in Chinwangtao harbor. Twelve of Wu's transports have left Chinwangtao since the 25th, and a large part of the commandered junks have been released. Several pieces of artillery have been landed from the transports to replace guns which have been damaged in action.

It is reported that Feng's troops are taking up a line about three miles south-east of Langfang and to date 5000 of the 11th Division and several hundred of the 7th Mixed Brigade have arrived. Wu's troops are detraining at Yangtsun and Changchuang. According to reports Feng Yu-hsiang controls his 11th Division, the 7th, 8th and 25th Mixed Brigades, 1st Shensi Division and perhaps the 15th Division under Wang Huai-ching. Wang, however, is now reported as going back to fight with Wu Pei-fu, and coming down the Lan river. The peace time strength of these units totals 27,000 men and with recruits perhaps would run up to somewhere near 33,000 men. Subtracting for the 15th Division it would leave about 27,-000 men all told at present with Feng Yu-hsiang. Wu has his 3rd Division and the 24th Division so far coming from Shanhaikuan, with a total peace

strength of 18,000, and with recruits this number would perhaps be nearest to 22,000. This will doubtless be all that Wu will withdraw from Shanhaikwan, but for his main reinforcements he is depending upon Chi Hsieh-yuan at Nanking. Hsiao Ping-hsun also has the 25th Division in Mukden with a peace strength of 9,000. Wu, therefore has sufficient sources from which to draw troops provided he can procure finances to pay and move them. To date no troop trains have arrived from Chi, although it was reported several days ago that a large number had started north.

One hundred and twenty-five marines arrived in Tientsin from the "Huron". These troops go to Peking at 11:20 A.M., on the 28th.

The British Admiral Bevesen returned by motor from Peking, and went aboard the British sloop "Penglove", which is scheduled to leave Tientsin at 9:30 A.M., on the 28th, and to return the following morning.

The two Japanese destroyers in Tientsin have moved up the river through the International Bridge to a berth opposite the Japanese Concession.

Four 3-inch Mountain guns were unloaded at Tientsin Central with ammunition and two are now loaded and in place with extra ammunition on the platform.

The International train from Peking arrived at 9:20 A.M., on the 28th.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM
Wednesday, Oct. 29, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 44.

Oct. 28th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin October 28th, 1924.

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4: AM | Pukow | Hungtsun | ---- | 500 | 55 | Arty. |
| 10:AM | Yanhsu | " | 3rd Div | 200 | 6 | Arty. 3" guns |
| 10:30 AM | Suchowfu | " | ------ | 1000 | 31 | Inf & M.D. |
| 11:AM | " | " | ------ | 900 | 23 | Arty & Inf |
| 4:45 PM | Machang | " | ------ | 450 | 27 | Infantry |
| 8:50 PM | Chinwangtao | " | ------ | 400 | 20 | " |
| 10:40 PM | Pukow | " | ------ | 400 | 17 | " |
| 7-trains | | | | 3850 | 189 | |

No wounded troops returned from the north.

The 9th, 15th, 23rd and 20th Divisions, Wang Huai-Ching's command are all loyal to Wu Pei-fu and indicates that Wang, while at first reported as with Feng Yu-hsiang is still under Wu's influence, and is supporting him. Units of the 15th Division and 2nd Shensi Division are now entrained at Tengshun, and moving west to support Wu at Yangtsun.

According to the Japanese, Lanchow was captured by Fengtien troops, and there is also a report that Taiyuanfu was in their hands. This has not been confirmed. The 2nd Shensi Division, although loyal to Wu looted Lanchow and this is thought to be the origin of the Fengtien capture.

Eleven trains have passed Suchowfu coming from Chengchow over the Lunghai line. Other trains are reported as coming from Pukow, but so far it has been impossible to identify any of these units.

The Peking-Hankow line has been cut at Paotingfu, and all rail communications stopped.

Wu Pei-fu's front line is 1/4 mile west of Chang-Chuang, where trenches have been constructed about 3 feet deep and 5 feet wide. Patrols are out in front about 600 yards. No artillery is apparent on this line. His second line is at Yangtsun, where his troops and supplies have all been detrained. Lofa is in the center between the lines, Feng's line being near Langfang.

Confidential. Bul. No. 44 cont'd

An observer from this office visited Wu's second line at Yangtsun yesterday, and observed that Infantry trenches were dug and occupied by troops, also that four 3-inch field guns were in position with a gun detail of about eight men to each gun.

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Walter C. Phillipsp,
Captain, 15th Infantry.
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM
Oct. 30, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 45.

Oct. 29th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin October 29th, 1924:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC ARMAMENT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:30 AM | Lanchow | Pangtsun | 20th Div | 350 | 40 | Infantry |
| 5:40 PM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin | 110 wounded troops. | | 7 | Wounded troops |
| 4:30 PM | Lanchow | Pangtsin | 20th Div | 250 | 35 | Inf. & b arty |
| 5: PM | Machang | " | 1st Shantung MB | 275 | 16 | Infantry |
| 6:30 PM | " | " | " " | 300 | 28 | " |
| 7: PM | " | " | " " | 120 | 7 | Infantry |
| 4:45 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin | ---------- | 80 | 4 | " |
| 7-trains | | | | 1575 | 129 | |

Thirty-six empties were returned from the north.

Marshal Chi has issued a circular telegram stating that Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsu and Kiangsi Provinces are all supporting Marshal Wu, and are despatching troops. It will be noted that trains of the 1st Shantung Mixed Brigade arrived, which is an indication that Shantung, in spite of the Governors proclamation of independence is sending troops to the support of Wu.

The 2nd Shensi Division, part of Wu's concentration on the Shanhaikwan front, have arrived in Tangku. It is reported the senior officers have deserted and the command has been assumed by three Majors. The troops are mutinying, and their intention was to come to Tientsin for the purpose of looting. Marshal Wu sent an armored train from Tientsin to Tangku with instructions to blow them off the tracks if they attempted to advance. These trains are now stopped at Tangku. The 15th Division is reported in the rear of the 2nd Shensi, and as a result the entire line is blocked north of Tangku. The locomotives are reported to be dry and without coal, hence it is impossible to move in either direction. Apprehension is felt in Tientsin in regard to the advance overland of this mutinying force of Shensi troops.

The International train left Tientsin East for Peking at 12 noon and returned at 10:20 A.M., without incident.

Chang Tso-lin's troops are reported now in Lanchow, Kuyeh and Tatunkou, and are advancing toward Tongshan. Shanhaikwan is still held by Wu's troops, also Chinwangtao, but it is reported that the troops at Chinwangtao are deserting and its capture is imminent. Chang's forces are those of the 2nd Army under Li Ching-lin, with Chang Tsung Chang, Commander of the 3rd Fengtien Infantry Brigade in command.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf. I.O.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Friday,
October 31, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 46.

October 30th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin October 30, 1924:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:20 AM | Machang | Yangtsun | 1st Shantung MB | 850 | 27 | Artillery |
| 1:30 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin-G. | 9th Div | 150 | 16 | Infantry |
| 4:05 PM | " | " | 20th Div | 190 | 10 | " |
| 6:35 PM | Tangku | " | 15th Div | 12 | 2 | Engineers |
| 6:45 PM | Pukow | Tientsin | ----- | 10 | 15 | Supplies |
| 8:00PM | Tientsin | Hsin Ho | ---- | 20 | 4 | Ammunition |
| 6-trains | | | | 1232 | 72 | |

The International train, Japanese commanding, left Tientsin East at 1: P.M., for Shanhaikwan with a detachment of U.S. troops aboard for the protection of Hanku bridge. A report at 9 AM 31st, stated that the train was still in the vicinity of Tangku.

It is reported that Chang Tso-lin's troops hold the railway from Lanchow to Tatungtsu. His troops include many Russians and Japanese. Shanhaikwan is still holding out and no attacks have occurred recently. Fengtien troops are reported to be moving westward from Lanchow along the Peking-Shanhaikwan caravan road, which passes north of Tongshan. The Chihli troops are constructing trenches east of Tongshan River bridge, and one train of Chihli troops has moved up the line toward Shanhaikwan.

The Yangtsun-Langfang front is unchanged, although fighting was reported to have begun. Wu has received very few reinforcements. The mutinying 2nd Shensi Division of Wu's at Tangku and Hsin Ho was stopped at Hsin Ho by Wu's armored train. Small groups of deserters from this Division are reported as straggling up the railway towardd Tientsin.

The Japanese Garrison in Tientsin was reinforced by 240 troops from Port Arthur.

Peace negotiations are being carried on between Wu and Feng through the Ex-Premier Chang Shao-tseng, who went from Tientsin to Peking to interview Feng and returned to Tientsin on the 30th. No agreement has yet been signed, but Wu is now in the mood fro accepting any reasonable peace terms.

The 8th Mixed Brigade is reported detraining at Kaifang. Feng has at present on this front units of the 11th Division, 1st Shansi Division, 5th and 8th Mixed Brigades. General Feng visited the front lines during the day, but returned to Peking, and it is reported gave instructions to General Chang at Lofa to hold up operations for the time being.

Latest reports from Chinwangtao state that it has been captured by Fengtien troops and that some of Wu's troops succeeded in embarking on the transports in the harbor, but many were captured.

The officer commanding the British detachment at Fengtai was bayonetted by one of Feng's troops.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China.
9 AM Saturday
November 1, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 47.

October 31st.

The following trains arrived from the Shanhaikuan area:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | CWT. | Yangtsun | 3rd. Div. | 300 | 52 | Artillery |
| 2:00 " | Lanchow | " | " | 300 | 17 | " |
| 6:50 " | Tangku | Tientsin | ------ | 60 | 12 | Armored train |
| 12:45 PM | " | " | (Red Cross train--700 wounded) | | | |
| 1:05 " | " | " | 3rd Div. | 200 | 6 | Infantry |
| 2:30 " | " | " | " | 150 | 6 | " |
| 9:30 " | Tongshan | " | ------ | 500 | 19 | Wounded |
| 10:30 " | Lanchow | " | 20th Div. | 300 | 28 | Infantry |
| 11:10 " | " | " | " | 150 | 10 | " |

The following trains arrived at Tientsin Central, over the Tientsin-Pukow:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. & REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:25 AM | Tsinan | Tientsin | ------ | 20 | 30 | Supplies |
| 11:40 " | " | " | ------ | 50 | 35 | " |
| 2:00 PM | " | Yangtsun | Honan M.B. | 525 | 41 | Artillery |
| 8:00 " | " | " | ------ | 10 | 9 | Carts |
| 11:45 " | Pukow | " | 4th Div. | 300 | 13 | Infantry |

Great confusion continues in the Tientsin stations, as both stations are practically blocked with troops and much difficulty is encountered in trying to identify the various units. Wu is not getting many reinforcements from the South.

Three transports of wounded Chihli troops from Chinwangtao arrived in Tientsin during the day but were refused the right to land by the City Police and the troops of the foreign garrisons on guard. Two of them docked along the Russian Concession and the other remained in mid-stream. The troops aboard (about 600 in all) were unarmed and several were reported to have died during the trip. They had not had food for three days.

A few from one boat got ashore but the majority were held on board and all the vessels were sent back down the river outside the six mile limit around Tientsin.

Fengtien cavalry is reported at Tangku.

Marshal Wu's train is reported to have been moved from its original place in Tientsin Central but its destination is so far unknown.

The International train which left for Shanhaikuan at 1 PM, 30th passed Tongshan at 10AM 31st.

Fengtien troops are fighting southeast of Tongshan and the foreign population have been collected in the American compound. Scattered unarmed units of the 9th Division (Chihli troops) are reported in the Tongshan vicinity.

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WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces In China
OFFICE OF G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Tientsin, China
9 AM Sunday
November 2, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 48.

November 1st.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin East Station:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | DESC. & REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:15 AM | Tangku | T.C. | 2nd. Shensi | 1000 | 32 | Infantry |
| 1:40 " | " | " | " | 400 | 18 | " |
| 4:20 " | " | " | " | 600 | 15 | " |
| 9:45 " | " | " | " | 50 | 15 | Supplies |
| 10:15 " | " | " | " | 400 | 28 | Inf. & Supplies |
| 11:00 " | " | " | " | 150 | 24 | Supplies |
| 12:30 PM | " | " | " | 350 | 17 | Infantry |
| 1:00 " | " | " | " | 100 | 1 | " |
| 1:20 " | " | " | " | 150 | 2 | " |
| 1:45 " | " | " | 14th Div. | 1500 | 37 | " |
| 2:20 " | " | " | " | 800 | 18 | Inf. Art. |
| 2:50 " | " | " | " | 300 | 8 | 150 Animals |
| 3:45 " | " | " | 2nd Shensi | 2000 | 45 | 220 Horses |
| 4:15 " | " | " | " | 100 | 10 | 80 " |
| 5:10 " | " | " | " | 950 | 25 | 50 " |
| 5:50 " | " | " | " | 600 | 22 | 150 " |
| 6:15 " | " | " | " | 800 | 29 | Inf. Art. Cav. |
| 6:30 " | " | " | " | 150 | 11 | Infantry |
| 7:00 " | T.K. | " | ——— | | 24 | Empty |
| 8:10 " | Tangku | " | 2nd Shensi | 400 | 28 | Inf. Art. |
| 10:00 " | Tongshan | " | 8th Div. | 800 | 31 | Inf. Art. Cav. |

There were no trains come up from the south to reinforce Wu's line at Yangtsun. "

The entire Shensi Division (9 trains) was moved through Tientsin Central, on down the Peking-Hankow line, with their destination Suchowfu, on the Lunghai line. It will be impossible for these to get much further than

Feinanfu on the line is out south of there .

The International train to Peking was fired on near Lofa and no news of its progress further has been reported. The International to Shanhaikwan was reported to have reached Shanhaikwan and passed Chinwangtao at 9:30 PM 1st on the return trip but this has not been confirmed.

It has been confirmed that the troops opposing the Chihli forces at Tungshan are the 1st Shansi Division which marched from Tungshan just west of Peking.

Two more transports arrived during the twenty four hours and the troops aboard have been disarmed by the City Police. Several sampans full of troops came up the river but were turned back by the outposts of the foreign garrisons.

No troops of Chihli opposition have yet arrived at Tsangku and the report in yesterday's Bulletin to that effect is incorrect.

Wu's line at Yangtsun is reported to have crumpled and the entire force is now in retreat east and south. None of these troops have yet arrived in Tientsin. Wu's position is now most precarious and his flight is imminent.

The 20th Division is reported coming to Peitsang in sixty sampans. From this point they are expected overland toward Tientsin.

The Native City is quiet but many unarmed soldiers are in the streets. A general evacuation of the Civil population is taking place

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WALKER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
Office of G-2 Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9AM Monday,
November 3, 1924.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 49.

November 2nd.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin East November 2nd 1924;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Desc & remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:55 AM | [redacted] | Tientsin E. | ---- | -x- | 27 | Sealed cars |
| 10: AM | " | " | ---- | ---- | 24 | Supplies |
| 11: AM | Shanhaikwan | " | 26th Div | 800 | 36 | Infantry |
| 2: PM | Tangku | " | 14th MB | 800 | 18 | " |
| 3:10 PM | " | " | 20th Div | 100 | 24 | " |
| 4: PM | Lanchow | " | " " | 200 | 28 | " |
| 5: PM | Tangku | " | " " | 250 | 18 | Anti-air-craft |
| 7-trains | | | | 2150 | 175 | |

No trains 6:PM to 12 midnight.

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central station;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:20 AM | Tangku | Hsuan | 14th Div | 1600 | 26 | Infantry |
| 8:30 PM | Tongshan | " | 2nd Shansai | 350 | 18 | Inf & arty |

The U.S. Gunboat "Asheville" arrived at 9 AM and docked on the German bund.

The International train from Tientsin to Peking and return, leaving 10:55 A.M., November 1st, was fired upon both going and coming, but returned to a point about one mile west of Tientsin Central by 5: PM on the 2nd. This step was due to the traffic congestion in Tientsin Central. The International train returning from Shanhaikwan was reported through Tongshan.

The traffic congestion has entirely cleared at Tangku, and all the congestion is now within the Tientsin yards.

Marshal Wu's train left Central station at 3:15 A.M., November 3rd, for Tangku and it is reported he boarded a Chinese Merchant transport for Tsingtao. His entire line was crushed at Yangtsun and Peitsang. Wu's troops within the Tientsin stations are being rapidly disarmed by the native police, and are scattering throughout the native city. Feng's advance troops are expected hourly at Tientsin Central. There is no report of the advance of the Fengtien troops

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf. IO

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Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Tuesday,
November 4, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 50.

November 3rd.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin Central;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | Desc & REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2: PM | Peking | Tientsin C | 8th MB (Feng's | 800 | 25 | Infantry |
| 6: PM | Tientsin C | " E | 11th Div " | 800 | 20 | " |
| 9:15 PM | Peking | " E | " " | 500 | 28 | " |
| 3-trains | | | | 2100 | 73 | |

Six trains of Wu's retreating troops arrived east of Tientsin East station, composed of units of the 9th, 15th, 20th and 3rd Divisions. The International train is immediately behind these and two more troops trains are in the rear of the International. These trains have been held here since about 6 P.M., November 3rd. At present one complete train of the 3rd Division is in Tientsin East station, and have surrendered to Marshal Tsang Chi-jui, but these troops still retain their arms. The troops on the trains to the east of the station are slowly being disarmed, and todate little trouble has occurred.

At 2 PM Feng's first troops arrived in Tientsin Central, composed of units of the 8th Mixed Brigade. They immediately took control, and stationed two machine guns in front of the head offices of the Peking-Mukden railway, covering the main street leading from the Central station. At this time most of Wu's troops had been disarmed by the native police, but Feng's units surrounded the trains and completed the work in orderly manner, taking about 2000 captives. At about 4 P.M., a crowd of about 500 of Wu's men with arms attempted to make a stand at the north approach of the Emmen bridge, but they were dispersed and disarmed without casualties by the police. At 6 P.M., the first troops of Feng's arrived at Tientsin East station, about 50 in all, and detrained west of the water tower, about 500 yards from the station forming a skirmish line, advanced east toward the station, some firing occurred, but without casualties. Feng's representatives went to the station platform to confer with the Officers of Wu's troops regarding a surrender, and firing again broke out at which time a French Annamite soldier who was a part of the French guard at the station was hit. Heavy reinforcements were immediately called out. Feng's troops took position north of the station, and constructed of native police and French Annamites

small trenches about 500 yards west of the station at right angles to the railway tracks, allowing no one to pass their lines in either direction. Trouble was anticipated in disarming the six trains of troops east of the station, but after 6:30 P.M., no further attempt was made to do so by Feng's troops and no other trouble was experienced during the night. Feng's troops are reported to have advanced about one mile east of Tientsin East station at 9: A.M. The International train from Peking arrived Tientsin East station at 11:50 A.M.

A special train of four cars left Tientsin East at 5: P.M., for Peking to bring back General Wang Chen-ping, Civil Governor of Chihli Province.

There are no reports of Fengtien troops further south than Tangku, and these were cavalry patrols.

Feng's first contact with Chang Tso-lin's forces was at Tongshan, when the Shansi 1st Division from Tungchow met the troops of the II Army coming south. A friendly conference was held and Feng's units advanced south. Whether their friendliness will continue when Chang's troops meet Feng's 11th Division is still an open question. Many Chinese observers are of the opinion that another conflict will develope. It should not be lost sight of that all the Yangtze provinces, including Szechuan are still strongly for Wu Pei-fu.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Wednesday,
November 5, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 51.
November 4th.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin East;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:40 AM | Yangtsun | Tientsin E | 11th Div | 500 | 17 | Arty |
| 4: PM | Tangku | " | Wu's Special train from Tangku. Empty. | | | |
| 5:50 PM | " | " | 9th Inf | 150 | 56 | Supplies |
| 6:05 PM | " | " | ——— | 135 | 22 | Equipment |
| 6:40 PM | " | " | --- | | 52 | Empties |
| 7:50 PM | " | " | | | 18 | " |
| 8: PM | Shanhaikwan | " | Allied train and arrived | | | |

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5: AM | Tientsin C | Peking | | 200 | 26 | Arms. |
| 6:40 AM | Yangtsun | Tientsin E | 8th MB | 300 | 17 | Arty |
| 6:40 AM | " | " C | 8th MB | 500 | 56 | " |
| 1:50 PM | Peking | " C | 7th MB | 500 | 30 | " |
| 6:20 PM | Tientsin E | Shantung | | | 51 | Empties |
| 11:10 PM | Tongshan | Peking | | | 18 | " |
| 11:15 PM | Tientsin E | " | | | 24 | Equipment |
| 11:20 PM | Peking | Tientsin C | 1st Shensi Div | 800 | 28 | Inf & arty |

Wu's troops are now practically all disarmed, and the situation is improving hourly. Feng's troops in Tientsin Central now consist of units of the 7th and 8th Mixed Brigades and the 1st Shensi Division, the 7th and 8th Mixed Brigades predominating. No units of Feng's are apparent in Tientsin East, and the little guarding necessary is done by Wu's troops, who have gone over to Tuan Chi-jui. Approximately 2000 of Feng's troops have detrained in and around Central station.

An International train for Peking left a t 10:20 AM., the 4th and arrived at Peking 2: AM November 5th. The International from Shanhaikwan arrived in Tientsin East at 8: PM., November 4th.

Chang Tso-lin's troops are reported to be coming south to Chunglianghcheng, the first station on the Peking-Mukden, east of Tientsin East, about 16 miles.

General Wang Chen-ping arrived in Tientsin on the 3rd, by motor from Peking. General Chang Fu-lai, one of Wu's generals on the Shanhaikwan front is in Tientsin assisting in salvaging Wu's abandoned supplies for Feng's army. There is apparently much haste in this work, as every effort is being made to get the supplies to Peking and all cleared up before the arrival of Chang Tso-lin's troops.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf. I.O.

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attache, CO 15th Inf.

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Headquarters U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2a Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China.
9 AM Thursday,
November 6, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 82.

Nov. 5th. The following trains arrived and departed at Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4:30 PM | Peking | Tientsin E | International train. | | | |
| 6:30 PM | Tangku | " | Fengtien | 1500 | 55 | Inf & Arty |
| 7:50 PM | Tientsin C | " | 23rd Div | 700 | 26 | Inf |
| 7:55 PM | Tangku | " | Fengtien | 600 | 34 | Inf |
| 10:15 PM | " | " | " | 400 | 50 | Inf. |
| 5-trains | | | | 3200 | 115 | |

Nov. 6th.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:20 AM | Tangku | Tientsin C | Fengtien 27th Div | 600 | 29 | Inf & Cav |
| 5:15 AM | " | " | " " " | 800 | 40 | Inf & Cav |
| 5: AM | Tientsin E | " | Fengtien troops | 700 | 26 | Infantry |
| 5:20 AM | " | " | Wu's troops | 200 | 15 | Disarmed |
| 4-trains | | | | 2300 | 108 | |

Chang Tso-lin's first troops arrived in Tientsin at 6:30 P.M., on the 5th. His leading train was heavily loaded and had about 200 Russians in the first two cars, with four Russian officers. The troops were all in Chinese uniform. On the third train Japanese troops were identified in Chinese uniform, about 200 in all. Russian units were scattered throughout three trains. At 2: AM of the 6th, the first train of Fengtien troops arrived at Central station. No break or disorder has so far occurred between the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang. It has not been ascertained whether Chang's troops will advance further toward Peking or not. Three trains of Feng's troops returned to Peking during the day, and one train of Wang Chen-ping's Staff and troops of the 23rd Division arrived from Peking. Wang has again assumed command of his old division, which he lost by order of Wu Pei-fu some months ago, when it was decided that a Civil Governor could not hold concurrently the command of a Division. Fengtien Generals, Chang Tsung-chang and Kuo Sung-ling are reported to have arrived in Tientsin.

A conference of the present leaders or their representatives was held in Tuan Chi-jui's home during the day, which was attended by General Hu Ching-yi, representative of Feng, Sun Kuo, representative of Sun Yat-sen, General Wang Chen-ping and representatives of Chang Tso-lin. The outcome of this conference is unknown.

The Japanese state that Chang's troops will advance no further than Tientsin, but Mukden officers aboard the trains say they are going to Peking. The Japanese also state that Chang Tso-lin will insist that the peace conference be held in Mukden.

The International train which left Tientsin for Peking at 10:20 AM on the 4th, returned without unusual incident at 4:30 PM on the 5th. A regular passenger train was dispatched to Peking at 4:30 PM on the 5th, and another is to be sent on the morning of the 6th, also an international to Shanhaikuan.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Friday,
November 7, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 55.

Nov. 6th. The following trains arrived at Tientsin East from the north:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:20 AM | Tangku | Tientsin C | Fengtien 27th D. | 600 | 29 | Inf & Cav |
| 5:15 AM | " | " | " " | 800 | 40 | " |
| 7:15 PM | " | " | 1st Brig 2d Army | 650 | 28 | Infantry |
| 11:15 PM | " | " | " " " | 600 | 25 | Inf & M.G. |
| 11:20 PM | " | " | " " " | 500 | 24 | Infantry |
| [illegible] November 7th: | | | | | | |
| 12:40 AM | " | " | 3rd Brig 2d Army | 1200 | 56 | Inf & Cav |
| 2: AM | " | " | 1st " " " | 500 | 24 | Infantry |
| 5: AM | " | " | ------- " " | 1000 | 38 | Inf & equip |
| 3:30 AM | " | " | " " | 500 | 25 | " " |
| 4:30 AM | " | " | 1st Div Fengtien | 800 | 38 | Infantry |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | 3rd Army | 250 | 12 | " |
| 8-trains | | | | 7200 | 345 | |

November 6th.

The following trains departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:30 AM | Tientsin C | " | Tientsin-Pukow RR | 8th MB | 400 | 22 | Inf & Arty |
| 11:55 AM | " | " | Peking | 27th Division | 600 | 31 | Infantry |
| 12: noon | " | " | Tientsin-Pukow RR | 3rd Brig. | 700 | 36 | Arty & Cav |
| 2:30 PM | " | " | " " | " " | 400 | 12 | Infantry. |
| 7:35 PM | " | " | Peking | | 250 | 12 | Equipment |
| 8:20 PM | " | " | Tientsin-Pukow RR | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |
| 10:55 PM | " | " | " " | 1st Brig.2nd Army | 650 | 24 | Infantry |
| 7-trains | | | | | 3150 | 165 | |

Chang Tso-lin's troops continue to arrive from Tangku, nine trains in all coming in during the period from 9 AM 6th to 9 AM 7th. Four trains of Chang's troops and one train of Feng's went south during the day over the Tientsin-Pukow line, and were reported later by the outposts along the American line as being on the branch line of the Tsin-Pu, leading to the Tsinan wharf on the Hai He just south of Tientsin. These trains, however, pulled back on the main line and had cleared the branch line by 5:30 AM of the 7th. It is not undetermined whether this move was to clear the yards at Tientsin Central or merely to await a more favorable time to move south to Machang and Techow. The Director of Techow arsenal is now in Peking, but is returning on the 7th, and Chang's troops will doubtless garrison the arsenal.

Units of the Shensi 1st Division have been in and around Tientsin Central since the occupation by Feng Yu-hsiang, and approximately 2500 are garrisoned near the station under the command of Hu Ching-yi. Reports of looting by these troops have been very current, and General Yang I-tsh of the City Police has submitted his resignation in protest as he states his police are no longer able to guarantee protection to life and property. These reports of general looting are not confirmed, and the Chinese version of Yang's resignation is that he is cognizant of the fact that he may be relieved of his post and in order to save his face is resigning with the looting as an excuse in order to ascertain exactly how firm his position is with the powers now in control. General Yang is still on duty at his yamen.

A 4th Brigade is being recruited and formed at Central station from the disarmed troops of Wu Pei-fu. None of Chang's troops have detrained in either Tientsin East or Tientsin Central, except temporarily at which time on the 6th they completed looting a train of supplies which had been turned over to Tuan Chi-jui. This train was made up and standing on the East station platform ready to pull out for Peking.

A International train for Shanhaikwan left at 10:20 A.M., on the 6th.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Saturday,
November 8, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 84.

Nov. 7th. The following trains arrived at Tientsin East;

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:40 AM | Tangku | Tientsin E | 3rd Brig 2d Army | 1200 | 56 | Inf & Cav |
| 2: AM | " | " | 1st " " " | 300 | 24 | Infantry |
| 3: AM | " | " | " " | 1000 | 38 | Inf & equip |
| 3:40 AM | " | " | " " | 500 | 25 | " " |
| 4:30 AM | " | " | 1st Div Fengtien | 800 | 38 | Infantry |
| 4:45 AM | " | " | 2nd Army " " | 250 | 18 | " |
| 8: AM | " | " | 2nd Army " " | 600 | 25 | " chinese |
| 10: AM | " | " | " " " " | 450 | 30 | Inf. Russians &/a |
| 11:15 AM | " | " | " " " " | 400 | 24 | " Arty. |
| 1:30 PM | " | " | " " " " | 800 | 30 | " " |
| 7:15 PM | " | " | 2nd Brig " " | 900 | 36 | Infantry |
| 11-trains | | | | 7200 | 334 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | 8th MB | 150 | 14 | Camels |
| 3:55 AM | " | Machang | 2nd Army | 600 | 17 | Infantry |
| 9:10 AM | " | Peking | 7th MB | 275 | 18 | Inf & supplies |
| 2: PM | " | " | " " | 800 | 51 | Arty & equip |
| 4:50 PM | " | " | 1st Shensi | 500 | 28 | Artillery |
| 9:25 PM | " | Machang | 2nd Army | 225 | 51 | Equipment |
| 6-trains | | | | 2550 | 189 | |

Tientsin East station is congested, but Central station is clearing up somewhat as Feng Yu-hsiang's troops are departing for Peking as rapidly as possible. Chang Tso-lin's troops now occupy both stations and have taken control of all the points formerly held by Feng's troops in Ho Pei, Chinese city. Chang is recruiting in Chinese city, and also reported arming the Russian population. Nineteen trains of Chang's troops have arrived in Tientsin East station up to 9 A.M., 8th, and several are in the east yards which have not yet been checked at the station. These trains are all heavily loaded, and approximately 12,000 Fengtien troops have arrived todate. These are all of the II Fengtien army, wearing no collar insignia, but having a black band around the arm with a white disc on the center. One complete train of Russians has arrived with four armored cars in the front of the train. This train carries two Russian women as Red Cross nurses. Japanese officers and soldiers have also been identified in several of the trains, and Russians are scattered throughout.

It is reported that Mr. Zobrak, formerly head of the Police in the Russian Concession, Tientsin, is aiding the Russian soldiers of Chang's by giving them clothing, money, etc. ( This increases the indications of Bolshevick backing of Chang's move).

About 7:30 A.M., November 8th, much firing was heard at a point to the north of Tientsin proper, between the East and Central stations. Rumors of a fight spread rapidly among the Chinese as well as foreigners, and there was a general evacuation of Chinese workmen from the factories, etd, within the city and the Concessions. On investigation an ammunition train of Chang's was found to be on fire on the tracks between the stations, about one mile north east of East station.

The International train which left for Shanhaikwan at 10:20 A.M., on the 6th, is reported at Hsin He on the return trip at 9 A.M., 8th.

Chang Tso-lin's plan is evidently to push down his entire force taking control of the Tientsin-Pukow at Machang and Cechow, and on to Pengtai and some point on the Peking-Hankow. With his backing by the Japanese and Russians he has nothing to fear from his rear. When the time comes for the conference he will be in position with force to dictate whatever solution may appear most beneficial to him. Chang Hsueh-liang, Chang's son and commandant of the 1st and 3rd Armies, has returned to Chinwangtao from the conference at Mukden, and is expected south within a few days.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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CG; US Consul
US Mil. attache
CO 15th Inf
G-2.

Confidential.

Headquarters U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Sunday,
November 9, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 85.

Nov. 8th.

There were no train movements either in or out of the Tientsin stations from 9 A.M., on the 8th, up to 12 midnight of the 8th. The East station remains blocked with the same trains and it is impossible for any more to pull in. The Central station while not so congested was not cleared during the day. There is much preparation being made for a departure however, in Central station. Within twenty-four hours the entire congestion could be cleared up if sufficient activity were shown by those in command of the troops. Some looting of a minor nature occurred near Tientsin East station, and the Russian troops caused some trouble when the local merchants refused to accept the Fengtien money for purchases, but the situation on the whole has been very quiet during this 24 hour period.

The International grain from Shanhaikuan has arrived in Tientsin East station, and one is scheduled to leave for Peking at 12 noon on the 9th.

A report from Mukden states that on or about October 24th, seven General Staff Officers from the Army War College in Japan arrived in Mukden and were banqueted at the Japanese Hotel by Chang Tso-lin and his staff.

Japanese reports state that 80 American soldiers were taken to Mukden along with the Chihli troops captured at Shanhaikuan. Also that two American gunboats accompanied Wu Pei-fu from Taku to Chefoo. These reports are from the Sino-Japanese News Service, with headquarters in Mukden.

At 3:20 A.M., on the 9th, the American soldier on duty as Military police at Tientsin Central station was put off the station platform by two Russians from Chang Tso-lin's troop trains standing in the station.

Distribution;
CG USAFC
US Consul.
US mil. attache
CO 15th Inf
Commander USS Ashville
G-2.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Confidential. Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence.

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Monday,
November 10, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 54.

Nov. 9th. The following trains arrived or departed at East station:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:40 AM | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | Fengtien 2nd army | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 7:50 AM | " | " | " " " | 400 | 24 | Inf & Cav |
| 8: AM | " | " | " " " | 500 | 29 | Russians & chinese |
| 8:10 AM | " | " | " " " | 800 | 37 | Infantry |
| 8:35 AM | " | " | " " " | 200 | 25 | " |
| 9:50 AM | " | " | " " " | 600 | 30 | Animals |
| 11: AM | Hofuho | " | " " " | 1200 | 45 | Inf & Cav |
| 11:10 AM | " | " | " " " | 600 | 22 | Infantry |
| 11:50 AM | Tientsin E | " | " " " | 400 | 28 | Artillery |
| 2:30 PM | " | Peking | Allied train | | | |
| 5:15 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | Fengtien 2nd army | 750 | 21 | Artillery |
| 7: PM | Tangku | " | " " " | 150 | 35 | Equipment |
| 9: PM | " | " | " " " | -- | 14 | Supplies |
| 15-trains | | | | 5900 | 315 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central station:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:50 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | Fengtien 2nd army | 500 | 30 | Ammunition |
| 2:30 AM | " | " | " " " | 600 | 24 | " |
| 5: AM | Peking | Tientsin C | 7th Mixed Brig. | 850 | 25 | Artillery |
| 6:30 AM | Tongshan | Machang | Fengtien 2nd army | 100 | 24 | Ammunition |
| 8:35 AM | " | " | " " " | 75 | 29 | Equipment |
| 9:40 AM | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | ---------- | | 51 | Empty cars |
| 10:10 AM | Lanchow | Machang | Fengtien 2nd army | 300 | 29 | Cav (russians) |
| 11:10 AM | Tongshan | " | " " " | 250 | 20 | Equipment |
| 11:25 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | 7th Mixed Brig. | 500 | 21 | Equipment |
| 12:05 PM | Tientsin C | " | Fengtien 2nd army | 600 | 25 | Infantry |
| 12:30 PM | Mukden | Machang | " " " | 1100 | 24 | " |
| 1:10 PM | " | Machang | " " " | 700 | 25 | Cavalry |
| 2:30 PM | " | " | " " " | 700 | 27 | " |
| 2:55 PM | " | Peking | " " " | 400 | 25 | Red Cross, 1-car |
| 3: PM | Peking | Tientsin C | (Feng's troops) | 400 | 17 | 2-motor cars |
| 4: PM | Mukden | Machang | Fengtien 2nd army | 1000 | 24 | Inf & Cav |
| 4:30 PM | Chinwangtao | Peking | Special train | | 5 | Passenger cars |
| 4:30 PM | Mukden | Machang | Fengtien 2nd army | 500 | 15 | Inf & coolies |
| 4:30 PM | Chinwangtao | " | " " " | 1280 | 32 | Infantry |
| 5:15 PM | Tientsin C | Peking | Allied train | -- | -- | |
| 20-trains | | | | 9875 | 460 | |

The movement of trains during the day resulted in a complete clearing of the yards in Tientsin East as well as Tientsin Central Stations. After the ne news of Chang Tso-lin's departure from Mukden orders were immediately issued and the entire lot of Fengtien troops moved out, chiefly to Machang.

At about 8 PM Nov. 9th, the Central Station was decorated and strings of electric lights hung. A large police delegation with a band was present and every indication of Chang's arrival being imminent. At9 AM on the 10th Chang's train had not arrived at East Station. The streets in Native City, north of the Yamen bridge and one block this side, were all blocked to the Central Station by forces which included troops of Chang Tso-lin, Wang Chen-ping's body-guard and the Native police. Chinese and foreigners were all prohibited from passing these lines and American soldiers in uniform were turned back although one American Military police was on duty at Central Station. This is all in preparation for the coming of Chang.

Nothing other than this occurred, of an unusual nature, during the day.

Distribution:
CG USAFC
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Commander USS Asheville
G-2

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Confidential. Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Tuesday,
November 11, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 57.

Nov. 10th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:05 AM | Tangku | Tientsin E | | Fengtien 2nd army | 400 | 12 | Artillery |
| 2:05 AM | " | " | C | " " " | 200 | 11 | Coolies |
| 4:50 AM | Tongshan | " | E | " 3rd " | 150 | 15 | " |
| 11:05 AM | " | " | C | Fengtien guards | 250 | 18 | Guards |
| 11:55 AM | " | " | C | Kirin troops | 100 | 7 | Body guards |
| 11:55 AM | " | " | " | General staff | 80 | 4 | Staff officers |
| 1:45 PM | " | " | " | Hqrs & Staff | 250 | 15 | Gen. Staff |
| 2:05 PM | Mukden | " | " | Mar. Chang Tso-lin | --- | 12 | Mar. Chang. |
| 2:40 PM | " | " | E | 1st&3rd Army | 250 | 14 | Infantry |
| 2:45 PM | Kuyeh | " | E | Allied coal train | | 52 | Coal |
| 8:30 PM | Mukden | " | E | 4th Army | 500 | 14 | Infantry |
| 9:30 PM | " | " | " | " " | 500 | 40 | " |
| 11:55 PM | Tangku | | | | 100 | 14 | Coolies |
| 10: PM | Shanhaikwan | " | " | 3rd Brig 2d army | 200 | 29 | Supplies |
| 11: PM | Tangku | " | " | " " " " | 500 | 50 | Infantry |
| 15-trains | | | | | 3280 | 265 | |

The following trains arrived or departed at Tientsin Central station:

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4:30 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | -- -- | -- | 14 | Supplies | |
| 5:10 AM | " " | " | 2nd army | 1500 | 57 | Inf & Cav | |
| 8: AM | " E | peking | Feng's 4th MB | 600 | 49 | " " | |
| 8:40 AM | Peking | Tientsin C | 11th Div | 800 | 58 | " " Arty | |
| 11:45 AM | Mukden | " " | Chang's body-guard | 125 | 17 | Infantry | |
| 12:30 PM | " | " " | " " " | 500 | 21 | " | |
| 12:30 PM | " | " " | " " " | 450 | 27 | " | |
| 2:30 PM | " | " " | Mar.Chang Tso-lin | 100 | 12 | Chang Tso-lin | |
| 2:30 PM | " | " " | Gen. Staff | 300 | 24 | Fengtien | |
| 4:45 PM | " | MaChang " | Fengtien 2nd army | 400 | 34 | Arty | |
| 7:45 PM | Tientsin E | Machang | " " " | 450 | 35 | Infantry | |
| 11-trains | | | | 5825 | 340 | | |

Feng Yu-hsiang arrived in Tientsin Central at 9: AM and went first to Tsao's Gardens in Ho Pei, but later to a friends house in the Japanese Concession. He was accompanied by a train of the 4th Mixed Brigade, which was recently recruited from the disbanded units of Wu's old force. This train of troops still remains in Central station.

At 11: Am the station platform at Teintsin East was cleared by the police, and a line thrown out in front of the station when the news was current that Chang Tso-lin's train was due. One train did arrive, but pulled on through to Central station. The second train disentrained about two hundred men, and placed them on both sides of the track, about twenty yards

apart from up in the eastern yards to the western limit of the western yards. The uniforms and equipment of these guards were excellent. All had heavy fur caps, the privates and non-commissioned officers having grey caps the captains and field officers black and the general officers brown beaver caps. The inner platform was entirely cleared of all unauthorized Chinese and foreign civilians. Four Japanese refused to get off and were forced to leave under protest from them. There were about 20 Japanese in civilian clothes, who remained outside the inner gates. Three more troops trains arrived from the north, and passed on to Central station, entirely clearing the yards except for a passenger train on the north track. The police forced all the passengers on this train to go inside and close the windows and doors. At 2.10 the Marshal's train arrived consisting of 12 cars with a wireless aerial running over two of the rear cars. Chang's immediate guard consisted of about twenty officers, mostly Captains armed with pistols and short machine rifles. The rifles was loaded from the side with clips holding about 20 cartridges. Each officer carried from ten to twenty extra clips. Chang was in his private car, and bowed to several on the platform, but did not alight nor did anyone go aboard. In less than a minute the train pulled on to the Central station. Chang is now staying in Ho Pei in his own property, about 1/4 of a mile from Central station.

Four of Chang Tso-lin's airplanes landed in or near Tientsin during the 9th. Two were piloted by French aviators, and two by Chinese. The French flyers were at East station to greet the Marshal on his arrival.

On Wednesday the 5th, a conference was held at the home of Tuan Chi-jui, which was attended by Hu Ching-yi, Chang Tsung-chang, Wang Chen-ping, Sun Kho and several other political and military leaders of the Anfuites, Kuomintang and Pei Tang parties. The object of the conference was to adopt some plan whereby the present leaders in power could distribute control and bring about a unification of China through arbitration and persuasion instead of by force. Some change or modification in the form of government was also on the agenda of the meeting. The question of president was not touched upon, but Tuan suggested that Lu Yung-shiang, deposed leader of Chekiang be made Inspector General of Chihli, Shantung and Honan, which Wu formerly held and that Feng Yu-hsiang be given Marshal Chi's place in Nanking. This would ofcourse eliminate Feng from Peking, and place him directly against Chi. Hu Ching-yi requested Marshal Tuan to come to Peking, but Tuan stated that when he came he would be accompanied by Chang Tsuang-chang and another brigade of Fengtien troops. Hu replied that would be unnecessary as Tuan was supposed to be fighting against Wu Pei-fu and Wu was not in Peking, further that Feng Yu-hsiang had sufficient troops in peking to protect Tuan. Sun Fo and the Kuomintang representatives from Canton did not enter into the discussion. This meeting adjourned without arriving at anything definite, and immediately afterwards Hu Ching-yi and Sun Kho called another secret conference with their supporters. The result of this conference is not known, but on Thursday Hu departed for Peking

and his troops with all of Feng's cleared the station for Peking within the next few days. Chang's troops have not advanced farther than Yangtsun on the way to Peking, and Feng has none east of Yangtsun, except those composing his body-guard. According to authoritative Chinese this situation indicates a definite division with a resulting alignment of Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Chi-jui on one side against Feng Yu-hsiang and Sun Yat-sen element on the other. Feng is reported to have dispatched representatives on the 6th to Wu Pei-fu at Chefoo.

The International train for Peking which cleared Tientsin East station at 2: PM on the 9th has returned to a point just west of Central station, where it is held due to the traffic congestion in Central station.

Four cars of Japanese civilians arrived at 12;30 PM on the 10th, attached to a train of Chang's body-guard.

General Chang Hsueh-liang is in command of the rear of Chang Tso-lin's forces with Headquarters at Chinwangtao. Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, who was recently defeated by Chi Hsieh-yuan in Shanghai arrived on Chang Tso-lin's train.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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US Consul
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Comdr. Ashville
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Confidential.

Headquarters U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Wednesday,
November 12, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 58.

Nov. 11th: The following trains arrived at Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:50 AM | Tangku | Tientsin C | 2nd Army | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 6:30 PM | Mukden | " E | " " | 500 | 40 | Equipment |
| 9: PM | Tangku | " E | " " | 600 | 30 | Infantry |
| 3-trains | | | | 1600 | 95 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:45 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | 2nd Army | 50 | 21 | Ammunition |
| 4: AM | Mukden | " | 4th Brig. Fengtien | 600 | 39 | Inf. & equip |
| 5: AM | " | " | ---------- | --- | 34 | Supplies |
| 7:50 AM | " | Tientsin C | 2nd Army | 125 | 23 | Equipment |
| 3:25 PM | Tientsin E | Pukow | Passenger train | | | |
| 3:25 PM | " " | Machang | 2nd Army | 800 | 25 | Inf & animals |
| 3:30 PM | " " | " | ---------- | 15 | 21 | Forage |
| 4:10 PM | Peking | Tientsin E | ---------- | --- | 18 | Empty cars |
| 8-trains | | | | 1590 | 181 | |

Two conferences were held during the day, but nothing definite was accomplished. Feng Yu-hsiang was present as well as Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin. Tuan still refuses to go to Peking, and the conference is apparently at a standstill until Sun Yat-sen arrives or the Yangtze provinces express in more definite terms their intentions toward the present leaders. Chang continues to move his troops nearer to Peking, as last reports show Fengtien units at Langfang. Few more Fengtien troops arrived in Tientsin during the 24 hours, but at present the East station is congested, and the Central is far from clear. One international train is scheduled to leave for Shanhaikuan at 9: AM on the 12th, and one for Peking at 11: AM on the 12th.

Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin arrived in Tientsin on the 11th. General Sutton, the Britisher who has been superintending Chang's arsenal in Mukden and building his Stokes Mortars, arrived on Chang's train on the 10th. Carleton Baker, ex-American Consul General at Mukden and at present chief purchasing agent for Chang Tso-lin, also arrived on Chang's train. General Sutton and Mr. Baker are staying at the Astor Hotel.

Bul. No. 58 cont'd.

Changte airplanes are located about two miles south of the American Compound. There are three Spads, one combination aquaplane and the number two plane of the Peking-Pei Ta Ho passenger service, making five planes in all. The latter plane is equipped for bombing, and aerial bombs have been transferred from the trains in the station to this point. About 20 Chinese mechanics are at present on duty with these planes.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:
CG; US Consul
US Mil. attache
CO 15th Inf
Comdr. Asheville
G-2

Confidential.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Thursday,
November 13, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 89.

Nov. 12th. The following trains arrived or departed at Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:45 AM | Tongku | Tientsin C | 2nd Army | 400 | 21 | Inf & arty |
| 3:40 AM | " | " | " " | 900 | 25 | Infantry |
| 4:50 AM | " | " | " " | 800 | 19 | " |
| 10:35 AM | Tientsin E | Shanhaikwan | Allied train | | | |
| 3:50 PM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin C | | 550 | 24 | Equipment |
| 5:45 PM | Tongshan | Tientsin E | Allied coal train | | | |
| 6: PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | 3rd army | 500 | 24 | Infantry |
| 9:40 PM | " | " | ——— | 50 | 30 | Supplies |
| 11: PM | " | " | 3rd army | 500 | 30 | Equipment |
| 9-trains | | | | 3500 | 171 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:50 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | ——— | 400 | 10 | Recruits |
| 2:20 PM | Tientsin E | " | ——— | 25 | 17 | supplies |
| 3:10 PM | " | " | ——— | 75 | 27 | transportation |
| 4: PM | " | " | Medical Corps | 275 | 40 | Med. equipment |
| 5: PM | " | " | 2nd army | 550 | 31 | Inf & supplies |
| 5-trains | | | | 1325 | 155 | |

General Wang Chen-ping's newly recruited body-guard of about 1200 has been disarmed with the exception of 300 men, which is allowed in the protocol as a body-guard for the Civil Governor. The disarming was done under order of Chang Tso-lin, and it is reported that Governor Wang himself has now disappeared. This act of Chang Tso-lin was not prompted by any motive, wishing to comply with the terms of the protocol, but from the mere fact that Wang Chen-ping is one who has been marked for elimination and his increased body-guard furnished a reason for action directly against him. Thus one of Feng's strongest supporters has passed further consideration, at least for the time being. According to the Chinese, Feng has also been given to understand that his part in the coming final settlement will be most minor, and it would not be at all surprising to learn of his disappearance at an early date. Orders have been issued by Chang that Pei Yuan, near Peking be evacuated by Feng's troops, and so far no action has been taken by Feng. The result of this order is awaited with much anxiety by the Chinese as it will reveal whether Feng has absolutely surrendered to Chang or still maintains sufficient independence to refuse to evacuate.

Chang is here as an absolute dictator, and has sufficient force to uphold any edict he may issue.

One international train left for Shanhaikwan at 10:30 Am on the 12th, and one for Peking at 12:30 PM on the 12th.

Two thousand Fengtien troops are reported to have detrained at Tangku, and are marching over the Tangku-Machang road to Machang on the Tsin-Pu railway line.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Friday,
November 14, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 60.

Nov. 15th. The following trains arrived at Tientsin East;

| TIME | FROM | TO | | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;Midnight | Tangku | Tientsin E | | 3rd Army(Fengtien) | 200 | 9 | Infantry |
| 1;10 AM | " | " | C | " " " | 500 | 21 | Arty & Inf |
| 2;40 AM | " | " | | " " " | 500 | 11 | Infantry |
| 3;30 AM | Tongshan | " | E | ---------- | ---- | 37 | Coal |
| 4;45 AM | Kuyeh | " | | Allied Coal train | | | |
| 6;30 PM | Nukien | " | C | ---------- | 125 | 28 | Equipment |
| 6-trains | | | | | 1325 | 106 | |

The following trains departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4;45 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | ---------- | --- | 31 | Equipment |

The international train which left for Peking on the 12th, at 12;30 P.M., returned to Tientsin East at 4;30 PM on the 15th.

Actual combat having ceased, the situation has now reached the stage where political activities are of primary significance. Nothing new has developed in the conference being held in Tientsin during the last twenty-four hours, although the original plan as set forth in the first conference, (see Bulletin No. 58) is being insisted upon. Wu Pei-fu has left Chefoo for the south and it is rumored that he will be welcomed either in Shanghai or Nanking. The Chinese report that Wu will now attempt to reorganize the remnants of the Chihli Party, either at Nanking or Hankow. Wu left one brigade of his 3rd Division in Loyang, and from latest reports his Honan Mixed Brigades and the 25th Division hold Paotingfu or a point just south on the Kin-Han line. Marshal Chi Shieh-yuan has sent telegrams pledging his support to Tuan Chi-jui, but this promise is so surrounded with provisions that very little or no actual support is provided for. Sun Chuan-fang of Chekiang is closely allied with Chi, and if Wu is sufficiently strong to consolidate these elements with his scattered forces, and bring along Hsiao Yen-nan at Hankow with the Hang Yang arsenal, his star may not yet have set. Chang Tso-lin continues to increase his forces in and around Tientsin, but he is not pushing much further in either direction. Feng is still in Tientsin, but his sudden flight would not be a surprise. The uncertainty of the situation is felt, particularly by the Chinese and no one can prophesy what may happen.

Distribution:
CG USAFC
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Comdr. Ashville
CO 15th Inf & Files G-2

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Confidential.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Saturday,
November 15, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 61.

Nov. 14th. The following trains arrived ~~and~~ departed from Tientsin East:

| TIME | FROM | TO | | UNIT | MEN | CARS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;45 AM | Tongku | Tientsin E | | 1st & 3rd Army | 700 | 25 | Infantry |
| 1;50 AM | " | " | | 2nd Army | 600 | 19 | " |
| 3;10 AM | Tongshan | " | | " " | 200 | 29 | " |
| 9;15 AM | " | " | C | " " | 650 | 35 | Artillery |
| 9;30 AM | Shanhaikwan | " | E | Allied train | | | |
| 10; AM | Tongshan | " | | | 250 | 25 | animals |
| 11; AM | Mukden | " | | 1st & 3rd army | 700 | 36 | Cav & inf |
| 1;15 PM | Tongshan | " | C | " " | 350 | 25 | " " |
| 2; PM | Tientsin E | Peking | | Allied train | | | |
| 3;20 PM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin E | | 1st & 3rd Army | 800 | 26 | Artillery |
| 4; PM | Tanglai | Pai-siang | | | | 20 | Equipment |
| 7;15 PM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin E | | | | 18 | Supplies |
| 12-trains | | | | | 4250 | 254 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4;AM | Tientsin C | Machang | | 100 | 30 | ammunition |
| 9;40 AM | " | Peking | | 150 | 3 | Rots |
| 1;20 PM | " | Machang | 2nd army | 55 | 16 | supplies |
| 5;PM | " | " | " " | 400 | 21 | ammunition |
| 5;45 PM | " | " | " " | 120 | 15 | transportation |
| 5; PM | " | " | " " | 250 | 16 | ( Russian & |
| 5;15 PM | " | " | 1st & 3rd army | [illegible] | 28 | inf Chinese troops |
| 5;40 PM | " | " | " " | 500 | 22 | animals |
| 6; PM | " | " | | | 9 | supplies |
| 8-trains | | | | 1775 | 158 | |

The international train which left Tientsin East for Shanhaikwan at 10;27 AM on the 12th, returned at 9;50 AM on the 14th. An international train left Tientsin East for Peking at 2;PM on the 14th.

The Peking-Mukden from Tientsin to Shanhaikwan is now practically clear of troop trains, although several of the yards in the larger stations are full of supply trains. Mr. Oliver the foreign traffic inspector at Shanhaikwan has also received orders to hold all trains at Shanhaikwan, where there are now about 6000 troops. This would indicate that Chang' concentration in Tientsin and vicinity is about complete with the bulk of his troops at Machang. Some reports state that Chang is now withdrawing his troops from the Yangtsun section, and running them all to Machang. An estimate of his troops so far

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Bul. No. 61 cont'd.

arriving at Tientsin East is between 50 and 55 thousand. A few have been detrained at Tsingtu and were marched overland, but at most not over two thousand. Reports from Peking state that Feng's Mixed Brigades are now all up to 6000 per brigade, and that recruiting is being actively engaged in. Feng has five Mixed Brigades, which would total 30,000 men, and two Divisions which might total 20,000, thus making a grand total of 50,000. The Peking report now places Feng's strength at 58,000. This figure is perhaps somewhat exaggerated. Therefore, it is apparent from rough estimates that Chang is already largely outnumbered by Feng Yu-hsiang's Peking army. It is not known how many more troops Chang has north of Shanhaikwan, as only a very few of the IV army have arrived, and a small percentage of the 1st and 3rd armies

Chang's flying field is now established at a point about three miles from Tientsin, northwest of the French arsenal. He has at present at this station thirteen Spads, numbered 1-3-8-9-10-11-12-14-15-18-19-20-21; One Handley-Page Passenger machine and one Aquaplane, both mentioned in Bul. No. 58. The Spads are all new machines with the exception of two.

Chang Tso-lin called officially on the foreign commandants during the day in his armored car, with a machine gun mounted in the front seat. He was accompanied by four officers of his staff and a car of his body-guard.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Confidential.

Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Sunday,
November 16, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 62.

Nov. 15th. The following trains arrived at Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4: AM | Tongshan | Tientsin E | 2nd Army | 500 | 14 | Arty |
| 5: AM | " | " | | 20 | 20 | Supplies |
| 5;15 Am | " | " | | | 20 | " |
| 10: AM | Lanshow | " | 2nd Army | 400 | 24 | Cav & Inf. |
| 10;30 AM | " | " | " " | 425 | 29 | Equipment |
| 10;30 AM | Tongshan | " | Allied coal train | | | |
| 10;30 AM | Lanchow | " | 1st & 3rd army | 1000 | 35 | Cav & Inf |
| 12;30 PM | " | " | | 150 | 28 | Animals |
| 2;30 PM | " | " | 1st & 3rd army | 600 | 30 | Arty |
| 9-trains | | | | 3095 | 198 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3;30 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | (Russians) | 200 | 30 | Cav.animals |
| 4;20 AM | " | " | 2nd army | 700 | 34 | Artillery |
| 11: AM | " | Peking | Feng's troops | 175 | 5 | Hosp.Corps |
| 11: AM | " | Machang | 2nd army | 500 | 38 | Artillery |
| 11;05 AM | " | " | | 25 | 28 | Supplies |
| 2;30 PM | " | " | | 150 | 27 | Transportation |
| 5;10 PM | " | " | 1st & 3rd army | 1000 | 35 | Arty & Cav |
| | | | | 2750 | 198 | |

The international train from Peking arrived at Tientsin East at 9;15 AM on the 15th.

Nothing new has developed in the various conferencesnnow held daily, as each participant seems to hesitate in either submitting or accepting any definite plan for fear of committing himself before the oppertune time arrives. There are as many reports current to the effect that the participants are being gradually separated as there are to the effect they are being bound together by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of China. Chang Tso-lin, however, is sending troops overland from the Machang area to the Peking-Mukden between Tientsin and Peking. He has had troops at Peitsang and Yang Tsun for some time, but some of these were withdrawn a few days ago. Now some troops are returning, but it is impossible to state the reason therefor. Wu Pei-fu is now in Nanking, and a conference was held [redacted] Chi Hsieh-yuan and representatives of the Yangtze provinces. The Tientsin conference is doubtless awaiting the outcome of this to determine exactly what the opposition under Wu will constitute as he will no doubt oppose any conclusion arrived at by his enemies Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang and Tuan Chi-jui.

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Bul. No. 42 Cont'd.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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CO 15th Inf
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Confidential.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Monday,
November 17, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 65.

Nov. 16th. The following trains arrived at Tientsin East:

| Time. | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:15 AM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | | 150 | 32 | Straw |
| 10:30 AM | " | " | | | 25 | " |
| 10:55 AM | " | " | | 100 | 23 | Coal. |
| 2:35 PM | " | " | | | | |
| 5: PM | Mukden | Tientsin E | Fengtien 2nd army | 1000 | 37 | Inf & arty |
| 5:30 PM | " | " | 2nd army | 500 | 24 | Inf & engrs |
| 4: PM | " | " | 2nd army | 1000 | 36 | Infantry |
| 5:05 PM | Tongshan | " | 2nd army | 350 | 24 | Supplies |
| 8-trains | | | Allied coal train | | 32 | |
| | | | | 3500 | 257 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2: PM | Tientsin C | Mukden | 50 | 20 | Carts |

Very little occurred of an unusual nature during this period. The conferences continue and it is now reported that Tuan Chi-jui will be made "Provisional Chief Executive", which has been expected from the first. Chang's troops are now concentrating at Pei Tsang, where there are 4000 Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery with 24 field pieces and eight stokes mortars. Beyond Pei Tsang there are about 1000 Cavalry constituting patrols and a small guard detachment in the towns and villages. A small post of Fengtien soldiers is on guard at one of the gates in Tungchow. Feng's recruiting continues in and around Peking. There is much pro-Wu Pei-fu propaganda in the small towns and villages outside of Peking, and also in the native city in Tientsin. The Chinese report that Lu Yung-hsiang is to be restored in his former stronghold of Chekiang, but it has not yet been decided exactly how this will be done. As a matter of fact, daily conferences have been held since November 11th, when Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang arrived in Tientsin, but up to date nothing of a definite plan has been decided upon, and Wu Pei-fu, the leader of the opposition, is now in his stronghold with sufficient troops for its protection.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of G-2, Military Intelligence,

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Tuesday,
November 18, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 44.

Nov. 17th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:45 AM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | 1st & 3rd Army | 1500 | 31 | Inf & arty |
| 100 AM | Tongshan | " | Coal train | | 30 | Coal |
| 11:05 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | Allied train | | | |
| 11:10 AM | Tongshan | Tientsin E | Coal | | 25 | Coal |
| 12:15 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | 3rd Brig. 2nd-army | 900 | 24 | Infantry |
| 12:25 PM | " | " | " " | 800 | 23 | " |
| 2:45 PM | Tientsin C | Taughu | Chang Hsueh-liang | 100 | 5 | Gen.Officer |
| 2:10 PM | Taughu | Tientsin C | " " " | 100 | 5 | Gen.officer |
| 8-trains | | | | 3400 | 145 | |

The following trains departed from Tientsin Central,

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9: AM | Tientsin C | Mukden | 1st& 3rd army | 1500 | 31 | Cav & Inf |
| 12:10 PM | " | Peking | Allied train | | | |
| 1:00 PM | " | Mukden | 2nd MB(Fengtien) | 800 | 19 | Arty |
| 2:20 PM | " | " | 3rd Brig 2nd army | 800 | 25 | Inf & arty |
| 4-trains | | | | 3100 | 75 | |

A few more troops are arriving daily, and most of them are going to Mukden, however, the number at Yangtsun is being increased.

Several rumors of anti-foreign feeling have been reported, but so far only one has been verified. There was an incident at one of the stations during the day when a newspaper reporter in attempting to get into a crowd of Chinese,was spat upon. This hardly sufficient to be called an example of rabid anti-foreign feeling.

The political aspect of the situation is forging more and more to the front, as the days pass. It is well established that Chang has been financially and materially aided by the Japanese and the Russian Governments. The Japanese, it is reported only wished Chang to retain control in Manchuria, and only come south to the Wall, but having vanquished Wu, he is now in Tientsin, and is planning to move on to Peking. To assure Chang's victory in Manchuria, money, material and personnel was supplied by Japan , but at present it is reported, the Japanese are loath to furnish further and wish Chang to return immediately to Mukden, leavingthe restoration in Peking to Tuan Chi-jui, aided by Mukden troops. The Japanese thus hope to have a free hand in all sorts of enterprises in Manchuria, while their

interests will be carefully guarded by Tuan in the capitol. They are strongly discouraging any attempt to unite the Kwantse provinces with Peking for the present, as their chief interests are all in the north, and Chinese influence from Central China, if in positions of power, might successfully oppose the Japanese plans.

The Russian situation is an entirely different proposition, and one in which Chang is not wholly cooperating. Mr. Karahan's efforts from the outset have been to Bolshevize China, and in order to better accomplish his ends he has backed Chang, hoping that he would thus have influence with the man in power. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang element have taken more strongly to the Bolshevick doctrines, and Chang from recent reports is becoming less inclined to give much attention to Karahan's directions. It is reported that he is granting all White Russians in his army a pension, and a lease of sixty acres of land along the border in northern Manchuria as a check against Bolshevick encroachings. Karahan insists that Chang come on to Peking and join with Sun Yat-sen. Chang Tso-lin and Sun, while both opposed the Chihli regime are essentially different in principle and personal ambitions. Any coalition of these two leaders is considered most unlikely by all observers.

Hence Chang Tso-lin is in the position of having received the support of two entirely different allies, each with such differnet aims that even if he were so inclined, ti would be impossible for him to conform to their desires. Chang is primarily for China and the Chinese regardless of the fact that for expediency he may have signed the Mukden-Russian treaty and have been advised by Japanese military experts, his plans from now on will be his own or of Chinese manufacture.

Twenty-five boxes of hand grenades were unloaded at Tientsin East station by Chang Tso-lin's troops, marked from the Ordance Officer, U.S.A. Camp Kearny, California.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Wednesday,
November 19, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 69.

Nov. 18th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:00 PM | Laochow | Tientsin C | 2nd Army | 800 | 27 | Inf & equip. |
| 1:50 PM | Tangku | " | " " | 400 | 38 | " " |
| 2:35 PM | " | " | " " | 300 | 27 | Engineers |
| 3:30 PM | Peking | Tientsin E | Allied train | | | |
| 4:30 PM | Tangku | " C | 2nd army | 300 | 30 | Engineers |
| 10:00 AM | Tientsin E | Shanhaikwan | Allied train | 20 | 16 | 34-horses |
| 7-trains | | | | 1720 | 138 | |

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:50 PM | Tientsin C | Shantung | 2nd army | 500 | 25 | Infantry |
| 2:00 PM | Peking | Tientsin E | Allied train | | | |
| 2:55 PM | Tientsin C | Shantung | 2nd army | 125 | 18 | Supplies |
| 3-trains | | | | 625 | 43 | |

An international train for Peking left Tientsin East at 11:05 AM on the 17th and returned to East station at 2:35 PM on the 18th. An international left for Shanhaikwan at 10:00 AM on the 18th.

General Chang Tsung-chang, commanding the 3rd Mixed Brigade of Fengtien troops went to Techow some days ago and took over the arsenals with about 500 Fengtien troops. It is reported that some fighting occurred during the day between these troops and Shantung troops of the 5th Division, under Cheng Shih-chi. Shantung recently declared neutrality, and Cheng, the Tuli of the Province, was rather worried about his position, since his big source of war material, the arsenal was turning out equipment for the Fengtien forces.

Marshal Wu Pei-fu has arrived at Hankow, and from reports has been successful in uniting the Yangtze provinces against the present government. This move was reported in Bulletin No. 60 before Wu left Chefoo. Wuchang, just across from Hankow is the capitol of the new government. Marshals Wu and Chi are behind the new movement, and the memorandum circulated to the Provinces was signed by leading representatives of all the Yangtze and

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Bul. No. 66 cont'd.

Central China provinces. Feng Yu-hsiang was the only person openly condemned in the memorandum, and although Chang was the original "rebel" his name was not mentioned. What effect this move will have remains to be seen.

General Li Ching-lin was installed as Governor of Chihli Province in the Yamen in Ho Pei. Representatives of the Provincial assembly, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and various other Chinese organizations were present. The ceremony was very formal and included all the usual procedure. General Li is most antagonistic to all former Chihli leaders and also some of Feng Yu-hsiang's newly appointed Cabinet, C.T. Wang in particular. Chang Tso-lin is planning his most trusted Lieutenants in the Chief position of power before he advances on to Peking, and when he really does move another general reshuffle is inevitable.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Thursday,
November 20, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 66.

Nov. 19th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;05 AM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin E | | | 600 | 12 | Coolies |
| 2; AM | " | " | | 2nd Army | 300 | 26 | Inf & supplies |
| 2;45 AM | " | " | | " " | 500 | 32 | " " |
| 5;30 PM | Tientsin E | " | C | " " | 300 | 23 | Engineers |
| 4-trains | | | | | 1700 | 93 | |

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10;00 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | | | 350 | 28 | Feng's Rets |
| 4;30 PM | Mukden | Machang | | | 200 | 19 | Inf |
| 6; PM | " | " | | 2nd Army | 650 | 34 | Inf. |
| 3-trains | | | | | 1200 | 81 | |

Traffic continues congested at Tientsin East and Central, and also between Central and Peitsang. The allied train which left at 10; AM on the 18th for Shanhaikwan returned at 11;30 PM 19th. This section of the line is practically clear of all troops, only three or four trains being passed in the entire route.

The declaration issued by Wu Pei-fu and Chi Hsieh-yuan from Wuchang is apparently having quite an effect on the "conference of the Elders" in Tientsin, and may cause an entire revision of Tuan Chi-jui's plans, as he has insisted all along that he would not go to Peking until the majority of the people so desired. The Yangtze alliance claims ten provinces and hence a majority opposing the Tientsin Conference. Whether this will be a serious objection in Tuan's opinion, is an open question, but it may serve to prolong his delay indefinitely in his Japanese Concession home. Chang's occupation of Tientsin has been most orderly, but his desire is undoubtedly to go to Peking and place Tuan Chi-jui in power there. Tuan, from past experience, has found caution to be a most essential attribute, and conditions as they are with Feng supreme in the capitol and his loyalty a more or less uncertain quantity at best, Tuan may bide his time in safety until by compromise or intrigue he becomes satisfied that Wu Pei-fu's southern opposition is inconsequential. Tuan, however, in a conference before the arrival of Chang Tso-lin, stated that of all the Chinese leaders, Wu Pei-fu appeared to have more of a policy for the uplift of China than any of

the others. Alliances, as such, mean little in China and any rearranging is possible and very probable at any time.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Friday,
November 21, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 67.

Nov. 20th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:30 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | Allied train | | | |
| 1:30 PM | Tongshan | Tientsin E | Allied coal train | | | |
| 5:05 PM | Tientsin E | " G | | | | |
| 5:30 PM | " | " | | 500 | 34 | Engineers |
| 8: PM | " | " | | 300 | 35 | Coolies |
| 9:10 PM | Tangku | " E | | 800 | 25 | Infantry |
| 6-trains | | | | | 14 | Equipment |
| | | | | 1600 | 108 | |

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:20 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | | | | |
| 9:40 AM | Peking | Tientsin C | | | 27 | Artillery |
| 11:00 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | Allied train | 50 | 22 | Equipment |
| 3-trains | | | | | | |
| | | | | 50 | 49 | |

Only one train arrived from the north during the day, which is the smallest movement of troops over this line since September 12th, when Wu's concentration first started. An international train left for Peking at 10:30 AM on the 20th. This train is scheduled to return on the morning of the 21st and go on directly to Chinwangtao to connect with the U.S.A.T "Thomas". The train is under American command.

Nothing new has occurred during this period. The papers are again being flooded with Sino-Japanese news reports, now to the effect that Wu Pei-fu's recent declaration from Wuchang of a Yangtze alliance is all propaganda and should not be considered seriously. Wu, however, has left Hankow and is on his way to Loyang, unopposed, regardless of the fact as reported by the same news service eight days ago, that Chengchowfu and Loyang were in the hands of Feng Yu-hsiang's Shensi troops.

The battle at Techow reported in Bulletin #65 has been confirmed and about 1000 wounded Fengtien troops have passed through Techow for the north. It would appear from this that the battle must have been south of Techow, perhaps along the Yellow river, near Tsinan, which is the Headquarters of the 5th Division.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, Act. I.O.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Saturday,
November 22, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 66.

Nov. 21st. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East :

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:50 AM | Tientsin E | Tangku | | 40 | 16 | Equip. |
| 2:30 AM | " | " | 2nd army | 600 | 21 | Inf. |
| 7:55 AM | SHK | Tientsin E | 27th Div. | 50 | 10 | Staff |
| 8:30 AM | Tientsin E | Tangku | 2nd Army | 400 | 35 | Inf. |
| 5:20 PM | " | Shanhaikuan | ALLIED TRAIN | | | |
| | | | | 1290 | 82 | |

Nov. 21st. The following trains arrived at Tientsin Central Station:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11:55 AM | Peking | Tientsin C | ALLIED TRAIN |
| 3:15 AM | Mukden | " | 7 50horses |

The international train which left for Peking at 10:30 AM on the 20th returned to Tientsin Central at 1:20 PM on the 21st and proceeded to Chinwangtao. Traffic congestion continues in both stations. During the day, orders were issued by Marshal Chang to prepare twelve trains for his departure for Peking and six trains for Feng Yu-hsiang at once. With both stations full of troops and empties this put the small transportation staff in a panic and little movement of any kind was accomplished. It will be noted that no trains arrived from the north and that the first trains moving back toward Mukden left for Tangku. It is unknown whether this was necessary in order to clear the road for Chang's trains for Peking or if these troops are going to Tangku for garrison purposes.

From all reports Chang and Feng are leaving for Peking very soon. Tuan Chi-jui will follow just as soon as he deems sufficient Fengtien troops have

arrived to guarantee his safety. Wu is reported to have arrived at Loyang. The Shensi troops which were ordered south to cut off the Kin-Han line preventing Wu from coming up th Chang chowfu stopped at Changtingfu, and looted the town, the commanding General being shot for disobedience of orders As far as the location of troops is concerned conditions are now very similar to the situation in 1922. Wu Pei-fu is in Loyang while Chang Tso-lin holds Machang on the Tsi-Pu line and his troops are advancing toward Peking. Feng Yu-hsiang however is on the opposite side at this time and Wu's forces are more or less decimated although he has the 25th Division and four Mixed Brigades intact. Delaying tactics however are now his salvation and the longer Chang, Tuan and Feng are employed in their reorganization the better prepared he will become to overthrew it in the not distant future.

Several reports are to the effect that the Italian Gunboat "Sebastiano Cabeto" which is now in Tientsin has been purchased by Chang Tso-lin. This has not yet been confirmed.

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WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Act. Intelligence Officer.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Sunday
November 23, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 69.

Nov. 22nd. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:30 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | Passenger Train | | | |
| 12:15 PM | " | Tongshan | " | | | |

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:00 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | (Marshal Tuan Chi-jui) | 750 | 19 | Inf |
| 10:40" | " | Two Trains | " (Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang) | 1000 | 22 | " |

The international train arrived at 12:45 AM 23rd and cleared Central Station at 9 Am 23rd for Peking.

A more detailed account of the fighting at Techow, reported in two previous bulletins, states that Techow was occupied on the 16th by Fengtien troops and that during the night of the 16th-17th units of the 5th Division advanced from Tsinanfu and drove them back to Sangyuan about seven miles with casualties of about 1000 reported for the Fengtien troops. On the 18th Chang's tr troops were all withdrawn to Tungkuanghsien out of Shantung in Chihli province and it is now reported the bulk of his concentration at Machang is moving overland toward Peking. The troops in Shantung consist of the 5th Division and seven Mixed Brigades. It is unknown whether this force is lined up with Wu Pei-fu as Cheng Shih-chi declared his neutrality some months ago. This fight however does substantiate the fact that they are hostile to Chang Tso-lin and will prevent his troops moving south over the Tsin-Pu line, if possible.

Chang Tso-lin's train has been made up in Tientsin Central for the last twenty hours but to date he and his staff are still in Tientsin. Tuan Chi-jui accompanied by his family, left Tientsin Central for Peking at 9 AM 22nd and

arrived in Peking about 2 PM 22nd, not being accompanied by any troops. Feng Yu-hsiang left at 10:40 AM 22nd immediately preceded by one train of his troops and having about 500 troops and staff aboard his own train. There are no troops of Feng now in or near Tientsin. Several thousand Fengtien troops are wandering around the Native city buthhave no apparent camp or point of concentration. Most of these troops are armed and are on no regular duty.

Semeenoff, the noted Russian leader, is now in Tientsin staying at the Tokiwa Hotel in the Japanese Concession.

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WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Act. Intelligence Officer, USAFC.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Monday,
November 24, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 70.

Nov. 23rd.

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:50 AM | T.E. | CHWCT. | Allied Train | | | |
| 12:40 PM | Tangku | T.E. | | 400 | 13 | Inf. |
| 11:25 " | Peking | " | Allied Train | | | |

The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 AM | T.C. | Peking | 350 | 13 | Inf. |
| 1:40 PM | " | " | 150 | 7 | " |
| 7:10 " | " | " | 250 | 10 | " |
| 11:15 " | Peking | T.E. | Allied Train | | |

The International train which left Tientsin East for Peking at 9:00 AM on the 23rd returned to East Station at 11:25 PM on the 23rd.

Chang Tso-lin's train consisting of 3 engines, 2 in front and one in rear 18 coaches and four box cars, one box car and two coaches carrying radio equipment with antennae on top of two cars left for Peking at 6:55 AM on the 24th. This train was preceded by one troop train. Chang and his entire staff including his son Chang Hsueh-liang and General Li Ching-lin were aboard. The Marshal does not plan to spend over two or three weeks in Peking and then he will return to Mukden withdrawing his troops to Koupangtze and Mukden.

At present there are five hundred Fengtien troops at Shanhaikuan and about 2000 at Chinwangtao. Approximately 50,000 Fengtien troops have arrived in Tientsin from the north and most of them have gone to Machang although about 5000 are reported to be in the Native city, garrisoned in various houses. Since the 21st there has been no further movement of Chang's troops north toward Shanhaikuan and only three trains departed at that time totalling 1200 men. Troop movement therefore has now practically ceased although the Machang troops may be moved up toward Peking.

Distribution;
CG; US Consul
US Mil Attache
Comdr. Asheville
CO 15th Inf.; Records G-2

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Act. Intelligence Officer, USAFC.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Tuesday,
November 25, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 71.

Nov. 24th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:25 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | 1st & 3rd Army | 1000 | 35 | Inf & Cav |
| 3:35 PM | " | " | " | 800 | 22 | Inf |
| 6:40 PM | " | " | " | 300 | 40 | Transportaion |
| 7:15 PM | " | " | " | 900 | 28 | Inf |
| 10: PM | Tientsin E | Tongshan | Passenger train | | | |
| 10:15 PM | Heinko | Tientsin C | | 200 | 30 | Coolies & equip |
| 11:05 PM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin C | | 20 | 11 | Supplies. |
| 7-trains | | | | 3220 | 166 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6: 55 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | | 1250 | 20 | Chang Tso-lin |
| 8:30 AM | " | " | Changs Staff | 350 | 12 | Inf. |
| 9: AM | " | " | 2nd army | 450 | 25 | Inf |
| 9:30 AM | " | " | " | 500 | 15 | Inf |
| 2:10 PM | " | Machang | | | 22 | Supplies |
| 2:55 PM | " | " | 2nd army | 400 | 7 | Inf |
| 3:10 PM | " | " | " | 1000 | 31 | Inf-Cav-MG |
| 3:45 PM | " | " | " | 350 | 17 | Infantry |
| 4:40 PM | " | " | 1st & 3rd army | 900 | 28 | Infantry |
| 6:20 PM | " | Peking | Passenger train | | | |
| 8:10 PM | " | Machang | 2nd army | 250 | 35 | Infantry |
| 10:50PM | " | " | | 200 | 30 | Coolies & equip |
| 11:25PM | " | " | | 20 | 11 | Supplies |
| 13-trains | | | | 5670 | 255 | |

The center of political activity has now shifted to Peking with the arrival of Tuan, Feng and Chang Tso-lin. however the most interesting contest now ensuing is not the most apparent. The international triangle, made up of Japan, Russia and the present Chinese leaders, is the fly in the ointment, when on the surface some peaceful solution of China's ills may seem in view. Japan's position is now anything but satisfactory as far as she is concerned, since Chang has exceeded her desires by coming south of the wall and on to Peking, and is advertising a unification of China by pacifying the defeated Chinese leaders with Japanese money. A united China is the last thing Japan desires, for with unity, cooperation among the Chinese leaders might result and it is an established fact that

the Japanese are soundly despised by many prominent Chinese, hence [illegible] such a case their interests would be restricted instead of increased. Chang also according to the Japanese viewpoint is now working directly in with the Russian Reds by consorting with the Kuomintang leaders and placing many in positions of prominence. Any strong Bolshevick elements in the Government of China appears to Japan as even more serious than a united China, for then Bolshevick principles would be a step nearer to the restless working classes of Japan. Whether as a scarecrow for Mr. Karahan and his Red cohorts or not, the Japanese have now unearthed Ataman Semenoff, the former White Russian leader, who is ensconed in the Tokiwa Hotel in the Japanese Concession, Tientsin, with many of his former Chita Officers and associates. There are perhaps more Russian Whites scattered throughout China then in any other country in the world and if properly organized and financed, using Chang Tso-lin's Russian White units as a nucleus, an appreciable force might be formed which could menace Red activities. The Russian point of view is somewhat more evident than that of the Japanese,, for they appear to only desire an unrestricted hand in the distribution of rabid anti-capitalistic doctrines. The Chinese Eastern Railway, however is looked upon as a very good acquisition if it could be obtained by means not too strongly opposed by the great powers. It has been reliably reported that at present there are seventy thousand Russian Red troops at Harbarovsk. These are at present not hostile to Chang, as he carefully arranged such details before leaving Manchuria by signing the Russian-Mukden treaty, etc. However, this force is still at Habarovsk and Chang is not so short sighted that in the present manouverings this fact will be overlooked, at least to the extent of antagonising Mr. Karahan. Hence Tuan Chi-jui and Chang are now placed in the position primarily of satisfying their present undesired allies and secondarily, unifying China by peaceful methods if possible. Feng Yu-hsiang, from all reports has been convinced by sufficient money from some source, that he is no longer wanted and he is planing an extensive trip abroad. Wu Pei-fu is reported to have communicated to Tuan Chi-jui his desire of cooperation, and from Tuan's past declarations he would be more than glad to accept Wu's support. The Japanese and the Russians would both oppose this coalition as Wu is one of the few unpurchasable Chinese leaders and he has strongly opposed Sun Yat-sen and his Bolshevick preaching in Canton. It is thought by many that Chang Tso-lin would also welcome a unification with Wu Pei-fu if unimpeded by his allied following. So the situation stands, as complicated and complex as it is possible for Oriental scheming and intrigue to make it, with unexpected revelations occurring daily and nmo much indication that the end is yet in sight.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf. Act. I.O.

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Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Wednesday,
November 26, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 72.

Nov. 25th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:30 AM | Tongshan | Tientsin C | | | 5 | Equip. |
| 3:25 AM | Peking | " E | | 10 | Passenger train | |
| 4:30 AM | Tanku | " " | | 20 | 20 | Supplies |
| 2:15 PM | Lanshow | Machang | Med.C. | 100 | 20 | Med.C. |
| 2:35 PM | Nudron | Machang | | 1500 | 51 | Inf-Cav. |
| 2:40 PM | " | " | 15th Brig. | 1200 | 22 | Inf. |
| 10:50 PM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin E | | 16 | 10 | Japanese |
| 7-trains | | | | 2646 | 128 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:00 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | 75 | 8 | Inf. |
| 8:30 AM | " " | Machang | | 17 | Supplies |
| 9:40 AM | " " | " | | 14 | Supplies |
| 4:15 PM | Lanshow | " | 1st & 3rd army 1500 | 51 | Inf. |
| 4:30 PM | " | " | " 1200 | 22 | ". |
| 5-trains | | | 2575 | 92 | |

A small movement of troops south continues, but the general traffic situation is little improved. One International train left for Peking at 9:30 AM on the 25th.

Two thousand men of the 27th Division, Fengtien troops, are reported to have arrived at Tangshan, commanded by General Ma Sung-lin? (Ma Sungling) and eight thousand more are expected.

Ataman Semenoff is still in Tientsin, closely guarded by his followers. It is interesting to note that since his departure from New York in 1922, he has been in Kobe and Nagasaki at the expense of the Japanese Government. Since arriving in Tientsin he has had two dinner engagements with the Japanese Consul General and frequent conferences with various Japanese. The explanation for his presence here is that he is going into business with a Russian-Japanese firm and the capital is being furnished from Japanese sources.

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Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China.
8 AM Thursday,
November 27, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 75.

Nov. 26th. The following trains arrived or departed from Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2;30 AM | Yangshan | Tientsin C | | | 5 | Ry Equip |
| 5;00 AM | Tanku | " E | | 125 | 29 | Inf. |
| 5;15 AM | " | Fengtai | | 180 | 28 | Qqv. |
| 4;30 AM | " | Tientsin E | | | 20 | Supplies |
| 5;15 AM | " | " " | | 80 | 28 | " |
| 6;15 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | | 125 | 14 | " |
| 7;45 AM | " " | " | | 200 | 29 | " |
| 8;00 AM | " " | " | | | 20 | " |
| 9;30 AM | " E | " | | 80 | Passenger | |
| 10;00 AM | " " | " | | | 31 | Supplies |
| 11;00 AM | " " | Tientsin C | | 100 | 7 | " |
| 5;15 PM | Lanshow | Tientsin C | | 150 | | " |
| 10;20 PM | Tientsin E | Machang | | | 24 | " |
| 11;15 PM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin C | | | 24 | " |
| 14-trains | | | | 980 | 239 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5;10 AM | Tanku | Machang | | 90 | 28 | Gov. |
| 7;15 AM | Tientsin C | Peitsang | 1st&3rd Army | 75 | 9 | Supplies |
| 8;25 AM | " " | " | | | 16 | Supplies |
| 8;35 AM | " [illegible] | Peking | | | 20 | " |
| 11;05 AM | " C | " | 1st,2nd&3rd Army | 100 | | Troops&Supplies |
| 2;05 PM | Peking | Tientsin C | | | | Allied Train |
| 3;30 Pm | Tientsin C | Machang | 2nd Army | 1000 | 30 | Inf.,M.D. |
| 6;30 PM | Lanshow | " | | 25 | 53 | Supplies |
| 9-trains | " | " | | 50 | 20 | " |
| | | | | 1340 | 176 | |

The international train from Peking arrived at Tiensin East at 2;45 PM on the 26th. One is scheduled to leave for Peking at 9;30 AM on the 27th and for Shanhaikwan at 10;30 AM on the 29th.

The Russians in Tientsin are very much excited by the proposition put forward by Semeonoff and his Lieutenants to the effect that all Russians in North China are to be enlisted under Semeonoff to form one complete Division. Good pay and allowances have been promised and Semeonoff intimates that since he is a Japanese subject and protected by the Japanese Government, the pay for the troops is more or less guaranteed. All the male Russians have been interrogated. Semeonoff's agents state that The Commercial Corporation for which he is establishing an office in the Japanese Concession is just to

feel the Chinese and the other foreigners as his real mission is to raise a White Russian Army for protection against the Russian Reds.

Chang Tso-lin's airplane field west of the Arsenal near Tientsin is being improved and mat-shed hangers are being constructed. Two planes from this field flew to Peking and returned on the 27th.

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China,
Office of the Commanding General, (G-2)

Tientsin, China,
9 AM Friday,
November 28th, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 74.

November 27th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:30 AM | Tanku | Tientsin E | Transportation | | 36 | Equip. |
| 10:30 AM | TientsinE | Tangku | " | 75 | 18 | Carts |
| 2:35 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | | 1000 | 23 | Inf. |
| 5:15 PM | " | " " | | 100 | 23 | Supplies |
| 6:10 PM | " | " " | | 1500 | 17 | Inf-Arty. |
| 8:30 PM | TientsinE | Peking | | | 12 | Supplies |
| 10:40PM | Lanhsien | Machang | 1st&3rd Army | 1800 | 26 | Inf. |
| 7-trains | | | | 4475 | 155 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:30 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | 1st&3rd Army | 10 | 19 | Supplies |
| 6:40 AM | " | " Machang | 3rd Army | 1350 | 17 | Inf-Arty. |
| 7:40 AM | " | " Peking | | | 16 | Supplies |
| 8:10 AM | " | " Tunglintsing | | 150 | | |
| 10:00 AM | " | " Machang | 3rd Army | 150 | 18 | Cav-Spls. |
| 10:40 AM | " | " Peking | 1st,2nd&3rd Army | 450 | 18 | |
| 11:00 AM | " | " Langfang | | 100 | 26 | Equip. |
| 11:15 AM | " | " Machang | 3rd Army | 1000 | 23 | Inf. |
| 12:00 M | " | " Langfang | " | 800 | 24 | Inf. |
| 3:20 PM | " | " Fengtai | | 500 | 23 | M.D. |
| 9:10 PM | " | " Machang | | 6 | 18 | Supplies |
| 11-trains | | | | 4516 | 202 | |

The traffic situation is still bad, although one passenger train has been dispatched from Tientsin East for Mukden, the first in two months and a half. One passenger is running daily to Peking. The Tsin-Pu and Kin-Han lines are both out of commission for an indefinite period.

No new developments have occurred during the last twenty-four hours, although General Semenoff is reported to have left during the day for Mukden or Japan but is returning within ten days or two weeks. His assistants have been left here to complete the plans for enlisting all the White Russians in North China, as the General hopes to re-establish himself again in Eastern Siberia with the support of Japan and Chang Tso-lin.

Wu Pei-fu is now in control of the Kin-Han railway line from Hankow to Chengchow and has established himself again at Loyang. Feng's resignation is reported to have been refused and it is now insisted upon from some sources that Wu Pei-fu resign. Wu Pei-fu is not the type of Chinese to resign without

a struggle but the time for such struggle has not yet arrived. Wu now has all the the Hupeh and several of the Honan units directly under his command and the other Pantze forces, while not strongly favoring either contendant, at present, for obvious reasons would more than likely cast their die with Wu. However the period of precipitate action has passed in the struggle and from now on nothing will be done without the lapse of much time, consumed in endless argument. Time is Wu's salvation and if the summer can be awaited without interference from Chang's main body, something similar to the situation in 1922 may be expected.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf., Act.I.O.

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Tientsin, China.
9 AM Saturday,
November 29, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 75.

November 28th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time: | From: | To: | Unit: | Men: | Cars: | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12;45 AM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | 1st&3rd Army | 900 | 35 | Inf-Arty. |
| 1;45 AM | Chinwangtao | " " | | 80 | 32 | Supplies |
| 4;15 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | | | 15 | Coal |
| 8;20 AM | " " | Tungshan | | 40 | 27 | Carts |
| 9;15 AM | " " | Peking | | 80 | | Passenger train |
| 11;30 AM | " " | Tungshan | | 150 | | " " |
| 12;15 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | 1st&3rd Army | 650 | 24 | Artillery |
| 1;30 PM | " | " " | | 100 | 20 | Supplies |
| 5;00 PM | " | " " | 1st&3rd Army | 800 | 18 | Artillery |
| 5;57 PM | Peking | " E | | | | Allied train. |
| 10-trains | | | | 2440 | 169 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1;57 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | 1st&3rd Army | 800 | 29 | Inf. |
| 2;16 AM | " " | Lanfa | | 10 | 27 | Supplies |
| 4;50 AM | Peking | Tientsin C | | 200 | 21 | Equip. |
| 12;35 PM | Tientsin C | Pengtai | 1st&3rd Army | 800 | 21 | Cav. |
| 2;30 PM | " " | " | " " | 400 | 15 | Cav. |
| 3;35 PM | " " | " | " " | 650 | 26 | Inf-Cav. |
| 5;00 PM | " " | Machang | | 100 | 20 | Supplies |
| 6;30 PM | " " | " | 1st&3rd Army | 135 | 12 | Supplies |
| 10;50 PM | " " | " | | 50 | 22 | Supplies |
| 9-trains | | | | 2545 | 219 | |

The Allied train which left Tientsin East for Peking at 10;55 AM on the 27th returned to Tientsin East at 5;57 PM on the 28th.

It was reported that Lanfa was looted by Pengtien soldiers after the withdrawal of the British detachment which has been stationed there during the emergency.

The situation is very quiet in Peking although reports are to the effect that some firing took place at Tungchow between Chang's troops and those of Feng Yu-hsiang. This has not been confirmed. Chang is moving more troops to Peking daily and Feng's troops are now clear of Peking. Feng's resignation has been again refused and he is reported to have gone to the Western Hills.

There is no confirmation of Wu Pei-fu's telegram to Tuan Chi-jui pledging allegiance.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf., Act.I.O.

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Tientsin, China.
9 AM Sunday,
November 30, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 76.

Nov. 29. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:45 AM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin E | | 50 | 2 | Med.C. |
| 9:20 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | | | | Passenger |
| 9:40 AM | " " | Shanhaikwan | | | | Allied train |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3:08 AM | Tientsin C | Lanfa | 10 | 19 | Supplies |
| 6:15 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | 15 | 1 | Russian |
| 9:30 AM | Peking | " " | | 22 | Equip. |
| 9:50 AM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | 50 | | Passenger |
| 10:10 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | 100 | 21 | Supplies |
| 12:45 PM | " " | Fengtai | | 17 | Ry.Equip |
| 2:35 PM | " " | " | | 24 | Supplies |
| 4:50 PM | " " | " | | 20 | Supplies |
| 8-trains | | | 175 | 124 | |

An International train left for Shanhaikwan at 9:40 AM on the 29th.

Some reports are to the effect that a second coup d'etat is planned and imminent in Peking. Feng Yu-hsiang, now in the Western Hills, is reported to have between 55 and 60 thousand troops around Peking while Chang's number is approximately 12 thousand. Chang, however, has about forty thousand troops at Mukden which could be quickly moved to Peking. The report states that since Feng and his radical friends have been practically ignored in the organization of the most recent government, the Bolshevik influence is insisting that he again assert himself and take over Peking, eliminating Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Chi-jui. It is further stated that Li Chin-lin is at present much disappointed over the fact that Chang refused to approve his appointment as Governor of Chihli province and that he will be at least neutral and perhaps pro-Feng Yu-hsiang. Wu Pei-fu is mentioned as joining in, to the extent of taking over control of the Kin-Han line. It is the opinion however of many that this report is premature, since, if such is Feng's plan, a much more auspicious time would be after Chang Tso-lin has withdrawn to Mukden with his main body of troops and this he is planning to do at any early date for several reasons. In the first place a large Red Russian concentration is at Harberovsk and reports are now to the effect that more Red troops are being concentrated in the Chita area. The Japanese are not over-

anxious to enter Manchuria in force but if the Russian hordes comes south with Chang Tso-lin's forces in Peking, any Russian advance would immediately precipitate their advance north with the avowed reason of protecting their property and nationals in Manchuria. However, with Chang's troops in Mukden, where the Japanese insist that they return immediately, and with Semenoff's White Russian force in formation, a definite check would be apparent. Feng therefore, if he has a second coup d'etat in mind, would find it much to his advantage to bide his time for the present and since the other large movements in the present war have been so perfectly timed to secure maximum execution, it is thought this will be carried out in a like manner. It is not believed that Wu has entered into this scheme at all but his whole plan at present is to let the pot boil dry if possible and at that time have sufficient force to make a complete take-over without being hindered by complicating alliances of any nature. Wu and the Yangtze provinces are of minor concern to the forces now in Peking so long as there is no northern advance imminent and any such move on their part is most improbable for at least six months.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf., Act.I.O.

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Tientsin, China.
9 AM Monday,
December 1, 1924

Intelligence Bulletin No. 77.

November 30, The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:30 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 100 | 16 | Equip. |
| 8:20 " | " | " " | | 50 | | Special train. |
| 9:50 " | Tientsin E | Tanku | | | 10 | Supplies |
| 10:15PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 50 | 21 | Equip. |
| 4-trains | | | | 190 | 47 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:30 AM | Tientsin C | Peking | | 50 | | Passenger |
| 1:05 PM | " " | Fengtai | | | 21 | Supplies |
| 3:20 " | " " | " | | | 7 | " |
| 5:15 " | Peking | Tientsin E | | 65 | | Passenger. |
| 11:00PM | Tientsin C | Machang | | 30 | 21 | Equip. |
| 5-trains | | | | 145 | 49 | |

The British ship "HOLLYHOCK" left Tientsin on the morning of the 30th. At present there are no British Naval vessels in Tientsin.

Conditions in Peking are unchanged. Sun-Yat-sen is reported to have left Japan on the 30th for China and is expected in Tientsin within a few days.

Chi Hsieh-yuan in Nanking has arrested the Civil Governor, Han Kuo-chun, who had plotted to overthrow the Tuchun. The appointee of the present regime as Defense Commissioner of Shanghai has also been unable to take office due to the opposition of Chi. Lu Yung-hsiang, former Tuchun of Chekiang, and who arrived in Peking with Chang Tso-lin was reported to have left for Shanghai to retake his position in Chekiang. He will now doubtless be forced to re-arrange his plans since Chi has shown so much present strength. An attempt is being made to force Hsiao Yao-nan out of office but so long as he has the 25th Division in hand these plans will also be unsuccessful.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Inf., Act.I.O.

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Tientsin, China.
December 3,1924.
9 AM Wednesday.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 78.

Dec. 2nd. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time: | From: | To: | Unit: | Men: | Cars: | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:50 PM | Tientsin | Mukden | | 200 | 16 | Spec.train. |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3:50 AM | Mukden | Tientsin | | 15 | 22 | Supplies |
| 4:45 " | Peking | " | 2nd Army | 350 | 26 | " |
| 5:50 " | " | " | " | | Chang | Tsung-chang. |
| 8:50 " | " | " | | 100 | | Casuals |
| 9:50 " | " | " | | | Chang | Tso-lin |
| 1:15 PM | Mukden | " | | 75 | 28 | Equip. |
| 3:30 " | " | " | | 20 | 12 | Art'y. |
| 4:20 " | Peking | " | 2nd Army | 500 | 17 | Inf. |
| 4:25 " | Tientsin | Pengtai | | | 22 | Supplies |
| 10:00" | Peking | Tientsin | | 100 | 30 | Equip. |
| 11:45" | " | " | 2nd Army | 475 | 23 | Inf. |
| 11-trains | | | | 1635 | 180 | |

Chang Tso-lin arrived in Tientsin at 9:50 AM on the 2nd, accompanied by some of his staff which included Chang Hsueh-liang, Li Ching-lin, Yang Yu-lin, Chief of Staff, and General Sutton, his British adviser. He was preceded by General Chang Tsung-chang with a train of 7 coaches at 6:50 AM and with his staff and body-guard, who went immediately to the Yamen and took possession. At 7:00 AM, 7:10 AM, 8:50 AM, and 9:00 AM detachments were dispatched from Central Station to various points in Hopei, native city, armed with automatic rifles, pistols and machine guns, approximately 200 men of the 2nd Army. On the arrival of Chang's train of 22 coaches, his body-guard detrained and Chang with his entire staff went to Tsao's Gardens, his former headquarters. Reports are current that the Manchu Emperor and Tuan Chi-jui are in the city but these reports have not been verified. At 4:20 PM 560 troops of the 2nd Army detrained and marched into the Chinese city taking five gun-pounders.

Traffic is now completely blocked at Tientsin Central and only one train has gone toward Mukden during the twenty-four hours.

It has been impossible yet to determine the object of this move on Chang's part. A number of reasons have been proposed by various observers, among which are: (a) a split between Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Chi-jui; (b) a definite split between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang

Tso-lin and since Feng was numerically superior in troops strength in Peking, Chang is withdrawing to Tientsin for the time being; (c) to meet Sun Yat-sen before he arrived among his radical following in Peking and to attempt to force some agreement with him here in Tientsin; (d) the Russian menace in Chang's northern border in Manchuria which has increased since Chang and Tuan Chi-jui deposed Feng's radical pro-Russian Cabinet and instituted an Anfu, pro-Japanese Cabinet; (e) insistance by the Japanese that Chang return to Mukden, since if the Reds did advance south into Manchuria with Chang's main body in Peking, the Japanese would immediately advance north from Korea and Kiaotung Peninsula to eject the Russians, which Japan does not wish to do at present. Any choice may be made from the above with an even percentage for error, as the time is yet too short to determine what the causes are or to predict what may follow.

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry, Act. I.O.

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Tientsin, China.
All Thursday.
December 4th, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No.79.

Dec.4th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unif | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2;10 AM | Tientsin E | Mukden | | 30 | 15 | Art'y Equip. |
| 6;30 " | " | " | | | 36 | Equipment |
| 10;00 " | " | Shanhaikwan English | | | | Allied Train |
| 10;05 " | " | Mukden | | | 25 | Equipment |
| 2;00 PM | " | Shanhaikwan | | 60 | | Passenger |
| 6;05 " | Mukden | Tientsin E | | | 20 | Supplies |
| 6-trains | | | | 90 | 104 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8;40 AM | Tientsin C | Mukden | | | 25 | Equipment |
| 9;50 " | " | Peking | | 40 | 6 | Funeral train for Gen.Tsao-Jui |
| 4;20 PM | Peking | Tientsin C | | 75 | 10 | General Officer and Staff. |
| 3-trains | | | | 115 | 41 | |

The situation is unchanged in Tientsin. Hangtsun is garrisoned by about one thousand Fengtien troops and the roads between Tientsin and Hangtsun are patrolled by Fengtien Cavalry. Eight hundred Fengtien troops are billeted in houses in the vicinity of Nei Hang. In all about twenty-five hundred troops are billeted in and around the native city. The native Chinese are very excited and many who have always been most loquacious are now afraid to talk or express any opinion.

Sun Yat-sen is scheduled to arrive from Japan on the Nippon Yusen Kaisha boat "Hakusei Maru" at about 12 noon on the 4th. From reports, however, it is his intention to go on to Peking at the earliest possible time.

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Tientsin, China.
~~SAT~~ FRIDAY
December 5, 1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 80.

Dec.4th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:05 AM | Peking | Tientsin E | | Special Train--Body of Tsao Jui | | |
| 6:15 " | " | Mukden | | | | Passenger Train |
| 9:15 " | Tangshan | Tientsin E | | | 28 | Coal |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:55 AM | Langfang | Mukden | | 50 | 18 | Equipment. |

Sun Yat-sen arrived at the French Bund at 12 noon aboard the Japanese steamer "Hokurei Maru". A small crowd of perhaps three hundred consisting of students and paid banner bearers was present within the police lines to welcome him. Official representatives of Chang Tso-lin and various organizations were also present. Before the arrival of the boat several red flags and banners with anti-foreign inscriptions were in evidence but General Yang I-teh personally had all of these taken down and they were not displayed thereafter. Numerous pamphlets were being passed about in the crowd of onlookers, most of whom were dock coolies who could not read. A few of these were rather radical but most were short biographies of Sun and the Kuo-ming-Tang. After all the Officials had gone aboard and greetings had taken place Sun left the boat accompanied by his wife dressed in foreign clothes. He will live in the Japanese concession, Chang's Garden, during his reported short stay in Tientsin.

A banquet for Sun was scheduled for 8 P.M. at the International Grand Hotel in the French Concession to which one hundred and thirty were invited. About sixty were in attendance, General Yang I-teh and Sun Kuo being the most prominent of those present. At the last moment it was announced that due to Sun's recent illness aboard ship, he had been advised by his German physicians to remain at home. The facts,as reported, are that since this hotel, being in the French Concession, is under French police protection, the police authorities advised Sun to keep out of the Concession as some trouble was anticipated.

A mandate has finally been issued appointing General Yang I-teh Civil Governor of Chihli Province and concurrently head of the Provincial Police. Lu Hung-hsiang has been appointed Tupan of Rehabilitation Affairs of Chihli Province, which relieves Chang Tso-lin of further responsibility toward his more or less undesirable friend Lu.

There has been scarcely any troop movement during this period although many of Chang's Russian troops are being returned to Tientsin from Machang and it is reported Fengtien troops are advancing overland from Machang toward

Confidential. Bul.No.80. Cont'd.

Peking. Peking is quiet other than persistent rumors of a second coup d' etat by Feng Yu-hsiang. Tuan Chi-jui and the Manchu Emperor are still in the Capitol.

The British detachment stationed at Shanhaikuan during the emergency has been withdrawn to Tientsin and the British Sloop "Foxglove" has also returned to this port.

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Tientsin, China.
9 AM Saturday.
December 6,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 81.

Dec.5th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11;45 AM | Tientsin E | Tangshan | | 400 | 8 | Infantry |
| 12;30 PM | " | " | | 250 | Passenger | " |
| 2-trains | | | | 650 | 8 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2;30 PM | Tientsin C | Machang | | 24 | Supplies |
| 3;10 " | " | " | | 32 | " |
| 10;00 " | Mukden | Tientsin C | (Mrs.Chang Tso-lin) | 8 | Special Train. |

There has been little change in the general situation during this period. Traffic congestion is clearing and the East Station is entirely open for through trains. The Central Station is also clearer than for some time.

Sun Yat-sen called upon Ex-president Li Yuan-hung in the British Concession at 2PM on the 5th but nothing of particular importance was discussed at their meeting.

Chang Tso-lin is moving his troops formerly in Peking down the Tientsin-Peking road and at present the main body of about 10,000 is two days march east of Tungchow coming toward Tientsin. From all indications Chang is not preparing to rush on to Mukden. The line north is at present clear although few troops are being moved back. The report of Fengtien troops moving toward Peking in yesterday's Bulletin now appears to have been in error. At present Chang's entire staff, including his foreign advisers, with the exception of his Chief of Staff, is in Tientsin and it will be noted that another of his wives arrived during the day from Mukden.

Feng Yu-hsiang is still in the Western Hills and his troops are gradually taking over the guarding of the city. It is reported by the Japanese that Wu Pei-fu's small force has mutinied and that Wu has gone to Hankow but this has not been confirmed.

Propaganda pamphlets in Chinese are being distributed daily by the Russian staff of Sun Yat-sen and, although none have been of a violent nature, they are all of a distinctly "Pink" tendency, suggesting that the salvation of China lies in the abrogation of all foreign treaties and particularly extraterritoriality.

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Tientsin, China.
9 A.M., Monday,
December 8th,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 82.

This Bulletin covers the period from 9 A.M. Saturday, December 6th, to 9 A.M. Monday, December 8th.

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec.6th; | | | | | | |
| 9:30 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | | | 11 | Passenger train |
| 12:45PM | " | Mukden | | 75 | 3 | General and Staff |
| 3:10 " | Shanhaikwan | Machang | | 500 | 31 | Infantry |
| 3:40 " | Mukden | " | | 160 | 22 | Equipment |
| 4-trains | | | | 735 | 67 | |
| Dec.7th; | | | | | | |
| 1:45 AM | Peking | Mukden | | | | Train #101 |
| 2:05 PM | Shanhaikwan | Peking | | | 15 | Passenger train |
| 2:05 " | Peking | Tientsin E | | | 14 | " " |
| 2:25 " | Mukden | Tientsin E | | 200 | 9 | Tuchun of Kirin and Staff |
| 3:00 " | Tientsin E | Mukden | | 170 | 26 | 5 Airplanes |
| 4:00 " | " | Peking | | | 14 | Passenger train |
| 4:30 " | " | " | | | 25 | Supplies |
| 5:30 " | Mukden | " | | | 12 | Passenger train |
| 6-trains | | | | 370 | 116 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec.6th; | | | | | | |
| 4:30 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | | 155 | 11 | Passenger train |
| 5:30 " | " | " | | 10 | 18 | Supplies |
| 10:00 " | " | Peking | | | 11 | Passenger train |
| 3:40 PM | " | Machang | | 30 | 5 | General Lu Yung-hsiang |
| 4-trains | | | | 175 | 45 | |
| Dec.7th; | | | | | | |
| 2:55 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 200 | 9 | General Chang Tso-hsiang |
| 6:45 " | Peking | " | | | | General Officer & Staff |
| 9:40 " | Tientsin C | Machang | | | 36 | Supplies |
| 3-trains | | | | 200 | 45 | |

It will be noted from the above that passengur traffic is rapidly improving and from all reports the only points where there is any congestion are at Fengtai and these stations and these are now seldom blocked.

Tientsin

The military situation is unchanged, although since the severe wind storm of a few days ago Chang has apparently given up the idea of maintaining

his aviation field near the French arsenal. At the time of the storm five of his planes were completly wrecked and five, in good repair, were returned to Mukden on the 7th. He has had fifteen planes at this field.

[redacted]to has been issued appointing General Hu Ching-yi Tupan of Honan Province. This indicates that the reports of Wu Pei-fu's recent defeat and flight from Loyang were doubtless correct. Wu is now reported in Hankow. It is also reported that he has resigned all his military offices. Chang Tso-lin is reported to have done likewise but both these reports must be considered in view of the little significance a Chinese resignation really carried.

General Chang Tso-hsiang, the Military Governor of Kirin Province, arrived from Mukden on the 7th and joined Chang Tsung-lin's headquarters. He has been taking Chang Tso-lin's place in Mukden since Chang's departure some weeks ago. General Wu Chun-sheng, Military Governor of Heilungkiang has recently returned to Mukden and he is at present acting Commander-in-chief in Manchuria.

Sun Yat-sen's propaganda continues and is rapidly spreading all along the railway lines. Radical pamphlets and posters have been noted at stations as far south as Tsinan on the Tsin-Pu line and at all the stations from Peking to Shanhaikwan on the Peking-Mukden. What effect this will have on the Chinese remains to be seen but as yet no effort is being made to [redacted] the distribution.

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Tientsin, China.
9 A.M., Tuesday.
December 9,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 83.

Dec.8th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:00 AM | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | | 25 | 15 | Supplies |
| 10:40 " | " | " | | 20 | 15 | " |
| 3:55 PM | " | Mukden | | — | 35 | Equip. |
| 3-trains | | | | 45 | 65 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:30 AM | Lanchow | Machang | | 10 | 25 | Supplies |
| 9:30 " | Tientsin C | Peking | | 55 | | Passenger |
| 3:40 PM | Langfang | Shanhaikuan | | 50 | 7 | Equip. |
| 10:20 " | Tientsin C | Machang | | — | 9 | Supplies |
| 4-trains | | | | 115 | 41 | |

There is much speculation in Chinese circles as to the reason for Sun Yat-sen's delay in Tientsin, since he announced at the time of his arrival that he would proceed immediately to Peking. At this time also he appeared to be in the best of health and stated that he was; although twenty-four hours after his arrival it was announced that he was indisposed and would be confined to his quarters for several days. The Chinese explanation of this is that Sun Yat-sen is being held here by Chang Tso-lin, since a plot was brewing in Peking, through Feng Yu-hsiang and Huang Fu, to meet Sun in Peking with a large demonstration and immediately make him President. Li-Ching-lin was to return to Tientsin and cut off the retreat of Chang Tso-lin. Li Ching-lin actually did leave Peking but he was closely followed by Chang and his entire staff. This plan remains so far immatured. What the next move will be no one, either Chinese or foreign, seems to be able to determine. Some sort of a rapprochement is developing between Wu Pei-fu, Tuan and Chang Tso-lin, as Chang's recent statements have completely changed from his former antagonistic attitude toward Wu to one of resignation and co-operation. In Wu's recent telegram to Tuan he has likewise decided to arbitrate, as he signs himself "your old pupil". If the peaceful unification of China really is the supreme desire in the mind of the present leaders, this triumvirate would be the strongest combination that could be gotten together. Wu has perhaps the largest following of merchant and middle class Chinese of any leader in North and Central China. Chang now has the best army in the field and Tuan Chi-jui is perhaps the most astute statesman in China. These three likewise appear to have the welfare of China at heart more than any of the other present leaders and place this above their individualistic ambitions. Present bolshevistic activity is solidifying

this union but whether or not it will be of sufficient force to actually bring about co-operation between these three formerly separated leaders and enemies, time alone will tell. China as a whole however is opposed to radical doctrines and this opposition will increase in direct ratio to the dissemination of Sun Yat-sen's and Khrahan's red posters and pamphlets.

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Tientsin, China.
December 10th, 1924.
9 A.M., Wednesday.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 84.

This is the quietest twenty-four hours since the beginning of the Chihli-Fengtien campaign. There was no movement of either troops or supply trains during the day and although the main lines are cleared nothing similar to normal passenger traffic has been restored.

The political situation likewise is apparently at a standstill. Hsiao Yen-shan, Chang Fu-ta, Chi Hsieh-yuan, and Sun Hsueh have submitted their resignations and Tsai Chung-sun, Tuchun of Kiangsi, has left the Province for Shanghai. The above list added to Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Wu Pei-fu includes practically all the leading militarists of North and Central China. From Chinese reports Li Yuan-hung, ex-President, now residing in the British Concession, Tientsin, is wielding quite an influence in the recent conferences. Incidentally, Sun Yat-sen called up Li for a two hours conference immediately after visiting Chang Tso-lin. Tuan Chi-jui is reported to be getting nervous over his present position and has sent his Minister of War and several other Anfuites of prominence to Tientsin in order to obtain some information of the situation, or perhaps troops from Chang Tso-lin. Feng and Kuang Fu, ex-Premier, remain in seclusion in the Western Hills.

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Tientsin, China.
9 A. M., Friday,
December 12,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 65.

This Bulletin covers the period from 9 A.M. Dec.10th to 9 A.M. Dec.12th.

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East:

Dec.10th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:20 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | | | 23 | Supplies |
| 9:50 " | Tientsin E | Tangshan | | 100 | 20 | Equipment |
| 2-trains | | | | 100 | 43 | |

Dec.11th:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:15 AM | Tientsin E | Peking | | | 15 | Passenger train |
| 9:55 " | " | Shanhaikwan | | | 14 | " |
| 11:10 " | " | Mukden | | 50 | 12 | Supplies |
| 11:20 " | " | Peking | | | 24 | " |
| 1:50 PM | " | Lanchow | | 150 | 18 | Art'y and Equip. |
| 8:50 " | " | Tangku | Russian | 100 | 7 | Armored special train |
| 6-trains | | | | 300 | 88 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central:

Dec.10th:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:10 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | | | 23 | Supplies |
| 10:10 " | " | " | 3d Army | 450 | 15 | Infantry |
| 4:50 PM | Machang | Tientsin C | | 200 | 20 | Equipment |
| 3-trains | | | | 650 | 58 | |

Dec.11th:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6:40 AM | Machang | Lanchow | | 35 | 11 | Equipment |
| 1:25 PM | Machang | Lanchow | | 150 | 18 | Art'y and Equip. |
| 8:50 " | " | Tientsin E | Russian | 100 | 7 | Armored special train |
| 3-trains | | | | 285 | 36 | |

The general situation is unchanged. At the military conference, which included most of Chang's Generals and General Wu Pei-fu, new Minister of War, held in Chang Tso-lin's headquarters in Tsao's Gardens it was definitely decided to launch an expedition against Chi Hsieh-yuan in Kiangsu. Among the points left undecided were the time of starting this campaign and the commanding officer. Lu Yung-hsiang appears to be most favored but this choice is questionable since Chang's Generals Li Ching-lin, Chang Tsung-chang, Chang Tso-hsiang and Chang Hsueh-liang are getting restless for some personal reward commensurate with the alleged victory they have won. It is reported that Chang himself is opposing such a move as he does not wish to further scatter his forces but the fact remains that he is being forced to give more attention to the satisfaction

of his subordinates. His army is no exception to other Chinese forces in which the commander must divide the spoils if he desires to maintain his leadership. So far nothing has been given any of the Fengtien Generals.

The situation in Peking appears quiet and at present there is no particular apprehension of trouble from Feng Yu-hsiang still in the Western Hills. It is reported that Feng has been paid his entire account of $20,000,000, which he was to receive as reward for his first coup d' etat and now he is satisfied. He too, however, has avaricious friends and followers who perhaps may not allow him to retire until they have also gotten a just share of the spoils ~~$~~ At the present most of Feng's supporters are on the eliminated list.

Chang Tso-lin is apparently planning to remain in Tientsin for some time and there is little indication that Sun Yat-sen is going to Peking in the near future.

Nothing of importance has been heard from Wu Pei-fu recently, although some of his family have left Tientsin to join him near Hankow. Desultory fighting is reported along the Yellow River near Kaifeng between the Shensi troops under Hu Ching-yi and Sun Yueh and the Honan troops.

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Tientsin, China.
9 A.M., Saturday,
December 15,1924.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 86.

Dec.13th. The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin East;

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:40 AM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | | 20 | 10 | Supplies |
| 9:55 " | Tientsin E | Peking | | | 17 | Passenger train |
| 10:30 " | " | Shanhaikwan | | | 12 | " |
| 1:00 PM | Tientsin C | Tientsin E | Russian | 50 | 5 | Art'y- 2 armed cars |
| 1:45 " | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | | 50 | 1 | Infantry |
| 2:00 " | Shanghai | Tientsin E | | | | KMA Coal train |
| 6 trains | | | | 120 | 45 | |

The following trains arrived or departed Tientsin Central;

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:50 AM | Mukden | Nanking | | 55 | 22 | Supplies |

The most interesting development during the day was the issuance of a mandate dismissing Chi Hsieh -yuan from the post of Taoiun of Kiangsu. This is in line with the reported southern expedition down the Tsin-Pu line by Chang's troops. The elimination of Chi is essential for Tuan's prestige in the south and it is going to be accomplished if possible without armed force.

In Tang -hsiang, having encountered some opposition in assuming his post of Pacification Commissioner of Chihli, has now been appointed by the above mandate Pacification Commissioner for Military affairs of Kiangsu and Anhwei Provinces, while Li Ching-lin is appointed temporarily to look after military affairs in Chihli Province.

The 3rd, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, and 26th Divisions and the 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 25th and 26th Mixed Brigades have been abolished. This was practically Wu Pei-fu's entire army with the exception of Feng Yu-hsiang's 11th Division and 7th and 8th Mixed Brigades and the 1st and 2nd Shensi Divisions. This leaves among the old regular army divisions, the 1st Division in Kiangsi whose commander, General Tsai Cheng-hsun, has just abdicated; 2nd Division with Sun Chuan-fang at Hangchow,Chekiang; 4th Division, also in Chekiang; 5th Division in Shantung; 6th Division with Chi at Nanking; 7th Division in [redacted]; 8th Division in Hupeh; 10th Division in Kiangsu; 11th at Peking; 12th Division in Fukien; the 16th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 34th, all in Szechuan with undetermined strength and mostly disorganized; the 17th Division is in Kwangtung and has practically lost connection with the Central Government; the 19th is in Kiangsu with Chi; the 25th is at Hankow; and the 27th and 29th are Manchurian units, while the 28th does not exist. It is apparent from the above that this mandate eliminates most of the war strength of North China with

the exception of Chi's three divisions in Xiangsu and Feng's force at Peking. The 25th at Hankow is a good division but is more or less isolated. Therefore if Chi Hsieh-yuan can be induced to vacate and Anfuites placed in command, Feng will be left alone to deal with and with no hope of support from outside sources his force can be easily controlled by Chang's Manchurian Army.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

## SITUATION SURVEY

FOR THE PERIOD OF OCTOBER 15TH to DECEMBER 31st 1924.

Chihli-Fengtien War

INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA

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## MILITARY

### CHIHLI-FENGTIEN 1924 WAR:

This period, with the period included in Summaries No.'s 72 and 73, covers the entire Chihli-Fengtien 1924 War. With the entire campaign now in the retrospective the circumstances which made up the campaign appear to naturally combine or fall into four distinct phases, each more or less complete in itself, as follows: (a) from September 12th to October 22nd, during which time the Chihli and Fengtien troops were mobilized and fighting occurred on the Shanhaikuan front, Marshal Wu arriving at Shanhaikuan on October 11th; (b) from October 23rd, on which day Feng completed his coup d' etat at Peking, to November 3rd, Marshal Wu returning to Tientsin on the 26th of October and leaving on the 3rd; (c) from November 4th to November 23rd. Feng's first troops arrived in Tientsin on the 3rd and Chang Tso-lin's on the 5th, Chang Tso-lin and staff arriving on the 10th; (d) from November 24th, when Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin arrived in Peking, to the present. Chang Tso-lin hurriedly returned to Tientsin on December 2nd.

The first phase has been discussed in previous Summaries and little need be added. No decisive victory was won by either side nor had any serious reverse been suffered. Wu's lines on October the 22nd were intact and his positions were strongly held, and, from the opinion of foreign observers present on the Shanhaikuan front, Wu's army was in the best condition since the mobilization started on September 12th. During the latter part of this first period, however his Shihmenchai sector had been broken, temporarily, during Wu's absence on a reconnoitering trip along the Manchurian coast aboard the "Hai Chee". This break was sufficiently serious to bring about a change of his plans whereby he abandoned the idea of landing troops along the Manchurian coast. As a result this entire force was disembarked at Chinwangtao and thrown into the breach which again stabilized his position. Wu's lines were now intact and his supplies and reserves were coming up to Chinwangtao at a rapid rate. However, with Chang's main body concentrated against him, any appreciable advance was most difficult. Any offensive on Feng's

part, at this time, would have enabled Wu to advance also and what was later a disastrous defeat could have been a victorious advance into Manchuria.

Now, however, the second phase of the campaign opened and in the early morning of the 23rd of October, Feng Yu-hsiang with his 11th Division and the 7th and 8th Mixed Brigades arrived in Peking and took over the city practically unopposed. He closed all the gates of the city, cutting the railway, telephone, and telegraph communications. Feng's posted proclamation at this time demanded (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) abdication of Tsao Kun, and (3) the arrest and punishment of all responsible for the present war. By this move Wu was cut off from his base of supplies and finances with his entire force in the field wholly dependant upon direct support from Peking. Feng's move was so faultlessly timed and executed that the rumor became current among foreign observers that some hand other than the Chinese was manipulating the movements of Feng's troops. It has now been substantiated that Feng was to be paid $20,000,000 through agents of Tuan Chi-jui, the money originating from Japanese sources. Five million was advanced to him at this time and, although at a high price, the blow as planned,proved to be sufficient to completely overthrow Wu Pei-fu, which was the object. Feng immediately took possession of all the Peking stations and started troops toward Tientsin but detrained them at Langfang. Rumors were current that Wu Pei-fu had attempted to commit suicide at Chinwangtao and others that he had boarded the "Hai Chee" and was sailing for the south, but at 11:50 A.M. on the 26th his train arrived in Tientsin accompanied by three troop trains. He went on to Central Station and established his headquarters in his train, from there moving his troops to Yangtsun. For sometime previous to this, reports were current that Chi Hsieh-yuan was sending re-inforcements north to Wu and many observers expected their immediate arrival, by the aid of which Wu would advance on Peking. His position up to this time was stillstrongly held on the Shanhaikwan front but his reserves were not sufficient to withdraw any large number of troops from this area for the Yangtsun line, however, five trains of the 3rd and 14th Divisions arrived in Tientsin. Some units of the 26th Division were at Machang and these were immediately moved up and a superficial system of trenches constructed west of Yangtsun while Feng was digging in near Langfang. Chi Hsieh-yuan's troops

however, did not arrive, chiefly due to the fact that Sun Tsung-hsien, Military Governor of Shantung, declared neutrality and refused to allow any troop movements over the Tsin-Pu line through Shantung Province. In the meantime the Japanese had increased their garrison at Chinwangtao to about 500 and, according to the British Officers aboard the British submarine in Chinwangtao harbor, the Japanese orders were to prevent the embarkation of any of Wu's army as at this time there were some twenty Chinese transports lying in the harbor. At Shanhaikuan from the 26th to the 30th, after the news of Wu's departure had been circulated among the troops, minor defeats developed into complete routs and on the 30th the Peking-Mukden was in Chang's possession as far south as Lanchow. The stations at Tientsin were completely blocked by troop trains which had come south to this point and five troop transports of wounded and refugee troops had arrived in Tientsin. These transports were not allowed to land within the 20 li limit and returned down the river. On the 31st Tongshan was taken by the 1st Shensi Division which had gone over to Feng Yu-hsiang and had marched from Tungchow overland. On the 1st of November Wu Pei-fu's thinly held line at Yangtsun was broken by Feng's troops with little opposition. Wu's armored train returned to the bridge-head, just west of Central Station, Tientsin. Wu's position now appeared most precarious as his peace proposals to Feng Yu-hsiang had apparently been disregarded, the Tsin-Pu line was blocked in Shantung Province, hostile troops of Feng's were but eight miles away rapidly advancing to his front, and Chang's and Feng's forces at Tongshan were moving south to cut off escape in the rear. At 3:15 A.M. on the 3rd of November Wu, with his staff and about 600 loyal troops of his 3rd Division, departed for Tangku and went aboard one of his transports for a southern destination.

The third phase of the campaign begins at this point. The native police in Tientsin immediately took the situation in hand and disarmed most of Wu's troops in the Stations and yards before the arrival of Feng's first units at 2:00 P.M. on the 3rd of November. Considering the large number of troops handled, the Native Police did an excellent piece of work and, although the Allied outposts were all on station, without prompt action on the part of this Police Force, the situation in the foreign concessions

might have been quite serious. At the arrival of Feng's troops, however, they assumed command and the disarming was practically completed by the morning of the 4th. General Wang Chen-ping, Governor of Chihli Province, arrived in Tientsin from Peking on the 3rd and took over his quarters in the Yamen. Wang, being one of the chief conspirators with Feng, started recruiting from the disbanded units of Wu Pei-fu's forces. On the 5th at 6:30 P.M., the first troops of Chang Tso-lin's arrived in Tientsin, East Station. These were all Russians and Japanese in Chinese uniform. Other trains of Chinese Fengtien troops followed. At this time there were but few troops of Feng Yu-hsiang's at the East Station but Central Station was strongly occupied. General Hu Ching-yi with his Shensi troops were also at Central Station and there was some doubt as to what the outcome would be when the Feng Yu-hsiang soldiers actually came in contact with the Manchurian forces. Chang's trains pulled on to Tientsin Central in the early morning of the 6th and several moved south during the day on the Tsin-Pu line to Machang. By the 7th, Chang's troops were in the majority in Tientsin and Feng Yu-hsiang's 7th and 8th Mixed Brigade units were returning to Peking. However, Hu Ching-yi's Shensi troops remained in and around the native city but all had evacuated before Chang Tso-lin himself arrived. On the 10th, Feng Yu-hsiang arrived from Peking with his staff and a small body guard and Marshal Chang arrived from Mukden, accompanied by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, Lu Yung-hsiang and Chang's entire staff. Much preparation was made in the Native City with flags and decorations and Chang's headquarters were established in Tsao's Garden, in Hopei, Native City. Five Fengtien airplanes arrived from the north and established a temporary field about two miles south of the American Compound. Troop trains continued from the north and several more units moved on south to Machang. General Wang Chen-ping still occupied the Yamen as Governor of Chihli Province and by the 12th had recruited about 1200 troops. By order of Marshal Chang these troops were disarmed and Wang fled to the Japanese Concession where he still remains. Actual combat now having ceased, activities of importance were now mainly of political significance. Wu Pei-fu was at sea on his way to Shanghai and rumors were rife of a Yangtze Alliance under Wu's leadership in opposition to Chang. On the 14th Chang abandoned his original aviation field south of Tientsin and established a new field near to the Feldch French Arsenal to the northwest of Tientsin, with fifteen planes

in all, which included thirteen new Spads. Daily conferences were held between Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang and Sun Kuo from the 10th up to the 22nd, when Tuan and Feng left for Peking. Chang Tso-lin and Staff left for Peking on his special train on the 24th. Nothing was published of any definite plan that had been decided upon up to this time in any of the conferences.

The fourth phase, from November 24th to the present, is one in which political activity predominates. The political happenings, however, will be covered in more detail under the POLITICAL sub-head. Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Tso-lin, and Feng Yu-hsiang are now in Peking and the long expected peaceful solution of China's ills is reported to be near at hand. The dethroned Wu Pei-fu is in Loyang with a small body guard, having been unsuccessful in his attempt to unite the Yangtze forces for a move in strength against Peking. Feng Yu-hsiang having been in daily conference with his two chief allies since the 10th and finding himself blocked at every turn by them and their supporters, has resigned. His troops have been withdrawn from Peking, being replaced by Chang Tso-lin's and the native police. His temporary Cabinet has been overthrown and an Anfu and Kuomintang Cabinet substituted at the dictation of Tuan Chi-jui. Following this direct blow, Feng accompanied by a small body-guard retired to a temple in the Western Hills and continued to submit resignations from all his posts. It was rumored at this time that he had decided to retire from all public activity and go abroad for a much needed rest. Chang Tso-lin, on Nov. 29th, had about twelve thousand troops in Peking and it was reported that Feng's troops outside of Peking numbered between fifty and sixty thousand. Chang, however, still had his concentration at Machang of about forty thousand but these troops were not moving up to Peking. Some disaffection now appeared for the first time in Chang's forces. General Li Ching-lin, one of Chang's chief sub-ordinates, had assumed the Governorship of Chihli Province immediately after the flight of General Wang Chen-ping but, according to Chang's previously announced policy, neither Chang nor any of his sub-ordinates would be placed in positions of political importance as a result of his victory. Hence Chang Tso-lin strongly opposed Li's assumption of this office and by his insistence forced

Li to retire, being succeeded by General Yang I-teh, former Chief of Police of Chihli Province. This, according to Chinese ethics caused Li to lose much face and therefore he sought the usual redress by conniving with Chang's enemy, Feng Yu-hsiang. The second coup d' etat was then planned in Feng's camp, whereby Li Ching-lin was to return to Tientsin and prevent any re-inforcements from coming to Chang's assistance while Feng and his forces would surround Peking and take over the city, making Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin with his entire staff prisoners. This was to culminate on the 5th of December, on which day Sun Yat-sen was to arrive in Peking. Sun was to be proclaimed President amid much demonstration with Bolshevick and anti-foreign colorings. As with most secret movements in China, too many appear to have been acquainted with the details. As a result, in the early morning of the 2nd, Chang Tso-lin hurriedly left Peking for Tientsin with the portion of his staff and body guard that he was able to collect on very short notice, the remainder following during the next day. No official explanation of this move has yet been forthcoming from Chang's headquarters. According to schedule Sun Yat-sen arrived in Tientsin at the French Bund at 12 noon on the 4th and was greeted by a small crowd of paid enthusiasts who were assembled at the wharf. At this time Sun appeared to be in excellent health but by 8:00 P.M. in the evening when a banquet was to be held in his honor at a Chinese Hotel in the French Concession he had become too ill to leave his home in the Japanese Concession. His illness can perhaps be somewhat attributed to the refusal of the French Police to permit him in the Concession for the banquet and also to the unexpected return of Chang Tso-lin to Tientsin. Following Chang's virtual flight from Peking his troops were also withdrawn and by the 7th Peking was practically free of Fengtien forces and Feng Yu-hsiang had replaced them with his own. Up to this time although Wu Pei-fu had been unsuccessful in any unification of the Yangtze Provinces against Tuan and Chang, General Chi Hsieh-yuan, now the leader on the Yangtze, was not coming out wholeheartedly as a supporter. Lu Yung-hsiang had not yet received any share of the spoils and with his insistance it was decided on the 10th to launch a campaign south on the Tsin-Pu line to eliminate Chi Hsieh-yuan. General Chang Tsung-chang with his brigade was to be in joint command with Lu Yung-hsiang. Other than this contemplated move there was no military activity during

this last phase of the Chihli-Fengtien conflict.

Theoretically, therefore, this war is at an end. Wu Pei-fu, supreme in military affairs in North China on the 12th of September, has been eliminated for the time being and Chang Tso-lin placed in his stead. Whether any actual good for China will devolve from these months of warring remains to be seen as the perspective is yet too narrow to be able to determine the beneficial results, if any exist. Outwardly, conditions politically and economically are about as unsettled as it is possible to be but, as the Chinese fabled Phoenix Bird, a leader may yet arise from this fire of dissention and disruption and China, now divided against itself, may be given at least some impetus in the direction of unification and peaceful conditions as a result of so much useless strife.

## POLITICAL

Political activity, as such, has been relegated to an insignificant position during this period of military predominance, but behind all the chief operations underground political intrigue invariably has been the propelling force. Dr. W. W. Yen's Cabinet was still in office up to October 23, when Feng returned to Peking, although it had been doing little since Wu Pei-fu arrived in Peking from Loyang, about the 15th of September. With Feng's advent most of Tsao Kun's Ministers became fugitives. Huang Fu, being in the original plot with Feng Yu-hsiang and also a Minister in the Yen Cabinet, was given the portfolio of Premier and requested by Feng to form a new Cabinet. On October 31st, a new Provisional Government was formed by order from Marshal Feng with the following personnel in the Cabinet:

General Huang Fu: Acting Premier and concurrently Minister

Minister of Communications: Chekiang. Graduated from Army Cadet College, Japan. Served on Staff of General Chen Chi-mei, and the Kiangsu tutuh. After a visit to Europe and America wrote two books on "Lessons of the European War and the Future of China", and "The World after the War". In 1921 was sent to study economic conditions in Europe and America, and joined the Chinese Delegation at Washington as High Adviser. On his return to China as appointed Director General of the Finance Commission. Member, College of Generals, Aug.1922, Minister for Foreign Affairs, February to April, 1923. Minister of Education, September 1923 to Jan 1924. First class Tashou Paokwang Chiaho decoration.

Dr. C. T. Wang, Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Finance: Chekiang. Studied in the Pei-yang University from 1895 to 1900. Was a teacher in the Anglo-Chinese College in Tientsin, and at Changsha High School, of which he was head master. Studied in Japan for four years, where he was Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. at Yokio. Then went to America, where he studied law for three years. Was General Li Yuan-hung's Chief of Diplomatic Affairs at Wuchang, and Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry in the first Republican Cabinet. Acting Minister of that Ministry until he resigned on the retirement of Tang Shao'yi. Vice-President of the Senate until unseated by Presidential Order of November 4, 1913. After the death of Yuan Shih-kai again became Vice-President of the Senate. Joined the southern movement, 1918, in opposition to the military Government in Peking. Chinese delegate at Paris Conference, 1919. Commissioner for Settlement of the Shantung Question, March 1922. Minister of Foreign Affairs and concurrently Acting Premier, Dec. 1922 to Jan. 1923. Was also for sometime Minister of Justice in 1922, but released by appointment of Cheng Ke. Commissioned to attend to Sino-Russian Affairs, Mar.1923 to Mar.1924. First class Tashou Paokwang Chiaho and First class Wenju Decorations.

Wang Yung-chiang: Minister of Interior: Fengtien. Finance Commissioner of Fengtien. Appointed Civil Governor of Fengtien, June 18,1922.

Mr. Li Chang-wu, Minister of War: Strong advocate of Feng Yu-hsiang and one of his Generals.

Admiral H. K. Tu, Naval Minister: Fukien. Born 1875. Graduated from the Naval Training School, Nanking. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, September 1922 to November 1923. Admiral in the Navy. Fourth of Order of Merit, 1st class Wenhu, Tashou Chiaho and 2nd class Tashou Paokwang Chiaho decorations.

Chang Yao-tseng, Minister of Justice: Yunnan. Born 1884. Graduate of a university in Japan. When the Nanking Government was organized he was the representative of Yunnan. Was a member of both the Advisory Council of Nanking and Provisional Council in Peking. A member of the Chung Yi Yuan and the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Unseated by Presidential Order of November 4, 1913. Minister of Justice, 1916.

Wang Nai-pin, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce: Fengtien. Born 1870. Was a Hsiutsai in the old Confucian School. He was at first a junior secretary in the Yamen of the Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces. Was once a Chief of Bureau for Collection of Opium-tax. Later Wang was appointed Superintendent of Native Customs at Sai Tsao Tai. Was successively Prefect of Chaoyang and Jehol. Promoted to be Taotai of Jehol in November, 1911. He lived as a private citizen when revolution broke out in that year. General Chang Tso-lin appointed him to repatriate the bandits in Fengtien and then made him Adviser to the Civil Governor of that Province. Was Adviser to President Hsu. Was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Commerce on Aug.11,1920. Resigned Dec. 25,1921. Director-General of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Fifth Order of Merit, 2nd class Paokwang Chiaho, Wenhu and Chiaho decorations.

In the meantime, Yen's Cabinet had either gone inhiding in Peking or slipped away for parts unknown. Wang Ke-min, the former Minister of Finance, was especially sought by Feng, as it was due to his efforts that Wu Pei-fu had been financed in this campaign. No violence, however, was done to any former Cabinet member by Feng's troops and at present the location of most of them is an open secret. The complection of Feng's new Cabinet was more or less radical, with Huang Fu and C.T.Wang dominating all others. An effort had been made to place Chang Tso-lin in the appointment of Wang Yung-chang as Minister of Interior and Wang Nai-pin as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, both Fengtien men and supporters of Chang. Little work of political importance was ac-

complished by this assembly of successful conspirators; however, this little was sufficient to mark their doom and definitely set a date for their downfall. The young Manchu Emperor, although deposed for years, is still considered by the Chinese generally with respect and retains his position in their hearts as the Son of Heaven despite all to the contrary. Immediately after the assumption of power by Huang Fu's Provisional Cabinet, a mandate was issued revoking the agreements that had been drawn up between the Chinese Republic and the Emperor at the time of the Emperors abdication. This new agreement stripped him of all the rights and privileges conferred upon him by the former agreement and forced him to leave his residence in the Forbidden City. A monthly sum was allotted for his expenses and he was declared free to go when and where he pleased. This move was a bit too radical for most of the thinking Chinese and portended a definite break between Chang Tso-lin, the Manchu, and Feng Yu-hsiang, long before Chang had ever arrived in Tientsin. On the 10th of November, the three leaders of North China, Tuan, Chang, and Feng, assembled in Tientsin with the remainder of China and the Chinese anxiously looking on to see whether it were possible for any good to come from such a conference. Early in the discussions it became apparent that Feng was to be shunted off but it was yet a bit hazy as to how this side-tracking was to be accomplished. In the meantime, little of interest was happening in Peking as all eyes were shifted toward Tientsin but nothing occurred in Tientsin to gratify this interest from the 10th until the 22nd. On the 22nd, Tuan and Feng both left for Peking, followed by Chang Tso-lin on the 24th. On the 25th, the Provisional Chief Executive, as Tuan Chi-jui now so styled himself, issued a mandate appointing an entire new Cabinet. This was the first actual indication that Feng Yu-hsiang was to have no real part in the formation of the new Government. By this mandate Feng's Cabinet was dismissed in entirety and a Cabinet, wholly Anfuite, was placed in power, which included the following:

Tang Shao-yi--Minister of Foreign Affairs: Is fairly neutral. Has had dealings with all parties. Was first Prime Minister of the Republic. He was one of the first group of Chinese Students sent to the United States, studying at Columbia University, but was recalled before graduating by the Government. Was appointed assistant in charge of the Korean Maritime Customs in 1882, one year after his return from America. After the China-Japanese War was Consul

General in Korea, at the same time being employed on the Staff of the Northern Railway Administration. Co-operated with Yuan Shih-kai in Shantung in the suppression of disturbances during the Boxer rising. Appointed Customs Taotai of Tientsin and Special Commissioner to the Tibet Convention. In 1906, he was made Director General of the Shanghai-Nanking and the Lu-han Railways. In 1907, he was appointed first Governor of Mengtien upon the re-organization of Manchuria and in 1911, appointed Minister of Communications. In 1915, he worked against Yuan Shih-kai when the latter aspired to be Emperor. For the last few years has been living in Shanghai, as the official representative of the Chinese Southern Government.

m Kung Hsin-chan--Minister of Interior: Anfu Party. Attached to Chinese Legations abroad and was Taotai in Kwangtung and Yunnan. Chief of the Salt Bureau, June 1914; concurrently being Director of the Inspectorate General, 1915. Vice-Minister, Minister of Finance, and Ex-Premier.

Li Szu-hao--Minister of Finance: Very decidedly Anfu Party. Born 1880. Chujen of the late Ching Dynasty. Secretary in the Ministryof Finance in his youth and concurrently rendered services in the Salt Administration. Vice-Minister of Finance, 1916. Minister of Finance, 1919. Director General of the Currency Reform Bureau. Director General, Salt Administration. Since the defeat of the Anfu Political Club has been in hiding.

Wu Kuang-hsing--Minister of War: Anfu Party. Brother-in-law of Tuan Chi-jui. Graduate of Japanese Military Officers Training School. Commander-in-chief of Upper Yangtze Valley. In 1920, when the Anfu-Chihli struggle arose, Wu attempted to capture Wuchang in order to enlarge the Anfu force, but was detected and arrested by General Wang Chan-yuan, and imprisoned at Wuchang. Released in August,1921, when General Wang was forced to flee to Tientsin. Amount of ransom reported to have been paid for his release was $200,000.

Lin Chien-chang--Minister of the Navy: Anfu party. No record of his former military or political activities.

Chang Shih-chao--Minister of Justice: Probably Anfu Party. No record of his former military or political activities.

Wang Chin-ling---Minister of Education: Neutral. Formerly Finance Commissioner in Yunnan.

Yang Shu-kan---Minister of Agriculture and Commerce: Possibly Kwomintang. Formerly Civil Governor of Canton.

Yeh Kung-cho---Minister of Communications: Anfuite. As much an adherent of Chang Tso-lin as of Sun Yat-sen. Formerly Vice-Minister of Communications. Is one of the few Chinese experts in Railway affairs. Born in 1880, educated at the Peking University. Upon the establishment of the Republic, he was Chief of the Railway Department in the Ministry of Communications, concurrently a member of the Finance Committee. In 1913, appointed Vice-Minister of Communications. Served as Secretary under the late President Ting Kuo-chang, then Vice-President with headquarters at Nanking. In 1917, he assisted Tuan Chi-jui in his struggle against General Chang Hsun's movement to restore the Little Emperor to the Throne, by managing transportation affairs for the Republican Army. Appointed Vice-Minister of Communications, resigning in the winter of 1918. Studied Industrial and Commercial conditions in Europe after the War. Minister of Communications Aug.1920 to May 1921. Special Commissioner for Promotion of Industries.

This Cabinet was a direct affront to Feng Yu-hsiang and it finally dawned upon him that he had best retire. This he did by withdrawing to the Western Hills and taking up his abode in a deserted temple along with the arch-conspirator, Huang Fu.

Now the time had arrived for the coming of the Savior of China, Sun Yat-sen of the Kwomintang, and, as stated under "Military", a coup d' etat was well planned but failed. Sun remained in Tientsin from December 4th until the 31st, having been in conference with no one except Chang Tso-lin and some of the local Chinese leaders such as Ex-President Li Yuan-hung. It is yet an open question whether Sun really has been ill or his delay here has been due to Chang Tso-lin's refusal to permit him to go to Peking. Chang has of course been opposing all of the radical and Bolshevistic projects of Sun and will prevent, if possible, any unity of action between Sun and the Bolshevistic elements. Sun is, however, now in Peking and Chang Tso-lin is in Tientsin ready to leave for Mukden at a moment's notice. One Brigade of Chang's troops has arrived at Suchowfu, Kiangsu, composing Lu Yung-hsiang's southern expedition. Feng Yu-hsiang, the unknown silent quantity, still holds the balance of power and is yet in retirement in the Western Hills.

## ECONOMIC GENERAL

During the past two months, due principally to the present civil war, very few, if any, new commercial and industrial enterprises have been undertaken by either Foreign or Chinese interests. The business of a majority of the prior established corporations have been brought to a complete standstill as a result of the impossibility of moving commodities. It is stated that firms which have previously been accustomed to doing a business of approximately $300.00 daily are now doing only about $100.00 weekly. Exports and imports have also fallen off. The military operations were chiefly responsible for a very widespread slump in both trade and financial activities. Domestic exchange broke down, Government bonds were far below par, and many financial houses went bankrupt. In Peking the Security Exchange was forced to close its doors resulting in untold loss to many investors. There have been also runs at different times on several banks. The Honan Provincial Bank collapsed, following the retreat of Wu Pei-fu, owing to withdrawals for military purposes.

As a direct result of the war, a coal famine has occurred, particularly along the Peking-Mukden Railway. The Kalian Mining Administration at Chinwangtao has tried to get coal trains through, but were hindered in doing so by the movement of troop trains. Efforts were also made to transport coal by boat up the Hai River, but this method proved too slow. During the month of November it became necessary to run allied coal trains, and by this method the situation has improved some. Prices per ton have raised on an average of two dollars.

The suffering among the poor caused by the floods which occurred in July and August has been increased by the civil war, as part of the military operations took place in the flooded area. An unusually dry cold has increased the suffering. The China International Famine Relief Commission estimates that no less than ten million people are affected and that something like $20,000,000 will be required to meet the emergency. Practically all sources from which relief funds might be expected have been very adversely affected by the civil war. Considering the facts of the instability of the present Central Government, the disorganization of the Railway and Telegraph facilities, the serious lack of relief funds with government granaries exhausted, and banditry and looting being more or less rife in certain provinces, it is difficult to forecast other than serious suffering to the innocent rural and

and village population of China before the worst stage is over just prior to the next harvest. It would appear that the only hope for victims of this calamity is in the China International Famine Relief Commission, a philanthropic organization, but which nevertheless has handled in the past large grants of Government Funds, particularly those where international supervision was desired. This organization is preparing a comprehensive program of relief with the conviction that funds to meet the emergency will be forthcoming.

HANYEHPING COAL and IRON CORP.

Ex-Premier Sun Pao-chi, who has been re-elected cha irman of the Board of Directors of the Hanyehping Coal and Iron Corporation, has announced that the shareholders of the corporation have passed a resolution authorizing him to raise a new loan of $8,500,000from Japanese steel and iron capitalists at six percent per annum. The proceeds of the Japanese loan will be employed for the re-organization of the coal and iron output of the Corporation sothat the fixed quantity of forty thousand tons of iron can be produced annually. The loan agreement gives preferential rights to the Japan-lenders for the purchase of the iron products of the Corporation at prices to be fixed by mutual arrangements. It is believed in commercial circles that unless the business of the Corporation be regulated according to modern methods and official corruption be erased from the administration the Hanyehping Coal and Iron mines in the Yangtze Valley will be turned over to foreign (Japanese) interests, within the next few years, as it is already heavily in debt to Japanese iron capitalists.

OFFICIAL COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVE of SOVIET RUSSIA.

Mr. T. M. Ponomarenko, official commercial representative of Soviet Russia, recently arrived in Tientsin. In outlining his plans he states that his activities while here will be strictly economic and that his purpose is the establishment of a closer trade relationship between China and Russia. He states that Russian merchant interests are much interested in the building up of a mutually profitable trade between the two countries and especially in the revival of the export of Chinese tea to Russia, and that he also believes that there are many other products of the two countries upon which a strong trade could be established. One of the first steps to be undertaken by him is the establishment of a Soviet-Chinese bank. Sufficient private capital is available in Russia for the establishment of such a bank of mixed capital, in his opinion, but he states

that, should it be found necessary, Government aid could be had. Mr. Ponomarenko, after a brief stay in Tientsin, intends to proceed to Peking and thence to Shanghai, where he expects to perfect the larger part of his plans, owing to the fact that the latter place is easily accessible by sea from Russia's principal far eastern port, Vladivostok.

PEKING'S TRAM CAR LINE.

Peking's first tram car line was put into operation December 17th. After inauguration ceremonies, as a part of which certain Company and Government officials spoke, invited guests were taken for a ride over the system and, later in the day, the general public was allowed to ride at a reduced fare. Counteracting opposition to the establishment of the line, circulars were distributed by the Company, stating the organization of the Company to be jointly Chinese and Foreign with the Government maintaining a controlling interest, and refuting the arguments that the tram cars would put the rickshaw pullers out of work and would be the cause of many accidents, by presenting figures to show that such conditions had not been brought about by the establishment of tram lines in Shanghai or in Tientsin.

TELEGRAPH and RAILWAYS.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin has given orders to the Chinese Government telegraph offices in Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang to re-establish their official connections with the Ministry of Communications. Commencing from January, 1925, the telegraph receipts will be remitted to the Chiaotungpu, as they were previous to the first Chihli-Fengtien War in 1922. Marshal Chang has also taken action with a view of securing the return of normal railway passenger and transportation conditions. Strict instructions have been issued to his army concerning the immediate release of locomotives and rolling stock not actually required for military service, and against military interference with transportation in general. A Military Transportation Headquarters, under the control of General Yu Kuo-han, has been established and a series of regulations governing the use of the railways by his forces promulgated with an aim of averting friction between Miltary and Railway Administration authorities. Gen. Yu is also a member of a committee recently organized by the Ministry of Communications with the object of expediting a return to normal railway passenger and transportation service. Strict orders have been issued to his soldiers against riding on trains without proper authority or tickets.

ATTAMAN SEMENOFF

Attaman Semenoff, the noted Russian leader, who has been practically unheard of since the defeat of his army on the Chita-Manchouli section, has again appeared before the eyes of the public, and established an office in Tientsin, announcing that he is organizing a Commercial Corporation to be known as "The Mongolia Trading Company"; that his company intends to obtain concessions in Mongolia for coal, timber, gold and silver; that the capital for the enterprise, which amounts to millions is already assured and will be increased proportionally with the growth of the business; that Japanese and Russian capitalists are backing the new company;. M. I. D. operatives from this office who have worked on the case to ascertain Mr. Semenoff's real mission in Tientsin find that it is to raise a White Russian Army for protection against the Russian Reds; that either he or his ex-Lieutenants, three in number, who are here with him have canvassed all the white male Russian residents in Tientsin with a proposition to enlist them under the command of Semenoff. Reports are also current that the Russian Reds, about 60,000 in number are mobilising at Chita and Habarovsk, Siberia-Mongolia border.

While in Tientsin, Mr. Semenoff has been closely guarded by his followers. It is interesting to note that since his departure from New York in 1922 he has been in Kobe and Nagasaki, Japan at the expense of the Japanese Government. Since arriving in Tientsin he has had two dinner engagements with the Japanese Consul General and frequent conferences with various Japanese. At present Semenoff is reported in Mukden and his plans for the future are more or less indefinite.

EX-MEMBERS of PARLIAMENT, TSAO KU N's ADMINISTRATION:

Approximately one hundred ex-Members of Parliament, Tsao Kun's administration, who were forced to leave Peking on account of the prosecution started for their having elected Tsao Kun to Presidency through bribery are now in Tientsin, establishing their quarters in the Japanese and French Concessions, and are attempting to stir up political trouble

in the present situation; The principal object of which is to create a discord between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Tuan Chi-jui.

MISSIONARY WORKERS of NORTH CHINA.

At a recent conference of the Missionary workers of North China, [illegible] announced that they did not need or desire any protection from their home Government; that it was their earnest desire that no form of military pressure, especially no foreign military force be exerted to protect them or their property, and that in the event of their capture by lawless persons or their death at their hands, no money be paid for their release, no punitive expeditions be sent out nor no indemnity extracted. Their action in announcing the above has caused considerable press comment by foreign newspapers. An editorial in a foreign (British) daily newspaper stated that it was surprising to find this number of American Missionaries who regard themselves as free to ignore the policy and instructions of their Government in time of emergency; that by so doing they might conceivably cause the loss of many lives, apart from their own; that to repudiate the protection of their National Authorities in advance, is, it seems, an incitement to lawlessness, and that the Stars and Stripes, and the Union Jack would cease to have any significance if Chinese militarists and bandits once got the idea that they could be ignored with impunity. The editorial further stated that foreign military force is seldom employed to secure the release of, or extract indemnities for outrages upon missionaries, but the knowledge that it may be used or that strong diplomatic pressure migh be applied, unquestionably serves to check lawless acts against foreigners in the interior, and to stir up the Chinese Government at Peking to make some efforts to assure them of the protection to which they are entitled by the Treaties. Also that in scores of instances this knowledge has enabled missionaries in localities where disorders prevail to protect from death and personal injury, numbers of innocent Chinese refugees.

Co-operation with local Civil authorities and foreign troop commanders is maintained.

LOCAL (Cont'd)

Attitude of Chinese and other foreigners toward Americans is friendly.

The morale of the command is "Excellent".

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

# SITUATION SURVEY

## FOR THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1ST to JANUARY 10TH, 1925.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,

HEADQUARTERS, U.S.ARMY FORCES IN CHINA.

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xx

# I N D E X

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## MILITARY

The chief item of military importance during this period is the advance of General Chang Tsung-chang's Fengtien Brigade south over the Tsin-Pu into Kiangsu. Lu Yung-hsiang accompanied the troops into the Province of Kiangsu but has not yet moved to Nanking. Chang Tsung-chang's troops entered Nanking in good order while the Kiangsu 6th Division withdrew to Chinkiang. There are no reports of Fengtien troops moving south of Nanking toward Shanghai. Previous to the arrival of the Fengtien forces Marshal Chi Hsueh-yuan had gone to Shanghai and it was predicted by many observers that a peaceful solution of the troubled Yangtze situation was in view. Chi, however, is not the type of leader to accept defeat without at least a show of force. It was surprising to some that he even left Nanking without offering opposition but the situation seems to have been one in which most of his subordinates would be opposing him, hence, in true Chinese style, he retired to await a more opportune time to impress his views upon his enemies. Sun Chuang-fang in Chekiang is still openly a friend of Chi's and it is entirely possible that Chi and Sun may unite in a sort of coalition to prevent the advance of Lu Yung-hsiang and the Manchurian troops south of Nanking. This is not a new surmise, for it works in with a plan reported in formation several weeks ago. Lu Yung-hsiang was one of the unwelcome friends of Chang Tso-lin who must be given something. Lu, along with Chang Tsung-chang has been insisting that this southern expedition be pushed forward with force. Chang Tso-lin, being more far-sighted, was loathe to divide up his forces and open his flank to an attack from his unfriendly ally, Feng Yu-hsiang. Sufficient force was brought to bear, however, by Chang's subordinates, who also wished to get some reward out of this victorious advance, and Lu was sent along with his Fengtien support. The rumor from Feng Yu-hsiang's headquarters was to the effect that this force would move down the Tsin-Pu unopposed but would be stopped before entering Shanghai. At this point, Chang Tso-lin having gone back to Mukden with most of his troops, Feng Yu-hsiang would send two brigades to Tientsin and Lu Yung-hsiang with Chang Tsung-chang's Manchurian troops would be eliminated between Chi's forces on the south and Feng's on the north. Chang Tso-lin would of course be in Mukden safe and secure but with no idea of coming south for the time being and Feng Yu-hsiang, the [illegible]'s traitor, would be the one powerful figure remaining,

supported in his activities by Sun Yat-sen, Hu Ching-yi and Sun Yush in the north, while Chi Hsieh-yuan and Sun Chuan-fang in the south would give him nominal support so long as he did not materially interfere with their domains. So rumor has it and it is surprising how frequently the rumor is true and the apparente fact false in China.

Chang Tso-lin's train has been on the main line ready to move, with steam up, for several days and it appears that this much of the rumor will carry through. If Chang does go back to Mukden he leaves Tuan Chi-jui without military protection and at the mercy of Feng Yu-hsiang, if Feng should desire to exert himself. Tuan could therefore be easily chucked into the discard without much loss for even his anticipated Conference of Leaders is now daily losing supporters and his reason for being is becoming of less importance.

Marshal Wu Pei-fu is reported to be at Shishan in Hupeh with his family and about five hundred troops. His position at present, however, is far from that of an active participant, but whether he, like Feng Yu-hsiang, is merely biding his time, remains to be seen. Marshal Hsiao Yao-nan is busily engaged in preparation for the anticipated advance of Hu Ching-yi from Honan south along the Kin-Han line. Efforts have been made by Tuan Chi-jui to hold Hu's troops in Honan but it appears that more force may be necessary to accomplish this than a mere command from Tuan.

KIANGSI:

Tupan Fang Peng-jen of Kiangsi is reported to have gained a decisive victory ofer General Tan Yen-kai at Kanchow in southern Kiangsi. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is nominally Tan Yen-kai's chief, had instructed Tan to stop his advance northward but apparently little regard was paid to Sun's orders. However, Tan's force of about 3000 in all is now in betreat across the border into Kwangtung where they may be met by Chen Chiung-ming's troops who are actively opposing the Kwomintang since Sun's departure for Peking.

So in every quarter China is torn by military disruptions, with a few more wars than usual under way and many more anticipated. Szechuan, perhaps, is the only area ordinarily war ridden that appears free, for the time being, from military operations.

## POLITICAL

Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived in Peking from Tientsin on the 31st of December and although there was a certain amount of celebration, the enthusiasm which had been planned for December 5th was a bit stale when by force of circumstances it had to be delivered almost a month later. Perhaps this opportunity would not have been given Peking's Bolshevick student body at all if Marshal Chang had not felt that conditions were getting beyond his control and he himself would be soon retreating to his haven in Manchuria. Sun's arrival, however, failed to produce any very unusual effect but perhaps this was mostly due to the indisposition of the leader, for it now appears that Sun is really ill. He has quarters in the Peking Grand Hotel and is under the care of a German physician. No statement of importance has been forthcoming from his headquarters other than one justifying Feng Yu-hsiang's action in regard to the deposed Emperor.

Chief Executive Tuan Chi-jui has been having great difficulty in collecting together the Cabinet he appointed some weeks ago. Mr. Tang Shao-yi, Tuan's appointee for Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is considered to be the ablest man in the present Cabinet, has refused to leave his home in Shanghai and it is reported that Dr. W. W. Yen of Tsao Kun's old Cabinet will be given the portfolio for the time being.

Whether the feeling is unwarranted or not, in certain sections of China many observers feel that a strong anti-foreign movement is brewing. The following Reuters Report gives a fair summary of the situation, particularly in Central China:

> " 'The North China Daily News' gives prominence to an article stating that it is impossible to ignore the fact that a serious wave of anti-foreign and anti-christian feeling is sweeping across China. Unless this fact is faced frankly grave results may ensue. Four years ago foreigners in the interior noted the growth of anti-foreign feeling and at intervals since, from many different places, the same feeling has been reported with growing emphasis. The article instances student strikes at Hunan, which took a bitterly anti-Christian turn, bibles being torn up and scattered over the grounds. It

states that symptoms closely resembling those of the Boxer year are reported from Shantung. The writer attributes the causes to the failure of the present rulers, who are attempting to deflect the popular wrath from themselves to the foreigners, also to the large growth of Christianity recently and the Boshevist poison.

" 'The North China Daily News', in an editorial on the subject says that many men not given to exaggeration express the opinion that an explosion is inevitable shortly. The present propaganda appears to us to be part of a widespread movement working for general repudiation of the treaties. The paper asks what the Diplomatic Body is doing. Will the storm take them as completely by surprise as that of 1900 ? The question is insistent because lootings, train robberies and treaty violations have shown whither the spirit of political China is tending."

## ECONOMIC

### RAILWAYS and the MILITARY

It is reported that on January 8, the special traffic committee of the Ministry of Communications held a meeting, in which officials of the Peking-Mukden, Peking-Hankow, and other railways were invited to participate. It was brought out that the Fengtien Military authorities had returned to the Peking-Mukden railway thirty locomotives and that the transportation facilities are now much better. As to the other lines, there is still a shortage of locomotives and rolling stock, conditions on the Peking-Hankow line being the worst. Of the 230 locomotives owned by this Company there are now only about 50 being used by the Company; the large majority are being held by military officers. It is believed that a very serious depreciation is occurring in the engines so held by the military, due to mechanical neglect and abuse, and that, if they are not soon restored to the Ministry of Communications, very few of them will

be serviceable.

COAL SHORTAGE IN PEKING

According to reports, it seems that Peking is threatened with a serious coal famine. On January 10th, it was estimated that there was only a scant 9 days' supply of coal on hand. It is predicted that the coldest period of the year, from Jan. 20th through the first week of February, will find the city hopelessly short of coal and that a great deal of discomfort and suffering will be caused the foreigners there and many deaths from cold among the Chinese in the Native City.

CHANG TSO-LIN'S COLONIZATION PLAN

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, having been appointed Commissioner for Reclamation of Lands and Colonization in the Northeastern Territory, has established something similar to an immigration bureau at Hopei, Native City, Tientsin. It is his plan to secure as many destitute people in Tientsin as possible for colonization of the Eastern Provinces. They are to be taken to the frontier of the Northeastern Territory and supplied with maintainance and occupation. Their families may either accompany them or be left behind, in which latter case care is to be taken of them by the bureau. It is reported that Marshal Chang has set aside $1,000,000 for the carrying out of this plan.

Co-operation with local Civil authorities and foreign troop commanders is maintained.

The attitude of Chinese and other foreigners toward Americans is friendly.

The morale of the command is "Excellent".

Walter C. Phillips

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

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"S" North China Star ( American) "T" Peking-Tientsin Times, (British) "FT" Far Eastern Times (Russian-Japan-Chinese)

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## General [illegible] Promised To Take The Field At Once Against Red Troops Of Canton

Chung Mei

Peking, Dec. 31.—A foreign telegram from Swatow states that General Chen Chiung-ming resumed office as commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung Army on the 27th.

At that time General Chen promised to take to the field at once against the red troops in Canton. To that end the merchants of Canton are said to have offered General Chen strong financial backing. He has also given out the report that the local Swatow people raised $400,000 for his expedition.

While General Chen is about to set off for Canton, the Kwangtung Expeditionary Forces under General Tan Yen-kai continues its advance into Kiangsi province. Reports on the success of the latter, however, greatly depending upon [illegible] that are issued by the Kwangtung headquarters or are contained in telegrams from Tupan Fang of Kiangsi to the Provisional Government in Peking.

Asiatic [illegible]

Peking, Dec. 12.—Foreign telegrams from the Yangtze Valley are rather disquieting. Marshal Wu Pei-fu, who is reported to be in poor health, was still at Chikungshan yesterday. On the Peking-Hankow Railway line between Chengchow and Suchow there are said to be about 40,000 troops whose position constitutes a serious problem. Several towns are reported to have been looted by them recently.

Troops from the North have now arrived at Chengchow and Kaifeng and Generals Hu Ching-yi and Kan Yu-kun have made a temporary working agreement. Hankow is threatened with a coal shortage and local sentiment there is in favour of peace at any price. The Military Governor is reported to have offered Marshal Wu $100,000 to go abroad, but Wu shows no inclination to leave the country.

[illegible]

The [illegible] issued last night appointing General Lu Yung-hsiang Pacification Commissioner [illegible] and Anhwei and directing [illegible] have been widely discussed in Peking to-day. Chinese officials do not believe that Chi will [illegible] but it is admitted that an [illegible] there might arise if General Lu's [illegible] were faced with a [illegible] owing to the [illegible] General [illegible] The belief is [illegible] that [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] of General Lu [illegible] expedition against Marshal Chi is said to have been accompanied with the offer of [illegible] troops already assembled at Machang. This creates a new army, which was [illegible] for the purpose in view of Marshal Chang's cancellation of his punitive expedition.

General Lu left Peking last night. General Chang Tsung-chang, who is to be in charge of General Lu's advance guard, is reported to have reached Tehchow.

**Meanwhile the Chief Secretary of the Chief Executive's office has telegraphed to Marshal Chi urging him to retire quietly and promising him personal safety if he does so.**

## [illegible] ADVANCE TO NANKING.

### FENGTIEN TROOPS ALSO TO VISIT SHANGHAI.

### WONDERFUL PRESS CAMPAIGN.

Peking, Dec. 15.

The effect which the resignation of Marshal Chi will have on the movement of Fengtien troops toward Nanking is being awaited in Peking. Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, whom the Provisional Government appointed as Tupan of Kiangsu, has a large number of Fengtien soldiers under him and a foreign despatch to-day reports them to be no further south than Pao To, on the Chihli Shantung border.

The transportation of these troops, however, will go on, according to the Chinese press, to carry out the policy of the government in bringing the entire Yangtze Valley within its power. The Chinese version has it that Marshal Lu will take four divisions and two Mixed Brigades of Mukden troops south with him. These units will be distributed, one mixed brigade at Hsuchow, the other along the railway, and the four divisions at Pengpu, Hoshan, Huaiming, Hochiu and Nanking, and perhaps as far south as Sungkiang and Shanghai.

Such a distribution is said to be part of the campaign in which the Fengtien units will cooperate with the Shensi troops of General Hu Ching-yi and Kan Yu-kun against Marshal Wu's remnants at Lunan and Hsingyangchow. The forces which would be sent to Shanghai and Sungkiang would participate in a joint movement with General Chow Ying-jen of Fukien in driving Governor Sun Chuan-fang out of Chekiang, the post which was his spoil out of the Chekiang Kiangsu war.

Leaving out no details of this paper campaign, the Chinese press adds that Marshal Lu would have his headquarters in Shanghai, while the funds for the new war would be dug up by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the Minister of Communications [illegible]

## STILL SITTING TIGHT.

### FENG REMAINS IN THE WESTERN HILLS.

Peking, Jan. 8.

Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang is not in Peking and has not been despite reports circulated, according to a statement of the office of the Garrison Commander, General Liu Chung-i. He is still in the Western Hills.

A resignation petition has been drafted by Marshal Feng asking to be relieved of his office as Tupan of the Northwest Frontier and has been held up for the reason that Marshal Tuan [illegible] has sent repeated representatives to the Western Hills urging him to take up office.

However, it is expected that the petition will be submitted within a few days when it is felt that Marshal Tuan will not be embarrassed thereby.—*Chung Mei.*

## THE KUOMINTANG ARMY

### ADVANCE TO HUPEH.

The [illegible] the Kuomintang [illegible] of [illegible] from [illegible] his troops have also been driven back.

Owing to the defeat of General Tan Yen-kai in Kiangsi, the message to Hupeh has now been removed, especially since the Kuomintang [illegible] under the command of General Liu Tsung-yu and General Tsai Chu-wu have also been badly handled by the Hupehese under General Chao Hen-ti. Furthermore, it is reported that General Yang Hsi-min, commander-in-chief of the Yunnan troops in Canton, who are regarded as the best fighting men under Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has refused the invitation of General Tang Chi-yao and General Hsiung Keh-wu of Yunnan and Szechuan to invade the Central Yangtze valley either through Kiangsi or Hunan so that General Tan's defeat may give temporary peace to the Yangtze provinces.—*A.N.A.*

Peking, Jan. 8.

General Hsiao Yao-nan of Hupeh has wired to the Government complaining that in spite of the orders of the Chief Executive, General Hu Ching-yi has reorganized the troops under General Fan Chung-hsiu, one of the Kuomintang commanders who recently returned to Honan *via* Kiangsi and Hupeh, into one full division and sent the troops to the Hupeh-Honan borders.

General Hu has taken over 20 battalions of the old Yichun troops from General Mi Chen-piao for reorganization. Furthermore, General Hsiao complains of the concentration of Hu's troops in the vicinity of Wushengkuan evidently for an invasion of Hupeh territory. Simultaneously, General Hsiao has strengthened his garrison at Wushengkuan against any possible advance by General Hu's troops.—*A.N.A.*

## [illegible] Complains Of Concentration Of Troops

[illegible] 8.—General Hsiao [illegible] Hupeh has wired [illegible] the matters of the [illegible] Executive, General Hu [illegible] has reorganized the [illegible] under General Fan Chung-hsiu, one of the Kuomintang commanders who recently returned to Honan *via* Kiangsi and Hupeh, into one full division and sent the troops to the Hupeh-Honan borders. General Hu has taken over twenty battalions of the old Yichun troops from General Mi Chen-piao for reorganization. Furthermore, General Hsiao complains about the concentration of Hu's troops in the vicinity of Wushengkuan evidently for an invasion of Hupeh territory. On account of this, the [illegible] of the people are greatly [illegible] and business is at a standstill in Hankow and Wuchang at the moment.

In conclusion, General Hsiao adds that as it is his duty to preserve peace and order within his province, he will resort to armed resistance against any body who invades his territory under whatever pretexts. Simultaneously General Hsiao has strengthened his garrison at Wushengkuan against any possible advance by General Hu's troops.

### Explains Hu's Presence

Asiatic News

Peking, Jan. 8.—Regarding the entry of Marshal Wu Pei-fu into Hupeh, General Hsiao says that he is extending protection to the ex-war lord of Loyang in his capacity as a faithful colleague and friend and that Marshal Wu has given his word of honor that while in Hupeh territory, he will not indulge in political movements. It is reported that Marshal Wu was forced to leave Chikungshan for Hupeh because General Fan Chung-hsiu was trying to surround the hills and capture him after his return to Honan from Kuangtung last month.

It is thus feared that under the pretext of following Marshal Wu, General Hu Ching-yi may invade Hupeh territory after the concentration of his troops in the vicinity of Wushengkuan has been completed General Hsiao, the Chihli leader, is feeling uneasy about the safety of his own position at Wuchang and he asks the Chief Executive to stop Hu's army preparations.

### Lu Arrives At Pukow

Asiatic News

Peking, Jan. 8.—Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang reports his safe arrival at Pukow in company with General Chang Tsung-chang and one brigade of Fengtien troops as bodygards and that they are proceeding to Nanking on the morning of the eighth instant. The Kiangsu troops evacuated Nanking in face of the Fengtien troops so that Nanking is peaceful. The mandate appointing Marshal Lu Tupan of Kiangsu will be issued after his safe establishment in the southern capital and Mr. Han Kuc-chun will remain as civil governor at Nanking.

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# Dr. Sun Yat-sen Arrives In Peking Today

## Will Stay At Hotel De Pekin Till Jan. 8.—Kwomintang Headquarters At Dr. Koo's House

Dr. Sun Yat-sen

## Fengtien Army Enters Shanhaikwan In Good Order

Marshal Chang Tso-lin Says He Is Glad—Kiangsu troops withdrawing to Nanking

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## ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING.

STUDENTS' DEMONSTRATION AGAINST CHRISTIANITY.

BIBLES DESTROYED AND TRAMPLED ABOUT.

BOXER YEAR SYMPTOMS.

Shanghai, Jan. 7.

The *North China Daily News* gives prominence to an article stating that it is impossible to ignore the fact that a serious wave of anti-foreign and anti-Christian feeling is sweeping across China. Unless this fact is faced frankly grave results may ensure. Four years ago foreigners in the interior noted the growth of anti-foreign feeling and at intervals since, from many different places, the same feeling has been reported with growing emphasis. The article instances student strikes at Hunan, which took a bitterly anti-Christian turn, Bibles being torn up and scattered over the school grounds. It states that symptoms closely resembling those of the Boxer year are reported from Shantung. The writer attributes the causes to the failure of the present rulers, who are attempting to deflect the popular wrath from themselves to the large growth of Christianity recently and the Bolshevist poison.

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## MANCHU

THE ...ENT.

...EXCUSE.

...FEELING

Peking, Jan. 9.

A letter addressed to Dr. Sun by members of the Ching Household in ... Wu Fu, ... the Regent, ... to the Manchu ... still valid thus ... the ... made by the ... Presidency." (sic).

"Unfortunately, on November 5 last year, there occurred an unexpected incident and, the Emperor was ... the palace in ... and the Agreement annulled. At that time, you were far away in Kwangtung and no pleading could be presented to you.

"It should be related that the Agreement was the foundation of the birth of the Republican Government which should be followed by both sides forever. As the authority who altered the agreement was not the original authority that signed it, perhaps, there might be misunderstandings. Fortunately, you are here in Peking again and we beg to take the opportunity to you to maintain the faith of the founder of the Chinese Republic and let the Agreement stand as valid as ever.

Signed by Pao-hsi, Shao-ying, Jung-yuan and Chi-Ling.

The answer sent by the Secretary of Dr. Sun reads: concerning th amendment of the Favourable Treatment Agreement and the Emperor's forced removal, they were made known to Dr. Sun, and according to his opinion, agreement and terms must be kept by both sides either basing on law or on custom. In case there be one side who breaks it, then it would be unfair to ask the other side to keep it. At the beginning of the Republic, the Agreement was concluded to repay the kindness of the former Manchu Emperor, but among the terms, there were those dealing with the prohibition of the use of the former Imperial ceremony and other ... so as to clear away the old thoughts and feelings of the people.

"Thus the Emperor was required to stay in the Palace for the time being and afterwards, he and his family were to be removed to the Summer Palace. The Emperor was to use the calendar of the Republican Government while other articles restricted the conferring of titles and posts. These not only maintained the safety of the Republican government but also exposed the true feeling of the Emperor.

"Unfortunately since the establishment of the Republic, during the thirteen years, the Ching Household has never kept its promise of removing out of the Imperial Palace. The documents and deeds were all marked with the years of Hsuan Tung and the giving of titles and portfolios has never been stopped. This shows that the Ching Household violated the terms.

In the 6th year of the Republic, there was the restoration which really violated all the terms of the Agreement and from then the Agreement should have been made invalid. For these reasons there will be no question about the efficacy of the Agreement. It is only hoped that all of you, gentlemen of the Ching household, will try to follow the tide and to be perfect Chinese citizens.

As to Mr. Pu Yi, he is being equipped with a solid basis of learning and if he can use the best of his time and energy, he will be unlimited in his future. I trust that you will present these poor and humble opinions to him.

"The above is the opinion of Dr. Sun, and is based on his instructions, we beg to inform you thereof: signed, Secretary's Office."—*Chung Mei.*

## CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN.

### INVITATION TO EX-PRESIDENT LI YUAN-HUNG.

Peking, Jan. 9.

The Chief Executive has wired to General Li Yuan-hung at Tientsin inviting the ex-President to accept the Chairmanship of the coming reorganisation conference in Peking which will be held some day in February.

Mr. Hsiao, a native of Hupeh and an intimate adherent of General Li left for Tientsin this morning on behalf of Marshal Tuan to invite the ex-President to come up to the metropolis as soon as possible.—*A.N.A.*

LYING STATEMENTS SO
PEKING.

PERIL TO REGIMES.

Peking, Jan.

The large amount of
stock taken by General Li
shan to transport his troops to Sui
yuan has given a fresh setback to
the efforts of the Ministry of Com
munications to restore traffic. Gen
eral Hsu Chung-yi seems to be
mainly responsible for the
Railway. General
several days
urging him
as the
ing that he
possible.

istry of Com
few of them will
be serviceable.

In reply to representations from
the Ministry of Communications,
the Peking-Suiyuan Railway Ad
ministration says that Marshal
Feng Yu-hsiang suggests station
ing a few military officers between
Peking and Paotschen to arrange
and supervise military transporta
tion on that line.—*Reuter.*

Unofficial military reports from
from Honan with the result that
Wu Sheng Kuan is being heavily
[illegible] Meanwhile the Ge
[illegible] to the
[illegible] the defence
[illegible] Field
[illegible] Wu Sheng
[illegible] through the
[illegible] closely supported by
[illegible] *Chung Mei.*

Peking, Jan. 10.

[illegible] appearance of a man-
[illegible] Hsiao Yao-nan as
Minister of Military Affairs of Ho-
peh, which is expected within a
few days, is said that another
[illegible] will support Kiang Tso-
pin as Civil Governor of that pro-
vince.

Chinese reports also insist that
the Government has decided on the
appointment of General Sun Yueh
as head of Bandit Extirpation of
Chihli, Honan and Shansi.—
*Chung Mei.*

Peking, Jan. 10.

It was reported recently that
the Government intended to ap-
point Mr. Chang Wen-chan for-
merly Minister [illegible]
will be made Civil Governor of
Hupeh. As soon as Marshal Hsiao
is appointed Tupan of Military
Affairs.

The latest report regarding Gen-
eral Sun Yueh is that he may be
appointed Civil Governor of
Shansi.—*Reuter.*

Peking, Jan. 11.

Three mandates were issued last
night with reference to the future
control of Hupeh. The first abo-
lishes the post of Tuchun of Hupeh
(held by Marshal Hsiao Yao-nan).
The second appoints Marshal Hsiao
Tupan of Military Affairs and Re-
habilitation in Hupeh. The third
appoints Marshal Hsiao Acting
Civil Governor of Hupeh.

This action on the part of the
Government is expected to go a
long way towards settling the situa-
tion in the middle Yangtze Valley.
—*Reuter.*

It doesn't require plenty of
men to give the order to load the
trucks and drive the engine and
pull the coal. It only requires
one. Puzzle: find the one.

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## Chang Tso-lin States Immigration Aims

Something similar to an immigration scheme which has been advocated by General Chang Tso-lin as a means of relieving the distress of the Province, is to be undertaken by the Provincial Government to enable the poor people here in Tientsin as possible and transfer them to the Eastern Provinces for the purpose of colonization.

The poor people will be taken to the outskirts of the Northeastern Territory and supplied with resources and provisions for settling of the colonies may either accompany them or be left behind in the latter case, they will be taken care of by the Government. It is reported that Marshal Chang has set aside $1,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out this scheme.

## ONLY 50 LOCOMOTIVES!

### RESULT OF MILITARY CONTROL OF KINHAN LINE.

Peking, Jan. 10.

According to reliable information, the special traffic committee of the Chinese Government held another meeting on Thursday, in which locomotive superintendents of the Peking-Mukden, Peking-Hankow and other railways were invited to participate. It was reported in the meeting that up to the 7th instant, the Fengtien Military Authorities have returned to the Ching-Feng railway thirty locomotives in all and that the situation of transportation facilities on the Peking-Mukden line are much better now. As to the other lines, there is still a general shortage of locomotives. The conditions on the Peking-Hankow line are the worst of all. Of all the 230 locomotives possessed by that railway, only 50 are now in free use, the rest mostly being detained by the military officers. At Chengchow station alone, over 50 engines are detained there now by order of General Hu Ching-yi. However special representatives have been sent down by the Peking-Hankow Railway Administration to interview General Hu and the various military commanders on the way in the hope that, for the sake of commercial transportation, they will release the engines.—*A. N. E.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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CONFIDENTIAL

SITUATION SURVEY

OCTOBER 25TH 1925 to JANUARY 1st 1926.

CIVIL WAR IN NORTH CHINA.

Between:

FENG YU-HSIANG- LI CHING-LIN

and

CHANG TSO-LIN - KUO SUNG-LIN.

MILITARY SITUATION.

MILITARY:


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## MILITARY:

### THE 1925 WAR IN NORTH CHINA:

During the period from October 15th to about December 26th, North China was involved in almost constant fighting which was of a much more serious nature than any Chinese Inter-Provincial war heretofore. There have been three distinct campaigns during this time and although more or less connected they were so separated as to locality that it is believed a better understanding of the whole can be obtained by the discussion of each under separate paragraphs. The campaign will be considered in sequence of occurrence under the following headings: (1) Sun Chuan-fang - Chang Tsung-chang War in Kiangsu Province; (2) Feng Yu-hsiang - Li Ching-lin War in Chihli Province; (3) Chang Tso-lin - Kuo Sung-lin War in Manchuria. The chief contending forces were: (1) The Chekiang force, nominally under the Yangtze Alliance; (2) the Fengtien Forces under Chang Tso-lin; (3) the Kuominchun Forces under Feng Yu-hsiang; and (4) the revolting Fengtien forces under Kuo Sung-lin.

### SUN CHUAN-FANG ---- CHANG-TSUNG-CHANG WAR IN KAINGSU:

The events leading up to the beginning of the withdrawal of the Fengtien forces from Shanghai have been discussed in Situation Surveys # 110 and 111 and will only be referred to very briefly in this report. General Sun Chuan-fang, an old Wu Pei-fu adherent, had been Tupan of Chekiang Province since the elimination of Lu Yung-hsiang in 1924. His policies were rather well received by the Chekiang populace up to the summer of 1925, when more or less friction arose between Sun and the Civil Governor Hsia Chao. The Governor had instituted a propaganda campaign under the heading of "Chekiang for the Chekiangese", mainly for the purpose of arousing public opinion against Sun Chuan-fang, who is a Shantung man, Hsiao Chao being a native of Chekiang. After a time opinion became so strong against Sun Chuan-fang that some sort of a move became necessary and as Kiangsu Province to the north was garrisoned with comparatively few Fengtien troops, Sun mobilized his entire force just south of the Kiangsu border. The Fengtien forces had not been well received by the Kiangsu people in Shanghai and Nanking and it was also reported that there was some enmity existing between the native Kiangsu Provincial troops and members of the Fengtien units. The Fengtien authorities had also announced for some weeks past that they wished to withdraw their troops from Kiangsu just as soon as a stable government could be established.

On October 15th, the first Fengtien units started their withdrawal from Shanghai and Sun Chuang-fang immediately moved north and took possession of the Shanghai district without opposition. No actual hostilities occurred between these forces until some of the Chekiang units arrived in the vicinity of Nanking, where the Fengtien 8th Division was encountered and some elements of this division were captured and disarmed. By this time the Kiangsu Native Troops were turning against the Fengtien troops and a rapid withdrawal was made northward over the Tientsin-Pukow to Suchowfu in northern Kiangsu. Suchowfu is at the junction of the Lung-Hai railway, running east and west through Honan, and the Tientsin-Pukow running north and south. When the Fengtien troops moved northward they took all the available rolling stock on the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow with them, hence when Sun Chuan-fang arrived at Nanking his advance was indefinitely halted as far as rail transportation northward was concerned. A certain amount of reorganization of the Native Kiangsu troops was necessary and increased efforts were made for the assistance of the 2nd Kuominchun, under Yueh Wei-tsun in a general attack on the Fengtien forces, now with headquarters at Suchowfu. This latter phase of the campaign did not develope very satisfactorily as General Yueh seemed content to await the result of anticipated large movements. The few troops under the Fengtien Tupan of Anhwei, General Chiang Teng-hsuang, had also been withdrawn to Suchowfu, and Chang Tsung-chang, Fengtien Tupan of Shantung, had sent reinforcements south to Suchowfu. Fengtien troops were dispatched east over the Lung-Hai railway to Haichow and defeated with little difficulty the Native Kiangsu Troops at this port, leaving the Fengtien troops in entire control of Northern Kiangsu.

General Sun Chuan-fang's advance now became very slow and many predicted that since he had taken Nanking he would not move farther northward. Chang Tsung-chang had recently dispatched his Russian armored train south of Suchowfu as far as Pengpu and no opposition had been encountered, however, on the second trip down they were met in strength at Pengpu by units of Sun Chuan-fang and the troops aboard were practically all killed. This was the first indication that Sun Chuan-fang actually intended to drive out the Mukden forces in Northern Kiangsu.

The chief Fengtien units for the defense of Suchowfu were from Shantung under the command of Chang Tsung-chang and the bulk of these, although nominally under Chang, were native Shantung units which had formerly been under Wu Pei-fu. Chang Tsung-chang's administration in Shantung had been very galling to all the inhabitants as his system of taxation was the most severe they had yet been forced to endure. Therefore, realizing that Sun Chuan-fang, a Wu Pei-fu follower and Shantung man,

was moving against them, on November 8th and 9th, the old 5th Wu Pei-fu Division and the 47th Mixed Brigade turned against their Mukden Commander and Suchowfu was won for Sun Chuan-fang. The Fengtien troops at Haichow were cut off and were forced to go by boat to Tsingtao.

There had been some assistance given by Yueh Wei-tsun and his Honan troops in this fight and Sun Chuan-fang insisted that they push forward into Shantung. It is also reported that Wu Pei-fu also sent ammunition and financial support to Yueh to further induce him to carry out that mission, but no further serious fighting occurred on this front. Chang Tsung-chang withdrew to Tsinanfu, holding Taianfu in force, and the 2nd Kuominchun occupied southwestern Shantung as far as Yenchowfu.

This campaign was thus brought to a close as Sun Chuan-fang stated that he would not advance into Shantung and Yueh Wei-tsun's forces were no match for any organized troops such as Chang Tsung-chang still possessed. At the outset it was believed by many observers that Sun's advance was the first move in a general Yangtze Alliance advance northward, but this is not believed to be correct. Even considering that Wu Pei-fu desired to make a general advance and that Sun was a Wu Pei-fu follower, it is believed that the circumstances stated at the beginning of this discussion were solely responsible for Sun Chuan-fang's actions and it was not through any sense of loyalty to Wu Pei-fu or the inauguration of a general Allied advance that prompted Sun to move into Kiangsu. To date the situation in this section is little changed from that on November 15th. There is no more evidence of the return of Wu Pei-fu than on that date and some reports now indicate that there may be a serious break between Sun and Wu. Sun is very well satisfied with his present position and desires no more conquests regardless as to whether Wu Pei-fu, his chief has attained his personal ambitions or not.

FENG YU- HSIANG - LI CHING-LIN WAR IN CHIHLI PROVINCE:

By the later part of October 1925, it was apparent to most military observers in North China, that hostilities were brewing. Chang Tso-lin's Fengtien troops began moving by rail through Tientsin over the Peking-Mukden toward Peking and south over the Tientsin-Pukow to Machang. The predictions generally at this time were that Chang had at last decided

to attack Feng Yu-hsiang and his Kuominchun forces and that the outcome would undoubtedly be favorable to Chang Tso-lin. The Mukden forces were considered to be the best equipped, best drilled and best organized body of troops that had ever been assembled in China and even conceding that Feng's forces had been recently re-equipped with vast supplies of Soviet war material from Urga, it was the opinion that Feng had little or no chance of victory.

Chang Tso-lin's concentration between Peking and Tientsin, and Machang and Tientsin continued unabated from about October23rd to November 14th. It will be noted that few if any reinforcements were sent to Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung and the entire Mukden concentration appeared to be restricted to the general vicinity of Tientsin. The Young General, "Chang Hsueh-liang" had arrived in Tientsin from Mukden on the 12th, and it was reported after his conference with Li Ching-lin that Li announced he would resign in preference to waging an aggressive campaign against Feng Yu-hsiang. The news of Chang Tsung-chang's defeat at Suchowfu two days before was now also having its effect on the morale of the Fengtien commanders and troops around Tientsin. However, it was generally considered by observers at this time that Chang-Tso-lin was still in a very favorable position to attack Feng Yu-hsiang and the outcome of the Suchowfu fight was of minor significance compared to the Major campaign which now appeared imminent. To the surprise of most foreigners Chang Tso-lin on the 13th began a withdrawal of his troops from the Tientsin vicinity. At this time the Fengtien troops numbered approximately 100,000 in and around Tientsin and no hostilities whatever had occurred north of Wenchowfu in southern Shantung. Feng Yu-hsiang's troops had not moved east of Peking and only a very few additional Kuominchun troops had come to reinforce ~~xxx~~ Feng's Peking garrison. The Mukden troops were marched overland from southern Chihli and Paoting-fu and heavy troop trains were daily dispatched northward from Tientsin. The 2nd Kuominchun from Honan moved up to Taming and Paotingfu close on the heels of the withdrawing Fengtien troops and some minor fighting occurred along the Peking-Hankow railway between these two forces, but the Fengtien retreat was not halted. As was intimated above, this precipitous retreat of Chang Tso-lin's army was unprecedented and unexplainable at this time, for from a military viewpoint his position was very strong and no reason could be assigned which could justify this move, considering that his troops in the Tientsin area had encountered no opposition from any direction. Young General Chang Hsueh-liang returned north on November 20th. The same heavy movements of troops continued northward with everyone expecting that Tientsin would be completely evacuated by the Fengtien troops in this unusual stampede. On the 22nd over 8000 troops passed through Tientsin by rail for Shanhaikuan, and large columns crossed the Hai Ho near Tangku and continued their march overland.

On November 24th, at about 5:00 PM detachments from Li Ching-lin's own troops, of about 120 each took over Tientsin Central and Tientsin East Stations. It was reported through the Japanese Consulate that the Peking-Mukden railway had been cut at Changli and that General Kuo Sung-lin, commanding the Fengtien 4th Army had revolted at Lanhsien and was moving against Chang Tso-lin in Mukden. This incident will be discussed under the third campaign in subsequent paragraphs.

The 24th was the last day of any Fengtien troop movement to the north over the railway. Rumor at first connected Li Ching-lin with Kuo in the revolt, but statements were soon forthcoming from Li's headquarters which made it plain that he with his forces would remain neutral in this most recent unexpected development. Troop movements by train in any direction through Tientsin had now stopped although Li was distributing his forces east to Chun Liang-cheng, south to Machang and north to Yangtsun and Peitsang. Feng Yu-hsiang had not moved any troops east to Peking, although it was reported on the 27th that Feng himself had arrived in Kalgan from Paotouchen and two brigades of his 1st Kuominchun arrived in Peking during the day. These were the first large reinforcements for his Peking garrison to arrive from Kalgan. At this time it was the general opinion that Li Ching-lin's flight might occur any time for with his eight to ten thousand troops he could not possibly hold out against the superior numerical force of the 1st Kuominchun. The opinion of most observers was of course based on the established precedent of the ordinary Chinese leader under similar circumstances, where the flight of one the usually settled the predicament.

The 1st International train was dispatched to Shanhaikuan at 12:30 Pm on November 28th, and arrived back in Tientsin on the 29th after an uneventful trip.

On December 1st the first train of the 1st Kuominchun troops, about 400 left Peking and detrained at Langfang. Some of the 2nd Kuominchun were reported marching from Paotingfu toward Tientsin, but Li Ching-lin seemed satisfied with his troop dispositions near Machang and the advance of the 2nd Kuominchun from this quarter never caused him any serious trouble. Feng Yu-hsiang's troops occupied the Jehol area without opposition as the Fengtien troops had been withdrawn from this front at the time of the general retreat. By December 5th, Li had constructed a trench system near Peitsang just northwest of Tientsin, and his troops were searching all trains coming from Peking at Yangtsun Station. On the 7th, the first large detachments of the 1st Kuominchun arrived at Langfang and detrained. Two days prior to this the 9th Division of the

1st Kuominchun had departed from Tungchow for Tongshan over the Peking-Shanhaikwan highway. Also on the 7th, the first active fighting in this campaign occurred at Machang when units of the 2nd Kuominchun met Li's troops and were repulsed. Li now had entrenched positions on three fronts, namely at Machang, Peitsang and Chieh Liang-cheng, and his prestige as a real fighting man was daily increasing, since he had now held out many days past the time when the average Chinese leader would have fled. By the 9th, the 1st Kuominchun were in possession of Yangtsun Station, and after a little exchange of fire between Li's outpost and the advance patrols of the 1st Kuominchun, Li's troops withdrew to their trenches near Peitsang. Feng's troops launched their first attack in strength on Li's Peitsang front on December 10th with little success. The 9th, 1st Kuominchun Division, arrived in Tongshan on the same day, having left Tungchow on the 5th. Intermittent firing continued daily on the Peitsang front until the 13th, when Li's troops counter-attacked and advanced his right flank about 5 miles. This was most encouraging to his troops and surprising to foreign observers. Li's resistance had been remarkable in Chinese warfare and some even predicted that if Li's reported reinforcements could arrive from Shantung he would be able to advance to Peking. However, the 1st Kuominchun were now sending large reinforcements to Yangtsun as all other traffic - including International trains had been stopped since the 10th, and no reinforcements for Li's thin lines arrived from Shantung. At this time Feng's concentration on the Yangtsun front was estimated at 30,000 while Li had at most 5,000. The Kuominchun forces now at Tongshan started their advance by rail to Tientsin, having received some rolling stock from Kuo Sung-lin's forces at Shanhaikuan. For the few days following Li's advance at Peitsang many rumors were afloat regarding the movements of Li's troops. The Shantung reinforcements were expected hourly. Rumors were current of attacks being made by Li around the right flank of Feng's forces as far west as Laofa and it was once reported that the Kuominchun had begun a general withdrawal and had removed their headquarters to Fengtai. Li continued shifting troops from one front to the other and back again, and the entire issue still hinged on whether the reinforcements from Chang Tsung-chang could arrive before Feng's troops could reorganize for an attack on all fronts. On December 20th, Tientsin was isolated as far as communications with the outside world, for all telephone, telegraph and cable connections were cut and on the 21st all incoming and outgoing steamers were being stopped by the Kuominchun troops at Tangku. This latter move by the Kuominchun was the reason that a Chinese merchant ship under Japanese register had arrived in Tientsin from Darien on the 20th loaded with ammunition and war materiel for Li' forces.

At 4: AM on the 22nd, a general attack was started by Feng's troops on the Peitsang front. Li Ching-lin doubtless realized that this was his last stand as he hurriedly rushed up his troops from the Chun Liang-cheng front and sent all troops in Tientsin and the immediate vicinity to Peitsang. Artillery firing could be distinctly heard in Tientsin during the whole day and his front retired about four miles to a line just south of Peitsang, where he was able to reorganize with his 2000 reinforcements, which he had succeeded in collecting. No attack had yet developed on the Chun Liang-cheng front, which had now been practically deserted by Li Ching-lin. Feng's attack on the Peitsang front continued unabated and on the morning of the 23rd, at 10: AM about 1500 of Li's troops arrived from the Machang front. Li's line again retreated toward Tientsin to a point a few hundred yards north of Peiyang University. The Kuominchun attack was now developing around Li's right flank. Two large columns of Li's troops from near Yu I-Hsing-fu retreated through Central Station, but were met by eight motor trucks from Li's Yamen filled with troops armed with head knives. The retreating troops were turned west through Ho Pei, Tientsin Native City and sent out the Tientsin-Peking Motor road to Peiyang. Machine gun squads were now on duty behind Li's lines to clean up all deserters from the front. Every available soldier was held in line by force at Peiyang during the night of the 23rd. Such methods had never been adopted before in Chinese wars and although the odds were greatly against Li, his resistance was admired by all observers. As a matter of fact the conduct of Li Ching-lin's defense of Tientsin was entirely too good, from a military aspect, to be directed by an average Chinese General and much speculation was rife as to what was really behind the whole movement.

At about 9: AM on the 24th, the small detachment which LI had left at Yu I-Hsing-fu after his retreat from this sector on the 23rd, retired in disorder through the Central station. The troops at the station started firing at random and throwing away their clothing and equipment and rushing south into the Native City. A few mimutes later the advance guard of the Kuominchun troops arrived at Central Station from the general direction of Yu I-Hsing-fu and firing became general in Northern Ho Pei. This detachment consisted of about 400 of the 5th Kuominchun Division. An advance was started south on Ta Cheng Li and most of the column moved out with skirmishers in front. There was little organized opposition to the advance, but heavy firing continued during the morning in southern Ho Pei. At about 10:30 AM the main body of the Kuominchun 5th Division arrived at Central station from Yu I-Hsin-fu. The advance line was now

reinforced and pushed forward, small detachments being sent into the Hutung and side streets. By this time Li's retreating troops from the Peiyang front were entering Ho Pei over the bridge on the Tientsin-Peking motor road in western Ho Pei. Li's resistance stiffened somewhat and although there were several casualties no large number of prisoners were taken and Li's artillery with the main body of his troops from Peiyang came south through Ho Pei, crossed the Yamen bridge and went west over Pei Ma Lu in the Walled City. All during this time much looting was going on in Ho Pei and the section of the city between the Yamen bridge and Pei Ma Lu. The Native Police were powerless in the above sections, however, they were heavily reinforced at the intersection of Dung Ma Lu and Pei Ma Lu and succeeded in diverting Li's column to the west doubtless preventing general looting in the main Native City. By 2:30 PM Ho Pei was cleared of Li's troops and the first detachment of two companies of the Kuominchun came across the Yamen bridge into the Native City proper. At this time the city generally was quiet except for a little rifle firing in detached Hutung, but by 3:00 PM contact was gained with Li's retreating forces in the west city and heavy artillery, machine gun and rifle firing commenced. The supply trains of the Kuominchun at Central Station were hurriedly moved north and all combat troops were rushed to the front as it was reported that Li's troops were counter-attacking on the west and had taken the bridges over the river to the west of Ho Pei. This latter proved to be false however, and Li's troops continued their retreat in fair order, however, some small detachments which had returned near the Yamen bridge were isolated and killed. By 5:00 PM on the 25th the entire city was in the hands of the Kuominchun and order had been restored. Li's rout on the Peiyang front had been caused by the Kuominchun advance around his right flank and as his main force of about five thousand was concentrated at Peiyang, their only hope was to withdraw to the south through the city and move on down the Tientsin-Pukow tracks, which was accomplished. About two thousand retreated during the morning east of Tientsin through the Russian concession and crossed the Hai Ho below Tientsin apparently with the intention of joining the retreating column on the Tientsin-Pukow railway. There were no large units of Li's troops captured during the day and his only loss of any consequence was his Quartermaster supplies in Ho Pei. There was no active pursuit.

The advance guard of the 9th Division, 1st Kuominchun, arrived at Tientsin East from Chun Liang-cheng at about 2:00 PM on the 24th, and the station was immediately decorated with flags by a reception committee of Chinese to welcome the main body which arrived about 7:30 PM.

The advance had encountered no opposition from Li's troops as they all had withdrawn southward and crossed the river. Some units of this Division moved to the village, Ta Shih-ku, south of the Belgian Concession for the night.

By the morning of the 25th, Tientsin was in the complete control of the 1st Kuominchun. The 2nd Kuominchun had not assisted in the attack on Tientsin, but it was reported that their activities around Tehchow in northern Shantung prevented any of Li's much needed reinforcements from being dispatched northward over the Tientsin-Pukow railway. In the days following approximately 2000 stragglers from Li's retreating forces were picked up by units of the 1st Kuominchun. General Chang Chih-chiang who had commanded the Kuominchun attack was now in command in Tientsin. On the 27th, an order was issued for the general withdrawal of the 1st Kuominchun, and General Sun Yueh commanding the 3rd Kuominchun arrived with a small body guard. Sun Yueh had been appointed Tupan of Chihli Province by Presidental mandate and during the next week approximately 5000 of the 3rd Kuominchun arrived and the entire 1st Kuominchun withdrew toward Peking.

Li Ching-lin succeeded in withdrawing all his artillery and all his units intact to Shantung Province, where Li later joined them after spending a few days in the Japanese concession, Tientsin. The Kuominchun attack commenced in earnest on December 10th, and Tientsin was evacuated by Li on December 24th. The attacking forces at the outset were estimated at 30,000 while Li's defendans approximated 9,000. There is no precedent in modern Chinese wars for such real fighting, and the ordinary idea of Chinese warfare resembling a comic opera fiasco with worthless rifles and disorganized mobs has been definitely dissipated.

CHANG TSO-LIN --Kuo SUNG-LIN WAR IN MANCHURIA:

On November 24th, as referred to under the Feng Yu-hsiang-Li Ching-lin campaign, General Kuo Sung-lin, commanding the 4th Fengtien Army revolted against Chang Tso-lin at Lanchien northeast of Tientsin on the Peking Mukden railway. By this date the bulk of Chang Tso-lin's army had been withdrawn from the south to the Lanhsian-Shanhaikuan area. General Kuo immediately announced allegiance to Feng Yu-hsiang and gave his troops the title of the Northeastern 4th Kuominchun. The Peking-Mukden railway was cut at Lanhsien and no Fengtien troops came south or went north from Tientsin after this time. After calling in conference the Commanding Officers of approximately 40,000 Fengtien troops, Kuo stated in substance that he had become dissatisfied with the actions of

Chang Tso-lin and was going to turn against his former leader and attempt to drive him out of Manchuria. General Chiang Teng-hsuan, the ex-Tupan of Anhwei, attempted to oppose Kuo's arguments but he was seized and executed. Kuo arrested five other Mukden Division Commanders and sent them with several other officers of lower rank to Tientsin to Li Ching-lin for imprisonment. Ten days later these officers were all released by Li and returned to Mukden by way of Darien to rejoin Chang Tso-lin.

There was little decision left to the troops in the matter of turning over as so long as they were paid and fed it was none of their concern. Some fighting occurred at Shanhaikuan between the forces of Chang Tso-hsiang, the brother of Chang Tso-lin, and General Kuo's revolting troops, but it was of little consequence. Kuo now was busy for several days with a general reorganization of his troops in the Lanhsien-Shanhaikuan area before he could set out toward Mukden. By November 28th, Kuo had started his advance on Mukden and was rapidly sending his forces north by rail from Shanhaikuan. The Peking-Mukden railway was now clear to Shanhaikuan and no serious opposition was made to the passage of the International trains through the area controlled by Kuo. Only about 5,000 of Kuo's troops were left south of the Wall by December 4th, and no opposition had been met except for the little skirmish at Shanhaikuan, stated above. Mukden was now in a state of turmoil, as Chang's troops were rapidly retreating in great disorder. A battle was expected at Chinchow and such had been anticipated by Kuo. His forces were brought up in order on the 7th, and the result was a complete rout of Chang Tso-lin's troops with the Liao River as the only natural obstacle left between Kuo Sung-lin's advance and Mukden proper. General Kuo's attack appeared to be suddenly halted at Hsin Min-fu and on the west bank of the Liao River. The Japanese were now reported to be taking active part in preventing the advance of Kuo's troops into the zone of the South Manchurian Railway. The announcement issued by the Japanese was to the effect that a strip six miles wide on each side of the railway would be kept clear of Chinese troops, being guarded by regular Japanese troops which had been rushed up to Mukden. When the news of Kuo's revolt was published the Japanese appeared to be more surprised than most foreigners, for this meant a complete revision of their plans in Manchuria. On the day following the report of Kuo's revolt at Lanhsien, troops from the Japanese 10th Division in Liaotung Peninsula were dispatched to Mukden. Other troops followed from Korea and after a special Cabinet meeting in Tokyo troops were dispatched directly from Japan. By the time that Kuo had reached the Liao River the entire city of Mukden was under the control of the Japanese with a Major General in command. It is reported

that the Japanese concentration in Mukden and along the South Manchurian railway totalled between 12 and 15,000 regular troops. The Chinese report that some of these Japanese units were placed in Chang-Tso-lin uniforms and were the deciding factor in Kuo's ultimate defeat. This perhaps will never be proven but the fact is that after decisive victories over Chang's troops and with the entire opposition in complete rout on December 9th, Kuo's advance was held at the Liao until about December 23rd. Time had now been given for reorganization of Chang's scattered forces and reinforcements had arrived from Kirin and Heiliungkiang. A frontal attack was launched and a cavalry flanking movement around Kuo's left which was successful, Kuo and his wife being captured and killed. Almost his entire command was soon disarmed and the leaders either made prisoners or killed. Approximately 8,000 of Kuo's troops succeeded in getting to Shanhaikuan where they have been so far unmolested. This group is under the command of General Wei Yi-shan, who is now negotiating for support from the 1st Kuominchun, which holds Lanchow and vicinity with the 9th Division under General Tang Chih-tao.

The news of the defeat of Kuo came as a great surprise to all observers, for his victories had been so decisive that it was considered impossible for Chang's chinese forces to halt him short of Mukden. By Kuo's defeat however Chang Tso-lin was again placed in the saddle in Manchuria and the Japanese interests were at least in better hands, from the Japanese viewpoint, than if Kuo Sung-lin the adherent of Feng Yu-hsiang and the Soviet influence had succeeded. Kuo Sung-lin was a native of Mukden and 43 years of age. He had graduated from the best military schools in China, and was later instructor in Tactics in the Fengtien Military School where he taught the "Young General" Chang Hsueh-liang. They later became the best of friends. Kuo's revolting army however, included all the forces nominally under the command of Chang Hsueh-liang.

GENERAL:

The wars included in this period of two months and a half have actually accomplished little in any way. Chang Tso-lin's power has been decreased. Feng Yu-hsiang's power has been increased, and Wu Pei-fu's power has remained more or less static, however, his lieutenant Sun Chuan-fang, has come to the front as a real element to be considered in the future.

The Japanese were forced to show their hand, particularly in the two latter campaigns, to an extent far greater than in any previous

Chinese Inter-Provincial conflicts. When Kuo Sung-lin's revolt occurred announcing his allegiance to Feng Yu-hsiang and his Soviet principles, the Japanese Manchurian Policy appeared to be toppling around their heads. Kuo had taken the prime of the Fengtien forces and the Japanese doubtless realised that Chang's resistance to Kuo's entry into Manchuria would be a fruitless effort unless something of a very forceful nature was done immediately. A Kuominchun advance on Tientsin was inevitable and with Li Ching-lin out of the way the road would be open for unlimitable reinforcements to Kuo in Manchuria, if necessary, in case he met with any unexpected difficulties. Fifteen thousand railway guards could be put into Manchuria by the Japanese under the Portsmouth Treaty and they immediately made preparations to carry out the provisions of this treaty. However, according to Chinese precedent, Li Ching-lin with his ten thousand troops at Tientsin could not be expected to hold out for more than a few hours after the Kuominchun had actually started their advance and Kuo Sung-lin must not be reinforced if it could possibly be prevented. There was no treaty provision similar to the Portsmouth Treaty whereby the Japanese garrison in Tientsin could be increased to such an appreciable extent and even if there had been provisions for this, any open activity on the part of the Japanese in assisting Li Ching-lin here would be too blatant. From sources which are believed to be reliable it is reported that five Japanese Staff Officers were assigned to Li Ching-lin's yamen in Tientsin shortly after Kuo's revolt had been announced, and that Li's entire campaign was actually under Japanese command. It was further reported that arrangements were made whereby Li was financed sufficiently to make it worth while and his safety in flight, when the time arrived, was also guaranteed. Only one Japanese Staff Officer was in Japanese uniform, however, all five of them were, from time to time, on his various fronts.

Such direction perhaps accounts for the very unusual nature of Li's entire defense of Tientsin. With approximately 10,000 troops he succeeded in holding up the advance of the entire Kuominchun forces for almost a month. On the 22nd and 23rd of December when the news of Kuo's defeat had been verified in Tientsin, Li's lines at Peitsang began a withdrawal, and on the 24th his entire force passed through Tientsin intact and Li was safe in the Japanese Concession. The mission of the Japanese staff had been fulfilled and their guarantees to Li Ching-lin apparently had been met. Chang Tso-lin was returned to power in Manchuria, and Li Ching-lin had run away to fight again another day, maybe for the Japanese. Thus the greatest series of modern Chinese wars was brought to a close.

A suspension of major hostilities for some months on all fronts is now practically a necessity. Time will be required for reorganization, and re-equipping in every army. In Manchuria Kuo's forces will be absorbed. It is not believed that another effort will be made by the Fengtien

forces to move south into North China proper, although an attempt might be made in the near future to capture the port of Chinwangtao. The Japanese never wanted Chang to move any of his troops out of Manchuria and their demands now mean more to the present regime at Mukden than ever before.

No aggressive action need be feared from the small 3rd Kuominchun forces in Tientsin and vicintiy.

General Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung is holding his position with difficulty. While his forces may well be somewhat augmented by the arrival of Li Ching-lin's, it is not expected that he will be in any position for some months to do more than hold off the intermittent advances of the 2nd Kuominchun from Honan.

Sun Chuan-fang appears to be satisfied with possession of Kiangsu Province and no hostile action is expected from this area. Wu Pei-fu's influence, it is reported, has declined somewhat, particularly with Sun and there are no indications that Wu has yet been able to induce Hsiao Yao-nan to supply Hupeh troops for a demonstration in Wu's favor. Therefore, it is believed the military situation generally will remain unchanged until the spring when the largest conflict China has yet seen will be started in North China.

Walter C. Phillips,
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Intelligence Officer.

2657-D.27
WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETINS

No. 1 to 71

The 1925 Chinese Civil War

Marshal Feng Yu-Hsiang - General Li Ching-lin.

The Military Situation, October 24th 1925

to January 3, 1926.

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CONSOLIDATION OF INTELLIGENCE BULLETINS CIVIL WAR IN CHINA 1925

Headquarters U.S.Army Forces in China. G-2.
Tientsin, China.

Bulletin No. 1. October 24, 1925.

Oct. 22nd. The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:10AM | Chun Liang-cheng | Leafa | 19th M.B. | 500 | | Chang Hsueh-liang's 4th Division. |
| 2:30AM | " | " | " | 500 | | do |
| 7:00AM | " | " | " | 500 | | do |
| 10:00PM | " | Peitsang | " | 500 | | do |
| 4-Trains | | | | 2000 | | |
| Oct. 23rd. | | | | | | |
| 11:30AM | " | Langfang | " | 300 | | do |
| 10:00PM | " | Fengtai | " | 100 | | do |
| 11:30PM | " | " | " | 200 | | do |
| | | | | 600 | | |

During the morning an ammunition train of 20 cars arrived at Central Station from Mukden and preparations were made to unload this ammunition in Ho Pei, Tientsin. The Mukden Cadet Corps now in Tientsin, of approximately 1,000 were unloading the ammunition which consisted of small arms ammunition and Stokes mortar shells.

No troops have been sent south over the Tientsin-Pukow and the only reinforcements from Chang Tso-lin have been to Li Ching-lin. This might indicate that Chang Tsung-chang will not be reinforced but the defense position will be held between Tientsin and Peking and south of Tientsin on the Tsin-Pu RR, perhaps at Machang, where Gen. Kuo Sung-lin now has his 6th Division of Fengtien troops. This is the same general position held by Chang Tso-lin in his former war with Wu Pei-fu in 1922 when Chang was defeated.

Wu Pei-fu sentiment is developing very rapidly in Tientsin among the Chinese and, due to this, it is reported that the Tientsin Native Police have been disarmed by order of Li Ching-lin, but this is incorrect. The general opinion among Chinese is that Wu will be in Peking within a month without the help of Feng Yu-hsiang, as Wu's Tientsin adherents strongly oppose any alliance with the "Christian General". They further state that Yueh Wei-tsun in Honan never has been a strong Feng man but favors Wu Pei-fu and will denounce Feng if necessary.

There has been no material interference with traffic on the Peking-Mukden but no trains are running south of Tsinan, Shantung Province, on the Tsin-Pu line. If Chang Tso-lin was making a general concentration, all the Peking-Mukden rolling stock would be seized.

Bulletin No. 2. October 25, 1925.

Oct. 24th.- No troop movements.

Oct. 25th.- At 2:00 A.M., one train of about 200 men left Central Station for Mukden. No other troops have been moved to or from the Tientsin garrison since the concentration started.

A report from Peking states that there at present between 30,000 and 60,000 Fengtien troops in the vicinity of Jehol. This concentration was undoubtedly made to forestall any advance in force by Feng Yu-hsiang south along the Peking-Suiyuan. The 3rd Division is the only unit identified at Jehol and is commanded by General Kan Chao-hsi.

There is some effort at recruiting being made in the Tientsin Native City and Marshal Law has been declared. The Native Police are sympathetic toward Wu's return but are still armed and on duty.

Consolidation - Intelligence Bulletins - Cont'd.

Bulletin No. 3. - October 26, 1925.

Oct. 25th. The following trains passed through Tientsin East Station.

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:10AM | Tientsin E | Langfang | - | 9 | 21 | Ammunition |
| - | Peking | Mukden | - | 251 | 5 | — |
| - | Shanhaikuan | Fengtai | - | 412 | 5 | Cavalrymen |
| 4:30PM | Mukden | Pukow | - | 100 | 10 | Wagons |
| 7:00PM | TientsinE | Lanchow | - | 280 | 6 | Recruits |
| 8:30PM | TientsinE | Shanhaikuan | - | 60 | 2 | Equipment |
| | | | | 1,092 | 49 | |

Recruiting is continuing for Chang Tso-lin in the Native City and the Special Areas in Tientsin, and about 200 recruits are now awaiting transportation northward at Central Station. One train of recruits has arrived in Tientsin from the towns between Peking and Tientsin. White Russians are being recruited in the Ex-Russian Concession.

So far no reinforcements have been south to the Shantung forces under Chang Tsung-chang at Suchowfu in Northern Kiangsu. From all reports, it appears that Chang Tso-lin is little worried about the present situation. He has collected 500 cars outside the Wall for emergency purposes and has issued an order to the Peking-Mukden to provide 20 trains at Lanchow, but no time limit was designated. His British adviser, General Sutton, is now in Tientsin to attend the Races during the week. Sun Chuan-fang's Chekiang forces are reported to have advanced to Pengpu, along the Tsin-Pu in Anhwei Province, but not to Suchowfu which was reported taken by the Southern forces some days ago. If allegiance can be maintained between Chang Tso-lin and his subordinates, it would appear now that the war will not come farther north than Shantung Province. However, the entire set-up may be changed if Feng Yu-hsiang decides to enter the arena. At present his most recent statements seem to indicate that he will abide by the old Chinese principle of combat wherin neutrality is maintained by the third party until the other two parties fight it out, and when the crucial time arrives he hopes to peacefully perform another coup d'etat and thereby increase his holding with Peking, Chihli Province, and as much more as possible.

Wu Pei-fu's preparations for a conflict of this magnitude have been, from all reports, very insufficient. He has no force at present which compares in anyway with the army under his direction in the 1924 conflict. He has not yet left Hankow and Hankow is far from the battle area. His finances are admittedly low and his equipment is scarce, hence many observers credit him with too much ability to institute another campaign which must from the outset be a fruitless effort; that is, if the unification of North and Central China is his goal. His subordinate, Sun Chuan-fang, has now accomplished his announced objective of taking Nanking and is not in any particular hurry to advance on the Fengtien concentration at Suchowfu. Therefore it is quite possible that for the time being at least no further movements will take place and hostilities can be postponed over the winter season, giving time for more detailed organization of the Yangtze forces.

Bulletin No. 4. October 27, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin.

East Station.

| Time | From | To | Men | Cars | Unit | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:00PM | Mukden | Loafa | 19 | 18 | | Ammunition |
| 8:50PM | Yangtsun | Taku | 3 | 1 | | 1 Machine Gun |
| 11:55PM Oct.27th | Langfang | Mukden | 36 | 2 | | Infantry |
| 4:00AM Oct.26th | Tientsin | Loafa | 19 | 1 | | 1 Machine Gun |

Central Station

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:55PM | Mukden | Langfang | 86 | 2 | | |

From the above report it is evident that Chang's concentration, if any is planned, has not yet been started. It is reported from Tsinan, however, that the majority of Chang Tsung-chang's forces have moved south either to Suchowfu or in the general direction of the Honan border. Sun Chuan-fang's most recent statement is to the effect that he will advance no farther for the time being but

Bulletin No 4 - Cont'd.

will leave the seige of Shantung Province to Honan and Hupeh troops. This is about the situation predicted when the first troops invaded Kiangsu from the south. Sun Chuan-fang's original move was primarily on his own responsibility and not the first advance of a general movement of the Yangtze Alliance northward. No troops have moved in any direction in Hupeh Province and Yueh Wei-tsun in Honan is more inclined to be neutral than pro-Wu Pei-fu, hence it is now reasonable to believe that the present phase of the campaign is completed and nothing more may occur for some time to come. Many of Wu's ardent sympathizers in Tientsin feel that this is not the time for Wu to assert himself as his organization, financial backing and supplies are far too insufficient for him to have any hope of victory yet.

Bulletin No. 5. October 28, 1925.

East Station

Oct. 27th.- The following trains passed through Tientsin:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5:00PM | Langfang | Shanhaikwan | Inf | 50 | 4 | Troops unarmed 40 animals |
| 5:00PM | Shanhaikwan | Loafa | Inf | 131 | 5 | Mixed Units.15 Boxes Hand Grenades.Troops unarmed. |
| 11:55PM | Loafa | Mukden | Inf | 100 | 3 | Mixed troops. |
| | | Central Station | | | | |
| 6:00PM | Peitsang | Chun Liang-cheng | | 100 | 4 | Cav & Inf 40 Animals |

The general situation remains unchanged, with little troop movement and no material interference with regular tarffic over the Peking-Mukden.

It is reliably reported that either today or tomorrow 4,000 troops will be moved south over the Tientsin-Pukow from Lanchow on the Peking-Mukden. Lanchow is the Headquarters of the 5th Fengtien Division and this move is doubtless the one reported in Intelligence Bulletin No. 3 for which 20 trains had been ordered by the Fengtien authorities for Lanchow.

Chinese opinion generally in the Tientsin vicinity is to the effect that Wu Pei-fu's assumption of command and his public announcements that he intends to attack Chang Tso-lin are ill-timed and that at present his efforts would be doomed to failure. Ther are, however, some reports to the effect that Chang Tso-lin is determined to settle the issue at Suchowfu with Yueh Wei-tsun and that hostilities will soon start there. This has not been confirmed and at present there is little to indicate such intention on Chang's part.

Bulletin No. 6. October 29, 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

Oct.28th.

| Time | From | To | Units | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:30AM | Tientsin | Shantung | 1st Div. | 565 | 17 | 45 Animals |
| 1:15PM | Yangtsun | Machang | 4th Div. | 810 | 13 | Inf. 62 Horses |
| 8:45PM | Mukden | Peitsang | Air Svce. | 80 | 18 | 10 Airplanes |
| 11:55PM | Lanchow | Yangtsun | 5th Div | 512 | 23 | 50 Animals |
| Oct.29th. | | | | | | |
| 1:45AM | Tangshan | Yangtsun | 5th DivInf | 506 | 14 | Supplies & 80 animals. |
| 4:30AM | Shanhaikuan | Yangliutsing | 10th Div Inf | 254 | 18 | Equipment |
| | | | | 2727 | 103 | |

This is the beginning of Chang's concentration and shows his first troops going south over the Tientsin-Pukow. It is reported that there is a heavy movement of troops north of the Wall to Shanhaikuan.

It is yet impossible to determine whether Chang intends only a defense of his position or is concentrating for an attack on Honan and an entry into Peking proper.

Bulletin No. 7. October 30. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct.29th | | | | | | |
| 9:30AM | Shanhaikuan | Tsinanfu | 10th Div | 1600 | 21 | Mixed troops |
| 5:45PM | Mukden | Loafa | Infantry | 110 | Pass T. | Mixed troops |
| 6:45PM | Mukden | Loafa | 81st Inf | 600 | 19 | 125 Animals |
| 11:55PM | Mukden | Tsinanfu | Guard | 16 | 12 | 12 Airplanes |
| 9:00PM | Chun Liang- | Loafa | 4th Div | 930 | 21 | 14 Horses. |
| Oct.30th | cheng | | | | | |
| 3:20AM | Chihsien | Yangtsun | Infantry | 612 | 23 | 20 Animals |
| 3:50 AM | Chinhsien | Tsinanfu | Infantry | 500 | 19 | 50 Animals |
| | | | | 4368 | 115 | |

The following empty cars were returned North on October 29th:

28 empty cars from Fengtai to Lutai
25 " " " Tientsin E " Shanhaikuan

This is the largest movement of troops yet reported and shows trains arriving from beyond the Wall from Chinhsien.

It is more apparent every day that Feng Yu-hsiang himself will remain neutral in the present struggle or at least will not be drawn in with Wu Pei-fu, but it is also apparent that his control over Yueh Wei-tsun in Honan and perhaps Sun Yueh in Shensi is not so strong. It is confirmed that there have been heavy movements of Honan troops east over the Lung-Hai toward Suchow within the last few days. The movement from the south under Sun Chuan-fang, however, appears to have stopped due to some misunderstanding between his troops and the native Kiangsu forces.

The report that Haichow has been captured by the Fengtien forces and Pai Po-shan's troops driven south, however, may have a unifying effect on the Kiangsu troops and bring about more cooperation with Sun Chuan-fang's forces from Chekiang.

From the Fengtien troop movements it would appear that Chang Tso-lin at least is in earnest.

A
Bulletin No. 8/ October 31. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct.30th. | | | | | | |
| 7:05AM | Shanhaikuan | Loafa | 10th Div | 920 | 18 | 95 Animals. Inf. |
| 8:15AM | Tientsin C | Changchuang | 4th Div | 1225 | 12 | 150 Animals. Inf. |
| 11:20AM | Tientsin C | " | 4th Div | 1430 | 14 | 70 Animals. 16 M.G's. 8 Stokes Mortars. |
| 3:00PM | Tongshan | Yangtsun | 5th Div | 1010 | 18 | 75 Horses |
| 3:00PM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | - | - | 18 | Food supplies. |
| 4:45PM | Tongshan | Yangtsun | 5th Div | 1415 | 29 | Equipment & 36 Animals |
| 5:15PM | Tongshan | Yangtsun | 5th Div | - | 16 | Infantry |
| 7:05PM | Machang | Loafa | 6th Div | 835 | 19 | 60 Animals |
| 10:00PM | Machang | Loafa | 6th Div | 1000 | 27 | 100 Animals. |
| Oct.31st. | | | | | | |
| 6:00AM | Lanchow | Yangliutsing | 5th Div | 600 | 23 | 5 Cars equipment and |
| 10 Trains. | | | | 8435 | 194 | 40 Animals. |

The movement of troops continues to increase as Chang Tso-lin is now sending units through Tientsin from all his forces between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan. No large trains have yet arrived direct from north of the Wall.

It is reported there are now about 6,000 troops in the Native City, Tientsin.

Bulletin No. 8-A - Cont'd.

Trenches are being constructed by the Fengtien troops at Langfang with Loafa as the Headquarters. The aviation base is being established at Yangtsun.

Preparations are being made for the British contingent to occupy their posts along their railway sector.

A recent rumor predicted a certain outbreak between Peking and Tientsin for October 31st but there has been nothing so far to confirm this report. The Japanese Headquarters still insist that there will be no hostilities in this area yet for some time. They have little or no information of Feng Yu-hsiang's movements, however, and are somewhat fearful as to the Soviet influence which may cause him to act at any time.

Bulletin No. 8-B. November 1,1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct.31st. | | | | | | |
| 6:40AM | Shanhaikuan | Peitsang | Inf | 250 | 10 | 70 Animals. |
| 7:20AM | Tientsin C. | Peitsang | | 90 | 3 | Chinese-Russians |
| 7:40AM | Lanchow | Peitsang | Inf | 630 | 15 | Field Equip & 100 Animals. |
| 10:40AM | Lanchow | Peitsang | Inf | 1000 | 16 | 100 Animals. |
| 10:40AM | Lanchow | Peitsang | Inf | 800 | 20 | 100 Animals. |
| 5:00PM | Tientsin C | Machang | 46th Inf | 900 | 11 | 120 Animals. |
| 8:00PM | Kowpangtze | Machang | | 800 | 21 | |
| 9:45PM | " | Yangliutsing | F A | 100 | 6 | 12 - 75's |
| Nov.1st. | | | | | | |
| 1:20AM | Machang | Yangtsun | Inf | 650 | 21 | 70 Animals |
| 4:15AM | Shanhaikuan | Yangtsun | | — | 15 | Animals & Carts |
| 5:30AM | Shanhaikuan | Yangtsun | | 150 | 16 | Animals & Carts. |
| 11 Trains. | | | | 5370 | 154 | |

70 Empty Cars were returned to Mukden.

Heavy movement of troops continue from south of the Wall towards Peking. The first large tarins of troops from North of the Wall arrived during this period. It is now believed that the bulk of Chang's troops formerly stationed between Shanhaikuan and Tientsin have been concentrated between Tientsin and Peking and that hereafter most of the troops will be from Manchuria direct. These northern troops are all in full winter equipment.

The railway authorities state that the passenger traffic will not be further restricted at this time. There is no indication of Chang Tso-lin coming to Tientsin.

Work is rapidly progressing on Li Ching-lin's arsenal in Ho Pei and the contractors state the construction will be completed by November 20th.

The Fengtien Governor of Jehol, Kan Chao-hsi, has recently issued a general warning to foreigners that his district is unsafe for travel due to numerous bandits. This is the same method employed by Feng Yu-hsiang when he wished to send arms to Kalgan from Urga and it may indicate, in Kan's case, that his troops are moving out toward Peking. On October 25th, it was reported that General Kan had between 30,000 and 60,000 troops concentrated in this area.

Bulletin No. 9. November 2. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.1st. | | | | | | |
| 11:30 AM | Kowpangtze | Yangliutsing | 59th Brig. | 900 | 16 | 180 Animals. |
| 11:45 AM | Lanchow | " | 7th Brig. | 300 | 12 | 8 - 3" pieces |
| 2:20 PM | Lanchow | " | 7th Cav. | 400 | 12 | 350 Animals. |
| 3:15 PM | Chungliangcheng | " | 4th Div | 550 | 14 | 58 M.G's. |
| 4:45 PM | Tongshan | Machang | 4th Div | 500 | 22 | Cavalry |
| 9:45 PM | Chinhsien | Yangtsun | — | 500 | 15 | Cavalry |
| Nov.2nd. | | | | | | |
| 1:30 AM | Mukden | Tsinanfu | A S | 100 | 21 | A.S. Equipment |
| 1:30 AM | Mukden | Yangtsun | Transport | 40 | 4 | 150 Animals. |
| 8 Trains | | | | 3290 | 116 | |

Feng Yu-hsiang's troop movements, if any are occurring, are still a matter of much question, as neither foreigners nor Chinese are apparently able to obtain any information from this quarter. It is reported that he has 20,000 troops just south of Peking along the Peking-Hankow railway disguised as Native Police and laborers.

Li Ching-lin is reported to be sending a large force from Machang overland to Pao Tingfu and Tamingfu. This would account for the number of troops now going down the Tsin-Pu line, for no reinforcements in strength from the north have yet arrived at Tsinanfu in Shantung.

A number of trains of empties are being daily dispatched northward from Tientsin, thus enabling the concentration to be carried on without seriously interrupting the through passenger schedule. Most of the local passenger and goods trains have been suspended between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan and business men in Tientsin state that it is now impossible to get any cars for goods shipments.

Bulletin No. 10. November 3. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Stations:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.2nd. | | | | | | |
| 9:10 AM | Liensban | Laofa | 1st Div | 200 | 11 | 7 - 3" Guns |
| 10:20 AM | Kowpangtze | Yangliutsing | 2nd Div | 350 | 13 | 130 Animals |
| **4:00 PM | Kowpangtze | Tientsin C | - | 500 | 20 | 350 Animals |
| 7:00 PM | Mukden | Yangliutsing | - | 350 | 7 | Infantry |
| 7:45 PM | Tsinanfu | Tientsin C | - | 12 | | Special train. one Maj.Gen., Staff and Guard. |
| 7:45 PM | Mukden | Yangliutsing | 10th Div | 150 | | Passenger train |
| 8:00 PM | Tientsin C | Machang | 41st Inf | 115 | 9 | Equipment |
| 10:25 PM | Kowpangtze | Lanchow | 35th Inf | 400 | 16 | Equipment |
| 10:55 PM | Yangtsun | Yangliutsing | - | 400 | 20 | 50 Animals. |
| Nov. 3rd. | | | | | | |
| 3:30 AM | Mukden | Yangliutsing | Inf | 700 | 24 | 50 Animals. |
| | | | | 3177 | 120 | |

** 7 - 3" field pieces were unloaded at Tientsin Central from this 4:00 PM train, reloaded on mule carts, and taken 7 Li Southwest.

It will be noted that all these troops moved south over the Tsin-Pu. Yangliutsing is the first station south of Tientsin West, about 15 minutes on the train from Tientsin West. These troops could be detrained easily at Yangliutsing or be moved south to Tsinghaihsien which is on the Tientsin-Paotingfu motor road. From this point a good dirt road road leads directly west into Paotingfu on the Kin-Han railway.

There is yet no information regarding Feng Yu-hsiang's troop movements.

Both the Chekiang and Fengtien Headquarters are reporting victories but it is doubted by many whether any real battle has yet been fought.

Bulletin No. 11. November 4th 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.3rd. | | | | | | |
| 6:20 AM | Chinhsien | Techow | Recruits | 100 | 10 | 300 Animals |
| 8:30 AM | " | " | 3rd Div | 900 | 25 | 150 " |
| 5:00 PM | " | Langfang | - | 1600 | 28 | 110 " |
| 6:15 PM | Shanhaikwan | Tientsin S | 11th Inf | 100 | 6 | Equipment |
| 6:45 PM | " | Yenchowfu | 11th Inf | 300 | 16 | 8 cars horses |
| 10:50 PM | Chinhsien | Techow | | 1000 | 24 | 30 Animals |
| Nov.4th | | | | | | |
| 1:40 AM | Chinhsien | Techow | | 80 | 11 | 100 Animals. |
| 7 Trains | | | | 4080 | 122 | |

It is reported that for the last three or four days fifteen troop trains per day have been passing through Shanhaikwan and unloading in the Lanhsien vicinity. Some of these are being moved on south toward Tientsin but others are marching overland toward Peking and north toward Jehol.

As is usual a general exodus from the Native City to the Concessions has been started by the wealthy Chinese but from all reports this move has been permanently checked. Li Ching-lin's tax collectors were immediately on their posts when the move started and the likin tax in most cases was so high that the owners decided it was cheaper to leave the goods to be seized in case of an invasion. Rents and food prices generally have been doubled and in some cases trebled by the great influx of Chinese to the Native City, Tientsin, from the small towns and villages being occupied by Fengtien troops around Tientsin. These refugees come from all points between Langfang and Tientsin and Machang on the Tsin-Pu and Tientsin. In most cases they claim that the Fengtien soldiers have commandeered their property and in some cases the entire villages.

The largest air-base outside of Mukden is being established by the Fengtien troops near Peitsang.

It is not believed that there has been any decisive fighting or any battle of consequence on the Suchowfu section. The Press reports victories for both sides in this area but authentic reports from Tsinan state no fighting has yet occurred.

Bulletin No. 12. November 5, 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.4th | | | | | | |
| 7:30 AM | Tientsin C | Mukden | | 150 | | Recruits |
| Nov.5th | | | | | | |
| 4:50 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | Inf. | 50 | 1 | |
| 6:00 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | Trans- | 70 | 18 | 250 Animals. |
| 3 Trains | | | port | 270 | 19 | |

Empty cars going north regularly from Tientsin and Tongshan vicinities.

This is the smallest troopmovement since the concentration started. A few troops are detraining daily at Tientsin Central and there has been some overland movement of military supplies from Tientsin Native City toward the south along the Tientsin-Paotingfu Motor Road.

About 1200 Cavalry detrained at Tongshan with carts, ammunition and several machine guns and moved west on the Peking road.

Bulletin No. 13. November 6, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.5th | | | | | | |
| 6:30 AM | Mukden | Laofa | | 12 | 4 | 50 Animals |
| 8:20 AM | Chinhsien | Tsinanfu | 2nd Div | 22 | 6 | 20 M.G's. |
| *11:50 AM | " | Moochuangtzu | " | 200 | 8 | 4-3" & 8 Carts |
| 3:30 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 150 | 11 | 54 Animals |
| 4:00 PM | " | " | 5th Brig | 250 | 18 | 8-3"'s;16 ammunition carts. |
| 10:50 PM | Tientsin C | Techow | | 20 | 18 | Equipment |
| 11:15 PM | Mukden | Tsangchow | | 400 | 12 | 90 Animals |
| 7 Trains | | | | 1054 | 77 | |

* Moochuangtzu is a small village 2 miles south of Tientsin Central Station.

This is a small troop movement compared to previous days but several trains of empties were returned northward during this period.

The unloading of troops and equipment in Tientsin Central emphasizes the fact that Chang is preparing to defend Tientsin proper in force. Practically the entire reinforcement going south on the Tientsin-Pukow is restricted to Chihli Province and particularly to points a few miles southnof Tientsin.

Two houndred and fifty empties were ordered to be collected last night in Tientsin to be sent north of the Wall for a big movement from Manchuria south. One hundred empties of this lot have already gone north and the remaining 150 will be sent up as rapidly as possible. With the arrival of these troops it is expected that Chang Tso-lin's attack on Peking and Feng Yu-hsiang will be initiated.

Two brigades of infantry are reported to have detrained at Lanhsien and moved overland toward Peking on the Peking-Shanhaikuan highway.

Bulletin No. 14. November 7, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.6th. | | | | | | |
| 2:30 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C. | 3rd Art. | 100 | 18 | 250 Animals |
| 8:25 PM | Tientsin E | Tsinanfu | | | | Spec.train.Gen.Yu and body-guard. |
| 8:50 PM | Mukden | Tsinanfu | Transport | 20 | 18 | Equipment |
| Nov.7th | | | | | | |
| 2:00 AM | Chinhsien | Tsinanfu | " | 50 | 20 | Equipment |
| 5:00 AM | Chinhsien | Tientsin | Art'y | 280 | 24 | 4-3" Howitzers; 4-3"'s;60 ammunition carts;unloaded at Tientsin C. |
| 5 Trains | | | | 450 | 80 | |

Note: 30 Russians, recruits, arrived on 7:00 AM passenger train from Mukden on November 6th.

Commercial shipping in Tientsin is now at a standstill. The Kailan Mining Administration now have 300 coal cars of their own which are the only ones available for their coal shipments. They are at present attempting to collect these in their own yards to prevent seizure.

The Japanese estimate the present number of Fengtien troops in Tientsin and vicinity at between 60,000 and 70,000. Three brigades are at Jehol with some reinforcements arriving from Chaoyang.

The large movement of troops anticipated from Manchuria south toward Tientsin has not yet started.

Bulletin No. 15. November 8, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station.

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.7th | | | | | | |
| 8:40 AM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | Recruits | 25 | 2 | Russians & Chinese |
| 11:15 AM | Tientsin C | Laofa | Inf. | 140 | 3 | |
| 1:s5 PM | Mukden | Peitsang | 2nd Div | 250 | 14 | 2- 3" Guns. |
| Nov.8th | | | | | | |
| 3:50 AM | Tsangchow | Tientsin C | Transport | 25 | 3 | Equipment |
| 6:45 AM | Tsinanfu | Mukden | | 30 | | Spec.Train of Gen. |
| 5 Trains | | | | 470 | 22 | Chiang & body-guard |

There is no change in the general situation. The peace conference arranged between Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchun and Chang Tso-lin has adjourned without result. Chang states that he will withdraw no further and will retain by all means avaiable his positions in Chihli Province between Tientsin and Peking and at Paotingfu and Taming. Chang, however, has withdrawn his troops from Fengtai to Langfang.

The reports of fighting on the Suchowfu front are very contradictory and it appears safe to assume that to date there has been little if any change from the positions as originally announced.

Wu Pei-fu is still in Hankow exerting every effort to collect finances. He doubtless fells that with his shortage of troops, money is the next best weapon in a Chinese War and he hopes to become prepared in this respect at least.

The Chines in Tientsin all expect Chang Tso-lin's advance to begin within a week or ten days at latest.

Bulletin No. 16. November 9, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8th | | | | | | |
| 7:15 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C. | Inf. | 150 | 4 | Unloaded at Tientsin C |
| 11:45 AM | Mukden | Yangliutsing | " | 30 | 8 | Equipment |
| 2:00 PM | Tientsin C | Techow | | 10 | 8 | Equipment |
| 2:20 PM | Lanchow | Tientsin C | Inf | 500 | 16 | 14 Auto Rifles;4 MGs |
| 9th | | | | | | |
| 4:15 AM | Mukden | Techow | 8th Inf | 100 | 10 | 4 Cars Horses |
| 4:30 AM | Tsinanfu | Tientsin C | | 100 | 2 | |
| 6 Trains | | | | 890 | 48 | |

At 7:05 A.M. on the 8th, General Chiang Teng-hsien, The Fengtien Tupan of Anhwei, passed through Tientsin by special train from Tsinanfu for Mukden. The report that he had gone to Mukden some time ago with Yang Yu-ting was in error.

The Tientsin-Pukow line is now attempting to run one passenger train per day each way between Tientsin and Tsinanfu. The down train leaves from the Central Station at 10:00 A.M. No time is stated for the arrival of the up train.

The USS ASHEVILLE arrived in Tientsin at 3:15 PM on the 8th with full complement and an additional 76 Marines and two Officers to be stationed in the American Compound, Tientsin.

The situation in the Native City, Tientsin, is very quiet although there are many rumors of the defeat of Chang Tsung-chang's troops at Suchowfu.

The The merchant class are all expecting extensive looting before the end of this war. This sentiment is very unusual and may be accounted for by the present sttitude of the Native Police who have heretofore been counted upon for protection. At present the Police are only lukewarm in their support of the Fengtien regime and the merchants feel that in case of an invasion on an opponent's troops and the retreat of the Fengtien forces the Police would not exert themselves one way or the other.

Bulletin No. 17. November 10. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.9th | | | | | | |
| 7:15 AM | Tientsin C | Yangliutsing | Transport | 20 | 17 | Equipment |
| 11:55 AM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | Recruits | 460 | 10 | Russian and Chinese |
| 3:00 PM | Chinhsien | Peitsang | | 300 | 16 | 9 cars equipment |
| Nov.10th. | | | | | | |
| 2:00 AM | Mukden | Machang | 6th Div | 200 | & 3 | |
| 4 Trains | | | | 980 | 46 | |

General Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young General", arrived in Tientsin at 5:50 A.M.,Nov.10th by special train from Lanchow. It is not known whether he will remain in Tientsin or go south to take command in Shantung.

It is reliably reported that the Fengtien troops under Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung were defeated and are now driven north along the Tsin-Pu line to Taianfu. This defeat was brough about by the desertion of the old 5th Division and the 47th Mixed Brigade, all Shantung troops, formerly loyal to Wu Pei-fu. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the Fengtien 2nd Division and the Russian Brigade, all of Chang Tsung-chang's alleged 60,000 troops are Shantung Native troops who have been up to last Fall under Wu's nominal leadership. Wu Pei-fu is a native of Shantung as is Sun Chuan-fang. Chang Tsung-chang was also born in Shantung but since his assumption of authority in the Province his system of excessive taxation has placed him in the position of being the most hated man in Shantung.

Chang Tsung-chang is now reported to have secretely arrived in Tientsin on the 4th, having been seriously wounded by a bomb explosion. He was immediately taken to a Japanese hospital in the Japanese Concession and died there on the 9th as a result of his wounds.

This collapse on the southern Shantung front was not unexpected by many observers, as it was a well known fact that the loyalty of the majority of Chang's so-called Fengtien troops was very weak. There is now little doubt that this advance of the Allies from the south will not be halted until the entire Province of Shantung has been taken over, although there may be an attempt by the Fengtien forces to concentrate at the Yellow River and check Sun's northern march. As has been stated several times heretofore, Chang Tso-lin apparently anticipated this collapse as his entire concentration from Mukden and north of Tientsin has been just south and west of Tientsin and no reinforcements except a few Russian and Chinese recruits have been sent to Shantung.

It was reported, although not verified, that Feng Yu-hsiang now has 30,000 troops fully equipped at Fengtai and has started his move toward Langfang, the outpost of the Fengtien forces along the Peking-Mukden line.

Bulletin No. 18. 1925. November 11th.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.10th | | | | | | |
| 7:05 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C. | | 35 | | Passenger Train |
| 10:30 AM | Mukden | Yangliutsing | | 30 | 6 | Equipment |
| 11:15 AM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | Recruits | 200 | 12 | 7 cars Equipment |
| Nov.11th. | | | | | | |
| 4:00 AM | Tientsin E | Techow | | 20 | 7 | Provisions. |
| 4 Trains | | | | 285 | 25 | |

The troop movement by rail has remained small during the last week averaging perhaps 700 to 800 daily; however, it is reported from Tongshan that approximately 20,000 troops have been detrained at that station and at Lanhsien within the last week and have moved westward over the Peking-Shanhaikuan highway.

Bulletin No. 18 - Cont'd.

It is reported from Peking that several large units of Fengtien troops have arrived in Tungchow and have advanced westward taking over two districts between Tungchow and Peking. These troops are reported as coming from Jehol but no doubt all of these troops came overland from Lanhsien and are part of the above forces.

There is no further news of the advance by the Allied Forces coming north into Shantung. The report in yesterday's bulletin of such advance has been confirmed, however.

Yueh Wei-chun is reported to have finally decided to join the Allied advance into Shantung and his Honan troops now occupy Tsaochowfu in southwestern Shantung. It is further reported that Yueh may be given supreme command of the Shantung campaign as Sun Chuan-fang is returning to Nanking.

Bulletin No. 19. November 12. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.11th. | | | | | | |
| 8:45 AM | Mukden | Laofa | Inf. | 100 | 2 | |
| 8:00 PM | " | " | | 50 | 28 | 450 Animals. |
| Nov.12th. | | | | | | |
| 2:35 AM | Tientsin C | Tsinanfu | | 50 | 11 | Supplies. |
| 3 Trains | | | | 200 | 41 | |

The situation is unchanged; however, more troops are reported as detraining at Tongshan and Lanhsien and moving overland to the west.

The Kailan Mining Administration has announced no further orders for delivery of coal will be received for the present. They own 300 coal cars but the Administration authorities state that if they ship coal now in these cars from the mines to Tientsin they have no assurance that the cars will not be seized by the military. They can, however, ship as far as Tangku and arrangements are being made to send the coal from there in barges up the river to Tientsin.

At present the return of empties toward the north has practically stopped and instead many empty cars are arriving in Tientsin from the North. The Chinese interpret this as preparation on Chang's part for a general withdrawal if such becomes necessary. The circumstances, however, at present do not warrant such a move on Chang's part.

There is no news of the movements of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops east of Peking, although his 1st Division in the city have made troops dispositions and occupied vantage points for a defense of the city. It is reported that Feng's troops from Nan Kou are on the move overland toward the east which would intersect the road from Peking to Jehol but this latter report has not been confirmed.

Bulletin No. 20. November 13. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.12th. | | | | | | |
| 9:35 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 30 | | Passenger train |
| 9:55 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 18 | | Passenger train |
| 1:30 PM | Chinwangtao | Tientsin C | 3rd Div | 120 | 6 | Equipment |
| 3:30 PM | Shanhaikuan | Peitsang | | 200 | 14 | Supplies |
| 11:00 PM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 325 | 7 | Special train |
| 5 Trains | | | | 693 | 29 | |

The 11:00 P.M. train was the special of Chang Hsueh-liang. The report of his arrival on the 10th was in error as he only came as far south as Lanhsien at that time. His 4th Division Artillery is now being loaded from Ho Pei at Tientsin Central and being moved up to Langfang and Laofa.

There has been little change in the general situation during the last twenty-

four hours.

It is reported from Shantung that the Fengtien troops are rapidly withdrawing to Techow in northern Shantung and to Tsangchow in Chihli Province. If this is the case Li Ching-lin will be forced to evacuate his troops from Taming in southern Chihli or they will be cut off from the main body of the Fengtien troops.

The Fengtien troops formerly at Haichow were withdrawn aboard transports to Tsingtao.

No reliable information is available of the movements of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops but it is reported that instead of an increase in Peking proper his troops are gradually being withdrawn north and west outside of the city.

Bulletin No. 21. November 14. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:00 AM | Mukden | Tsinanfu | 4th Div | 1100 | 21 | 60 Animals |
| 9:35 AM | Mukden | Tsinanfu | | 50 | 9 | 180 Animals |
| 2:10 PM | Tientsin C | Chunliangcheng | 1st Div | 300 | 7 | 8-3" Guns |
| 6:00 PM | Tientsin C | Tongshan | | 30 | 13 | 700 animals |
| 6:40 PM | Tientsin C | Yangtsun | | 450 | 5 | 120 animals |
| 10:40 PM | Tientsin C | Yangtsun | | 30 | 16 | 150 animals |
| 11:15 PM | Langfang | Tongshan | | 500 | 16 | 4-3" Guns |
| Nov.14th | | | | | | |
| 1:15 AM | Tientsin C | Lanchow | 5th Inf | 200 | 15 | 100 animals |
| 5:10 AM | Tientsin C | Kuyeh | 2nd Art | 300 | 20 | 9-3" Guns |
| 9 Trains | | | | 2960 | 122 | |

From the above train movements it is apparent that Chang Tso-lin's concentration of empty cars here at Tientsin, reported several days ago, was really for a withdrawal toward the north. It is very difficult to say at this time just what significance this retreat has. Since Chang Hseuh-liang's arrival on the 12th, Li Ching-lin is reported to have announced that he would resign in preference to waging an aggressive campaign against Feng Yu-hsiang. It is now an established fact that Shantung and Chang Tsung-chang's military organization has been lost to the Fengtien party. Hence with Chang Tsung-chang out of consideration and Li Ching-lin desiring to resign it is perhaps the best policy for the Manchurian warlord Chang to accept conditions as he finds them and return his loyal troops as rapidly as possible to his own territory north of the Wall.

The advance of the Allied forces, although very slow, has been unobstructed so far in Shantung. It is now reported from Tsingtao that the Fengtien commanders have evacuated and all troops have been turned over to old Wu Pei-fu commanders. The navy at Tsingtao is yet undecided in their allegiance.

Feng Yu-hsiang's troops are reported as coming into Peking and also reported as withdrawing. It is not believed, however, that Feng will engage in any combat if there is a possible opportunity afforded to avert such by a strategic retreat.

There are now very few troops in Tientsin Native City as Li Ching-lin's forces have moved out to Yangtsun, Paotingfu and Taming and Chang Hsueh-liang's artillery is now at Laofa. There is, however, much recruiting and commandeering of carts and animals. The merchant class still predict the arrival of Wu Pei-fu in Tientsin within a month.

Bulletin No. 22. November 15, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.14th. | | | | | | |
| 10:45 AM | Tientsin C | Kuyeh | | 200 | 6 | Recruits |
| 1:00 PM | Tientsin C | Tongshan | | 200 | 19 | 4-3" Guns |
| 2:10 PM | Tsinanfu | Tongshan | | 25 | 17 | Equipment |
| 3:10 PM | Suchowfu | Tongshan | 4th Div | 900 | 22 | |
| 6:00 PM | Tientsin C | Tongshan | 1st Div | 300 | 10 | Artillery |
| 8:00 PM | Yangliutsing | Lanchow | | 300 | 15 | 60 animals |
| 11:00 PM | Yangliutsing | Lanchow | | 350 | 10 | Artillery |
| 11:50 PM | Tientsin C | Lanchow | 1st Div | 150 | 10 | |
| Nov.15th | | | | | | |
| 1:10 AM | Tientsin C | Liechuang | | 300 | 13 | |
| 3:00 AM | Laofa | Liechuang | | 800 | 20 | |
| 5:00 AM | Tsinanfu | Tongshan | | 200 | 17 | Artillery |
| 11 Trains | | | | 3725 | 159 | |

The train movement for this period verified the reports of yesterday that the entire Fengtien concentration is being rapidly moved north and outside of the Wall. The Chinese opinion in Tientsin is now that an agreement has been forced upon Chang Tso-lin by the Japanese which is to the effect that they will refuse further support to Chang if he remains in Chihli and south of the Wall.

This attitude on the part of the Japanese now coincides with their attitude last year when they insisted up to the last that Chang would not move into Chihli Province. However in spite of their advice, Chang's forces pushed south and have been in possession of the four best Provinces of North China since. The Japanese have been endeavoring in every way to arrange for his withdrawal for the last year as they have felt the risk is too big with his forces so scattered and that if he were defeated in Chihli again as in 1922 the victors would doubtless push him out of Manchuria proper and a very difficult situation would arise for them if, for instance, Wu Pei-fu who is so anti-Japanese was in charge.

The Japanese Headquarters in Tientsin have been very optimistic throughout all the present emergency and have insisted that there would be no war in North China this year. From the present unprecedented developments it would appear that they have had the situation well in hand from the start and whether an agreement has been arrived at between Feng and Chang or not Chang Tso-lin will retire to Mukden and be able to hold Manchuria against all odds.

Shantung is now reported to be practically free of Fengtien troops and Sun Chuan-fang arrived in Tsinanfu on the afternoon of the 14th.

Units of the 2nd Fengtien Division detrained at Liangwangshuang, about 20 miles south of Tientsin on the Tsin-Pu railway, and marching north and west passed through the American Defense Sector south of Tientsin during the day. These troops encamped in villages south of Tientsin but north of the Tsin-Pu Railway spur running to the Hai Ho. This is within the outpost line of the Defense Sector. At 5:15 PM on the 14th a regiment of about 1500 passed through the Italian Concession from Chinese City, past the northern end of the International bridge and on south through the ex-Russian Concession. All the above troops were in full field equipment with Trench Mortars and Machine Guns. Many of the villages south of Tientsin fled to the Concession areas.

Bulletin No. 23. November 16, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.15th | | | | | | |
| 8:00 AM | Tientsin C. | Kuyeh | Art. | 150 | 16 | 3-3" Guns Equip & Horses |
| 5:30 PM | " | Lanchow | 5th Div. | 300 | 15 | |
| 6:00 PM | " | " | 5th Div. | 200 | 22 | 60 Animals |
| 7:30 PM | " | " | 2nd Div. | 250 | 10 | 150 Animals |
| 8:00 PM | " | " | 4th Div. | 250 | 12 | 4-3" Guns |
| Nov.16th | | | | | | |
| 12:15 AM | " | " | | 100 | 25 | Supplies |
| 6 Trains | | | | 1250 | 100 | |

Bulletin No. 23 - Cont'd.

1730 men and 14- 3" Guns were at the Station awaiting transportation.

The train movements during the twenty-four hours show further rapid withdrawal of the Fengtien forces northward. It will be noted that all these troops have been marched into Tientsin Central and loaded there. These troops have all been stationed between Tientsin and Peking and are being marched into Tientsin.

No troop trains came from the south during this period although approximately 5000 passed east along the Tientsin-Pukow spur just south of Tientsin and moved on down the Taku motor road toward Taku. The main Fengtien force from Shantung appears to have arrived although none of the Russian Brigade have yet been identified as passing in or around Tientsin.

No more troops have passed through the Foreign Defense Sectors although the troops from Shantung passed just within and parallel to the outpost line of the American Defense Sector.

The airplane field south of Tientsin is marked off and there is a detachment of 10 men and a non-commissioned officer who states that the Fengtien airplanes from Techow and Machang are expected to arrive to-day. These will doubtless be dismantled here and shipped back to Mukden.

The down train on the Tsin-Pu line is only going as far as Techow at present which is another indication that Tsinanfu, Shantung Province, is not under Fengtien control.

Bulletin No. 24. November 17. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.16th. | | | | | | |
| 3:45 PM | Tientsin C. | Lanchow | 5th Div | 200 | 24 | 3-3"Guns;Equipment |
| 4:30 PM | Laofa | " | " | 60 | | Infantry |
| Nov.17th. | | | | | | |
| 2:30 AM | Tientsin C. | Leichang | Inf. | 400 | 17 | 60 anaimals |
| 4:45 AM | Langfang | " | | 200 | 13 | 8 cars equipment |
| 4 Trains | | | | 860 | 54 | |

The movement of troops is daily becoming smaller and from all indications the war for this year has been definitely postponed. Between 20,000 and 25,000 Fengtien troops have been sent north by rail and overland through Tientsin in the last four days. Part of these troops came from the Shantung front and part from Chihli Province between Tientsin and Peking along the railway and to the south. It is reported that many troops have gone east over the road between Peking and Shanhaikuan but no estimate of their number or destination of units has been obtained.

It is reported that much looting has been going on in many villages around Tientsin. Soldiers are selling mules, carts and Chinese girls from the villages for Five Dollars, local currency, a piece.

At about 10:00 P.M. a Chinese troop train arrived at Tientsin East station alongside the train which is being loaded for the Loyal British Regiment which departs on the 17th. British guards were aboard the train. It is reported several shots were fired through the British train by the Chinese troops.

There is no information of the movement of the Allied troops from the south although it is verified that no Fengtien troops are stationed south of Techow.

Bulletin No. 25. November 18. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.17th | | | | | | |
| 9:40 AM | Mukden | Tientsin C | | 7 | 1 | Gen.Officer & Staff |
| 12:15 PM | Laofa | Kuyeh | | 150 | 21 | Equip;40 Animals |
| 1:30 PM | Tientsin C | Kuyeh | | 150 | 18 | 2-3" Guns |
| 2:20 PM | Yangtsun | Lanchow | 9th F A | 150 | 23 | 4-3" Guns |
| 2:55 PM | Laofa | Kuyeh | | 500 | 11 | 3 Machine Guns |
| 5 Trains | | | | 957 | 74 | |

The military situation is unchanged; however, the withdrawal of troops continues.

The exact agreement which has been arrived at between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang representatives is yet unknown but indications at present do not agree with the reported Fengtine withdrawal to Lutai. It is believed that Chang Tso-lin will retain Tientsin and vicinity until he is forced out. The present reports state Chunliangcheng will be the headquarters of the Fengtien forces for the Tientsin area of their occupation.

The troops which went overland south of Tientsin from the Tsin-Pu line have arrived at Tangku and are being transported north. Eight trains moved out toward Mukden during the afternoon of the 17th.

Bulletin No. 26. November 19. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin East Station.

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.18th. | | | | | | |
| 11:50 PM | Langfang | Shanhaikwan | Inf | 300 | 26 | Mixed troops |
| 11:55 PM | Tientsin C | Kuyeh | 2nd Brig | 250 | 18 | 100 animals |
| | | | | 550 | 44 | |

This is the smallest movement of troops yet and would indicate that the Fengtien withdrawal is about complete.

In addition to the eight troop trains which left Tangku on the 17th, approximately 4,000 troops were reported to be marching overland from Tangku and had passed Lutai on the 18th.

It is reported from Paotingfu that the Fengtien withdrawal was not accomplished before the arrival of the Kuominchun troops from Honan and a fight took place on the 17th between some smaller units near Chengtingfu but the Mukden troops immediately retreated eastward. The Fengtien withdrawal apparently only clears the Peking-Hankow and the intervening country east to the Tsin-Pu will remain occupied by the troops of Li Ching-lin.

The war, from all indications, is over and as is usually the case the outcome was most unexpected and an alignment is already proceeding for an undoubted renewal of hostilities in the not distant future. According to the press reported agreement a sort of joint military administration office is to be established in Tientsin with both Feng and Chang equally represented. It will be the duty of this body to maintain peaceful conditions between the "Christian" General's Soviet equipped troops and Chang Tso-lin's Mukden army with its Japanese support. This is too good to be true but predictions cannot be made in a country where things do not happen according to precedent or experience. However, after every lull we have a storm and at present the lull is on.

Bulletin No. 27. November 20, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.19th. | | | | | | |
| 6:20 AM | Yangtsun | Kuyeh | | 600 | 22 | 30 Animals |
| 7:00 AM | Yangtsun | Lanchow | | 50 | 15 | 100 animals |
| 7:45 AM | Yangtsun | Kuyeh | 7th Art | 120 | 20 | 100 animals |
| 5:10 PM | Anting | Lanchow | | 950 | 24 | 75 animals |
| 11:50 PM | Anting | Lanchow | | 700 | 21 | 60 animals |
| Nov 20th. | | | | | | |
| 4:10 AM | Langfang | Kuyeh | | 650 | 25 | 60 animals. |
| 6 Trains | | | | 3070 | 127 | |

At 9:30 AM the 19th 3,000 men, 1100 animals, 500 carts, with 8 - 3" Guns and 8 Machine Guns, passed East Station marching toward Tangku.

Chang Hsueh-liang left at 12:10 AM on the 20th by special train for the North.

The general situation remains unchanged. Fengtien troops, however, continue to arrive overland and by rail. During the day one regiment was reported as marching east along the Tsin-Pu spur toward Taku Road. More troops may be expected from the south if a real withdrawal is taking place as none of the Russian Brigade has yet appeared.

There has been no special order for concentration of rolling stock but the general order is for the supply to be continual until the withdrawal is completed. Langfang is now practically evacuated. The report in the Bulletin that Chunliang-cheng would be the Headquarters of Chang Hsueh-liang was in error as this town is also now clear of troops and the Young General has gone North.

Bulletin No. 28. November 21, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin East Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.20th. | | | | | | |
| 9:30 AM | Langfang | Lanchow | Infantry | 900 | 20 | 4-3" Guns |
| 4:10 PM | Tientsin C | Kaiping | Air Service | 1500 | 17 | 10 animals |
| 10:10 PM | Langfang | Kuyeh | | 50 | 4 | 50 animals |
| 10:55 PM | Langfang | Kuyeh | | 50 | 10 | 60 animals |
| 11:50 PM | Langfang | Kuyeh | Infantry | 50 | 17 | 50 animals |
| Nov 21st | | | | | | |
| 1:25 AM | Tientsin C | Mukden | | | 10 | Equipment |
| 2:20 AM | Tientsin C | Chinwangtao | | 800 | 17 | 40 animals |
| 4:20 AM | Laofa | Kuyeh | | 650 | 22 | 70 animals |
| 6 Trains | | | | 4000 | 117 | |

The general situation remains as confused as ever with neither the Chinese nor foreign observers being able to furinsh any logical reasoning for the unprecedented conditions. The Fengtien withdrawal continues unabated. Chang Hsueh-liang is reported to have left Tientsin for the north after a disagreement with Li Ching-lin but this is unconfirmed and his departure may have been merely to maintain contact with his 4th Division which is being withdrawn to Lutaix and north.

Troops continue to arrive overland in the Tientsin vicinity from the south along the Tsin-Pu railway. They arrive at Tu Cheng, a village south of Tientsin but just within the American Sector where they stay all night and move out the following day over the Tientsin-Taku motor road to Hsi Ku, a village opposite Tangku. They cross the Hai Ho here and either continue the march north or are entrained for Shanhai-kuan.

Bulletin No. 29. November 22, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.21st. | | | | | | |
| 11:15 AM | Langfang | Tongshan | | 500 | 17 | 4 cars equipment |
| 1:40 PM | Tientsin C | Peitsang | 1st Div. | 125 | 15 | 11 cars ponies and equip. |
| Nov.22nd. | | | | | | |
| 1:30 AM | Tientsin C | Hankn | 1st Div | 315 | 10 | |
| 3 Train | | | | 940 | 42 | |

The general situation is unchanged. No troops arrived during this period from the south.

It is reported that Li Ching-lin's private train is on the tracks with steam up ready for Li's departure northward. It will be noted that units of Li's 1st Division are being withdrawn northward.

Four airplanes from Peitsang passed over Tientsin for the north during the day.

The definite reason for Chang Tso-lin's precipitate withdrawal still remains a mystery for neither Feng Yu-hsiang with his Kuominchun nor Sun Chuan-fang's Allied force have advanced in strength any nearer the Fengtien positions since the rapid withdrawal began some days ago.

Bulletin No. 30. November 23rd. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.22nd. | | | | | | |
| 10:40 AM | Yenchowfu | Mukden | Inf | 1500 | 31 | 100 animals |
| 11:30 AM | " | " | | 310 | 26 | 20 carsequipment |
| 1:35 PM | Tsangchow | Yangtsun | 2nd Div Inf | 900 | 16 | |
| 2:00 PM | " | " | " | 635 | 16 | 3 cars ponies |
| 3:30 PM | " | " | " | 1000 | 20 | |
| 6:05 PM | " | " | " | 1000 | 26 | 7 cars equipment |
| 6:15 PM | Tientsin C | " | " | 700 | 17 | 3 cars equipment |
| 8:15 PM | Tsinanfu | " | 2nd Div Art | 900 | 25 | 12-3" Guns |
| 9:20 PM | " | " | " | 1100 | 29 | 8-3" Guns |
| Nov.23rd. | | | | | | |
| 3:00 AM | Techow | " | | 300 | 16 | 4 cars equipment |
| 10 Trains | | | | 8345 | 222 | |

This is the largest movement of troops from the south over the Tientsin-Pukow and indicates that the withdrawal now even includes many troops north of Tehchow. It is not yet clear why these troops did not move on up the Peking-Mukden toward Shanhaikuan. This large movement may indicate a Fengtien concentration around Tientsin or it maye be the beginning of a withdrawal from Tientsin proper, for such a move has been rumored for several days in the Native City. It is very difficult to offer any explanation for this apparently panicky flight of the best trained and equipped army that has ever been organized by the Chinese. No fighting of any consequence has yet occurred; yet for reasons best known to Chang Tso-lin his entire force is hurrying back to Manchuria, surrendering without an effort all the gains made during the entire Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924.

Reports are to the effect that Sun Chuan-fang has now been made supreme commander of the Allied Armies since there has been so much hesitation on Wu Pei-fu's part to assume direct command and come to the front.

There is no report of the movement of Feng Yu-hsiang's 1st Kuominchun troops but Yueh Wei-chun's forces continue tomadvance into Shantung.

Bulletin No. 31. November 24, 1925.

The follwoing trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.23rd. | | | | | | |
| 10:25 PM | Yangliutsing | Hanku | | 200 | 20 | 4 - 3" Guns. |
| 11:10 PM | Yangliutsing | Hanku | | 240 | 23 | 0 cars equipment |
| Nov.24th. | | | | | | |
| 2:00 AM | Tehchow | Lanchow | | 400 | 25 | 12 Trench Mortars |
| 4:00 AM | Tehchow | Lanchow | Guards | 20 | 17 | Supplies |
| 3:50 AM | Tehchow | Lanchow | | 350 | 22 | 5 cars equipment |
| 5 Trains | | | | 1210 | 108 | |

No further trains went to Yangtsun or toward Peking during this period. It is reported that approximately 5,000 troops left Peitsang and vicinity overland for Tongshan and Lanchow. This is undoubtedly part of the troops which arrived there from the south yesterday.

All reports seem to indicate that there has been no change made in the definite plans of withdrawal of the Fengtien forces northward. Rumors of a change of heart on the part of the Mukden authorities in that they are now concentrating for an attack on Peking are all unconfirmed. In fact movements now indicate that Tientsin will be evacuated without a blow if the southern advance of the Kuominchun continues as at present. Li Ching-lin is still in the Native City but it is reported all preparations have been made for his departure on very short notice.

General Sun Yueh, the present Tupan of Shensi, it is reported, has been chosen by the Kuominchun as the Tupan of Chihli Province after the Fengtien forces have evacuated within the coming month.

Most of the Russian troops of Chang Tsung-chang have been captured, it is reported, and the few who escaped are now scattered through the country around Tsinanfu.

Bulletin No. 32. November 25, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Stations:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | EAST | | | |
| Nov.24th. | | | | | | |
| 9:00 AM | Tientsin C | Lutai | | 1000 | 17 | 1 car rifle ammunition |
| 9:45 AM | Natice City | Tongshan | | | 22 | Equipment |
| 10:30 AM | " " | " | | 200 | 19 | 11 cars equipment |
| | | | CENTRAL | | | |
| 3:15 PM | Tsinanfu | Yangtsun | 6 & 7 Cav | 135 | 25 | 12 cars ponies |
| 7:35 PM | Peking | Mukden | | 30 | | Passenger train |
| 5 Trains | | | | 1365 | 83 | |

At 5:20 P.M., 4 Officers and 110 men arrived at Tientsin Central Station from the Native City and took over Station guard. One hundred and fifty Fengtien troops have occupied the Tientsin East Station.

The Peking-Mukden line has been but at Changli and Pei Ta Ho and all wire communications are out north of Tongshan. All traffic on the Peking-Mukden has been stopped north of Tongshan. Regular traffic is still maintained between Tientsin and Peking.

According to reports from the Japanese Consulate, Li Ching-lin and Kuo Sung-lin have combined against Chang Tso-lin and have requested his resignation in favor of Chang Hsueh-liang. This coalition of Li and Kuo is also working directly with Feng Yu-hsiang and the Central Government. It is rather doubted by this office that Li and Kuo Sung-lin are together on this move as there was much friction between Li and Kuo in Tientsin ten days ago when Kuo was here.

Bulletin No. 32 - Cont'd.

Fighting has occurred at Lanchow and Shanhaikuan between forces reported to be loyal to Chang Tso-lin and the troops under command of Kuo Sung-lin. The Japanese Military Headquarters reports that General Kuo's troops were disarmed at Shanhaikuan and are now held in arrest. The Japanese Military telegraph is the only line of communication open between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan.

It isreported from Chinese sources that a coup d'etat has occurred in Mukden and that Chang Tso-lin with most of his Staff, including Yang Tu-ting, are in arrest. Troops under the influence of General Kuo Sung-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang are in possession of the Fengtien Military Headquarters. This report has not been confirmed.

The situation in Tientsin Native City is quiet although all the Fengtien Communication authorities have fled and the present railway administration have put on new uniforms.

There are at present not over 1000 Chinese troops in Tientsin Native City. There are approximately 5000 troops at Peitsang and Yangtsun but their allegiance is yet undetermined.

The advance into Shantung continues and Chang Tsung-chang's remaining few troops are reported as going toward Tsingtao. The Tientsin-Pukow trains are still running to Tehchow.

Feng Yu-hsiang's troops are reported in Tungchow, east of Peking, but he has moved none along the Peking-Mukden.

Bulletin No. 33. November 26. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:40 AM | Machang | Tientsin C | 2nd Div Inf | 1600 | 34 | 8 Cars equipment. |
| 4:45 PM | Tehchow | Tientsin C | | 40 | 1 | Special train. Upon disembarking these men, coming from Tsinanfu and en route to Kuyeh, were disarmed by Li Ching-lin's men. |

The movement of troop trains has been practically at a standstill. Passenger traffic has been maintained between Tientsin and Peking and the line to Chinwangtao was open last night long enough to permit the passage of the Corinthian Special which arrived at Tientsin about 10:00 PM on the 25th. The railway authorities, however, are unable to operate trains north of Tongshan to date.

The many rumors of the various coalitions and alliances reported during this period have at least served to further complicate the motley situation as far as obtaining a correct solution of the present problem is concerned. The reported coup d'etat in Mukden is still unconfirmed. A radio as well as a telegraph message through Jehol are reported to have been received during the period, stating that the situation was quiet and nothing unusual had occurred. There is yet too much confliction to be able to give any reasonable solution; however, the following appears most plausible for the time being. Kuo Sung-lin, the commander of the Fengtien 4th Army, has allied with Feng Yu-hsiang and his troops revolted in the vicinity of Lanhsien and are now organizing. Kuo has been intimate with the Young General and very hostile to Yang Yu-ting, the present Chief of Staff for Chang Tso-lin. In recent months it has been considered by many Fengtien leaders that Chang Tso-lin was spending his time playing Mah Jongg and smoking opium and that bhis entire policy was being dictated by Yang Yu-ting and Chang's Japanese advisers. Kuo, therefore, being the most prominent of the younger Generals, has taken the matter in his own hands and allied his forces at least with Feng Yuhsiang. It is not believed that Li Ching-lin is in this coalition as he has been too aligned with the old crowd and is trusted by neither side. Li, however, has been forced into so-called neutrality in order to save his face as long as possible as he is neither able to stand off Feng Yu-hsiang nor an attack from Kuo Sung-lin whose troops far outnumber Li's. Li Ching-lin's forced retirement may be expected within the near future, a case something similar to Wang Chen-pin of the Chihli Clique of last year. As is stated above, it is yet too soom for any report

to be written with a semblance of reason on the Mukden situation as affected by Kuo's revolt at Lanhsien. The troops at Lanhsien have put on the red band of Feng Yu-hsiang's forces.

The situation in the Tientsin Native City remains quiet although Li Ching-lin's troops still guard the railway stations and are on post with fixed bayonets searching all Chinese both coming from and going to the trains. Some units from Peitsang were disarmed without resistance near the Central Station during the day by Li's troops.

The Provincial President's family from Peking are reported to have arrived in the Japanese Concession. General Yang I-teh, former Chihli Governor, has also moved into the Japanese Concession from Ho Pei, Tientsin, Native City.

Sixteen unarmed troops from Li Ching-lin's forces appeared at the South Office of the Chinese Telephone Administration in the British Concession and announced that they had come to take control. They were in charge of an English speaking Chinese Officer. The B.M.C.Police, however, intervened and they were directed to leave the Concession which they did.

The Fengtien Police authorities in the ex-German Concession have all left their posts and moved out of their residences within the Concession.

Bulletin No. 34. November 27, 1925.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin Central Station Nov. 26, 1925:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:00 AM | the West | Tientsin C | Li Ching-lin' troops | 300 | 19 | 4-3" Guns, 12 ammunition carts, 4-1 pounders, 150 animals. |
| 10:30 PM | Chang Li | Tientsin C | | 250 | 5 | Prisoners of War. |
| | | | | 550 | 24 | |

Ambassador Karahan left Tientsin by Special Car for Peking at 3:55 PM on the 26th.

The situation generally is somewhat quieter. Conditions in Mukden appear to be rather unsettled and the city is under Martial Law but Chang Tso-lin has not been arrested and from all indications is still in power. The revolt of Kuo Sung-lin at Lanhsien has been successful in the Lanhsien - Shanhaikuan area as all of Chang Tso-lin's loyal troops are now reported north of the Wall. The effect of the revolt, however, has not extended much beyond the above area. Since a certain amount of time has been consumed in organization, etc., of Kuo's forces, it has not bee announced whether Kuo will continue the advance into Manchuria or move south on Tientsin and eliminate Li Ching-lin. The railway authorities are still unable to move any trains north of Tongshan.

Conditions in the Native City, Tientsin, are unchanged, although there is a general feeling of uneasiness and many predictions of looting on a wide scale when Li Ching-lin leaves. All the merchant class fully expect Li will flee within a short time and they hope that Yang I-teh, the old Chihli Governor, will immediately take over the Police and protect their places of business.

There are no reliable reports of the movement of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops or of any further advance of the Kuominchun into Shantung.

Bulletin No. 35. November 28, 1925.

The following trains departed from Tientsin East Station Nov. 27th 1925:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:30 PM | Machang | Lanchow | | 80 | 4 | Infantry |

The movement of troop trains in the Tientsin vicinity has now practically stopped. Five Officers and 150 men (Infantry) left the Native City about noon on the 27th and marched south along the Tientsin-Paotingfu motor road. No troops have arrived in Tientsin overland, although it was reported from various Chinese sources during the day ~~that two~~

day that two brigades of Yueh Wei-chun's Kuominchun force from Paotingfu were moving overland toward Tientsin. Infantry troops, with steady marching, should cover this distance in three days. These are units of the old Hu Ching-yi troops from Shensi which caused some trouble in Tientsin last year after the defeat of Wu Pei-fu.

The Peking-Mukden is now reported clear to Shanhaikuan although beyond there a bridge has been destroyed and efforts to repair the break have so far been unsuccessful. According to a telegram at 2:00 PM, the 27th, to Li Ching-lin, General Kuo Sung-lin captured Shanhaikuan on the morning of the 27th. General Chang Hsueh-liang had arrived earlier vy boat at Chinwangtao and requested a conference with General Kuo which was refused. It is reported that Youn Chang reimbarked and went back to Mukden.

The first International train is scheduled to leave Tientsin for Shanhaikuan at 9:30 AM on the 28th. It will be followed one-half hour later by the Corinthia Special of tourists coming from Peking.

Feng Yu-hsaing is reported to have arrived at Kalgan from Paotouchen and one or two of his brigades have arrived in Peking. He now occupies Tungchow, Pei Yuan, Nan Yuan and Fengtai.

Conditions in Tientsin Native City are quiet; however, all the Chinese are expecting Li Ching-lin to flee. There are very few soldiers in or around the Native City and there has been no change of insignia indicating allegiance to Feng Yu-hsiang. Li's troops all wear a small triangle of red cloth on their breasts stating that they are Chihli Provincial troops.

Bulletin No. 36. November 29. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov.28th. | | | | | | |
| 8:50 PM | Tsinanfu | Chunliangcheng | 1st Div. | 400 | 13 | Li Ching-lin's 3rd Inf. |
| 10:15 PM | Tsinghaihsien | Chunliangcheng | " | 350 | 18 | 8 cars equipment |
| Nov,29th. | | | | | | |
| 3:00 AM | T - P Line | Chunliangcheng | " | 80 | 14 | 12 cars equipment |
| 3 Trains. | | | | 830 | 45 | |

The International train left on schedule and passed through Tongshan at 12:30 PM on the 28th, although nothing further has been reported. The track was reported clear by the railway authorities when the train left and no difficulty was anticipated in making th trip.

The military situation is unchanged and no further information has been received of the advance of the 2nd Kuominchun troops east of Paotingfu. No new information has been received from Kuo Sung-lin's Shanhaikuan front.

It is reported that much rioting by Kuomintang sympathizers occurred in Peking on the 28th. As a result of such activities, along with the general unsettled conditions, it would not be at all surprising to find the Provisional President, Tuan Chi-jui, in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin most any day now.

Bulletin No. 37. November 30. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station, Nov. 29th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:20 PM | Peitsang | Tientsin Native City | [illegible] | 20 | 1 | |
| 4:30 PM | the West | Chunliangcheng | 1st Div | 400 | 16 | 5 cars equipment. |
| 2 Trains. | | | | 420 | 17 | |

The International train arrived at 6:45 PM on the 29th in Tientsin East Station from Shanhaikuan after an uneventful trip. The track was clear the entire way except for a small block of troops near Chinwangtao. Kuo Sung-lin is in command between Tientsin and the Wall. From yesterday's report of Li Ching-lin's 1st Division troops moving up to Chunliangcheng, it would appear that they are also hurrying to join Kuo's advance. Kuo Sung-lin is at Shanhaikuan and dispatched five trains of troops during the night of the 28th to Wanchiatun, the first station north of Shanhaikuan. The small railway bridge just at the Wall had been blown out but it was sufficiently repaired to permit the passage of these trains. It was stated that Kuo is determined to continue his advance into Manchuria and will push forward as rapidly as possible. He has sufficient supplies and an abundance of artillery. At present all Fengtien troops south of the Wall, with the exception of the few in Shantung, are concentrating in the Lanhsien - Chinwangtao district. It is estimated by observers that his concentration numbers at most between 25,000 and 30,000 troops. Kuo has so far only been opposed in a small battle at Shanhaikuan on the 23rd. There are two Japanese gun boats and the Italian "Libia" at Chinwangtao. It is reported that "Young Chang" was taken off at Chinwangtao by a Japanese vessel. Kuo is apparently confident that he has sufficient forces to take Fengtien without any assistance. A brief history of Kuo's military career is attached.

It is reported from very reliable sources that the Tupan of Chihli Province, Li Ching-lin, left Tientsin by boat on the night of the 29th for Japan. Practically his entire administration has left office, most of them coming into the Concessions, and at present no one can be found who claims to be in control. The ex-German Concession, Fengtien officials are all in the Japanese Concession and no one is in charge of the administration there. A Feng Yu-hsiang supporter is expected to arrive shortly from Peking to assume control of the Provincial Administration but no intimation has yet been made as to who this may be.

Tuan Chi-jui is practically in arrest in Peking as special guards provided from the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang have been placed around his residence. Tuan had planned to leave for Tientsin on the 29th but after this was ascertained by General Lu Chung-lin, the Kuominchun leader in charge of the Metropolitan Area, the new guards were immediately posted.

## KUO SUNG-LIN

Kuo Sung-lin is a native of Mukden and is forty-three years of age. He had graduated from the Fengtien Military School and was commander of a corps in Szechuan under General Chu Tze-chao before the Revolution. After that he became a Staff Officer of the Fengtien Military Governor, Chang King-yu. Owing to his ability he entered the Peking Military College and graduated in 1917.

After his graduation he was ordered to the headquarters of Tuman troops at Canton by Mr. Wu Chien-lien, Chaiman of the House of Representatives, but did not leave North China. He later became a teacher at the Military School in Mukden while General Chang Hsueh-liang was a student of that school and made friends with General Chang.

During the civil war between Chihli and Anfu Parties (1920), he was a commander of a regiment of bodyguards for Marshal Chang and was later appointed as a regimental commander at the front. He fought bravely and was praised by General Chang who promoted him to a brigade commander after the war.

He was vice-commander of the first troops on the right flank during the civil war of Fengtien-Chihli of 1922 and defeated the troops of Chihli at Shanfang advancing toward Tehchow. But he was forced to withdraw to Shanhaikuan due tothe defeat on the left flank. He co-operated with General Li Ching-lin ( a commander of a brigade at that time) at Shanhaikuan. Last year he was a vice-commander of the 3rd Army fighting against Marshal Wu Pei-fu at Shanhaikuan for more than ten days. Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Chang Hsueh-liang highly praised him and promoted him to command the 6th Division. At the beginning of the present war, he was appointed as commander of the 4th Army.

Kuo Sung-lin - Cont'd.

He has been in actual command of all the troops nominally under the command of General Chang Hsueh-liang, as he is the only one whom the latter credits.

Bulletin No. 28, December 1, 1925.

The following train arrived at Tientsin Central Station Dec. 1st, 1925:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3:45 AM | Machang | Tientsin C | 1st Div Inf. | 300 | 23 | 14 cars equipment. |

There has been little change in the military situation during the last twenty-four hours. Kuo Sung-lin's advance is going forward and it is reported that he anticipates no opposition until he reaches Chinchowfu where the forces of Chang Tso-lin are concentrating. This places him well within Manchuria but it does expose his left flank to an attack from the direction of Jehol and the Fengtien troops from this area loyal to Chang Tso-lin are reported to be returning eastward. Kuo has his airfield at Changli where ten planes are assembled.

The Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Karahan, arrived at 5:40 PM on the Japanese steamer "Chohei Maru" from Darien. The report of his arrival in Bulletin #34 was in error as the Special Car at that time was for Mr. Alfred H. Lauberg, Soviet Consul General to Shanghai, who, accompanied by four attendants, had preceded Mr. Karahan from Moscow. According to a report from an American Missionary who travelled from Vladivostock to Darien with Karahan's train, there was great secrecy concerning his movements at all times during the trip. His special train was shifted as to schedule from time to time and although he arrived in Darien on the 25th he did not sail until the 28th.

The "Chohei Maru" docked at the German Bund and two representatives from the Soviet Consulate in Tientsin went aboard. Karahan's arrival was not made public and there was no crowd to greet him. He left the boat at 6:00 PM and spent the night at the Soviet Consulate.

The Missionary also reported that there was a large concentration of Soviet troops along the Manchurian border and much recruiting in Vladivostock. A second Russo-Japanese War, he stated, was generally expected by the Soviets in Vladivostock.

Conditions in the Native City are quiet and at present there are fewer troops in evidence than at any time for the last year. Li Ching-lin's whereabouts are yet unknown but he is not on duty and many of his administrative staff are in the Concessions.

Bulletin No. 39, December 2, 1925.

The following trains arrived at Tientsin Central Station Dec. 1st:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:40 PM | Yangtsun | Tientsin C | | 70 | 1 | Infantry |
| 10:20 PM | Machang | Tientsin C | | 60 | 2 | Infantry |
| 10:25 PM | Shanhaikuan | Tientsin Native City | | | | Generals Rong and Kuo Yung-yu |

There is little change in the military situation in Tientsin for the period. The Peking-Mukden as far as Shanhaikuan is now clear and a mail train is leaving Tientsin at 11:30 AM on December 2nd for Shanhaikuan. If this train goes through the regular passenger schedule will be started on the 3rd or 4th, according to the Peking-Mukden officials. Regular service has never been suspended between Peking and Tongshan.

The Kuominchun troops reported some days ago as coming overland from Paotingfu have arrived at Machang and at several points alont the Tientsin-Pukow. One train of about 400 Kuominchun troops arrived at 4:10 PM on the 1st at Langfang coming by rail from Peking. It is also reported that some Kuominchun have come overland to Peitsang and Yangtsun but this is unconfirmed and is believed incorrect.

Bulletin No. 39 - Cont'd.

The Shantung situation is little changed with Chang Tsung-chang's troops still holding the Tsinan-Kiaochow railway and eastern Shantung. In view of the most recent moves of the Kuominchun, however, Shantung is now surrounded on the south, west and north by troops opposing the Fengtien party and it is believed inevitable that it must soon be cleared of all Manchurian troops. It is reported that the Kuominchun are buying up the Fengtien troops as they advance in the Province and there has actually been very little fighting of any kind in Shantung proper.

The situation in Tientsin Native City is very quiet. The troops on the troop train mentioned above from Machang were from Chang Tsung-chang's forces and were disarmed on their arrival in Central Station. It is generally believed by the Chinese that a few hundred Kuominchun from Honan have come into the Native City in disguise but there is no way to verify this report. It is not apparent that any additional guards or patrols have been put on duty.

Bulletin No. 40. December 3. 1925.

This is the first day since the troop movements first started, about October 22nd, that there has been no troop or military supply trains passing through the Tientsin station.

The regular passenger train No. 3 to Shanhaikuan left Tientsin East at 11:30 AM on the 2nd and arrived without difficulty at Shanhaikuan. A down train left Shanhaikuan during the day and arrived at Tientsin at 7:00 PM. According to the railway authorities two passenger trains will be sent to Shanhaikuan on the 3rd and the same number returned. The road is clear at present and no interference with traffic is anticipated unless Kuo Sung-lin is defeated beyond Shanhaikuan.

The second International train leaves from Shanhaikuan at 9:30 AM on the 3rd with the British in command.

The military situation in Shantung is daily becoming more uncertain for the troops of Chang Tsung-chang, and the Peking-Mukden has been ordered to supply 20 trains at once to be dispatched south over the Tientsin-Pukow railway. This is undoubtedly for the evacuation of Chang Tsung-chang's forces in this directionas it may be impossible for his troops to escape by boat from Tsingtao or Chefoo. Just what will occur in case of such an attempted evacuation is hard to determine. Chang Tsung-chang is strong in announcing his allegiance to Chang Tso-lin. The few units that have arrived from Shantung have been immediately disarmed by Li Ching-lin's forces in the Native City and it is unlikely that the Kuominchun would permit a force as large as Chang Tsung-chang's to proceed toward Mukden and attack Kuo Sung-lin in the rear. The outcome of this situation is therefore most difficult to determine.

No Kuominchun have moved nearer to Tientsin on the Peking-Mukden than Langfang, reported yesterday.

The Peking-Tientsin train was detained by troops of Li Ching-lin at Yangtsun on the evening of the 2nd as it was reported several prominent politicians were aboard, who were fleeing to the Tientsin Concessions.

The situation on the Manchuria front between Kuo Sung-lin and Chang Tso-lin is very indefinite but it is assured that Kuo's headquarters are now all north of the Wall. The Japanese attitude in regard to the advance of Kuo's forces is very interesting. The Japanese have largely increased their police force in Mukden during the last ten days and have also ordered the 10th Regular Division from Liaotung Peninsular to move into Manchuria. A special meeting of the Cabinet in Tokyo provided for dispatching another regiment from Japan to Darien at once. Such activity has this has not occurred before in Chinese interprovincial wars and may mean more than a local struggle for the supremacy of some Chinese militarist. It would not be at all surprising that even though Kuo were successful in reaching Mukden none of his forces would be permitted beyond the South Manchurian Railway. It may not be that the Japanese are directly aiding Chang Tso-lin as they have recently so strongly asserted, but the definite fact is apparent that they are going to defend their holdings in Manchuria at all costs even though armed

occupation of a large portion of the country becomes necessary as they see it.

Bulletin No. 41. December 4. 1925.

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations on Dec. 3rd:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:15 AM | Tientsin C | LanHsien | | 33 | 2 | 1 car equipment |
| 6:50 PM | Tientsin C | Lutai | Li Ching-lin troops | 105 | 26 | 110 animals, 50 boxes ammunition. |
| | | | | 138 | 28 | |

There is little actual change in the general situation although the rumors are more prevalent than ever before. During the day it was reported that the Peking-Mukden had been broken between Peking and Tientsin and that a general attack on the city was hourly expected, by the Kuominchun coming from the South and West. The railway line is entirely clear and no break has occurred anywhere south of Shanhaikuan. The International train left Tientsin at 9:30 A.M. and arrived at Shanhaikuan at 6:30 PM encountering no difficulties whatsoever. No Kuominchun troops are nearer Tientsin than Langfang on the Peking-Mukden and Machang on the Tsin-Pu line which was reported several days ago. Li Ching-lin is still in office but his position is still unstable as none of the factions appear to have seriously accepted his allegiance and it is only a matter of days until his replacement must occur.

The military situation is Shantung is still indefinite with most of Chang Tsung-chang's troops massed along the Tsinan-Kiaochow railway. The arsenal at Tehchow has been practically denuded of all useful machinery and it is reported that the little which could not be removed has been wrecked. It is also reported that Chang Tsung-chang has over fifty locomotives and an abundance of rolling stock along the Tsinan-Kiaochow but due to the present distribution of hostile troops no way of retreat by rail is left open to him. Admiral Pi, who bombarded Chefoo, has definitely announced allegiance to Feng Yu-hsiang and has named his forces the Fourth Kuominchun.

No information has been received of the advance of Kuo Sung-lin on the Manchurian front.

Feng Yu-hsiang's forces have occupied Jehol. This was accomplished without fighting after the withdrawal of the Fengtien forces under General Kan toward Chaoyang.

Bulletin No. 42. December 5. 1925.

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations Dec. 4th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:30 AM | Tsang-Chow | Tientsin | | 203 | 22 | 4 cars equipment and horses |
| 10:40PM | Machang | Tientsin | LiChing-lin troops | 41 | 1 | 3rd Inf. |
| | | | | 244 | 23 | |

The second International train returned from Shanhaikuan at 5:28 PM on the 4th. The trip was uneventful and very good time was made throughout. At present Kuo Sung-lin's troops south of the Wall number about 5000 of which over 2000 are at Shanhaikuan. Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan have both been thoroughly looted and all shops are still closed at Shanhaikuan although some business is being carried on in Chinwangtao. The two Japanese gun-boats and the Italian "Libra" are still in Chinwangtao harbor. It is reported that Kuo's advance has reached Lienshan on the Peking-Mukden. Kuo, however, is preparing for a withdrawal if it becomes necessary for he is now having large systems of trenches constructed at both Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao. There are over a thousand of Kuo's troops south of the Chinwangtao vicinity. No reinforcements or supplies have arrived either by rail or overland from Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchun. A battalion is being formed for Kuo's army at Tangku from remnants of Li Ching-lin's 1st Division. From all reports Kuo has so far met with little opposition in his advance, however the big battle is not expected until he arrives near Chinchow. A report from General Sutton from Mukden states that the political

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situation is very serious and a complete change in administration may occur any day. This could indicate that little faith was placed in the loyal Fengtien troops being able to halt Kuo's advance.

The British contingent have occupied Laofa and Langfang in their railway sector and the French have sent a detachment to Yangtsun. This is claimed to have been necessary since the regular passenger trains from Peking to Tientsin have been stopped and searched several times by troops of Li Ching-lin's near Yangtsun station. There has been no attempt to wreck the trains or materially interfere with open traffic. Although the French detachment was on duty at Yangtsun, the regular passenger train from Peking, due at 4:25 PM was held up almost two hours at Yangtsun on the 4th by Li Ching-lin's detachments.

A rather extensive trench system has been constructed near Peitsang, perhaps as a withdrawal position from Yangtsun.

Bulletin No. 43. December 6. 1925.

The military situation is unchanged and there has been no movement of either troop or military supply trains during this period.

There were many rumors during the day of an impending attack on Tientsin from the south, but a patrol was made to a distance of eight miles below Tientsin and no soldiers were found nor were there any reports that they were anywhere in the whole vicinity.

The British contingent along the railway sector use a locomotive as a patrol from Peking, south to the end of their sector. During the afternoon it was discovered that Li Ching-lin's troops had mined Bridge No.31 within the British sector. The mine was immediately removed, however special care was taken thereafter causing the unusual delay of the passenger train from Peking to Tientsin which arrived several hours late. The searching of the passenger trains is still continued at Yangtsun by Li Ching-lin's forces in spite of the rather mild protest submitted to Li by the Senior Commandant.

Li Ching-lin issued another anti-Feng Yu-hsiang and anti-Soviet declaration during the day which was published in English and Chinese as an extra issue of the Far Eastern Times which is now being published daily in the Japanese Concession, Tientsin. Li is exerting every effort to hold on in Tientsin as long as possible. His most recent gesture in this direction was the dispatching of an English and Chinese advisor who jointly called on the Headquarters of the foreign contingents requesting that certain information which the advisors had be forwarded through the various headquarters to their Legations in Peking. It is not known exactly what Li hoped to accomplish by such, but the request was refused by at least three of the foreign military headquarters. It is well known that Li Ching-lin wishes the foreign military to take up their positions in the defense lines as soon as possible, thereby furnishing him some bulwark for a time anyway.

Bulletin No. 44. December 7. 1925.

The following trains left Tientsin Central Station Dec. 6th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:45 PM | Tientsin C | Yanglintsing | | 215 | 5 | Li Ching-lin's troops 50 animals. |

There has been little change in the Tientsin area. Conditions in the city are quiet but the martial law squads are becoming more active. No travel by motor or cart is permitted in the Native City after ten o'clock at night and it is reported that many Chinese have been stopped and their money and coats taken from them by the troops.

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The railway service between Tientsin and Peking is still uncertain. On the night of the 6th, the 4:25 train from Peking was again stopped by Li's troops as the rails had been removed between Yangtsun and Peitsang. According to the railway authorities this is the third time recently that the rails have been taken up in this vicinity. The passenger service from Tientsin, north, only extends to Tongshan as it was feared by the Peking-Mukden authorities that they were taking too big a chance in having the rolling stock seized by dispatching trains to Shanhaikuan. There are no passenger trains south over the Tientsin-Pukow.

The anticipated advance of the Kuominchun on Tientsin is very slowly developing. On the 6th there were only three or four Kuominchun troops at Langfang, as those detrained there some days ago had departed toward the north. In the early morning of the 7th, five trains of troops, about 2,000 arrived from Peking and detrained, marching southeast along the railway. This is undoubtedly the beginning of Feng's advance in force on Tientsin proper. It is reported that Feng has also been sending troops west from Tungchow for the last three days. These troops are undoubtedly marching over the Peking-Shanhaikuan road toward Lanchow. No troops of the 2nd Kuominchun have been reported north of Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow although it is very possible that they are much nearer Tientsin since Li's 200 troops were dispatched south yesterday.

The Japanese Headquarters as well as the railway authorities report that Kuo Sung-lin's advance has been successful and that Chang Tso-lin's forces have been routed at Chinchow. General Kuo is now in Chinchow and his troops are pursueing the scattered Fengtien forces toward Mukden. The report has not yet been confirmed but if true it means the defeat of Chang and his ultimate flight. North of Chinchow the terrain is flat and maneuvering is possible, however large rivers must be crossed before Mukden can be reached, and if Chang's forces concentrate at any one of these larger streams the advance may be halted.

The Japanese have moved their Chinese naval base from Shanghai to Port Arthur and a brigade of infantry has been placed in readiness, in Japan, to move to Manchuria at any time. It is believed that the revolt of Kuo Sung-lin came as a great surprise to the Japanese and thus a real emergency in regard to their Manchurian holdings has been precipitated, from their viewpoint at least. Such precaution as they are now taking in sending additional troops and naval vessels to China are most unusual and have never occurred before in a Chinese interprovincial war.

Bulletin No. 45. December 8, 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central Dec. 7th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:45 PM Dec.6th | North | South | | 6 | 19 | 14 cars Hay 5 cars Wood |
| 2:20 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | 3rd Inf 1st Div & 1st Cav | 480 | 30 | 80 animals. Li Ching-lin's troops. |
| | | | | 486 | 49 | |

The situation on all fronts is developing rapidly. South of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow railway, the 2nd Kuominchun attack at Tehchow and Machang on the 7th. Li Ching-lin left Tientsin for Machang by special train in the early morning of the 7th to personally direct the attack at this front. The first reports arriving from Machang stated that the advance Kuominchun units had been driven off and many captured, however later in the evening reports were current that the Kuominchun main body of 20,000 men had arrived and had occupied the city. The distance from Machang to Tientsin is about 52 miles. The latter report of the capture of Machang is doubted since the train of 30 cars of Li's troops, noted above, was not dispatched south until 2:00 AM on the 8th. The only troops at Tehchow, according to reports several days ago, were a few scattered units of Chang Tsung-chang's forces from Tsinan. Chang's large concentration at Tehchow of some weeks ago had all been withdrawn south to Tsinanfu. A Kuominchun victory at Tehchow is therefore

very probable. It is not believed that Li's forces at Machang could withstand an attack in force, for from the latest estimates, his entire concentration there is not over four thousand at most.

The situation on the Mukden front would indicate an entire collapse of Chang Tso-lin's defense forces. It has been definitely confirmed that Kuo Sung-lin's attack on Chinchow was successful and his advance resulted in a complete rout of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces opposing him. From a very reliable source in Mukden it was stated that on the morning of the 6th the situation had developed into a complete debacle and that Chang Hsueh-liang's retreating forces were near Mukden attempting to hold a hopeless position. Chang Tso-lin was expected to leave for Japan on the 6th. No further confirmation has been received from this front but it is apparently a safe prediction that Kuo Sung-lin is now in charge in Mukden. It is not believed that Kuo will take action south, such as an attack on Li Ching-lin at Tientsin, for at present his entire force is with him in Manchuria. According to his announced plan of some days ago he only desired to unseat Chang in Mukden and had no particular interest in the activities south of the wall.

The forces of the 1st Kuominchun coming from Peking to Tientsin were largely increased during the day and as a result the 4:25 PM passenger train from Peking did not arrive in Tientsin until 6 A M on the 8th. A very heavy movement of trains from the Peking-Suiyuan at Fengtai blocked all traffic south of Fengtai on the Peking-Mukden. From present indications it would appear that the 1st Kuominchun will be at Tientsin in a very few days, for Li's troops at Yangtsun and Peitsang will undoubtedly quit if they are opposed by any sizeable force.

The situation in Tientsin Native City is quiet but a general exodus towards the Concessions has started in earnest. There now appears little opposition on the part of Li's soldiers to prevent this flight, conditions being quite different from a few weeks ago when his tax officers were demanding so much likin that it was cheaper for the Chinese to leave their goods at home, running the risk of having it all looted, than to take it to safety in the Concessions.

In addition to Li's lines at Yangtsun, Peitsang and Machang it is reported he has constructed quite a system of trenches east of East Arsenal, Tientsin, flanking the Peking-Mukden.

A late report from the railway authorities state there will be no trains from Tientsin to Peking on the 8th.

Bulletin No. 46. December 9, 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Dec. 8th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:30 AM | Machang | Tientsin | | | | 28 wounded with escort. |
| 10:15 AM | Tientsin | Machang | | 66 | 7 | 5 cars Equip. 40 Horses 2 pcs 6" Art. |

There has been little change in the general situation around Tientsin during the day. Li Ching-lin's troops are still at Yangtsun and Peitsang and contrary to press reports have not been attacked by the 1st Kuominchun from Peking. On the night of the 8th however a general advance was begun by Feng's troops from Langfang toward Tientsin and several units have reached Laofa.

No additional information is available from the Mukden area.

Wounded troops are arriving in Tientsin from Machang, where according to Li Ching-lin's report he was victorious. The villagers however, south of Tientsin all state that units of the 2nd Kuominchun are only a few miles south and will be in the immediate vicinity of Tientsin today or tomorrow. It is uncertain whether or not this is more propaganda of Lin Ching-lin's to urge the foreign contingents to put out their defense lines. Li's headquarters are almost daily dispatching long letters and sending representatives to one or the other of the foreign contingent headquarters urging their cooperation in the defense of Tientsin.

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The French gunboat "ALTAIR" arrived in port on the 7th and two Japanese destroyers are expected.

The third International train, under American command, is scheduled to run to Peking at 9:30 AM on the 9th. This train will be sent to Shanhaikuan on its return from Peking.

The Peking-Mukden has been cut east of Yangtsun and also west of Yangtsun. The passenger train leaving Peking at 8:25 PM on the 8th has not yet arrived in Tientsin.

The situation in Tientsin Native City is unchanged, but the exodus of wealthy Chinese continues. Li Ching-lin's troops have recently occupied some sections south of Ho Pei district within the walled city and are moving in supplies and material. There are very few troops at present in Tientsin.

Bulletin No. 47. December 10. 1925.

The following trains passed through Tientsin Central Station Dec. 9th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:15 AM | Machang | Tientsin | | 14 | | 14 wounded with escort. |
| 2:30 PM | Tientsin | Peitsang | | 104 | 17 | 12 cars food |
| 3:00 PM | Tientsin | Peitsang | | 50 | 40 | 81 horses. |

The third International train left Tientsin East at 10:00 AM on the 9th, for Peking. News had already been received of two breaks in the railway near Yangtsun, hence the repair cars of the Railway Engineering Department were attached at East Station. The breaks were repaired, including a break at bridge No. 31 just west of Yangtsun and the train arrived in Peking at 4:00 AM on the 10th. It left Peking at 8:00 AM on the 10th on its return trip.

There were numerous rumors during the day of an imminent Kuominchun advance on Tientsin but so far this has failed to materialize. Firing was reported near Yangtsun during the morning of the 9th but there has been no battle of any consequence on this front yet. It is not believed that Feng Yu-hsiang's main body advancing from Langfang has yet arrived on the Yangtsun front and the little firing which occurred on the 9th was doubtless by patrols far in advance. According to reports from the British detachment at Laofa last night, Feng's headquarters was now at Laofa, which is about 13 miles west of Yangtsun. Thus if the advance is pushed forward and attack in strength may be expected today.

It will be noted that a train of 40 cars, practically empty, went to Peitsang in the afternoon of the 9th. From latest reports at 8:30 AM this morning, ~~600~~ 600 troops arrived in Central Station from the Yangtsun-Paotsang area and about 600 more were marched in from Ho Pei. These troops are now loading and intending to move south over the Tientsin-Pukow. This would indicate that Li Ching-lin has been successful in his efforts around Machang and may now intend to evacuate toward Shantung and join up with Chang Tsung-chang.

Reports from patrols south of Tientsin indicate no troops within a radius of 10 miles of the city.

A late report from the French detachment at Yangtsun states that the station is now held by troops of the 1st Kuominchun

The Japanese occupied their positions at the bridges in Native City during the night of the 9th, but they withdrew this morning.

Conditions in the Native City are unchanged.

Bulletin No. 48. December 11. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Stations Dec. 10th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:45 AM | Tientsin E | Lutai | Italians | 104 | | MG's Rifles & ammunition. 1 animal. |
| 8:45 AM | Yangtsun | Machang | 6th Div Inf | 1460 | 27 | 3 cars Equip. 50 animals |
| 1:45 PM | Native City | South | 2nd Regt, 3rd Mixed Brigade | 1228 | 22 | 6 cars horses |
| 3:00 PM | Tientsin C | Langfang (Outpost) | British | 10 | Note: | 1 British officer. All returned to Tientsin one hour later. |
| | | Laofa (Outpost) | French | 5 | | |

In the above report it will be noted that the train leaving Tientsin Central at 1:45 PM was sent south over the Tientsin-Pukow. This regiment was entrained from Ho Pei, Tientsin Native City, and was switched back to the Hai Ho on the Tientsin-Pukow spur just south of Tientsin proper. The regiment detrained near the river on the Tientsin-Taku motor road and marched south at 6:30 PM on the 10th. Their destination was Machang, however they were striking the Machang-Taku canal at Hsiao Chan.

The third International train which left Peking for Tientsin at 8:00 AM on the 10th, arrived at Yangtsun about 4:00 PM the same day and remained there over night as Feng's three armored trains and two large troop trains were blocking the route to Tientsin. During the night the armored trains returned to Yangtsun and the International train started south toward Tientsin at 7:00 AM on the 11th. At 7:25 AM the train was fired upon with shrapnel by the troops of Li Ching-lin near Peitsang. There was little damage to the train and no casualties. The train returned to Yang tsun. Several breaks in the railway are reported between Tientsin and Yangtsun. The fourth International train is scheduled to leave for Shanhaikuan at 10:00 AM today.

An attack in force was made by the 1st Kuominchun near Peitsang during the day and is continuing intermittently. Feng Yu-hsiang has three armored trains in the advance and is rushing up troops by rail. The result of this attack is at present unknown although Li Ching-lin has ordered all available rolling stock for the removal of his troops south over the Tientsin-Pukow. The advance units of Feng's two brigades which left Tungchow some days ago, arrived in Tongshan at 9:30 AM on the 10th and the main body arrived later in the day. Some rails were removed from the Peking-Mukden south of Tongshan but were later replaced. It is yet unknown whether these troops intend to go north as reinforcements for Kuo Sung-lin or come south for an attack on Li at Tientsin.

Li Ching-lin returned to Tientsin from Machang by motor at 7:00 PM on the 10th and a military conference was held in his Yamen in Ho Pei in the early morning of the 11th. Although no information is available of the fighting at Machang, it is believed that Li's troops have been successful and that he is now returning here to direct the defense at Peitsang.

Conditions in the Native City are very tense. At the time of Li Ching-lin's arrival, his route through the city was lined with troops and all traffic was stopped for the night. All lights were also extinguished during the night and heavy patrols were in all the main streets. The station guard was increased although there was no traffic whatsoever on the railway on in the station yards. It is the general impression that Feng's troops will arrive in Tientsin today although Li's defense at Peitsang has held longer than anticipated.

Bulletin No. 49. December 12. 1925.

There have been no troop/train movements during this period.

The third International train has been held at Yangtsun but is returning to Peking at 12 noon today. Patrols sent forward from the train about five miles south of Yangtsun, where a break in the railway has been made, were fired upon by Li Ching-lin's troops and the repair men refused to work. Fodd was supplied to

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the International train by the Chinese military commander at Yangtsun. Another International train was dispatched from East Station at 3:30 PM on the 11th as a relief. The object was to get through to Yangtsun and either transfer the passengers or bring back the regular train. This train reached Peitsang but found a bridge blown out in advance of Li's lines and the tracks mined. It was impossible to make repairs and the train is remaining at this station. A Staff Officer from Li Ching-lin's Headquarters accompanied the train.

There has been no decisive fighting on this front, however it is reported that Feng will launch a general attack during the day. Li's position is entrenched at right angles to with the railway and he has several batteries of 75's in rear positions. His entire line opened fire at 6:00 AM on the 12th with artillery, Stokes mortars, machine guns and rifles and the fir is conting intermittently. His officers also state that a general attack will be launched today.

Conditions in the Native City are little changed. An International Guard has been established at Tientsin Central. About three hundred wounded Li Ching-lin soldiers arrived from Peitsang this morning. All carts are being commandeered and empty motor trucks are drawn up in front of the military headquarters. Rumors in the city are that Li's forces have been defeated at Machang and are retreating on Tientsin from the south, but this has not been confirmed. Some troops are reported south of Tientsin.

The Japanese have placed barbed wire barricades at all entrances into their defense sector from the Chinese City and their troops are taking up their positions.

The Feng Yu-hsiang troops at Tongshan have not yet moved in either direction but have authorized the railway authorities to send one train to Shanhaikuan, but no trains go toward Tientsin.

Bulletin No. 50. December 13. 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Central December 12th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2:10 PM | Peitsang | Tientsin C | | | | Allied Train. |
| 10:00 AM | Yangtsun | Native City | | 150 | | Wounded |
| 2:15 PM | Machang | Tientsin C | 1st Div | 1260 | 21 | 3 cars Equip. Inf. |
| 6:45 PM | South | Tientsin C | 1st & 2nd Inf | 1000 | 35 | Several cars animals and equipment. This train left Tientsin Central for Peitsang front at 8:45 PM |

The Allied Relief train which was dispatched at 3:30 PM on the 11th returned to Tientsin Central at 2:10 PM on the 12th. It was impossible for this train to advance farther than Peitsang as the girders on bridge No. 27 on the Peking-Mukden railway had been moved laterally about 6 feet and the rails were removed for about fifty feet just south of the bridge. Li Ching-lin's front line crossed the railway at this point. Li's officers stated that the track beyond the bridge was mined. Due to the incessant firing the Chinese repairmen refused to work. No connection was established with the International train at Yangtsun, however some arrangements were made for the transfer by motor car through the lines, but the motor supposed to be provided by the Chinese failed to appear. Since the train at Yangtsun had returned to Peking the relief train was ordered back to Tientsin at 1:10 PM.

The situation on the Peitsang-Yangtsun front is unchanged. There has been a large expenditure of ammunition but little actual contact by the infantry. All the wounded returned to Tientsin were from shrapnel. Li Ching-lin's line extends to the right and left of the railway at bridge No. 27, for a distance of four thousand yards. His trenches are very weakly manned, approximately 2,000 troops being in the front line. He has a second line of trenches to the rear, about 800 yards,

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which are unoccupied. It is estimated by observers that Li only had about 1,000 men in his reserve, however it will be noted that the train above of 1,000 men went to reinforce his lines on the 12th. The number of Feng's troops is not known but without doubt he far outnumbers Li's forces. No decisive battle has yet been fought but it is daily expected and the odds are strongly in Feng's favor.

Yesterday afternoon the eight "Blue Express" cars which constitute Li Ching-lin's private train were pulled up on the main trac k and made ready for departure. Li arrived at Central Station at 8:00 AM on the 13th and departed for Peitsang at 8:30 AM.

The fourth International train, American commanding, is scheduled to leave East Station for Shanhaikuan at 12 noon today.

The situation in Native City is unchanged. The Japanese have constructed sand-nag machine gun positions in addition to their barricades in every main street leading into their sector. Few Chinese troops are in evidence although the martial law squads are still on duty. Small detachments are kept at the bridges and the store houses in Ho Pei.

There is no new information regarding the military situation in Shantung although it is believed that Chang Tsung-chang is attempting to send troops north to Li's assistance.

Bulletin No. 51, December 14, 1925.

One train of supplies and a few troops arrived during the day from Tehchow with Tsinan-Kiaochow locomotives which would indicate that the Tientsin-Pukow line is now open to Shantung. This is the only movement of troops or military supply trains during the day.

The fourth International train, American command, left Tientsin East for Shanhaikuan at 12:00 noon on the 13th. It arrived at Shanhaikuan at 11:45 PM and left on the return journey at 5:30 AM on the 14th, arriving at Chinwangtao at 6:00 AM. No difficutly has been encountered so far.

The situation on the Peitsang-Yangtsun front is reported favorable to Li Ching-lin. His right flank east of the railway has advanced about 10 li and has captured the village Chang Chuang-tse, taking about 200 Kuominchun prisoners. The flank is commanded by General Ku and with confirmation of this victory, Li Ching-lin immediately forwarded $50,000 as a bonus to the troops. As further confirmation of the advance of his lines north of their original position, Li has ordered the railway engineering Department to repair the bridge No. 27 which was just a few yards north of his line on the 12th. Li now states that this point is far in rear of his .present line and the repairs can be safely made. Li has about two regiments east of Tientsin in the general vicinity of Chang Kwei-chang on the Peking-Mukden where a system of trenches are constructed. About 1200 of his troops are also reported along the right bank of the Hai Ho at Ko Ku about opposite Chun Liang-cheng on the Peking-Mukden. These troops have artillery and machine guns and doubtless arribed from Machang over the Machang-Taku Canal. It is reported that the alliance quoted in the press several days ago regarding a coalition between Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang and Li Ching-lin, against the Kuominchun is correct. Li has been assured of four brigades from Chang Tsung-chang as reinforcements. These troops are to arrive within the next few days and from the arrival in Tientsin of the Shantung train noted above, it may be assumed that such reinforcement is at least possible as far as the railway route is concerned.

Feng Yu-hsiang's troops are arriving hourly in the Yangtsun vicinity from the north. His approximate strength in this area is now about 30,000. His reported flank attack is a turning movement around Li's right flank to the north and east of Tientsin, striking the Peking-Mukden about Chun Liang-cheng. It is also reporetd that another First Kuominchun column is to attack from Wang Ching-ton, west

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of Tientsin while the frontal attack at Yangtsun is a holding attack until the flanking movement develops. Feng's troops under General Tang Chih-tao at Tongshan have moved south as far as Lutai and are continuing toward Tientsin. General Tang has informed the railway authorities that he will collect all profits from this section of the Peking-Mukden. No contact between the opposing forces has yet been made on this front. It is now expected that Feng's main attack will develop in this sector and Li's only hope of success in withstanding it is immediate reinforcements from Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung.

Conditions in the Native City, Tientsin, and the outlying districts are unchanged although the influx of Chinese into the Concessions continues.

It is reported from Shantung that Chang Tsung-chang is sending forces to connect with the Hupeh troops of Wu Pei-fu in southern Honan. This will clear the way for an advance by Wu Pei-fu up the Kin-Han railway and if successful will eliminate the 2nd Kuominchun.

No additional information has arrived from the Mukden front but it is apparent that Kuo Sung-lin has not entered Mukden proper. Some of his units have crossed the Liao River but his main body is still near Sin Min-fu west of the Liao. No Kuominchun reinforcements have moved north to assist Kuo Sung-lin's advance.

Bulletin No. 54. December 15, 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Stations Dec. 14th:

| Time | From | To | Men | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7:05 PM | Chang Kwei-chang | Tang Kuan-tung | 405 | |
| 11:05 PM | Yang Liu-cheng | Chun Liang-cheng | 505 | 15 animals. |

Li Ching-lin's special train is now on the main line of the Tientsin-Pukow in Central Station and is reported to be leaving very soon for Machang.

The situation on the Peitsang front is very indefinite at present. It is reported that troops from Li Ching-lin's left flank crossed the Pei Ho and the Hun Ho moving west and north and attacked Chang Chuang on the Peking-Mukden about half way between Yangtsun and Laofa or about 8 miles west of Yangtsun. Kuominchun troops still hold Yangtsun and during the night of the 14th eighteen troop trains left Fengtai for the Yangtsun front. Reports from an observer in Li's lines on the morning of the 14th state that the left flank had not advanced north toward Yangtsun from their original position but the right flank had moved up, as reported in yesterday's Bulletin. It is not believed that the attack of Li's troops noted can be with much force and considering the large reinforcements now coming to Feng, it will have little effect on the general outcome.

The fourth International train arrived at Hsin Ho between Tientsin and Tangku on the Peking-Mukden about 1:40 PM on the 14th. Li Ching-lin's troops had damaged bridges # 4 and #5 just west of Hsin Ho so that it was necessary to remain in Hsin Ho over the night. Repairs are now being made and the train is expected to arrive in Tientsin East sometime today.

The removal of Li's troops from Chang Kwei-chang on one train and the return within a few hours of another train about the same size adds confusion to the situation. When the first train left Chang Kwei-chang for the Tsin-Pu line it was believed that Li had decided to evacuate this front. His troops train was shortly followed by about 250 troops on foot coming toward Tientsin which further confirmed this as true. Four hours later, however, he rushed back another train to the same section he had just left. Three Kuominchun trains of troops are behind the International train at Hsin Ho. These troops are units of the 2 brigades which left Tungchow and came overland to Tongshan. These troops are moving toward Tientsin as rapidly as possible, however, they will meet some opposition at or near Chun Liang-cheng.

Conditions in the Native City are unchanged. There are 200 empty cars, 20 coaches and 20 locomotives in the Central Station.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 53. December 16, 1925.

The forth International train arrived from Shanhaikuan at 7:20 PM on the 15th. The bridges Nos. 4 and 5 were repaired and the train proceeded to Chun Liang-cheng. A detachment of Li Ching-lin's forces stopped the train at this point but permitted it to go on through to Tientsin without further difficulty.

The general military situation in the immediate vicinity is little changed. The attack of Li's forces on Chang Chuang noted in yesterday's Bulletin was apparently successful as it is reported that there is now a general retirement of the Kuominchun from Yangtsun to Laofa. All troop trains from Peking are now being discharged at Laofa and the position is being heavily entrenched. Large trains of reinforcements are hourly arriving in the vicinity of Laofa and many dead and wounded are being sent back toward Peking. On the morning of the 15th Li's line at Peitsang was in its original position to the west of the railway, but on the eastern side it had advanced about 10 li as stated several days ago, however, the advance was still from three to four miles from Yangtsun. Li Ching-lin has received no reinforcements from the south, on this front.

It is reported from the Machang front on the Tientsin-Pukow that there has been heavy fighting from Tehchow north to Machang and that the 2nd Kuominchun have been successful in this area. Tehchow is now reported to be held by the Kuominchun and all of Chang Tsung-chang's troops have been withdrawn to Tsinan. As further verification of the fighting in this area, approximately 250 wounded arrived in Central Station last night from Tangkuantun, a station on the Tientsin-Pukow just north of Machang. These troops reported hand to hand fighting at Machang during the day with the Kuominchun and that they had withdrawn toward Tientsin. If this is correct it will preclude all possibility of any reinforcemrnt coming from Shantung for Li Ching-lin.

A brisk bombardment was kept up during the 15th at a point about four miles west of West Station, Tientsin. It is reported that this attack is on Tientsin, being made by units of the 2nd Kuominchun which have come overland from the Peking-Hankow railway. This fighting is the nearest to Tientsin that has yet occurred.

The Kuominchun troops entraining at Tongshan have all detrained at Peitsang, just north of Hanku on the Peking-Mukden. The rolling stock for this movement of troops south was all sent from Shanhaikuan and their con - centration has been as a result, rather slow. Their apparent strength is about eight thousand. Li Ching-lin's troops on this front are entrenched at Chun Liang-cheng at right angles with the railway for a total distance of about 2500 yards. His entire force approximates about two regiments or at most fifteen hundred. He has a small second line about one mile west of his front line trenches. There has been no contact as yet on this front.

The situation in the Native City is unchanged. Press gangs are collecting coolies to handle the dead and wounded. No recruits are being sent to the front. Li Ching-lin's train is still on the main track with steam up. Many rumors are current in the Native City that Feng's organization is breaking up in a way similar to Chang Tso-lin's. It is reported that Feng has gone to Paotow and has recalled his troops from Jehol to Kalgan. General Li Chung-lin, Feng's leader in Peking and General Tang, commanding Feng's troops at Tongshan have been bought over. General Chang Chi-chiang, commanding the Kuominchun at Yangtsun has decided to join the Chihli forces. None of the above rumors have been confirmed but under the present conditions almost anything may happen. The most improbable rumor today may be a stern reality tomorrow.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 54, Dec. 17, 1925:

The following is a report of train movements through Tientsin Central on December 16th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars. | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4:20PM | Tang Kuan-tun | Tientsin C | | 40 | 3 | Mostly recruits |
| 10:AM | Tientsin C | Peitsang | | 120 | 8 | Supplies & clothing. |

The military situation is little changed. On the Laofa front it is reported by the Japanese that the Kuominchun are again about to be flanked out of Laofa. A strong column of Li Ching-lin's troops which are advancing around the right flank of the Kuominchun, are about to attack Langfang, which is in rear of the present Kuominchun line. It is reported by the British that no further Kuominchun reinforcements are coming south of Peking. No reinforcements have yet arrived from Shantung for Li Ching-lin.

The fronts are unchanged. The Kuominchun from Tongshan have arrived at Tanku and the bridges that were repaired by the International train between Hsin Ho and Chun Liang-cheng have again been blown up by Li's troops.

At about 5:00PM on the 16th, it was reported that there were four motor trucks full of armed Chinese soldiers in the southern end of the ex-German Concession. Upon investigation it was found that this detachment was the personal body-guard of some very high military official and that the troops had come through the concession from Li Ching-lin's Yamen in Ho Pei. The troops were very heavily armed and remained at the corner of Taku and Tangku Roads in the Concession for about one hour, when the trucks were filled with oil and gas. One car in the convoy was a large touring car with the curtains drawn and when they started south over Taku Road this car was placed between two trucks heavily loaded with troops. The destination of this detachment was said to be Hsiao Chan.

Conditions in the Native City are unchanged. The Japanese detachments stationed in their defensive sector are stopping all vehicles coming from the Native City.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 55, December 18th 1925:

The following is a report of train movements at Teintsin Stations, Thursday, December 17th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Cars. | Men | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:35 AM | Tientsin E | Chun Liang cheng | 6th Div. | 3 | 18 | 5 animals and arty ammunition to 6th Div. |

The general military situation is unchanged. From latest authentic reports Yangtsun is still held by the Kuominchun forces with Li Ching-lin's line advance to Hankou on the Pei Ho, north of Peitsang. The flanking movement of Li's on Langfang has not yet developed, however, it is reported that Kuominchun Headquarters has been moved to Fengtai from Langfang. In spite of the many rumors of reinforcements from Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung, none have arrived so far.

During the afternoon of the 17th, the foreign residents of the Taku-Tangku vicinity requested the British Consul-General at Teintsin to provide means for their transportation to Tientsin as they had been reliably informed that fighting was imminent between the Kuominchun coming south from Peitang and Li Ching-lin's troops moving up over the Machang canal toward Taku from

Hsiao Chan. No fighting was yet occurred however in this vicinity. The 9th Division Headquarters of the 1st Kuominchun is now in Hanku and it is reported that the 8th Kuominchun Division is expected to arrive in this vicinity at an early date.

The railway engineering department of the Peking-Mukden sent a repair train north towardd Langtsun during the day but fighting was still too close for the workmen to do any repairing on Bridge No. 27, which has been damaged ever since the fighting started on this front. This is reported to be the only real break in the railway between Peking and Tientsin although some rails may have been taken out at other places.

According to report from Missionaries at Tehchow the city is now in the possession of Chang Tsung-chang after ten days fighting.

At about 7: AM on the 18th, the 1st Infantry regiment of the 1st Division and three troops of Cavalry arrived from Machang aboard two trains, at a point just south of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow spur at the Hai Ho. These troops, approximately 1200, detrained and moved south over Taku road for Hsiao Chan. It is reported that Li has moved some artillery to the vicinity of Taku from Machang and plans to prevent an advance on Tientsin by the Kuominchun either by rail from Tangku or overland along the Taku road.

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Intelligence Bulletin No.56, December 19, 1925:

The following is a report of train movement s form Tientsin Central, Friday, December 18th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars. | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8:PM | Tientsin C | Tang Kuan-tun | 3rd Inf | 1500 | 20 | 3 cars equipment. Li's Body-guard. |
| 9:37 PM | Tientsin C | Tang Kuan-tun | 3rd Inf | | 12 | 4 cars supplies & animals. |
| | (Li Ching-lin's Special with Gen. Li on board) | | | | | |

The military situation is unchanged. The reason for the departure of Li Ching-lin for Tang Kuan-tun on the Tientsin-Pukow, just north of Machang, is not known. It is reported from reliable sources that some reinforcements are on they way north from Shantung and it may be that Li has gone south for a conference with this force. The fact that his entire body-guard accompanied him is very unusual as this has only been done before when an antire Headquarters was transferred from one location to another.

There has been little fighting on any of the fronts during the day and no troops have been moved in the vicinity of Tientsin during this period. General Tang Chih-tao on command of the Kuominchun troops at Lutai has requested the Peking-Mukden railway authorities to repair the bridges between Hsin Ho and Chun Liang-cheng as he wishes to come to ientsin with his troops. This doubtless means that arrangements have been made whereby General Tang is moving over to Li Ching-lin's leadership. The bridges were repaired on the night of the 18th and regular traffic will soon be resumed to Tongshang.

British Consular officials went to Taku on the moring of the 18th, aboard a launch, with Marines from H.M.S. "Hollyhock" to investigate the situation regarding hostilities on this front. This was in reply to the requestof the foreign civilian population in the Taku-Tangku vicinity noted in Yesterday's bulletin.

Bul. No. 54 Cont'd.

The Native City is very quiet. The Japanese have withdrawn their sentries at the Native City bridges and also the detachments in their Concession guard [illegible] which have been on duty for several days.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 57, Dec. 20th 1925:

Following is a report of train movements at Teintsin Stations Saturday, December 19th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars. | Remarks/ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:40 PM | Yang Kuan-tun | Tientsin C | 3rd Inf | | 12 | Li Ching-lin's Special. |
| 12/20th: | | | | | | |
| 1:30 AM | Tientsin C | Machang | | 104 | 2 | Armored cars, 2 pcs 65 Mm arty. 5 M.Gs. |
| 2:25 AM | Yang Liutsing | Changkwuichang | | 400 | 23 | 500 animals, 4 pk 3rd arty. |

The military situation is unchanged. Li Chingslin's train with Li aboard returned as noted above, however, the large troop train accompanying him south yesterday did not return.

Armed Chinese troops were reported coming up the river during the day at a point within the Tientsin-Pukow railway spur. Upon investigation it was found that raiding parties of Li Ching-lin's troops had been visiting the villages east of the river but were not attempting to come into Tientsin.

The railway between Tientsin and Tangku is again broken and all telephone and telegraph communications were reported out during the day.

The British Consulate launch reported yesterday as going to Taku has not yet returned.

Press gangs are again working in the Native City, Tientsin, and deserters are being rounded up. Refugees continue to arrive from the outlying villages. Li now has one company of bicycles doing patrol work in the city.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 58, Dec. 21.st 1925:

Following is a report ot train movements at Tientsin Stations, Sunday, December 20th:

| Time | From | To | Unit. | Men. | Cars. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9: PM | Tientsin E | Chun Liang-cheng | | | 6 | Ammunition under guard. |

There has been no material changes in the military situation during this period.

The British Consulate launch returned from Taku on the 20th, and reported that there were four trains of Kuominchun troops at Hsin Ho. The small detachment which Li Ching-lin had at Tangku was dispersed Friday morning. At present the Kuominchun troops are repairing Bridges No. 4 and 5 and are slowly working their way to Chun Liang-cheng. The railway authorities report that eight Kuominchun trains are coming toward Tientsin from Lutai. All communications including telephone, telegraph and cable telegraph connections have been cut between Tientsin and Taku.

Bulletin No. 58 Cont'd.

Five hundred troops arrived in Central Station overland from the Peitsang front at 3: PM on the 20th. These troops had full field equipment and 18 machine guns. They were loaded immediately but are still at Central Station. Li Ching-lin's train has been on the main track of the Tientsin-Pukow line headed for Machang since the afternoon of the 20th, and at present his body-guard is lining the street to the station and his departure at any moment is expected.

At about 3 :00 PM on the 20th, the Martial Law detachments were much augumented in the Ex-Russian and Ex-Austrian concessions and they were very active until 7:30 Pm the 20th, when it is reported they were withdrawn. They stopped all Chinese and foreigners at the International Bridge and several foreigners in cars already within this area. The Postal Commissioner was given an armed escort to the International Bridge when he departed for his home in the evening, from his offices in the Central Post Office. The Italians had their guard on duty at the Police Yamen Bridge, ex-Austrian concession. No definite reason for the above actions on the part of the Chinese is known. There was a rumor in the city during the afternoon that the Kuominchun were occupying a village just south east of the Russian Concession and it may have been a precautionary measure until this report could be investigated.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 59. Dec. 22nd 1925:

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations, Monday, December 21st:

| Time: | From | To | Unit: | Men | Cars. | Remarks: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12:15Pm | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | | 6 | 1 | Armored train. 4 field pcs & 2 M Gun |
| 12/22nd: | | | | | | |
| 6:30 AM | Tientsin | Peitsang | | 6 | 5 | Supplies. |

The fifth International train, Japanese commanding, left for Shanhaikuan at 10:30 AM today. The third train which has been at Peking for some time is scheduled to start on its return to Tientsin at 6:30 AM on the 23rd. The French out-post at Yangtsun reports that in addition to the break in bridge No.27 that about 2100 meters of track have been taken up by the Kuominchun and the ties and rails used in trench construction.

The military situation is rapidly developing at the present. At 4:00 AM on the 22nd a general attack was started on the Peitsang front by the Kuominchun forces. The attack is an enveloping movement from the west of Tientsin and at the same time pushing the frontal attack. Li's troops are now reported south of Peitsang and in full retreat. Li has no reserves to stem the attack but he is feverishly attempting to bring up his force from Chun Liang-cheng. The Japanese, French and Italians have placed their detachments in their defense lines. Rifle fire can be distinctly heard from the Native City and at present it is apparent that Li's entire front at Peitsang is collapsing. Airplanes of both sides have been flying but there has been little or no attempt at bombing. The Japanese consider the situation very serious and have taken all precautions possible in their sector. Feng's forces are estimated by the Japanese at between sixty and seventy thousand.

All telegraph communications are still out. The Japanese military line from Tientsin to Taku on the south side of the river to their detachment of 11 men at Tangku is, however, still intact.

It is reported from Taku that Kuominchun troops are now in possessionand all boats coming and going to Tientsin are being fired upon in this vicinity by these troops. It isxannounced that the Kuominchun will board and search all vessels coming to Tientsin, for war material. This has been caused by the arrival on Sunday of a shipment of ammunition for Li by boat under Japanese register from Darien. The report of the searching of vessels at Taku has not been confirmed.

Bulletin No. 60, December 23, 1925.

The following trains cleared Tientsin Stations Dec. 22nd:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10:45 AM | Tientsin E | | | | | Allied Train |
| 10:45 AM | Chang Kuei Chuang | Peitsang | 6th Div | 20 | 1 | Armored train |
| 11:40 AM | Tientsin E | Tientsin C | Det.1st Inf | 354 | 4 | Went to Peitsang |
| 3:00 PM | Chun Liang-cheng | Peitsang | 2nd Inf | 615 | 18 | 6 animals |
| 6:30 PM | " " " | Tientsin E | | | | Allied train |
| Dec.23rd. | | | | | | |
| 4:00 AM | Chang Kuei | Tientsin C | | 18 | 1 | |
| 3:30 PM | Tientsin C | Peitsang | 3rd Inf | 1500 | 32 | |

The fifth International train leaving Tientsin at 10:30 AM on the 22nd, Japanese commanding, was stopped by rifle fire of Kuominchun troops at a point about 5 miles east of Chun Liang-cheng. An armored Kuominchun train advanced in front of the International train and Infantry was deployed to prevent any further advance. The Commander of the Kuominchun front came aboard the International train and after inspecting it stated that he had definite orders to stop their advance and insisted that they turn back to Tientsin immediately. Attempts were made by the International to advance and they were fired upon by the infantry. There were no apparent breaks in the track. After a further unsuccessful conference between the Japanese train commander and the Kuominchun General the train returned to Chun Liang-cheng and on to Tientsin arriving at 6:30 PM. The orders for the return of the third International train from Peking today have been revoked.

The military situation for this period has been one of great activity. The Kuominchun attack which opened on the morning of the 22nd was at least partially successful. Li's Peitsang line retired about four miles, however, he reorganized and is now holding a line from a point just south of Peitsang village on the river, extending northeast for approximately 2000 yards. Peitsang station has been destroyed. The attack around Li's left flank was partially successful and the Kuominchun line is now reported extending in a general direction north and south through Han Chia-shu west of the old Peiyang Arsenal.

It is not believed that any Kuominchun offensive was attempted to the northwest in the Huan To vicinity. No advance has been reported by the Kuominchun on the Hsin Ho front although they are entrenched about five miles east of Chun Liang-cheng. During the day one regiment of Li's troops were rushed to Peitsang from Chun Liang-cheng and Li's bodyguard regiment in the Native City was also sent forward. About 600 other troops were brought up from Machang and undoubtedly it was this reinforcement that strengthened his lines at Peitsang. No troops have yet arrived from Shantung. It is reported that the Kuominchun are now reforming for another attack within the next 24 hours. Li's position at present is most precarious and without immediate reinforcements he may be expected to collapse entirely today or tomorrow.

Kuominchun airplanes have been dropping propaganda posters over the Native City and vicinity. Conditions in the Native City are very bad. Li's tax collectors during the day and night of the 22nd collected an additional $250.00 from each storekeeper and it is reported the Chinese Chamber of Commerce paid out $500,000. during the day. Even the ricksha coolies were forced to pay a small sum of tax. Li Ching-lin's train is still on the main track with an engine on either end pointing in either direction. The execution squads have been kept very busy during the day and many slightly wounded have been turned back under guard to the front. Li now has a large detachment of military police on duty to handle the above cases.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 61; Dec. 24, 1925.

The following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations, Wednesday, December 23rd:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10;55AM | Tientsin N | Peitsang | MP | 65 | | |
| 1;15 PM | Chun Liang-cheng | West Front | 6th Div Inf. | 516 | 5 | |
| 2;45 PM | " " " | " " | " " " | 365 | 18 | |
| 10;55 AM | Machang | Tientsin C | Inf & Cav | 1090 | 18 | 60 Animals, 2 equipment. Went to West Front. |
| 2;30 PM | Hsing Hsien | TientsinC | Inf & Cav | 629 | | 20 animals, 1 car equipment. Went to West Front. |

At about 10;00 Am on the 23rd, Li's northern line again retreated toward Tientsin to a point a few hundred yards north of Peiyang University. Li's troops retreated rapidly for Tui Hsing-fu, east of the Peking-[illegible], overland through Central Station and in Ho Pei native city they were turned back out the Tientsin-Peking motor road and reinforced the line north of Peiyang. This line was advanced by the evening of the 23rd to a point about 1½ miles north of Peiyang. Every available reinforcement was put into Li's line at this point but the troops generally were not in a fighting mood and were forced into position at the point of a bayonet. The Kuominchun advance on the west is about one mile west of West Station. Apparently Li has abandoned his position in the east and northeast as detachments of troops have been crossing the river south of Chang Kwei-chang and at various points down river from this point. At present there is every indication that the Kuominchun will enter the Native City today.

The Japanese, French and Italian defense lines are out and patrols are being made by the American and British forces.

No information is available of the advance of the Kuominchun force from the Chun Liang-cheng front.

Conditions in the Native City are very bad. All lights were extinguished during the night and heavy police patrols were on duty stopping everyone. All shops were closed. Li kept approximately 800 men around his Yamen during the night. Li's train is at present at the West Station on the Tientsin-Pukow, but is unoccupied and the bridges from the Native City to West Station are all up, the only passage across the river being by boat. Li now has 7 motor trucks filled with executioners with head knives who are rounding up all deserting units and forcing them back to the front. No looting has yet occurred in the Native City.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 62. Dec 25th

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations, Thursday, December 24th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7;40AM | Chun Liang-cheng | Tientsin C | | 334 | 5 | Li Ching-lin troops |
| 7;50AM | " " " | " (marching) | | 160 | | " " " " |
| 8;32AM | " " " | " | | 285 | | " " " " |
| 7;30 PM | Chun Kwei Chung | Tientsin E | | 415 | | Feng Yu-hsing |
| 3;30 PM | Yangtsun | Tientsin C | | 50 | | Cavalry & red-cross. Feng's armored train. |

The military situation developed very rapidly during this period. At about 9:AM on the 24th, the small detachment which Li had left at Pa-I Hsiang-fu after his retreat from this sector on the 22nd, retired in disorder through the Central station. The troops at the station started firing at random and throwing away their clothing and equipment and rushing south into the Native City. A few minutes later the advance guard of the Kuominchun troops arrived at Central Station from the general direction of Pa-I Hsiang-fu and firing became general in Northern Ho Pei. This detachment consisted of about 400 of the 5th Kuominchun Division. An advance was started south on Ta Cheng Lu and most of the column moved out with skirmishers in front. There was little organized opposition to the advance but heavy firing continued during the morning in southern Ho Pei. At about 10:30 AM the main body of the Kuominchun 9th Division arrived at Central station from Pa-I Hsiang-fu. The advance line was now reinforced and pushed forward, small detachments being sent into the Hutungs and side streets. By this time Li's retreating troops from the Peiyang front were entering Ho Pei over the bridge on the Tientsin-Peking motor road in western Ho Pei. Li's resistance stiffened somewhat and although there were several casualties no large number of prisoners were taken and Li's artillery with the main body of his troops from Peiyang came south through Ho Pei, crossed the Yamen bridge and went west over Pei Ma Lu in the Walled City. All during this time much looting was going on in Ho Pei and the section of the city between the Yamen bridge and Pei Ma Lu. The Native Police were powerless in the above sections however, they were heavily reinforced at the intersection of Dung Ma Li and Pei Ma Lu and succeeded in diverting Li's column to the west doubtless preventing general looting in the main Native City. By 2:30 Ho Pei was cleared of Li's troops and the first detachment of two companies of the Kuominchun came across the Yamen bridge into the Native City proper. At this time the city generally was quiet except for a little rifle firing in detached Hutungs but by 3:00 PM contact was gained with Li's retreating forces in the west city and heavy artillery, machine gun and rifle firing commenced. The supply trains of the Kuominchun at Central Station were hurriedly moved north and all combat troops were rushed to the front as it was reported that Li's troops were counter-attacking on the west and had taken the bridges over the river to the west of Ho Pei. This latter proved to be false however and Li's troops continued their retreat in fair order, however, some small detachments which had returned near the Yamen bridge were isolated and killed. By 5 PM on the 24th the entire city was in the hands of the Kuominchun and order had been restored. Li's rout on the Peiyang front had been caused by the Kuominchun advance around his right flank and as his main force of about five thousand was concentrated at Peiyang their only hope was to withdraw to the south through the city and move on down the Tientsin-Pukow tracks which was accomplished. About two thousand retreated during the night east of Tientsin through the Russian concession and crossed the Hai Ho below Tientsin apparently with the intention of joining the retreating column on the Tientsin-Pukow railway. There were no large units of Li's troops captured during the day and his only loss of any consequence was his Quartermaster supplies in Ho Pei. There was no active pursuit.

The Kuominchun armored train arrived in Central station about 3:00 PM on the 24th. It consisted of eight camouflaged cars and was the best armoured train that has been seen used in Chinese warfare. It started south over the Tientsin-Pukow but returned to Tientsin where it remains.

The advance guard of the 9th Division, 1st Kuominchun, arrived at Tientsin East from Chun Liang-cheng at about 2:PM on the 24th and the station was immediately decorated with flags by a reception committee of Chinese to welcome the main body which arrived about 7:30 PM. The advance had encountered no opposition from Li's troops as they had all withdrawn southward and crossed the river. Some units of this Division moved to the village, Ta Shih-ku, south of the Belgian Concession for the night.

During the morning of the 24th, there was an exchange of fire between the retreating troops of Li's army and the international guard at the Chinese Electric Light Plant. This post is under Italian command. No foreign casualties occurred. This is the only incident of actual return of fire by the foreign contingents during this emergency.

The Native City was very quiet and orderly during the night of the 24th although all shops were closed and a general feeling of nervous was apparent. Heavy foreign patrols were on duty within the Concessions throughout the night as there was a rumor of a Kuominchun demonstration in the Concessions in celebration of the arrival of Feng's forces. Nothing developed however. Conditions at present are quiet and no further trouble is anticipated. The contact so far with the Kuominchun authorities has been friendly and some effort is being made to cooperate with the desires of the Foreign Commandants when when these desires have been brought to the attention of the Kuominchun. The troops are orderly and better disciplined than any seen heretofore in Tientsin. The foreign method of shaking hands is noticeable among the Kuominchun and no smoking is permitted by the officers.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 63. December 26th 1925

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations, Friday, December 25th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:30 PM | Peking | Tientsin E | | | | Allied train. |
| 3:30 PM | Chun Liang | Central Sta | 17th Reg. | 280 | 8 | Gen. Tang Chih-tao Staff and bodyguard |
| 12/24/25: | | | | | | |
| 6:30 PM | Peitsang | Tientsin C | | 320 | | Gen. Chang Chih-chiang, staff & bodyguard. |
| 8:00PM | Tientsin C | Peking | | 1200 | 15 | Prisoners |
| 7:45 PM | Peitsang | Tientsin C | | 210 | 4 | Kuominchun Cav. |

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Tientsin and vicinity are now completely occupied by the Kuominchun. Order has been restored in the Native City and many of the shops are opening. The International guard has been withdrawn from Central Station and the Japanese barricades and detachments have been withdrawn from the entrances to their Concessions. There are no troops in evidence in the Walled City section of the Native City although there are several thousand in Ho Pei and in the vicinity of West Station. Li Ching-lin's private train of Blue Express coaches is at West Station, but Li's location is yet unknown.

It will be noted from the avove train report that the Third International train arrived from Peking at 1:30 PM on the 25th. The return journey was made without incident except reduced speed was necessary between Yangtsun and Tientsin due to the poor condition of the track. No other International train has yet been scheduled.

Generals Chang Chih-chiang and Tang Chih-tao, commanding the 5th and 9th Kuominchun Divisions respectively, have arrived in Tientsin and Chang Chih-chiang is in supreme command. These entire Divisions are in Tientsin and vicinity, also units of the 1st Division commanded by General In Chung-lin, although General In is still in Peking.

During this period there have been movements of Kuominchun from the Native City to the west of the Concessions and also to the East of the Concessions. At 1:15 PM the head of the column of the 5th Division, marching from the Native City, arrived at the right flank of the American sector at a point on the dike near Race Course Road but after some difficulty the column was turned out of the front line toward the southeast. A small detachment of cavalry from the same column attepted to come back into the Ex-German Concession from the soughwest, but these were met by American

Patrol and directed across the river. Their destination was Ta Shih-ku, south of the Belgian Concession. Other units of the Kuominchun have been passing back and forth through the Ex-Russian Concession and coming from [illegible] going to the Native City. No organized pursuit of Li Chiang-lin's forces has yet been instituted and from the confusing movements of the Kuominchun around the Concession areas it is impossible to determine just what is the plan, if any. Troops have marched on all sides of the Concessions and back again and although none have yet come within the Concessions proper, large units have passed through the defense lines of the British and French in the Ex-Russian Concession. The American contingent is the only one known so far to have seriously objected to the intrusion of the troops within their lines.

It is reported from the railway authorities that the Peking-Mukden railway has been torn up just north of Shanhaikuan. This is reported to have been done by units of Chang Tso-lin's army which have come around Kuo Sung-lin's forces and are attempting to prevent Kuo's retreat to join Feng's forces in Tientsin. General Kuo is reported to have been betrayed and executed by adherents of Chang Hsueh-liang and now almost his entire force has turned over to the old Fengtien leaders. The above report, other than the destruction of the railway at Shanhaikuan, has not been confirmed. One train of about 500 of Kuo Sung-lin's troops passed through Tongshan on the 24th to join Feng's 9th Division at Hsin Ho but no others have come south. If the above rumor is correct this will again place Chang Tso-lin directly against Feng Yu-hsiang's forces here and the situation becomes something similar to that of 1924, with Feng in command instead of Wu Pei-fu. Feng however now has a hostile Shantung at his rear with Chang Tsung-chang's army intact, also a hostile Yangtze Valley force of undetermined strength under Wu Pei-fu's influence. The Yangtze, while not pro-Chang Tso-lin, would be more favorable to Chang than Feng and the long rumored alliance of Wu and Chang Tso-lin might now develope.

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**Intelligence Bulletin No. 44, December 27, 1925.**

Following is a report of train movements at Tientsin Stations, Saturday, December 26th:

| Time | From | To | Unit | Men | Cars | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11:30AM | Tientsin E | Native City | 1st Div | | | Marching. |
| 2:30PM | Lanchow | Tientsin | | 7 | 1 | 2 Officers and 5 men of Kuo Sung-lin's staff. |
| 5:20 PM | Tongshan | Tientsin C | Inf | 43 | 2 | 5 animals, attached to passenger train No. 8. |
| 12/27/25; | | | | | | |
| 4:30 AM | Native City | Tientsin E | | 506 | | 25 horses, 30 camels marching overland. |

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There has been little development in the military situation during this period. A few new troops have arrived from Peking and a few hundred were sent down the Tientsin-Pukow in the direction of Li's retreating forces. No large units of Li's troops have yet been captured, however, stragglers are being picked up in the Native City and in the villages south of Tientsin. During the 24 hours period about 1000 prisoners were sent toward Peking. It is reported by the Chinese that Li's retreating troops looted 130 villages in the vicinity of Tientsin and that over 30 were completely destroyed and burned.

No further attempts to trespass within the American Defense sector were made by the Kuominchun during the day and it is now believed that if they actually become acquainted with the limist of the sector they will not trespass voluntarily.

More reports are at hand verifying the defeat of Kuo Sung-lin's forces at Hsin Min-fu and his execution by the adherents of Chang Hsueh-liang.

It is reliably reported that the present 1st Kuominchun Administration authorities are packing up this morning for a withdrawal to Peking. This has been caused by the appointment of General Sun Yueh as Tupan of Chihli and as a result, his appointments and occupation forces will all be from the 3rd Kuominchun from Shensi Province. It has not been verified whether or not Sun Yueh will make his headquarters in Paotingfu or Tientsin but his jurisdiction will extend over the entire Province of Chihli and his troops, mostly ex-bandits, will be the force of occupation. There has been much opposition by Chihli people to this appointment but the mandate has been issued by order of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang.

The Native City is very quiet. The Japanese have replaced a small detachment at the entrances to their Concession. The Italian's also have a guard at the Police Bamen Bridge. All shops are open and business appears as good as usual. The Kuominchun troops pay for everthing and no cases of looting by them have been reported.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 65. Dec. 28, 1925.

The military situation is little changed for this period. General Sun Yueh, late Tupan of Shansi and present Tupan of Chihli Province arrived in Tientsin at 8:10 AM on the 27th with a body-guard of 100 troops. The 1st Kuominchun is rapidly withdrawing from the Tientsin area through Tientsin Central Station toward Peking, by train and overland.

The 1st Kuominchun units which have been identified in the Tientsin area include the entire 5th and 9th Divisions, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division under General Meng, the 1st Cavalry Brigade under General Chang Shu-chen, the 1st Chahar Cavalry Brigade under Chiao Chien-tsai and the 7th Mixed Brigade under Ko Chung-chang. The total estimated strength of this force was about 32,000 maximum.

Kuo Sung-lin's absolute defeat in Manchuria is still being verified. This plan as now developed, it is reported, has been in the making for some time and has been accomplished only through strong financila and military backing of Chang Tso-lin by the Japanese. The unprecedented resistance displayed by Li Ching-lin's small force around Tientsin was considered necessary in order to hold up the entire Kuominchun advance and pervent reinforcements being sent to Kuo Sung-lin until Kuo's defeat became an assured fact. It was conceded by the Japanese advisers from the start that Li's forces had no hope of victory against the large number of Kuominchun troops but his determined stand was accomplished by guaranteeing his escape and sufficient financial backing to make it worth while. It is interesting to note that Kuo's defeat occurred about the 23rd and no conspicuous retreat was made on the Peitsang front until the afternoon of that same day, when Li's forces from Yu-I Hsiang-fu came through Central Station. Li is now reported to be in the Japanese Concession, Tientsin and Japanese detachments are still guarding the entrances to their Concession and patrolling the streets.

No units of the 3rd Kuominchun other than Sun Yueh's body guard have arrived in Tientsin although they are expected today. Even Sun's body guard appear to be much inferior to the ordinary 1st Kuominchun troops.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 46. Dec. 29. 1925.

No change has occurred in the military situation. About 900 Shensi troops arrived in the Native City during the day, 200 by rail and 700 overland from Paotingfu. Many units are reported enroute overland from the Peking-Hankow Line. The 1st Kuominchun continues their withdrawal toward Peking to Nan Yuan and Tung Chow. All temporary officials appointed by Chang Chih-chiang have returned to Peking and General Sun Yueh has not yet published any new appointments.

No large Kuominchun units have gone far south, and the column of the 5th Division that passed by the American Sector, going toward Taku on the 25th is now reported on the Tsin Pu Line, near Yang Lin-tsing and moving toward West station. None of the 1st Kuominchun has moved northward toward Tongshan and Shanhaikwan.

The situation in the Native City is very quiet, and the Native Police are in complete control with troops guarding only the military Yamens.

A regular passenger train is being dispatched to Shanhaikuan today, and the railway authorities state that as soon as repairs are completed on the bridge just North of the Wall daily ~~daily~~ trains will be sent to Chin Chow. Two passenger trains are now running each way between Tientsin and Peking.

From all indications a suspension of hostilities may be expected for some months now. Time for reorganization is necessary on all fronts. In Manchuria Kou's forces will be absorbed and reequipped, but it is most difficult to predict whether there will be another attempt made by the Fengtien forces to come south of the Wall. It is not believed that the Japanese ever wanted Chang to move any of his troops out of Manchuria and in view of the recent turn of events in Fengtien, the Japanese now have a stronger hold on Chang than ever before.

The turnover from the 1st Kuominchun to the 3rd Kuominchun in the Tientsin vicinity and the whole of Chihli Province will take some time and what plans may be in the making for further aggressive action are not yet known.

From latest reports Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung is holding his Province with difficulty and he is not in a position to make any advance in any direction. General Yen Hsi-shan, in Shansi is reported to have driven out the units of the 2nd Kuominchun, which invaded his Province from the East and with Sun Yueh moving his Shensi troops to Tientsin, Shansi's western border is safe. Sun Chuan-fang appears to be satisfied with possession of Kiangsu, and no hostile action is expected from this area. The Hupeh troops however, are as anxious as ever to advance into Honan and a break appears more imminent in this section than in any other portion of North China.

Wu Pei-fu, it is reported is most anxious to return to his old station at Loyang and since Sun Yueh's forces, now in Tientsin, are no longer a support for Yueh Wei-tsun, Hsiao Yao-nan under Wu Pei-fu's influence might push north into Honan. It has not yet been announced who will assume command in Shensi Province since Sun Yueh's departure.

Intelligence Bulletin No. 67 December 30th 1925:

The military situation is unchanged. The withdrawal of the 1st Kuominchun continues and approximately 1200 of the 3rd Kuominchun arrived during the day. At present there are about 5000 of the 3rd Kuominchun in Tientsin. The arm bang of the 3rd is red with a white stripe in the center. General Sun Yueh's Headquarters are in Isao Kun's Gardens in Ho Pei. Conditions in the Native City are again normal and no looting or trouble has occurred between the Kuominchun troops and the civilian population. The Chinese merchants however are yet uncertain as to what may be the attitude of the troops of the 3rd Kuominchun as they have had little contact with them so far. Some looting was reported of a small village south of Tientsin by the troops of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division. These troops are Peking soldiers under Lu Chung-lin and are not as well disciplined as Feng's army from the Peking-Suiyuan districts.

The " Hai Chee" loaded with Chang Tso-lin's troops is reported off the port of Chinwangtao but no troops have landed. Some of Kuo's old troops are in Chinwangtao but are reported to be ready to turn over to whoever arrived first. No information is available to the advance of the Kuominchun north to Shanhaikuan.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 68. December 31. 1925:

Approximately 6000 of the 1st Kuominchun left the Tientsin area for Peking and vicinity during the day and about 300 of the 3rd Kuominchun arrived . There are now few troops of either army evident in the Native City. At 7:00 AM today the first train of Kuominchun to go north toward Shanhaikuan left Tientsin East, consisting of 500 Infantry and five Officers. These were 1st Kuominchun troops.

It is reported that the bulk of Li's defeated army of about 6000 is in the vicinity of Machang between Tsing Hai-hsien and Tsing Hsien on the Tientsin-Pukow and that the Commander is in touch with units of Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung. Li Ching-lin from British Consular reports is in Tsinanfu. It is reported in Tientsin that Li left the Japanese Concession by motor over the Tientsin-Paotingfu motor road to Tsing Hai-haien and went aboard train at this point for Tsinanfu.

The 9th Division of the 1st Kuominchun which came overland from Tsing-chow to Tongshan and south to Tientsin now has headquarters in Ho Pei, Native City Tientsin although most of its units have moved back toward Peking. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1st Kuominchun, were identified south of Tientsin on the 30th, having come overland from Langfang to the south of Tientsin and were returning to Tientsin Native City. These troops will doubtless also join the exodus of the 1st Kuominchun.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 69. January 1. 1926:

The military situation is unchanged. Two cars of about 50 men of the 1st Kuominchun went east to Tongshan from Tientsin at 9:55 AM on the 31st. No other troops were moved during the period either in or out of Tientsin. The Native City has a normal appearance.

The railway authorities have started one goods train to Peking from Tientsin and one passenger train will be dispatched daily to Shanhaikuan beginning today. The chief drawback to instituting a regular schedule to both Peking and Shanhaikuan is the shortage of rolling stock. No freight traffic has been established on the Tientsin-Shanhaikuan section.

Bul. No. 69 Cont'd to next page.

Bulletin No. 69, June 1, 1926 Contd.

From Chinese reports it appears that Chang Tso-lin's return to power has not been as successful as heretofore reported. General Kan Chan-erh, the Fengtien General who has been stationed in Jehol, has started another revolt near Mukden and it is claimed he has captured Changta, a district very near the city of Mukden, on the 29th. General Wei Yi-shan has succeeded in assembling the remants of Kuo's forces and is attacking Hsin Min-fu with some successes. No confirmation of the above report has been received but anything seems possible in the present situation. The Japanese reinforcements have been withdrawn from Mukden to Darien and Korea. Many rumors are now being circulated among the Chinese locally regarding Chang's use of the Japanese troops on the firing line before Hsin Min-fu and in the ultimate defeat of Kuo Sung-lin.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 70, January 2nd 1926:

Approximately 1000 of the 3rd Kuominchun arrived in Tientsin during the day. The estimated total of the Third now in Tientsin and vicinity is about 4500. Practically all the units of the 1st Kuominchun have withdrawn. Few Kuominchun troops have gone north toward Shanhaikuan although Feng's armored train left Tientsin East for Shanhaikuan at 10:00 AM today.

No local appointments have yet been made by General Sun Yueh and as he has so far refused all attempts to be interviewed no information as to his anticipated policy is obtainable.

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 71, January 3, 1926:

The military situation in the vicinity of Tientsin is little changed. No new units of the 3rd Kuominchun arrived during the day, although 3 cars of 1st Kuominchun troops arrived at East tation from Shanhaikuan. This was General Li Lieh-chun and staff, who had gone to Shanhaikuan from Feng Yu-hsiang's Headquarters some days ago for conference with General Wei Yi-shan at Shanhaikuan. The 1st Kuominchun 9th Division headquarters under General Tang Chih-tao is now situated at Kaiping and his troops are scattered throughout the entire area from Tientsin to this station. At Changli is the first appearance of units of General Wei Yi-shan of Kuo Sung-lin's old force. General Wei has approximately 8,000 men from Changli to Shanhaikuan, but his troops extend only to Wanchiatun, the first station north of the Wall.

The result of the conference between General Li and Wei was apparently satisfactory and Wei is to be furnished money for his troops and ammunition. There are two Chinese gun boats in Chinwangtao harbor, under Chang Tso-lin's influence, but they have not attempted to land any detachments and it is reported they have only their regular crews aboard. No looting is occurring in this section, and many of the shops are opening in Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao.

The Chinese do not expect any hostilities in this vicinity during the winter. Anti-Japanese feeling is very intense at Shanhaikuan. The railway is reported as practically destroyed for several miles north of Wanchiatun and at various places as far as Chin Chow. Chang Tso-lin's troops are reported at Chienso, two stations north of Shanhaikuan, but are not in a fighting mood unless much money and ammunition are forthcoming from Mukden.

Conditions in the Native City are quiet, although there was a large Student parade held during the afternoon of the 2nd. A Japanese Boycott is now being instigated due to the reported activities of the Japanese in the defeat of Kuo Sung-lin. The Native Police are now only armed with sticks and no opposition has been made to the Student gathering's.

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Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:
Commanding General
U. S. Consul General
U.S.Military Attache, Peking.
Commander, U.S.S. ASHEVILLE
C.O., 15th Infantry
Records, G-2.

Egypt 2
1-1
1926 2657-9-27 MAR 20
77
WAR DEPARTMENT

REPORTS OF MILITARY OBSERVERS

ABOARD

INTERNATIONAL -----TRAINS

November 28th to December 22, 1925.

CIVIL WAR IN NORTH CHINA.

1925

Tsao

10m

REPORT OF OBSERVER ON ALLIED TRAIN

Tientsin East Station

By

Chen Liang-cheng

[redacted]

and

Return

December 22nd 1925

Captain Artoguma, Japanese, Train Commander.

1st Lt., P.E.Gallagher, 15th Infantry, U.S.A.
Detachment Commander.

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TRAIN - TIENTSIN TO SHANHAIKUAN

U. S. Army Detachment:
1st Lieutenant P.E.Gallagher, Commanding.
1 Sergeant
1 Corporal
7 Privates
2 Radio Operators

British Detachment:
Lieutenant D. J. Keating, Commanding
1 Sergeant
8 Privates

French Detachment:
Lieutenant (Unknown) Commanding
1 Sergeant
8 Privates

Italian Detachment:
Lieutenant (Unknown) Commanding
9 Sailors

Japanese Detachment:
Lieutenant (Unknown) Commanding
1 Sergeant
15 Privates

TRAIN:
Pacific type Engine No. 190
1 First Class Coach
1 Buffet Car
1 Second Class Coach
6 Third Class Coaches
1 Baggage Car
1 Combination Baggage & Mail Car
1 Flat Car of Cross-ties
1 Flat Car of Rails
1 Flat Car, empty.
2 Supply Cars.

RADIO EQUIPMENT:
U. S. Army.

REPORT OF OBSERVER - FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TRAIN
December 22nd 1925.

Left Tientsin East Station at 10:45 A.M.

CHUNG KUEI CHENG : Arrived 11:06 A.M. Stopped for one minute. Passed 4 cars of Li Ching-lin's troops headed toward Tientsin. Large supply of flour on platform. About 40 carts at station ready for use.

SECTION HOUSE NO.10:

Stopped at 10:20 A.M. Five minute delay caused by pony having fallen between cross-ties on bridge. It was quickly removed. A few soldiers with six carts crossed the railway track going south at this point.

SECTION HOUSE NO. 8:

Stopped at 11:35 A.M. Four minute delay by Li's troops. A few soldiers supervising digging of trenches about 450 yards north of railway track. One squad on the south side of track, apparently on patrol.

CHUN LIANG-CHENG:

Arrived at 11:48 A.M. Left 11:55 A.M. Trenches being dug on south side of railroad track, parrelling the track and about 450 yards away. Eight machine gun positions, four on each side of the track on west bank of creek, commanding approach to railway bridge. Two artillery positions on south side of track and about 100 yards west of creek. About 300 soldiers in evidence. Train was not molested and no opposition offered to its going forward.

BRIDGE NO. 5:

Train stopped by rifle fire. At 12:26 P.M. train backed toward Chun Liang-cheng for about one mile. Started forward again at 12:41. At 12:47 train was again stopped by rifle fire, train only being hit once, the car occupied by the British detachment having a small piece knocked out of the side. No casualties. At 1:43 P.M. train again started forward slowly but three minutes later were fired upon again. A train of two cars and engine coming from the direction of Hsin Ho was about half mile ahead of Allied train. They seemed to be bring up machine-guns. Allied train was again compelled to move back and stopped

and stopped at 1:50 P.M. Started forward again at 2:17 P.M., moving forward slowly for three minutes when wervere again fired upon. After getting in touch with a Major of Feng's troops at 3:00 P.M. we were informed that it was thought that the Allied train was one of Li's armored trains. The train Commander and the Japanese Vice-consul went forward to Hsin Ho and communicated with the Chinese General by telephone. At 3:55 P.M. the Japanese Vice-consul and the train Commander returned with the information that the Allied train would be allowed twenty minutes to return toward Chun Liang-cheng otherwise the train would again be fired upon. Started back toward Chun Liang-cheng at 4:05 P.M. Arrived at eastern side of Chun Liang-cheng at 4:50, were stopped for one minute and proceeded across bridge to Chun Liang-cheng. Li Ching-lin's troops were taking up their positions evidently fearing that some of Feng's troops would try to follow the Allied train through.
Left Chun Liang-cheng for Tientsin at 5:10 P.M.

CHUNG KUEI CHENG:

Arrived at 5:50 P.M. Stopped to allow empty train to pass headed toward Chun Liang-cheng. Left at 6:01 P.M.

Arrived at TIENTSIN East Station at 6:30 P.M.

Christian Edmundsen,
Sergeant, Co."I", 15th Infantry,
Observer.

File

# REPORT OF CHANNEL OF ALIED MAIL

## Tientsin Rest Station

## To

## Shanhaikwan

## and

## Return

December 15th -19th 1925.

Captain William B. Tuttle, 15th Infantry, Train Commander

Lieutenant John H. McCammon, 15th Inf., Detachment Commander.

[redacted] - ELEMENT TO ACCOMPANY

[redacted] Commander - Captain E.E.Dyche,
[redacted] Infantry.

U.S.Army Detachment:
[redacted] Lieut. Colonel, Commanding.
2 Sergeant
1 Corporal
7 Privates, 1st.
2 Radio Operators
1 Private 1st Class, Med. Detach.

British Detachment:
Lieutenant Peters, Commanding.
1 Corporal
6 Privates

French Detachment:
Lieutenant Bailly, Commanding.
1 Non-commissioned Officer
6 Privates (Sailors)

Italian Detachment:
Lieutenant Giuppa, Commanding.
1 Non-commissioned officer.
6 Privates

Japanese Detachment:
Lieutenant Saito, Commanding.
1 Non-commissioned officer
6 Privates.

TRAIN:

Pacific type Engine No. 190.
1 First Class Coach
1 Buffet Car
1 Mail Class Coach
5 Third Class Coaches
1 Pay Car
1 Baggage Car
1 Combination Baggage and Mail Car
2 Flat Cars - Cross-ties
1 " " - Rails

Radio Equipment furnished by the American Detachment.

[redacted] - [redacted] ALLIED units
[redacted] to [redacted].

Left Yinchuin Rail Station at 1730 P.M., November 12th 1944.

First sign of Chinese troops at 1730 P.M., about 8 miles east of Yinchuin. Passed 20 carts with a detachment of 12 soldiers, along north side of town. Carts empty. Three similar lots passed. Detachment of 12 soldiers guarding supplies on dirt road about 300 yards from railway tracks. Small amount of supplies.

At 1840 P.M. train was stopped at bottom house No. 6 by a detachment of 12 Chinese's 6th Div. 1st troops. Driver had been pistol on train on a hitch. We were allowed to proceed after explanation had been made to the non-commissioned officer in charge. Two hundred yards west of the bottom house, it has constructed a secondary line of trenches, at right angles to the railway tracks extending to the south between 600 and 1000 yards and to the North about 1000 yards. A detachment was still working on the northern end. About 100 men in the working party.

CHUNG LIANG CHUNG:

Arrived 1830 P.M.
Departed 1854 P.M.

Crossed bridge on eastern side of town slowly. About three hundred soldiers in sight. Could not get any definite idea how many troops he has at that point. Machine Gun emplacements command the Railway bridge, with trenches lowering the west bank of the stream for several hundred yards on either side. Emplacements are camouflaged with straw and rude protections against shell fire have been constructed. Distant from the track, there were, what appeared to be artillery positions, however owing to the distance and low visibility was unable to be certain. The troops and the railroad officials will not put out any information at this point.

After leaving Chung Liang Chung and about half a mile up the track train was held up by a squad of Li's troops who got aboard the train with the idea of going forward with the train. However they were forced off without trouble.

HSIN HO:

Did not stop at station, but stopped at Creek just west of town and picked up three French soldiers. No soldiers stationed at Hsin Ho.

TAKOU:

Arrived 1:20 P.M.
Departed 2:00 P.M.

No soldiers of either side at this place, other than a few sentries guarding the rail works on South side of RR tracks. It was reported however that there are quite a few Chihli troops at Taku. While train was at Tangku

Military authorities were notified that there were three trains loads of Japs's troops en route from Shenyang to Antung and that Antung had been occupied by Japs's troops two days before. Three cars of military supplies were added to train, also two service cars, with soldiers. A special train of one private car, 1 armed class car and an engine were in the station at Tsaohe, waiting for the Allied special to clear so that it could return to Changchun. There were several military officers in the car but no one knew exactly who they were. It entered at Tsaohe from the direction of Changchun about 20 minutes before the Allied train. The car was said to be the private car of the P-O Ray president.

HAIMO, Arrived 4h55 P.M. - Left 5h10 P.M.
Put off supplies for Japanese military stationed there. Reported that Peng is sending troops into Fuhsing, about 1000 having already arrived. No Chinese soldiers in sight however.

ERTAI,
Arrived 5h25 P.M. - Left 5h30 P.M.
Guard of 40 men, Peng Yenhsiang 9th Division troops at Station. They were very friendly and communicative. They stated that Peng has 10,000 troops in this sector and that their objective is Changchun. Did not see many troops at Erhtai, however there was one troop train on the siding which had apparently just been unloaded.( 12 cars in train )

TAHSHANG,
Arrived 4h55 P.M. Left 4h59 P.M.
3 cars of about 300 or 400 men at this point, occupying the compounds on each side of tracks. Station guard of about 30 men on platform. All talking about how to Changchun.

HSHKOCHHANG,
Arrived 4h30 P.M. Left 4h36 P.M.
Five or six hundred men here. Chinese officer wanted to search Allied train. Train Commander explained that it could not be permitted and after communicating with their headquarters in Tungshan they permitted train to proceed.

TUNGSHAN,
Arrived 4h55 P.M. Left 5h26 P.M.
Captain Riley reported that there was very little happening. Estimates that there are about 5,000 men in the Kuomintang army in this sector. About 1,000 troops left Tungshan going toward Antai during the day. Three trains. No cars in the yards but it was said by one of the RR authorities that there were cars over hook out of sight. The pay-master of this army expected to Li Ching-lin with the entire pay-roll on the 11th of Dec. Trains started running between Tungshan and Changchun on the 12th. One train each way daily.

HSIPING:

Arrived 5:35 P.M. Stopped for 1 minute only.
About two hundred Manchukuo troops here. One troops train in yard. 15 cars.

WALI:

Arrived 5:50 P.M. Left 5:55 P.M.
No troops in evidence. Too dark to see anything away from station. No one on platform but P-M Dept. soldier, getting paid. First station since leaving Antung that there were no soldiers.

KUNIN:

Arrived 6:12 P.M. Left 6:22 P.M.
Fourth civilian stated there were no troops in the vicinity of Kuyuh.

LOU HSIEN:

Arrived 7:50 P.M. Left 8:05 P.M.
Native Missionary stated that there were 100 of Kao's troops at this station. There were some soldiers on the platform, all wearing the Chang Tso-lin army cap. Also that there are about 200 of the same troops at Lou Chow. These troops are about half infantry and half pioneer troops. The general sentiment in this section seem to be in favor of Feng Yu-hsiang. He stated and that every one is glad that Chang Tso-lin has lost out. It is possible that this is his own personal sentiment and not that of the rest of the population.

Stops made for a moment or two only at each stationto enable the P-M paymaster to pay employees. No more troops in evidence at these stations.

CHANG LI:

Arrived 9:30 P.M. Left 9:35 P.M.
Very little information as there was only one person at station who spoke any English and this man spoke very little. Was able to get the information that there were 200 of Kao's troops at this place, all infantry.

CHINWANGTAO:

Arrived 11:05 P.M. Left 11:20 P.M.
Gen. Kao Sung-ling has about 500 infantry here. Everything quiet. There has been no disorder and no fighting there this month.

SHANHAIKWAN:

Arrived 11:50 P.M.
Passengers detrained.
A Mr. Wanglo, a Peking-Mukden man stationed at Shanhaikwan stated that Kao is in complete control in that section and that it is reported that Chang Tso-lin has fled. This report has never been confirmed but it seems to be the general impression that it is true.
There has been no looting here for some time.

There seems to be no probability that Han will dispatch troops to help Feng at Shanhaikwan although he has allowed three troop trains to go south to Tangshan to help the movement against Li Chung-lin from the North.

REMARKS

Left Shanhaikwan at 6:25 A.M.

CHINWANGTAO:

Arrived 6:10 A.M. Did not stop at Station but stopped in west yard for about five minutes.

HAN TA HSU:

Stopped at American Camp for 20 minutes.

PEITAHO:

Arrived 7:16 A.M. Left 7:18 A.M.
50 soldiers stationed here as station guard.

CHANG LI:

Passed Chang Li at 8:04 A.M. No stop. No sign of aeroplanes. Some trenches and M.G. emplacements (all unoccupied) on the North side of town, probably old ones. Very few soldiers in evidence

LAN HSIEN:

Arrived 8:53 A.M. Left 8:58 A.M. Nothing new here since last night, except that a pontoon bridge has been thrown across the river about half mile east of town by the Japanese and Police. Could not discover its intention unless it is to replace a bridge that may have been destroyed during the operations of last month.

KUYEH:

Arrived 9:45 A.M. Left 9:49 A.M.
Reported by station master that there was one empty troop train ahead of us, going to Tangshan from Chinwangtao to help transport Feng's troops forward.

KAIPING:

Passed this station at 1)45 A.M. Did not stop. Appeared to be quite a few troops scattered around the compounds distant from the station.

TONGSHAN:

Arrived 10:20 A.M. Left 11:00 A.M.
Two empty troop trains in yard (one just having arrived from Chinwangtao) ready to load troops for Lutai. One is to be loaded with artillery which arrived overland during the night. Did not get to see

this artillery as it had been halted back of the cement works and was not visible from the station.

There were approximately 80 cars in this station yard.

Approximately 3000 troops have already been shipped out through Tongshan and more are coming in all the time. The Railway superintendent stated that Fung must have about 10,000 troops in this army, which is designated by a red cloth around the left arm with the figures "IX Div" printed on it. Quite a few camels have also been sent out from Tangshan.

We were informed that the Railway had been cut west of Tsaku.

LUNAI:

Arrived 12 N Left 12:05.

Train of 10 cars loading with IX Division troops, all Infantry. Three cars camels. Said they were going to Peitsang. About 1000 troops. Apparently the scarcity of rolling stock is slowing up the movement of these forces and is causing them to advance short distances in order to keep his force together. The troops appeared to be well equipped, clothed in good health and spirits. Said they were going to take Tientsin.

HANKU:

Arrived 12:15 P.M. Left 12:32 P.M.

Picked up 40 Italian sailors with their equipment, including machine guns, returning to Tientsin.

No Chinese troops in sight at station but Railway employee stated that troops had been marching into Peitsang overland during the morning. He also stated that Gen. Tang has concentrated boats at Peitsang and intends going up the river to Tientsin. He believed that Tang would not try to attack Li's position by railroad owing to the shortage of rolling stock. It is probable that Tang's idea is to attack Chang Liang-Cheng from the front and at the same time attempt to turn Li's right flank from the direction of the river, that is if the report about the boats is true.

TANKU:

Arrived at 1:35 P.M. Left at 2:30 P.M.

Six cars of coal attached to train for Tientsin.

Were definitely advised that bridges Nos. 4 & 5 west of Hsin Ho had been destroyed by troops on the special that was in Tsaku station Sunday afternoon when we were north bound. The Allied train pulled on up to Hsin Ho arriving at 2:45 P.M. Patrol went forward to Bridge No.4 and found bridge almost completely demolished. Impossible to finish Monday. British and American guard established at Bridge No. 4 during the night.

Tuesday, Dec. 15th. Work train left for bridge No.4 at 6:30 A.M. Observer went with train to bridge No.4 and walked on to bridge No. 5, about two miles further. Work train got over No.4 bridge and arrived at No. 5 bridge about 7:30. They immediately started to work. Observer left train at No. 5 bridge and continued toward bridge No.6. Stopped at Section house about two miles west of bridge No. 5 where the watchman stated that No. 6 bridge was in good condition. A body of Li's troops

coming from the direction of Chen Liang Chang along the Railroad track, headed off on to a dirt road at the station house and went toward the river. This road leads over almost to the river and then turns south through the K R A property and goes on to Hsien Ho and Yunho. Did not find out how far this detachment. There were about 250 men in the detachment.

Repairs on bridge No. 4 were completed at 11:45 A.M. and on bridge No. 5 at 2:30 P.M. After bridge No. 5 was completed, the train Commander and the railway officials went on the work train to bridge No. 6. Finding this bridge in good condition they returned to the Allied train, which almost immediately left for Tientsin, leaving Hsin Ho at 3:25 P.M.

At 4:30 P.M. the train was stopped about 400 yards east of Bridge No. 6 by Chinese troops. One rail on each side of track had been removed. Upon learning that it was the Allied Special and communicating with their Commander Saikhan Liang Chang, we were signalled ahead, the repair gave evidence by the train having replaced the rails. Were again stopped one hundred feet from the bridge and shown there some spikes and fish plates had been removed. Were allowed to replace them. From the talk of the members of the patrol who stopped us the first time, it was gathered that Li has artillery placed to command the K R track, as we were not allowed to proceed until we were signalled ahead from the station proper, and while they would not say definitely that there was artillery there, their gestures indicated that if we had tried to proceed without first receiving the necessary clearance signal, we would have been blown up. After replacing the fish plates and the spikes, the train came on across the bridge to Chen Liang Chang, leaving there at 6:08 P.M. Train was again signalled to stop at the same place it was stopped on Sunday, when east bound, but were allowed to proceed immediately.

Arrived at Tientsin East Station at 7:20 P.M., December 15th 1925.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

The trip as a whole, was conducted in an extremely efficient manner. The Railway officials co-operated with the military personnel in every possible way. The train was at all times comfortable, sufficient food was carried, and the spirit throughout, both of the military and the railway personnel, was of the best. The engineering department of the Peking-Mukden conducted the repairs to the Bridges Nos. 4 and 5 in a rapid and efficient manner and reduced the delay of the train from what at first appeared to be a delay of several days to one of twenty-four hours. The co-operation between the different military elements was excellent, reliefs being made promptly and during the stop over at Hsin Ho the vicinity of the train being efficiently patrolled.

Ralph S. Freeman,
Private, Co.H,15th Infantry,
Observer.

Observers Report

of

ALLIED TRAIN Dec. 11th. and 12th.

TIENTSIN EAST STATION

To

BRIDGE No. 27 P.M. R .R.

and return

## Train Complement

Engine No. 196 ; Pacific type
Engine No. 87 ; Suitch

2 First class coaches ... { 1 Buffet, Diner
                          { 1 Parlour Car

1 Second class coach

6 Third class coaches.... { 5 for Troops
                          { 1 for R.R. Cooliee

1 Service coach

2 Gondolas, with repair material.

UNITED STATES,
2 Officers, ( Lieut. Adams commanding Guard and Lieut. Dobbes as
             Liaison for French, Italian and Chinese)
1 Sergeant
2 Corporal
7 Privates

BRITISH,
1 Officer ( Lieut. Peters, Commanding Guard.)
1 Corporal
7 Privates

FRENCH ;
1officer ( Lieut. de Cannes, Navy, Commanding Guard.)
1 Sergeant
1 Corporal
6 Privates

ITALIAN;
1 Officer ( Capt. Biagi, acting also as TRAIN COMMANDANT)
1 Petty Officer
6 Privates

JAPANESE;
1 Officer ( Lieut. Saito, commanding guard. )
1 Sergeant
1 Corporal
6 Privates.

Departed TIENTSIN EAST 5:32 P.M.

Departed TIENTSIN CENTRAL 5:52 P.M.

A Chinese Staff Officer from the Tupan of Chihli Office( whose card is attached to the original of this report) accompanied the train from this point, his assistant,Stenaline Y.P.Young(card also attached) was with the train from Tientsin East station.

Arrived PEI TSANG 4:25 P.M.
Departed PEI TSANG 4:42 P.M.

The entire station staff at this point had deserted leaving no one in charge, there were very few soldiers in evidence, entrenchments however were noted just west of the station, these were said to be the last line of defense for the city of Tientsin.2 men of the B.A.T. were removing with them a stock of tobacco that they had collected from the interior, they claim that their stocks at Pei Tsang the loose on the station platform had not been molested in any way. At a point about a 1000 yards west of the station we had to stop and replace a rail which had been removed. From Pei Tsang the Railroad men were given instructions to proceed to Nan Kou Chuang, while there is no village by this name on the Railroad proper there is a village south offplate Layer's Cabin(here after called cabin #2) number #2, about 1500 yards by this name.

There were two minor stops from Pei Tsang, the cause being field telephone wires, these being on bamboo pole did not clear the stack of the locomotive.

At 6:45 the Allied Train arrived at Cabin #2, here it was halted by troops who would not allow the train to pass beyond this point, piling ties on the track to impede the trains progress. This it developed later was more of a protective measure than one of defiance as the track beyond this cabin for a distance of thirty rail lengths had been removed.

Lieutenant Dessez made arrangements thru Col. Chang of the Tupan's Office to have the Commandant of the front lines pay a visit to the Officers of the Allied Train at the Train. Lieut. Dessez and Myself then paid a visit to the front lines occupied by Li's troops. These lines were only a 100 yards west of Cabin #2. Upon our return it was found that the front line Commander ( Gen. Li Na Ku) had arrived and a conference was immediately called, those present were the Officers of the Allied Train, Li Na Ku and his body guard,and Col. Chang and Mr. Young the latter in capacity of an Interpreter.

General Ma immediately brought the matter to the front that it would be impossible for the train to advance from this point , he and his officers assured the Allied Officers that the trucks had been mined beyond the bridge( No. 37 ) but they would disclose neither the nature or locality of the mines, they also further requested that the bridge itself had been under artillery fire less than fifteen minutes before the arrival of the Allied train, and also that the bridge itself had been mined by them.

Lieut. Dessez arranged for a cessation of fire and asked that we be allowed to repair the bridge and proceed.Gen. Ma agreed not to fire on us if we wished to repair and advance, but said that he would not remove the mines nor advise us where they were at, and that he would again destroy the bridge as soon as the Allied train had advanced over it, leaving the Train in almost territory, his reason was that the Feng Soldiers had advanced against him in the Van of the Other Train and he saw no reason for allowing the same thing to happen again. He was willing he said, to assist the Allied Commanders in any way that he could without impairing the strength of his own position.

The matter of getting to the Other Train at Yang Tsun was reduced to land transportation of some class, motor trucks were mentioned by the General, he said that he would try to get cars from the Tupan and other places, that he would telephone that night and arrange for the cars to be at cabin #2 between 5 and 6 A.M. the following morning.The only stipulation was that the cars must be driven and returned to him by the Allied Commanders, this was all agreed to( The the cars had not arrived when the train left the cabin in the morning at 7:20) It was Lieut. Dessez's intention to get the provisions to the train at Yang Tsun by motor, arrange a safe return thru Feng's lines bring the women and children with us by motor and marching the men down the trucks to the train east of the bridge at cabin #2.General Ma had already agreed to suspend fire on his side during this manoeuver.

After the departure of General Ma the following made their way through Li's lines to the bridge for an examination:Capt. Biagi, Italian, Lieut. de Caunes, French, Lieut. Peters, British and Lieut. Dessez and Adams and Corp. Miller U.S. The there was a cessation of artillery fire during the visit to the bridge the rifle and machine gun fire was not suspended. It was found that this bridge(No. 37) was a five span truss girder and that the west span had been blown about six feet out of line and the stringers, ties and rails demolished, it would have been impossible to repaired the bridge inside of ten hours without the aid of a derrick to either have removed the span for scrapping or to have reset it. Upon our return to the Allied Train Ma again resumed Artillery fire from the six guns that were in position near the Allied Train, this fire was intermittent during the night but in the early morning it was renewed with vigor and supplemented by several new guns that had been moved up during the night, several of the gun positions were within 75 yards of the Allied Train.

During the night it was thought advisable to get information to the Allied Commanders if possible, to this end there was at 12(mid night) a man dispatched by foot, this man understands telegraphy to some extent and tried to get the Hdqt Office of the R.L.Co. at Central Station, also any other office that he could finding that the Telegraph was out of order he tried the staff telephone but could get no answer as it was evident account of no trains being run there were few if any railroad men on the job at any station. This man returned to Cabin 22 about 2 A.M. some time after his return the Train Commandant decided to return to Tientsin for fuel and water for the locomotives. The train was backed up to Pei Tsang where all but one car and the two locomotives were left, these with Lieut. Peters in command and with Corpl. Miller returned to Tientsin where minor reports were to be made. Finding Capt. Phillips I.O. at the phone at Central Station and in communication with Lieut. Dessez at Pei Tsang simplified matters to a great extent.

The two engines and coach proceded to Tientsin East station where refueling and watering was completed and a new engine to replace No. 57 was put on this latter engine had a greater fuel and water capacity than the former switch engine which had become dead during the night. Also an extra car of bridge material and an additional 40 coolies were loaded here for emergency. We then returned to Pei Tsang where some time later Captain Biagi gave orders to return to Tientsin. Explaining that the orders had originated in Tientsin in the Allied Commanders Office.

ADDENDA:

As I ( Corporal Miller) made the trip from cabin 22 to PeiTsang on foot and after midnight I had a very good chance to observe all the different artillery positions and note from flashes the approximate lenght of the lines. Would states that there were about 18 guns on Li's line and that he was operating over a front of about 6000 yards, that these guns were en echelon from a point about 2miles southwest of cabin 22 to the cabin only three guns being north of this point. That Li had no more than three MGs in action and that these were at the extreme south end of his line where fire concentration seemed to be the greatest. The heaviest of this fire was about four A.M. when a general attack seemed to have been made at that point. Early in the morning of the 12th. Li's troops made a sortie to the west, believe that it was successfull as these men did not return.

Feng's Artillery seemed to consist of not more than 10 pieces and seemed to be concentrated on a point about 4000 yards south of the train on the positions that the greater of Li's fire came from during the night. Feng's front was not over 800 yards from Li's at cabin 22, his fire at this point seemed to consist of M.G. and rifle, very little artillery was directed toward the point occupied by Li's troops near cabin 22 during the night this in the morning there were many shells falling in this vicinity, we noted a direct hit on one of the gun positions as we were returning to Pei Tsang. Li's wounded were returned by long carts and the ammunition supply of which there seems to be no lack, was carried forward the same way.

EDWARD D MILLER
C 2

[redacted] Colonel

December 24, 1938.

Subject: Report of military movement, International Train Schedule No. [redacted], December 8, to 24, 1938.

To: The Intelligence Officer, U.S.A.F.C., Shanghai.

Number of trains left, 4th, train, 1938, 1st.
Destination Pukow, Locomotive No. 20, Steam, 150m. int.

Contingents:

Japanese, 2 officers; 1 Korean officer; 11 enlisted men.
British, 1 officer; 0 enlisted male
Russian, 1 officer, 10 enlisted male
Italians, 1 officer 0 enlisted men.
Japanese 1 officer; 10 enlisted men.

The train was made up of 14 cars; 0 coaches; 2 baggage cars and 4 cars of regular material.

The International train left Hsuchowfu Station, Shantung at 10: 00 AM December 8, 1938; and Central station at 10:15 AM. A station guard of about 50 men were observed at Central station.

Arrived at Suitzung at 10:30 AM and departed at 10:40 AM. The Peking Express from Shanhsien was passed at this station and the conductor of this train stated that his train had been turned back by Li Chung-jin's troops and that no trains were being allowed to pass through the lines.

Considerable movements of troops were observed at Suitzung. Trenches were being dug on each side of the track. Barbed wire entanglements were also under construction and machine gun fire could be distinctly heard on the East side of the track. A staff officer of Li's forces stated that there were about 10,000 troops on that front, but this report was believed to be slightly exaggerated. At bridge No. 37, just North of Suitzung the train was again stopped by Li's troops, who stated that the Chinese Nationalist forces under command of General Chang Chih-chung were holding the defensive near Changshowchi, that it was thought dangerous for the Allied trains to attempt to proceed further as most probably we would be fired upon. The train, however, proceed at about 4 miles per hour, passing more of Li's troops on each side of the track. The construction of artillery emplacements were also noted. At 11:30 AM the train reached a point where two rails had been removed from the track, these were replaced and the train proceeded. At section house No. 23, 150 Infantry troops were observed marching South.

Arrived at Yungtsun at 2:40 PM and departed from there at 3:10 PM. At a point two miles north the track had been blown up and after being repaired by the train crew, the train proceeded. At 3:50 PM the engine passed over an 80 inch missing section of the rail which had been blown up. The damaged rail was removed from underneath the train and a new rail put down. No Chinese troops were observed at this point. At 5:30 PM the train reached Bridge No. 31, which had been blown

up and the radio branch 40 km ahead just south of the bridge. This was the most serious obstacle on that route which had caused delays to supply. No change were observed at this point, but the telegraph wires had been cut near the bridge.

At 0400 hr Changchiang was reached, where foreign telegraphs were encountered. The troops there acted to patrol the bridge and their re-ports were passed by the radio commander. The train proceeded at 0445 hr.

At 0455 hr the train was again stopped and searched by Chinese troops. At 0600 hr Lanhi was reached. Due to darkness, no troops could be observed here. Lanhsien was reached at 0615 hr. Three troops patrol were in the railway yards. Passed through Tuchiaoying at 0640 hr. Arrived at Anking at 0715 hr December 10th. Departed at 0730 hr and arrived at Pukiang at 0800 hr December 10. Here the train was met by a detach-ment of the International Settlement and four men from each Japanese guard in Pukiang, under command of an officer from the Nantung, American Battalion.

## [illegible], December 10th.

Left Pukiang at 0830 hr December 10th. At a point 2 miles north of Langhsing, time 1040 hr a troop train was found standing on the main track, and the troops and supplies were being unloaded. Ammunition was removed into carts and immediately dispatched south. These troops consisted of 2 mixed brigades. 20 flatcar carriers were counted. The soldiers individual equipment was complete, including cotton shoes and clothing. The field pieces were clean and properly fabricated to avoid rust. A delay of about 2 hours was made at this point.

At 1430 hr the train arrived at Langhsing. All trucks were full of troop trains, a total 30 in number. Approximately 2, 000 mixed troops were observed marching South from this station. The train departed from Langhsing at 1450 hr and arrived at Chang-Chiang at 1530 hr. One troops train was on the main line at this station and General Chang Chih-Chung, commander of the Chinese forces, and his staff were aboard.

The train arrived at Tungtsun at 1650 hr December 10, and remained there until 7:00 AM December 11, when it proceeded to a point about five miles South of Tungtsun, where it was fired upon by Li Ching-Lin's forces. Sharpnel and shells were being used, but no direct hits were made on the International train. However, sharpnel bursted directly over the engine, bringing one of their guns. The train stopped and after a few minutes - the shelling continuing - the train returned to a point out of range of Li's artillery. Three wounded Asiatics were just in rear of the International train which prevented further retiring.

At 10:05 AM a patrol, consisting of Lieut. Brown, 15th Infantry, and 2 men from each contingent, were sent forward under a French flag to get in contact, if possible, with Li Ching-Lin's forces, to arrange for the safe passage of the train through his lines. This patrol was, at a point South and through Tungtsun Lines, fired upon by 1000 troops, who used machine gunsand rifles. The patrol returned to the train at 1:00 PM with no casualties.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

field messages with. The commissioned officers carried dagger-hilt swords with keys under a transparent cover; field glasses and generally complete equipment. Maps were carried apparently in accordance with orders received from higher commanders. No large units of mounted troops were observed.

Troop's armored trains, about six coaches to each train, were painted in camouflage colors. Two trains were made up there in front and three in rear of the locomotive. The front and rear cars had large guns mounted in turrets.

Transportation observed included companies of carts (Peking Cart) Canals, and some automobiles with general headquarters.

The small carts appeared to have been improvised into carts as they were not uniform; had poor animals and civilian coolie drivers. Canals were in good condition and were led by uniformed men. Automobiles were Dodge, Buick, and a light truck - like Ford speed wagon.

A field searchlight was carried on General Chang Chih-Hsing's train.

[redacted]

The wounded coming in at Tangtsun were well cared for. They had been bandaged and were accompanied by medical personnel. There was a well equipped field hospital train on the siding at Tangtsun.

[redacted] AT TIENTSIN.

Date, Sixty: From the number of wounded that were coming in daily, it appeared that Feng was losing about 2000 men each day. On December 22, it was reported that 800 wounded arrived at Tangsun emergency hospital. Foreign medical aid was aiding the Chinese Surgeons at the Tangsun hospital. Some of the more serious cases were removed to the Peking Union Medical College and to the Peking Central Hospital. The Central Epidemic Prevention Bureau, under the direction of Surgeon General Shiaou C. Fung, and six assistants were reported as being on duty day and night to give injections to prevent lockjaw.

The first aid to the wounded in the battle area and collection and evacuation to the rear shows a marked improvement over anything previously observed.

[redacted]

Left Peking 6 AM December 25, 1925. Arrived Langfang 9 AM. Passed through Lwan 9:30 AM. [redacted] 10:45 AM. Arrived at East Station, Tientsin, at 1:00 PM December 25, 1925.

W.J. JOHNSON,
Warrant Officer, USA.

MARINE DETACHMENT, AMERICAN
LEGATION, PEKING, CHINA.
December 16, 1928.

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL PASSENGERS REQUESTING PERMITS TO TRAVEL ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRAIN:

The attention of all passengers travelling on the International train is invited to the fact that the treaty provisions by virtue of which this train is operated, assumes the absolute neutrality, with respect to the warring Chinese factions, of those foreign nationals in whose interest the train is run.

Aspecial agreement has been entered into between the Diplomatin Body and the two belligerents at present concerned, by which the latter have agreed to facilitate the operation of the train upon the assurance of the former that military information gained in the territory of one, will not be disclosed in the territory of the other, either either deliberately or through carelessness on the part of any of the personnel or passengers travelling on the train.

It is understood therefore that each passenger accepting a permit for passage on this train agrees upon his honor to uphold the guarantees ~~intr by th~~ entered into by his Government, in spirit as well as in letter, and that to this end he will particularly observe the following important instructions:

1. To carry out promptly and cheerfully all instructions or suggestions made by the military officer commanding the train.

2. To make no attempt to observe, but rather to especially avoid observing anything of a military nature during the entire journey. To this end, the blinds of the train may have to be drawn.

3. To use no camera at any time during the journey. To avoid the suggestion of such an act all cameras should be securely stored within the owners baggage.

4. To make no statements whatever within the territory of one faction concerning observations made in the territory of the other. Remember that in the present day, and when dealing with military operations on the scale of those at present in progress, with their attendant political ramifications, all information, however trivial and on whatever subject, may have an important significance to either belligerent.

Such travelers as may be travelling on official duty for their governments, which duties require them to make official reports to their superiors, must do so with the understanding that the information contained is strictly confidential.

Due to the unsettled conditions, the length of time necessary to make the trip is uncertain, and the passengers should therefore be prepared for a trip of several days.

L. McCARTY LITTLE
Colonel, U.S.Marine Corps,
Commandant, and
Senior Commandant, Internation Legation Guards,
Peking China.

S-3

Observers Report

of

ALLIED TRAIN

from

TIENTSIN EAST STATION

to

SHAN HAI KUAN

and

RETURN

Dec. 3d and 4th. 1925 incl.

( Captain Pipe, British; Train Commander)

( Lieutenant Cocksen, Detachment Commander)

## TRAIN COMPLEMENT

Pacific Type Engine No. 191

8 First class coaches

1 Service Coach

3 Freight Vans

## TROOPS

**United States**

1 Officer ( Lieut. Cookson, 15th. Infantry )
1 Sergeant
1 Corporal
7 Privates

**British**

2 Officers ( Captain Pipe , Commandant
Lieutenant Lucas, Detachment Commander)
1 Corporal
8 Privates

**French**

1 Officer ( Lieutenant Richard )
2 Sergeants
1 Corporal
10 Privates

**Italian**

1 Officer ( Lieutenant Caridi )
1 Petty Officer
8 Privates

**Japanese**

1 Officer ( Lieutenant Nagata )
3 N.C.O.s
12 Privates.

Chronological Log

TIENTSIN EAST STATION

Dpt. 9:32 A.M.

CHANG KUEI CHUANG

9:49 A.M. No stop

CHUN LIANG CHUANG

10:02 A.M. No stop

About 150 men drilling witout arms at this station.

HSIN HO

10:20 A.M. No stop

TANG KU

Arr. 10:25 A.M.
Dpt. 10:37 A.M.

PEI TANG

10:53 A.M. Nostop

CHA TING

11:07 A.M. No stop

LU TAI

11:25 A.M. No stop

About 50 men drilling in field north of station.

TIEN CHUANG

11:40 AM. No stop

TANG PANG

11:52 AM. No stop

HSU KO CHUANG

12:05 PM. No stop

TANG SHAN

Arr. 12:19 P.M.
Dpt. 12:43 P.M.
Coal and water for engine at this station.

KAI PING

12:58 P.M. No stop
About 150 Men at drill in field north of station.

WA LI

1:07 P.M. No stop

KU YEH

1:19 P.M. No stop

PEI CHIA TIEN

1:29 P.M. No stop

TO TZU TOU

1:49 P.M. No stop

LAN HSIEN

Arr. 1:58 P.M.
Dpt. 2:08 P.M.
The Japanese troops unloaded some supplies at this station.

CHU KOU CHUANG

1:10 P.M. No stop

SHIH MEN

3:14 P.M. No stop

AN SHAN

Arr. 3:27 P.M.
Dpt. 3:34 P.M.
About one mile west of this station there was a train of 60 Long Carts and 2 Artillery Pieces under Soldier escort east bound.

HOU FENG TAI

2:44 P.M. No stop

CHANG LI

2:54 P.M. No stop

CHANG CHIA CHUANG

3:02 P.M. No stop

LIU SHOU YING

3:14 P.M. No stop

PEI TA HO

Arr. 3:22 P.M.
Dpt. 3:30 P.M.

HAN TA HSU

Arrv 3:43 P.M.
Dpt. 3:45 P.M.

CHIN WANG TAO

3:55 P.M.
4:30 P.M.

There were comparatively few soldiers in evidence at this point but those at this station are billeting themselves in private houses and when they leave they take everything with them. In this manner the town has been thoroughly looted. No shops are open and business is at a standstill, only one open air market was observed running, when formerly there would be from two to threehundred small vendors.

SHAN HAI KUAN
Arrv 5:12 P.M.

The scene of the recent wreck is entirely clear and trains are using both the east and west tracks.

There are about two thousand soldiers at this point the most of them seem to be engaged in commissary or hospital, wagon trains of long carts are frequent from the country sides where it is rumored that the soldiers are collecting for their use the winter grain of the farmers.

Atbain of 70 long carts of artillery ammunition left here at nine P.M. going east, the shells were 3" or 75 MM.

The Intelligence Department of Gen.Kuo has two men in it who are American School Graduates, and these two are given missionary work to do among the farmers to convert them to Kuo, they also act as Liason between Feng and Kuo.
SHENHAN SOO and GILBERT KAO.

Frequent executions arein order here and heads are hung in the gates of the west city, the claim is that these men are looters and thieves, but as there seems to be little to loot it is more than likely that they are political enemies.

Shan Hai Kuan is completely cleaned as to shops, stores, etc., there are no shops open and no street vendors. There was however no open rioting or looting.

[redacted]

SHAN HAI KWAN

Dpt. 9:59 A.M.

On the road and marching east from Chin Wang Tao were 1500 Men, 50 animals with packs, and about a 100 Long carts.

CHIN WANG TAO

Arr. 10:22 A.M.
Dpt. 10:31 A.M.

There are new trenches built at this station all facing toward the east.

NAN TA SHU

10:46 A.M. No stop

Passed a two car train with about 50 soldiers going east.

PEI TA HO

10:55 A.M. No stop

LIU SHOU YING

11:10 A.M. No stop

Near this station and going east there were 50 long carts under soldier escort fording the river.

CHANG CHIA CHUANG

11:20 A.M. No stop

CHANG LI

11:28 A.M.
11:33 A.M.

All the Airplanes formerly at this point have been moved on north.

HOU FENG TAI

11:45 A.M. No stop

Just west of this station there were 80 long carts under soldier escort east bound.

AN SHAN

11:45 A.M. No stop

West of this station there were 14 Long carts under soldier escort east bound.

SHIH MEN

12:09 P.M. No stop

CHU KOU CHUANG

12:15 P.M. No stop

LAN HSIEN

12:22 P.M.
12:29 P.M.

TO TZU TOU

12:40 P.M. No stop

LEI CHUANG

12:49 P.M. No stop

PEI CHIA TIEN

1:00 P.M. No stop

KU YEH

1:08 P.M. No stop

WA LI

1:14 P.M. No stop

KAI PING

1:25 P.M. No stop

TUNG SHAN

1:42
2:20

An east bound passenger train passed us here, there were few soldiers on train others than the train guards.

HSU KO CHUANG

2:34 P.M. No stop

TANG FANG

2:48 P.M.
2:56 P.M.

East bound passenger passed us here, few soldiers noted on train.

TIEN CHUANG

3:09 P.M. No stop

LU TAI

3:23 P.M. No stop

HANG KU

3:38 P.M. No stop

CHA TANG

3:48 P.M. No stop

PEI TANG

3:58 P.M. No stop

TANG KU

4:11 P.M.
4:14 P.M.

A number of soldiers at this station were carring equipment and loading it on barges for Ta Ku where they are to be formed into a new Ying. These men are from Chun Liang Chuang and many are former 1D men. No Officers of rank above a Lieut. were in evidence. Possibly 1000 men were in this district.

HSIN HO

4:22 P.M.
4:37 P.M.

A few men from the 1 D cavalry were trying to get to Tientsin from this point, claiming that they were on leave. This is the first instance of anyone leaving any of the contingents.

CHUN LIANG CHUANG

4:56 P.M. No stop

CHANG KUEI CHUANG

5:11 P.M. No stop

TIENTSIN EAST STATION

5:28 P.M.

G E N E R A L

ALLIED TRAIN

The morale of the Foreign Nationals was excellent, the men were all anxious to do their duty and there was no conflicting of orders.

The train was completely made up of first class cars and were warm and comfortable at all times.

Food was excellent and well cooked, served at regular hours.

The coach assigned to the United States Contingent was well swept and clean when turned over to the Railroad here.

SHAN HAI KUAN

Old residents of this city claim there was never a time in the history of the city that this town was so near cleaned out by the military as now. Looting while not open has been thorough and thievery seems to abound in spite of frequent executions to the marauders.

Gen. Kou is said to have with him north of the wall at present about 120 field pieces. And he claims to have sufficient ammunition tho no one seems to know where his base of supplies are at.

He has established an Intelligence Section and placed two Foreign educated Chinese in charge, Mr. Sherman Soo and Mr. Gilbert Kao. T[illegible] also act as liason to Gen. Feng.

It is rumored here that Feng and Kuo are going to establish schools, build canals and roads, start transit systems and improve the country in general.

At the time the train left it was reported that Gen. Kou had reached TUNG HSIN CHUANG on his march to CHIEN CHOU(or HSIEN)

E.D.Miller
Corporal Hq. 15th.Inf.
Observer G-2

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Infantry, 8 Bde.

8 Pilot Class Canoes [redacted]

8 Skipt Class Canoes
(For Medical Detachments)

1 Service Cgo.

United States Troops
1 Officer (Lt.Smith)
1 Sergeant (Guard Commander)
1 Sergeant
6 Privates
British Troops
1 Officer (Lt.Keating)
1 Sergeant
6 Privates
French Troops
1 Officer (Sgt.Chagnon)
2 Sergeants
6 Privates
Italian Troops
1 Officer (Lt. Storti)
1 Petty Officer
6 Privates
*Japanese Troops
1 Officer (Lt.Kurimoto)
1 Sergeant
6 Privates

*--The Japanese Contingent was requested by the soldiers who were working on communication lines; at all times after leaving Bougie there were no less than 15 Japanese enlisted men aboard.

CONFIDENTIAL
Log
of the TRAIN

[redacted] MAIN
Departed 9:00 AM, Nov.20th,1944.

[redacted] JUNCTION
9:07 AM,20 Stgs.

[redacted] CROSS
9:09 AM, No Stop.

[redacted] NO
10:16 AM, No Stop.

[redacted] NO
Arrived 10:16 AM
Departed 10:35 AM
The delay caused by a coal train coming into the yards. 2 Battalion Native Infantry reported near there; No Artillery or Trench Mortars and only 2 Machine Guns.
4 Japanese Kia. Lieutenant joined train at this station.

[redacted] MAIN
10:38 AM, No Stop.

[redacted] CREA [redacted]
11:05 AM, No Stop.

[redacted] NO 2
11:15 AM, No Stop.
About 80 8th Brigade soldiers on platform at this station. (Fort Collier during WW). About a company were drilling extended order 200 yards northwest of station.

[redacted] CROSS
11:20 AM, No Stop.

[redacted] MAIN
11:46 AM, No Stop

[redacted] NO CROSS
11:55 AM, No Stop

[redacted] GRAD
Arr. [redacted]
Dep. [redacted]
Nothing available regarding Chang Ssu-nan's career could be had at this
by could but also of contemporaries and some were not known.
There was one train taking cash up to Ip ward and about 200 cars
(6 2 1). 60 cabooses and 20 long tanks were already there. 30 cars
of charcoal and stores would run on a cross siding to be hooked on to the
Army trains.
The Special Train carrying the Customs passengers pulled in at
10:40 PM

KAI FENG
10:55 PM, No Stop
Slowed down sufficiently to allow 2 Japanese Lieutenants to board.

WA LI
1:05 PM, No Stop

HU HSI
Arr. 1:12 PM
Dep. 1:14 PM
The Station Master at this point said that the entire system as
far as the Hill was clear for Traffic.

PEI CHIA HSIN
1:22 PM, No Stop.

LIU CHUAN
1:30 PM, No Stop

SO HSU Tun
1:37 PM, No Stop

[redacted]
Arr.1:45 PM
Dep.1:47 PM
9 Japanese boarded here and six got off and reported to Japanese
commander at Station.
The detention of Chang Ying Hsuan, The Tupan (or ex-) of Anhwei
at the west gate of Lanchow was reported by a native Missionary who
witnessed the occurrence.
Inquiry developed the fact that the looting at this point was of
minor consequence.

CHU MA CHIANG
Arr. [redacted] PM
Dep.2:10 PM

[illegible]
[illegible] No Stop
50 lone cars guarded by soldiers on east north of station out eastbound.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Ten soldiers wrecking caboose 89 A out [illegible] headend here. Above work on Fifteen hours.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Ohe, Hut's train reported out of this station at 11:25 AM. Locomotive of 2-8-8-2 Mikedon at this point. Approximately 2000 cars; 1 train of 25 cars; approximately 1200 cars on west track not going east.

A detachment of 25 soldiers stopped the Allied train at Yeh Ostrum signal as soon as they ascertained that the train was an Allied one they signalled us ahead.

There are 10 planes at this point, two of them monoplanes.

The station master reports that there is a constant flow of [illegible] on the highway but does not know the amount of cars on the north. The estimate of 2000 was given us by Mr. Inoue of the Hokuhiei Railway.

[illegible] CHIA CHUANG
[illegible]
[illegible]

LIU SHUI YING
[illegible], No Stop.
A dead engine on north siding at this point; this was the only piece of motive power in this condition noted on the entire trip, a great testament to the conditions prevailing during 1926 when there were many.

[illegible] HO
[illegible]
[illegible]
A train of [illegible] cars (50), soldier convoyed, on east north or station eastbound.

[illegible] HA HSU
Arrv. 6:00 PM
Dep. 6:05 PM

At 6:00 PM the Cantonese Special pulled in behind us and follow-ing this train was the Hong Special we had passed at Changtik. At this Polish the Allied, Cantonese and Hong Specials were transferred to the West Bound Train, on account of the Special of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek the main lines at this Hong Sub Progress was also from this point out of the mud in hedge between Kan Tao Hsu and Chin Hsu. There were approximately 150 long carts under military guard during the river.

CHIN HSIU TAO
Arrv. 6:30 PM
Dep. 6:35 PM

The West yards were entered at 6:40 PM but several short delays caused by the switching of troop trains delayed us.

On trains in the Yards were 25 field pieces and several trains of troops and daily a very careful guard was being kept over all equipment and close examination was impossible. 8 Mixed Locomotives all with steam up and full crews of Japs under Gen Hsu's orders.

A short visit was paid to the Cantonese special by the Japanese consular and the Hong Minister and passengers were vaccinated in prepar-ation for entering Hong Kong Colony.

The number of men's troops at Chin Hsu Tao was that of the ex-pected; orders were obeyed but not with snap and vigour soldiers guard-ing war material seem to be the only ones under to duty.

In reply to President and many of the men think they have a good cause to fight for, the many would venture no remarks at all regarding the present state of affairs. Mr Brown of the Methodist Mission kindly interpreted for us and was able to hold a very useful intelligent conversation with the Chinese; also there were some who knew him personally and seemed willing to tell him anything they could.

SHAN HAI KWAN
Arrv. at West Yards, 9:00 PM
Arrv. at Station, 2:45 AM, Nov.29th.

Our train proceeded with caution from Chin Hsu Tao and stopped at approach of every bridge, a short train was ahead of us and Gen. Hsu's special just ahead of it.

About a mile west of Shan Hai Kwan, the East Yards were closed on account of a wreck; this occurred Monday Night and from reports of Mr. Hunter at this station who is attending some of the casualties there were 20 killed and about 75 injured.

A steel coal dumpcar their side and the frame of a flat across the East Track; the engine has been removed to the Shops at this station for repair.

[illegible] the wards for sick children were tidied and work and [illegible] all [illegible] the night nobody stayed about the Shantikkum [illegible] [illegible] of the Shantik ones were of stone and were quite full of [illegible] [illegible].

I walked up to the station surrounded by Sub-Inspectors and [illegible] from [illegible] of their [illegible] Shantikkum's [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] spit shots of the Shantikkum Master's office and was greeted by [illegible] on which [illegible] [illegible]. At either end of waiting platform [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

We pulled out of Station at [redacted] passed through [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] and arrived at [redacted] at [redacted].

[redacted] A Nip train half moving stores arriving in the north; were 30 field pieces, approximately 1500 men and 200 lorry carts.

The next found three engines blasted by the work of Sabotage, and the damp train of the 7th Div., who are using it for storage there at this very time.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

On entering this station, the train was delayed at the main [redacted] crossing from [redacted] to [redacted] when we moved to the Station.

In the Station yards here to day there are 120 cars (Gondolas and Flats) of troops and vehicle, 20 cars material, 30 cars flour and miscellaneous supplies. There are about 400 lorry carts and 30 Field Pieces here this AM. The Station Platforms are used for detraining and entraining and Tents which are loaded and unloaded by the trains and given cover.

Besides the 7th Div, there is another, whose identity, there was no military decision and refused to tell, about 400 men. I told asking friends with a detachment in a near by park train and he gave me his name as Imai Chuang Chung Tai and wrote the attached.

On the Field north of Station an airplane was being assembled. At 10:45 airplane march over this station.

[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
Very few soldiers in evidence here.

[redacted]
[redacted]

Between this station [redacted] Chung Chin Chuang the following Japanese troops noted. 700 long carts; 2000 Infantry; 27 Field pieces. Here the Train crosses the Wagon road it was necessary to stop for a moment while 2 Artillery pieces were cleared from the rails.

[redacted]
[redacted]
Returns this station and Chang Li overtaking East Bound troops this point.

[redacted] Infantry
[redacted] Pack Mules
[redacted] Machine Guns
[redacted] Trench Mortars

Troop train East Bound Carrying
[redacted] Gunless soldiers
[redacted] Flat cars of Carts
[redacted] Gunless Horses
[redacted] Open Coal car Each.

CHANG LI
Arr. 10:10 PM
Dep. 10:25 PM

About 800 cars and 150 carts in vicinity of this station. The Station Master says he knows there has been constant travel by Highway but does not know the exact nations.

The Detachment of Wire Signal Corps to stay East Bound Trains remains on duty.

Chiliu Tzuchiao East of Station, 1/4 mile.
The 30 Airplanes reported on up trip 1-month here.

HSU PING HAI
12:40, No Stop

Returns this Station and Am Shan the following East Bound troop train was passed:

2 Gunless soldiers
6 Freight cars
4 Flats containing 4 Field Pieces and 2 Autos.

AN SHAN
12:49 PM, No Stop

[redacted]
1:05 PM, No Stop

Returns this Station and Chu Ka Chuang, 12 carts and 30 soldiers East Bound by road.

CHU KO CHUANG
Arr. 1:09 PM
Dep. 1:14 P.

Returns this station and Lanchien 20 carts & about 30 soldiers east bound by road.

LAN HSIEN
Arr. 1:35 PM
Dep. 1:55 PM

At this station there was 2 coaches of troops and 6 Gondolas of flour east bound.

[redacted]
[redacted] No stop

[redacted]
[redacted] No stop
Dormet 16 car troop trains and tanks. 4 cars Dormeg & cars Beds
4 cars Long carrying 2 cars Dropped cars consisting 4 Field Pieces.
10 cars on road each Dormet with small amount of soldiers.

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop.

[redacted]
Arr. [redacted]
Dep. [redacted]
Platform detachment of 20 soldiers were seiler device A A I.

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

Congolon
Arr. [redacted]
Dep. [redacted]
Unit and Water.
The troop movement at this point seems to have become very low.
There has been no large movement during the last 12 hours.

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

[redacted]
[redacted] No Stop

[redacted]
Arr. [redacted]
Dep. [redacted]

[redacted]
Arr. [redacted]
Dep. [redacted]

Hall [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

were short, prompt and snappy to order. At Chin Wang Tao, a marked difference was noticed, some companies would readily obey orders,while a mile past train of Mountain pieces deliberately refused to obey an officer until after the sergeant had been beaten and then only reluctantly.

Looting is mostly always present. In Tsi and Tsingtao but few there looted, and while, verifying this,found that a Japs submit and several other places had been cleaned, there was very little damage done but they had heard Chin Wang Tao had been looted. Ship keepers at the latter station claim there had been no looting.

Nearly all stations had a few soldiers in evidence but only in rare instances were these sentr or on duty.

For the most part, the Chinese were pleasant and even when refusing co-operation or field pieces did not become excited but usually smiled as usual.

Railroads

Ship Keepers, Postal and railroad men are reticent in giving information and resented that some soldier does not hear them when they do. The Asst Ta Sun Station Master said it was because they did not know when to trust.

Foreign Navy

Commdore Alleso of the Italian Cruiser "Libia" gave Lt. Sturich, the Italian Guard Commander, the information that Chang Hsueh-liang and seven country from Chang-li to Chin Wang Tao and sailed for Japan or Dairen. The "Libia" and two Japanese destroyers are lying in Chin Wangtao. Commdore Alleso is senior Naval Officer present.

E. D. Miller,
Corporal, 15th Infantry,
G-2 Observer, Allied Train.